Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of first and second degree robbery, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief. The court concluded that the state court acted contrary to clearly established law when it based its prima facie analysis on the discredited, pre-Johnson v. California standard articulated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Box. In this case, it was appropriate for the district court to determine de novo whether petitioner had raised an inference of racial bias; the court also agreed with the district court that, contrary to the state court’s conclusion, petitioner did raise an inference of discrimination more than sufficient to meet his “minimal” burden at Batson Step One; the fact that a prosecutor peremptorily strikes all or most veniremembers of the defendant’s race – as was the case here – is often sufficient on its own to make a prima facie case at Step One; if a prosecutor testifies both to his general jury selection approach and that he is confident one of these race-neutral preferences was the actual reason for the strike, this is sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy Batson Step Two; this evidence alone will seldom be enough at Step Three to overcome a prima facie case unless the prosecutor has a regular practice of striking veniremembers who possess an objective characteristic that may be clearly defined; and, in this case, petitioner's prima facie case was sufficient to carry his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike of an African American juror was motivated in substantial part by race. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Shirley v. Yates" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to illegal reentry into the United States. The district court increased defendant's base offense level because of a prior aggravated assault conviction in New Jersey. The court concluded that the provision of the New Jersey statute under which defendant was convicted does not qualify as federal generic aggravated assault and therefore is not a “crime of violence." In this case, the New Jersey statute punishes conduct committed with only extreme indifference recklessness and is therefore broader than the general federal offense, and New Jersey’s definition of “attempt” is broader than the federal generic definition. Because this error was not harmless, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Garcia-Jimenez" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court's grant of petitioner's habeas petition. Petitioner argued that California’s post-conviction system of judicial review creates such a long period of delay between sentencing and execution that only an “arbitrary” few prisoners actually are executed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Under Teague v. Lane, federal courts may not consider novel constitutional theories on habeas review. The court concluded that, in this case, petitioner's claim asks the court to apply a novel constitutional rule and therefore, the claim is barred by Teague. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Jones v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The court rejected petitioner's argument that he was denied due process when a prosecution investigation destroyed the defense strategy tape; petitioner's confrontation rights were not violated when the trial court admitted various statements from petitioner's sister; petitioner's confrontation rights were not violated by the introduction at trial of multi-level hearsay testimony; the court rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase; and petitioner's right to an impartial jury was not violated when the trial court failed to dismiss a juror who admitted to hearing a news report that suggested petitioner would hurt his guards if he were given the death penalty. Because the California Supreme Court's decision was reasonable, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Zapien v. Martel" on Justia Law

After the district court conducted two competency hearings, the district court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and referred defendant to a federal medical center for further evaluation. On appeal, defendant challenged the second commitment order, arguing that the second competency hearing violated his constitutional rights. The court held that, as a person whose competence to stand trial was in question, defendant could not legally waive his right to counsel; thus he was entitled to be represented by an attorney at his competency hearing. Therefore, the district court was required to provide defendant with an attorney during his competency proceedings. Applying the meaningful adversarial testing standard, the court concluded that the district court's appointment of amicus counsel satisfied this requirement of the right to counsel. Accordingly, defendant was sufficiently represented by counsel at the competency hearing to overcome his denial of counsel claim. The court further concluded that any potential abuse of discretion in not allowing defendant to speak at a hearing on supplemental briefing was harmless, there are no clear procedural violations under 18 U.S.C. 4241, and there is no reason to reassign this case to a different district court judge. The court affirmed the judgment and remanded. View "United States v. Kowalczyk" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for distribution of child pornography and possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's restitution order. The court agreed that the district court erred when it failed to disaggregate losses caused to the victim due to the crimes perpetrated against her by the original abuser and those caused to her by others who possessed or distributed images of the abuse which were made by the original abuser. Accordingly, the court vacated the restitution order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Galan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's finding of removeability and determination that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The court affirmed the BIA’s finding that petitioner's violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.690(2) and 199.480, possession of a credit card or debit card without the consent of the cardholder, is a categorical CIMT. Further, petitioner is not entitled to a petty offense exception in section 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) because the exception is only available to aliens whose CIMT conviction did not have a maximum possible penalty of imprisonment for a year or more. The court concluded that a conspiracy conviction under Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.480 is a gross misdemeanor potentially punishable by one year imprisonment, and is covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Although petitioner was not sentenced to a year imprisonment, the court deferred to the BIA’s reasonable approach of considering the sentence that could have been imposed, not the actual sentence. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner's reliance on the Fourth Circuit decision in Soliman v. Gonzales is unavailing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Mancilla-Delafuente v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Petitioner's first habeas petition, arguing that the prosecutor excluded an African-American prospective juror on account of her race, was denied by the district court, but this court remanded in light of Cook v. LaMarque, which clarified that a peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause if it is “motivated in substantial part” by race “regardless of whether the strike would have issued if race had played no role.” On remand, the district court found that the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race and granted petitioner habeas relief. On appeal, the state raised several challenges. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that Cook merely clarified the standard of proof for Batson claims, but it did not set forth a new rule for purposes of Teague v. Lane; the California Supreme Court’s decision is not owed deference under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254, because it was contrary to clearly established federal law, and the presumption of correctness afforded to the state trial court’s factual findings is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence; the district court was not required to conduct its own evidentiary hearing, because it did not reject the magistrate judge’s credibility determination; and the district court’s finding that the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race was not clearly erroneous View "Crittenden v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to bank fraud after stealing $264,824.10 from her employer, RBS. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's restitution order. The court concluded that the textual reach of 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4) manifestly covers the entirety of the attorneys’ fees awarded to RBS, not just those incurred leading up to and during the grand jury proceedings; the district court was manifestly aware of the law governing an award of attorneys’ fees; the district court properly concluded that RBS’s taxes and penalties were foreseeable and directly and proximately caused by defendant’s embezzlement, with no break in the chain of causation; the negotiated amount of the IRS’s abatement did not relieve the district court of its responsibility to determine the amount of loss; and in reducing RBS' requested attorneys' fees, the district court did not conclude in making this reduction that the fees incurred were not reasonably necessary, just that the billing rate charged was too high. The court also concluded that there was no statutory error and no violation of due process. The court rejected defendant's remaining argument under Paroline v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Eyraud" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his two-year sentence for violating his supervised release conditions. The court held, consistent with the rule adopted by other circuits, that “a sentence is not final—and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a) does not apply—when there is no formal break in the proceedings from which to logically and reasonably conclude that sentencing had finished. . . .” In this case, the court held that the district court’s initial, twelve-month-and-a-day sentence was not a binding sentence within the meaning of Rule 35. Accordingly, neither 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) nor Rule 35 deprived the district court of jurisdiction to alter defendant's sentence due to his apparently disrespectful conduct during the ongoing sentencing hearing. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Ochoa" on Justia Law