Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Hugo Rivera-Muniz pleaded guilty to reentering the United States without authorization after having been deported or removed. At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered Rivera-Muniz’s previous conviction for voluntary manslaughter under California Penal Code section 192(a) and concluded that it was an enumerated crime of violence that triggered a 16-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). However, the district court also applied a 7-level downward variance, thus sentencing Rivera-Muniz to twenty-seven months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Rivera-Muniz challenged the 16-level enhancement, arguing that California Penal Code section 192(a) was not categorically a crime of violence. Finding no error in the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Rivera-Muniz" on Justia Law

In 1997, Michael Harris was convicted of eight federal criminal counts related to theft from an employee benefit plan. He was sentenced to 30 months in prison and ordered to pay $646,000 in restitution. He paid only a small fraction of that amount. The government later learned that Harris was a beneficiary of two irrevocable, discretionary trusts established by his parents for his support. In 2015, the government applied for a writ of continuing garnishment for any property distributed to Harris from the trusts. The trustees opposed the application on the ground that Harris had disclaimed his interest in the trusts, with the exception of several checking and investment accounts. The district court granted the writ and ordered the trustees to pay to the United States all current and future amounts distributed to Harris under the trusts. After review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Harris’s interest in the trusts qualified as property under the federal debt collection procedure that applied in this case. “The government is not attempting to compel distributions from the trusts. However, any current or future distributions from the trusts to Harris shall be subject to the continuing writ of garnishment, until the restitution judgment is satisfied.” View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction for sexual exploitation and attempted sex trafficking of a minor. The court concluded that, because the conduct charged in the indictment was substantially different from the conduct described in the jury instructions, the district court constructively amended the indictment. In this case, under the indictment, the government was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either that defendant affirmatively knew of the victim's age, or, alternatively, that he recklessly disregarded her minority status. In contrast, the jury instructions afforded jurors a third option for convicting defendant: namely, they could convict so long as they determined that defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim. Therefore, defendant's conviction for attempted sex trafficking of a minor must be reversed. The court remanded for resentencing on defendant's single remaining conviction. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The court filed an amended opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the denial of habeas relief, and order denying a petition for rehearing en banc. Petitioner, convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that the relevant state court decision, relating to petitioner's claims regarding (1) the use of a leg brace as a security measure during trial; (2) the use of dual juries; (3) juror bias; (4) counsel's performance during the plea process; and (5) counsel's performance during the penalty phase, was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before that court. The court concluded, however, that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a "causal nexus” test, whereby not all mitigating evidence was considered under Lockett v. Ohio, Eddings v. Oklahoma, and their progeny. Consequently, this decision was contrary to established federal law and the court reversed, remanding with instructions to grant the petition with respect to petitioner's sentence. View "Hedlund v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendants Crooked Arm and Shane appealed their sentences for conspiring to kill, transport, offer for sale, and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. 703(a), 707(b), and 18 U.S.C. 371. Crooked Arm and Shane contended that they admitted only to misdemeanor conduct and cannot be sentenced as felons, an argument they cast as an Apprendi claim. The court explained that while Crooked Arm and Shane challenge their sentences in this appeal, the core of their claim actually appears to be a challenge to their felony convictions— the logical predicate of being sentenced as a felon is conviction of a felony. The court has already resolved any challenge to defendants' felony convictions in Crooked Arm I. Because Crooked Arm I disposes of their arguments, Crooked Arm's and Shane's challenges to their felony sentences fail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Crooked Arm" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder, appealed the district court's denial of his motion for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). In Jones v. Wood, the court held that a habeas court must either obtain and review the relevant portions of the record on which the state court based its judgment, or conduct an evidentiary hearing of its own. In this case, the court concluded that the district court failed to obtain and review the relevant portions of the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's claims. Consequently, the district court failed to perform the "independent review" of the basis for the state court's decision that Jones required. The court concluded that the State was clearly wrong in asserting that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) prevents a federal habeas court from reviewing the record and obliges it, instead, to accept the state court's description of facts on faith. Rather, it was clear that in order to provide adequate habeas review as contemplated by AEDPA, the district court was required to review the state court record. Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissal of the petition and remanded with instructions. View "Nasby v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants violated his Second Amendment rights by seizing firearms and ammunition he kept in his home, and then prosecuting him for the unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition. At issue was the constitutionality of California's ten-year ban on possession of firearms after a conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence. The court concluded that, because it has already upheld the more restrictive federal lifetime ban for persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in United States v. Chovan, the court must uphold the California law as well. The court denied plaintiff relief on his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution where the record reflects that his arrest and prosecution were based on probable cause that he possessed the weapons unlawfully. The court concluded that plaintiff's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments claims based on violation of plaintiff's Miranda rights were not cognizable under section 1983. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's official-capacity claims against the Police Department, City Attorney's Office, and the California Bureau of Firearms, concluding that the Bureau is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and his remaining claims against the Police Department failed because he has not sufficiently alleged an underlying constitutional violation or otherwise identified an official policy or custom that was the "moving force" behind a potential constitutional violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fortson v. L.A. City Attorney's Office" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to unlawful reentry following removal and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence, arguing that, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States, the district court erred when it applied the modified categorical approach to determine that his 2014 conviction under California Vehicle Code section 10851(a) constituted an aggravated felony. The court explained that it need not reach that question here because, even assuming Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder remains good law, the conviction fails to satisfy the modified categorical test at stage three, and therefore is not a qualifying predicate offense. In this case, in light of United States v. Vidal, the judicially noticable documents did not satisfy the requirements of the modified categorical approach because the record of conviction did not establish that he was actually convicted of a qualifying aggravated felony theft offense. Accordingly, the court agreed with defendant's alternative argument, vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing. View "United States v. Arriaga-Pinon" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting undocumented immigrants. Over defendant's objection, the district court imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2L1.1(b)(7)(A) for bodily injury because one of the passengers in the trunk of defendant's car sustained injuries. The court took this case en banc to resolve an intra-circuit conflict over the standard of review that applies when the court reviews a district court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of a given case. The court concluded that as a general rule such decisions should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court explained that there is at least one situation in which de novo review is appropriate: determining whether a defendant's prior conviction is for a "crime of violence," as required under some provisions of the Guidelines. Applying de novo review in this case, the court concluded that the district court identified the correct legal standard by applying USSG 2L1.1(b)(7)(A). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the standard for bodily injury had been met. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gasca-Ruiz" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of armed bank robberies and a firearm offense, appealed pro se from the district court's order denying his motion to set aside enforcement of the fine and restitution ordered as part of his criminal judgment. Defendant's judgment was entered during the time when the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. 3613(b), provided that a criminal defendant's liability to pay a fine expired either 20 years after the entry of judgment or upon the death of the defendant. The court agreed with the district court that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MPVRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227, and not the VWPA, applied in this case. The court explained that the MVRA's amendment merely increased the time period over which the government could collect those fines and restitution, and did not affect defendant's substantive rights. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Blackwell, Jr." on Justia Law