Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The court concluded that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain the conviction under a constructive possession theory. However, the court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. The court stated that it would be a bridge too far to allow a jury to extrapolate from comparison drugs that were not from activity related to the defendant or a conspiracy in which the defendant is involved. A 90% level of purity would more than suffice to support the jury’s quantity determination, if adequately connected to the drugs concerning which defendant had constructive possession. However, the government failed to include evidence connecting that purity level to defendant. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a mistrial was not necessary where an FBI agent mentioned the name of a gang and the district court, among other things, immediately sustained the objection and ordered the jury to disregard it. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Lemus" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, arguing that the district court erred by failing to ensure that his stipulation was knowing and voluntary. Defendant also challenged his sentence, contending that the district court erred in dismissing his court-appointed interpreter contrary to the provisions of the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. 1827(f)(1). In this opinion, the court held that the district court dismissed the interpreter without adhering to the procedures required by the Act where defendant did not validly waive his right to an interpreter. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The court affirmed the conviction in a memorandum disposition. View "United States v. Murguia-Rodriquez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her sentence of 46 months after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. The court concluded that the government did not breach defendant's plea agreement by not objecting when the district court granted only a two-level departure for fast track (rather than the four-level departure in the agreement). The court concluded that no plain error occurred where, unlike the plea agreement in United States v. Camarillo-Tello, defendant's plea agreement does not indicate the government “will recommend” the four-level departure for fast track. Rather, paragraph eight of her plea agreement provides “the parties stipulate and agree that the following guideline calculations are appropriate for the charge for which the defendant is pleading guilty.” That language is sufficiently distinct from the language obligating government action in Camarillo-Tello for the court to conclude no plain error occurred here. Therefore. the court enforced the appellate waiver and dismissed the appeal because the government did not breach defendant's plea agreement. View "United States v. Hernandez-Castro" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enjoin the application of Propositions 89 and 9 as to them. Proposition 89 amended the California Constitution to vest in the Governor constitutional authority to reverse, affirm, or modify grants of parole as to inmates convicted of murder. Proposition 9 amended the California Penal Code to increase the default period of time after which a prisoner would be scheduled for a parole hearing, after the denial of parole. California inmates who were sentenced to life terms with the possibility of parole for murders committed before the passage of the two Propositions contend that applying the Propositions to them creates a significant risk that their periods of incarceration will be longer than they would have been before the passage of the Propositions. The district court found in favor of plaintiffs. The court concluded that Johnson v. Gomez controls where Proposition 89 remains only a transfer of decisionmaking power, which does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, the district court erred in finding that Johnson does not control the outcome of plaintiffs' challenge to Proposition 89 and the court reversed the district court's findings and injunction as to Proposition 89. The court also concluded that the district court committed legal error, among other things, by basing its findings principally on speculation and inference, rather than concrete evidence demonstrating that the petition to advance process failed to afford relief from the classwide risk of lengthened incarceration posed by Proposition 9. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Gilman v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner, on trial for first degree murder of a police officer, challenged the prosecutor’s decision to excuse nine black prospective jurors. Applying the doubly deferential standard for reviewing a Batson v. Kentucky determination, the court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also concluded that the trial court’s decision to preclude petitioner from responding to the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for his strikes was harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. View "Sifuentes v. Brazelton" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of five counts of lewd and lascivious acts by use of force for sexually abusing his stepdaughters and their cousin, appealed the district court's denial of petitioner's request for a Rhines v. Weber stay. In Rhines, the Supreme Court held that a district court has discretion to stay, rather than dismiss, a timely-filed “mixed” petition for habeas corpus relief - that is, a single petition that includes both exhausted and unexhausted claims. The court joined several of its sister circuits in holding that the Rhines stay-and-abeyance procedure is not limited to mixed petitions, and a district court may stay a petition that raises only unexhausted claims. In this case, the district court dismissed the petition on the assumption that it lacked authority to grant petitioner's request for a Rhines stay. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to decide the issue in the first instance. View "Mena v. Long" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for mail fraud, arguing that there was insufficient evidence on Counts 4 and 6 to show that the underlying mailings furthered his fraudulent scheme. Count 4 arises from the notice of disability award that SSA mailed to defendant's girlfriend. The court affirmed as to this count, concluding that the notice of disability award marked the last step before defendant's girlfriend would receive disability benefit payments, the goal of her fraudulent plan with defendant. The mailing was a contemplated, necessary step in its respective scheme. Count 6 pertains to the application summary that SSA mailed to defendant in January 2012. The court reversed as to this count because the underlying mailing was not part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time, and because it did nothing to further the scheme. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Eglash" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for obstructing justice by lying under oath to a grand jury about his role in impeding an investigation. During trial, defendant testified and allegedly lied under oath again. The district judge applied an enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 based on defendant's trial testimony, without expressly finding that the testimony was willfully or materially false. The court agreed with the parties that the district court erred by enhancing the sentence without making the findings necessary to show that defendant's trial testimony was, in fact, perjury. The court rejected defendant's contention that, even if his trial testimony was perjurious, the obstruction enhancement cannot be applied. The court concluded that applying the obstruction enhancement to defendant's false trial testimony does not impermissibly penalize him twice for the same conduct if the district court finds that his trial testimony was false, willful, and material. The court remanded for the district court to make express findings as to the willfulness and materiality of defendant’s trial testimony in light of United States v. Castro-Ponce in order to determine whether the obstruction enhancement applies, and to resentence accordingly. Finally, the court denied defendant's request for reassignment to a different judge on remand. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder and the Pima County Superior court found that Atkins v. Virginia did not preclude his execution, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied special action relief, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review. In 2010, this court remanded this case to the district court for the limited purpose of considering petitioner's Atkins claim and the district court denied the claim in 2012. The court concluded that a presumption of correctness does not apply to the state court's factual determination that petitioner was not intellectually disabled at the time of the offense and trial. The court held that the state court’s factual determination is not entitled to deference because it is not fairly supported by the record. Judge Reinhardt would hold that deference is not due for the additional and independent reason that the Pima County Superior Court rendered its finding that petitioner was not intellectually disabled under a constitutionally impermissible legal standard. Applying de novo review to determine whether petitioner has demonstrated intellectual disability by clear and convincing evidence as required by Arizona law, the court held that he has met this burden where, considering his intellectual functioning test scores and his history of significantly impaired adaptive behavior, as the court must under Atkins and Hall v. Florida, the court found that the record in this case overwhelmingly demonstrates that petitioner satisfied the two substantive prongs of Arizona’s definition of intellectual disability both prior to age eighteen and at the time of the crime. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Smith v. Schriro" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of assaulting and attempted premeditated murder. Defendant served his sentence and is out of prison on parole. The Superior Court concluded in a decision spoken from the bench that trial counsel’s performance had been constitutionally defective by failing to secure medical evidence to support his primary expert’s sleepwalking opinion – a conclusion with which the prosecution agreed. The Superior Court found, however, that counsel’s failure had not been prejudicial. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition. The court reversed, concluding that the Superior Court’s decision was (1) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, and (2) objectively unreasonable in its application of clearly established Federal constitutional law. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Yun Hseng Liao v. Junious" on Justia Law