Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A group of former executives from an investment management company were prosecuted after the company collapsed and was placed in receivership. The company, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors, primarily through promissory notes and other investment vehicles, experienced severe financial distress following the default of a major asset. Despite this, the executives continued to solicit investments, representing to investors that their funds would be used to purchase secure receivables and that the company was financially healthy. In reality, most new investor funds were used to pay prior investors and cover operating expenses. The executives were accused of making material misrepresentations and misleading half-truths about the use of investor funds, the security of investments, and the company’s financial health.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. The jury found all three defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and multiple counts of wire fraud; one defendant was also convicted of making a false statement on a loan application. The defendants argued that they were improperly convicted on an omissions theory of fraud and that they were prevented from presenting a complete defense based on disclosures in offering documents and financial statements. They also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the materiality of their statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government’s theory at trial was based on affirmative misrepresentations and misleading half-truths, not mere omissions, and that the jury instructions fairly stated the law. The court found that evidence of what was not disclosed was relevant to materiality, and that disclaimers in offering documents did not render other representations immaterial in a criminal fraud prosecution. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. JESENIK" on Justia Law

Douglas Eligha Taylor was originally convicted in 1995 for robbing four banks in Los Angeles, pleading guilty to multiple counts including armed bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to 147 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. After his release in 2007, Taylor committed another bank robbery in 2008 and was prosecuted in state court, receiving a 17-year sentence. While in state custody, he was involved in a stabbing incident and accumulated multiple rules violations. Upon completing his state sentence in 2023, Taylor was transferred to federal custody, where the United States Probation Office petitioned to revoke his supervised release based on his 2008 conduct. Taylor admitted the allegations, and the district court accepted his admissions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California revoked Taylor’s supervised release and imposed a 60-month prison sentence, which was above the recommended Guidelines range of 18–24 months, followed by 24 months of supervised release. The court explained its decision by referencing Taylor’s repeated violations, the danger posed to the public, his lack of deterrence from prior sanctions, and the risk of recidivism. Taylor appealed, arguing that the district court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain the sentence, improperly considering his prior criminal conduct, and imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not commit plain procedural error, adequately explained its reasons for the above-Guidelines sentence, and properly considered Taylor’s history and risk to the public. The court also found the sentence to be substantively reasonable and rejected Taylor’s arguments for a lower sentence. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. TAYLOR" on Justia Law

Gladys Perez was convicted in Nevada state court of first-degree murder, child neglect, and child abuse, and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. After her conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Nevada and became final in May 2012, Perez filed a state post-conviction habeas petition, which tolled the federal one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Her state petition was denied in December 2013, and Perez repeatedly instructed her court-appointed attorney, Bret Whipple, to file an appeal. Whipple failed to communicate with Perez or file the appeal, and did not provide her with the necessary case documents. After months of unsuccessful attempts to contact Whipple, Perez began preparing a federal habeas petition on her own, facing additional obstacles such as limited access to the prison law library, incomplete case files, and delays in obtaining a required financial certificate from prison officials.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed Perez’s federal habeas petition as untimely, finding that she had not demonstrated the extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence required for equitable tolling under AEDPA. The district court concluded that Perez’s efforts to contact her attorney and prepare her petition were insufficient to excuse her late filing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Perez’s abandonment by her post-conviction counsel constituted an extraordinary circumstance that prevented her timely filing, and that she acted with reasonable diligence both before and after the abandonment. The court also found that delays by prison officials in processing her financial certificate further contributed to her late filing. The panel concluded that Perez qualified for equitable tolling and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of her habeas petition. View "PEREZ V. REUBART" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was shot five times in his apartment parking lot and, in the chaos, dropped his black iPhone and a satchel. His girlfriend took the satchel but left the phone, which was later recovered by police near some shrubs. The police also seized a different (white) iPhone from the defendant at the hospital. The black iPhone remained in police evidence for over two years, until it became relevant in a separate federal drug investigation. The government ultimately used data from the black iPhone, along with other evidence, to charge the defendant with drug trafficking, firearm offenses, and money laundering.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the black iPhone, arguing that he retained a privacy interest in the device and its data, and also sought recusal of the district judge due to her prior service as U.S. Attorney when he was prosecuted for unrelated charges over fifteen years earlier. The district court denied both motions, finding that the defendant had abandoned the black iPhone and thus lacked standing to challenge its search, and that recusal was not warranted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that the defendant had abandoned his privacy interest in the black iPhone, holding that the circumstances—dropping the phone while fleeing after being shot—did not show intent to abandon the device or its data. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the suppression motion because federal agents obtained a warrant and searched the phone within a reasonable period. The court also affirmed the denial of the recusal motion, concluding that a reasonable person would not question the judge’s impartiality under these facts. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. HUNT" on Justia Law

Two individuals, both members of a San Francisco gang known as Mac Block, were involved in a shootout at a funeral reception that resulted in the death of a man named Simmons and injuries to several bystanders. The government alleged that the defendants, after a confrontation with Simmons, retrieved firearms and returned to the scene, where a gunfight ensued. One defendant was accused of aiding and abetting the murder, while the other was alleged to have directly participated in the shooting. Both were charged with murder in aid of racketeering under the VICAR statute and with being felons in possession of firearms.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial. Before trial, the court considered, but ultimately denied, a motion to bifurcate the trial so that the jury would first decide whether the defendants committed murder, and only if so, then consider the racketeering elements. The court concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent, specifically United States v. Barker, precluded such bifurcation. The court also addressed a Batson challenge to the government’s peremptory strike of a Black juror, finding the government’s race-neutral explanation sufficient and not pretextual. The jury convicted both defendants on all counts, and the court denied post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that Barker forecloses bifurcation of the elements of a single VICAR murder charge, reasoning that such bifurcation would impermissibly alter the structure of the offense as defined by Congress. The court also upheld the district court’s rejection of the Batson challenge, finding no clear error in the determination that the government’s strike was not racially motivated. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. MANNING" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in Montana suspected Danielle Williams of drug trafficking and observed her and Brandon Gordon engaging in suspicious activity, including Gordon climbing a fence with a black bag and entering Williams’s vehicle. After a traffic stop, officers found drug paraphernalia and two stolen handguns in the vehicle. Gordon later admitted to daily methamphetamine use and intent to use the stolen items to pay a drug debt. He was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for possessing a stolen firearm. At trial, the jury acquitted him of the stolen firearm charge but convicted him of being a felon in possession. He was sentenced to 87 months in prison.Gordon appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the conviction. He then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, raising several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that his attorney misinformed him about sentencing exposure, failed to challenge the indictment, and did not move to suppress evidence. The district court denied his claims, declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, and dismissed a second-in-time § 2255 motion as an unauthorized successive petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court held that counsel’s alleged sentencing predictions did not constitute ineffective assistance, so no evidentiary hearing was required. The court also held that, although the district court should have considered all ineffective assistance claims related to plea negotiations as a whole, Gordon’s claims failed on the merits. Finally, the court determined that Gordon’s second-in-time § 2255 motion should have been treated as a motion to amend, but denied relief because the only argument raised was foreclosed by binding precedent. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. GORDON" on Justia Law

After being convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, the petitioner was sentenced to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release. While incarcerated, he participated in recidivism reduction programs and earned time credits under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). He continued to accrue these credits while on home confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Upon nearing the end of his custodial sentence, he sought to have his earned time credits applied to reduce both his remaining time in custody and the length of his supervised release. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) applied some credits to end his custody early but refused to apply the remaining credits to reduce his supervised release, arguing that the FSA did not permit such use.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed his habeas corpus petition, agreeing with the government that the FSA time credits could not be used to shorten the term of supervised release. The court found that the credits could only be applied to reduce time in custody, not supervised release, and thus denied the petitioner’s request for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the FSA, as well as relevant canons of statutory construction, demonstrate that Congress intended for earned time credits to be applied toward reducing the length of supervised release, not just custodial time. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded with instructions to grant the petition in part, direct the government to recalculate the petitioner’s earned time credits, and provide the recalculation to his probation officer. The main holding is that, under the FSA, earned time credits may be used to reduce the term of supervised release. View "GONZALEZ V. HERRERA" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple offenses related to sex trafficking, including trafficking minors who were often recruited from foster care or group homes. He exerted control over these victims through violence and threats, collected all proceeds from their prostitution, and provided them with basic necessities in return. The defendant also filmed sexual acts with minor victims and arranged for some to be tattooed with his aliases. A grand jury indicted him on several counts, including conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor, sex trafficking of minors, sex trafficking by force, sexual exploitation of a child, and possession of child pornography. He was found guilty on all counts, but his appeal focused on two counts related to sex trafficking and the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss two counts of the indictment as duplicitous, rejecting his argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 creates two separate crimes—one for sex trafficking by advertising and another for other forms of trafficking—based on different mens rea requirements. The court found that the statute defines a single offense with multiple means of commission. After a jury conviction, the district court sentenced the defendant to life in prison, finding that the sentence was appropriate given the nature of the offenses and the defendant’s history, and adequately addressed his mitigation arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that sex trafficking a minor by advertising is not a separate crime under § 1591, but rather an alternative means of violating the statute, so the indictment was not duplicitous. The court also found no procedural or substantive error in the life sentence imposed. View "USA V. BRADFORD" on Justia Law

Kyle Handley was convicted of two counts of kidnapping for ransom under California Penal Code section 209(a). This statute mandates life imprisonment without parole if the victim suffers death or bodily harm, or is confined in a manner exposing them to a substantial likelihood of death. The information filed against Handley did not specifically allege these circumstances. However, during the trial, Handley consented to jury instructions and a verdict form requiring special findings on these allegations. Following his conviction, the state trial court sentenced him to life without parole.On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected Handley’s claim that the jury’s findings and his sentence should be reversed because he was not formally charged with the special allegations. The court held that the Constitution does not require an information to charge punishment-enhancing facts. Alternatively, it found that Handley received constitutionally sufficient notice of the special allegations through informal amendment of the information during a jury instruction conference at trial.Handley then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. He argued that he lacked adequate notice of the special allegations because they were omitted from the written information. The district court denied the petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Handley’s habeas petition. The panel held that it was not clearly established that the Sixth Amendment requires state charging documents to allege punishment-enhancing facts. Nor was it clearly established that the notice required by the Sixth Amendment must be provided by the written information itself and cannot be provided through informal amendment. The court also found that the state court’s factual findings regarding informal amendment were reasonable. The decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law, and Handley was not entitled to de novo review of his Sixth Amendment claim. View "HANDLEY V. MOORE" on Justia Law