Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting undocumented immigrants. Over defendant's objection, the district court imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2L1.1(b)(7)(A) for bodily injury because one of the passengers in the trunk of defendant's car sustained injuries. The court took this case en banc to resolve an intra-circuit conflict over the standard of review that applies when the court reviews a district court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of a given case. The court concluded that as a general rule such decisions should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court explained that there is at least one situation in which de novo review is appropriate: determining whether a defendant's prior conviction is for a "crime of violence," as required under some provisions of the Guidelines. Applying de novo review in this case, the court concluded that the district court identified the correct legal standard by applying USSG 2L1.1(b)(7)(A). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the standard for bodily injury had been met. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gasca-Ruiz" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of armed bank robberies and a firearm offense, appealed pro se from the district court's order denying his motion to set aside enforcement of the fine and restitution ordered as part of his criminal judgment. Defendant's judgment was entered during the time when the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. 3613(b), provided that a criminal defendant's liability to pay a fine expired either 20 years after the entry of judgment or upon the death of the defendant. The court agreed with the district court that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MPVRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227, and not the VWPA, applied in this case. The court explained that the MVRA's amendment merely increased the time period over which the government could collect those fines and restitution, and did not affect defendant's substantive rights. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Blackwell, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, through Attorney Larry Klayman, filed the instant emergency petition asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus to the district court for its failure sua sponte to admit Klayman pro hac vice. The court rejected petitioner's claims of changed circumstances: the district court's refusal to dismiss all charges against petitioner in light of the issuance of a report that may cast doubt on the credibility of one of the government's potential witnesses; a hearing at which defense counsel agreed to strike the district court's husband, Brian Rutledge, who is a deputy district attorney in Clark County, from its potential witness list; and the lack of federal criminal experience of petitioner's current counsel of choice, Bret Whipple. The court held that the district court's failure sua sponte to grant Klayman pro hac vice status as of March 2017 was neither an abuse of discretion nor clear error. The court concluded that the petition and reply contain patently false assertions and lack the most basic of due diligence in fact checking. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for writ of mandamus. View "Bundy v. US District Court for the District of Nevada, Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen and national of Mexico, appealed his conviction of two counts of aggravated identity theft and two counts of attempted illegal reentry. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's third request for new counsel; the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that defendant had breached the terms of his 2008 plea agreement by unlawfully returning to the United States in 2011; the district court did not err by ruling that defendant had breached his plea agreement at a pretrial motions-in-limine hearing; the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to submit the issue of breach to a jury; the district court did not err by allowing the government to reindict defendant on the 2008 charges without first seeking a judicial finding of breach; the district court did not err by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing sua sponte; the district court did not commit errors that cumulatively rendered defendant's trial fundamentally unfair; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a Mexican birth certificate that the government claimed belonged to defendant; the district court did not err by failing to hold a hearing on potential jury bias after defendant made an obscene gesture towards a juror; the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government to elicit testimony about the witnesses' testimony in unrelated prior proceedings; the district court did not plainly err by allowing the government to question defendant about the credibility of a witness; the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to 184 months in prison; and the district court lacked authority to order defendant to use the name "Ramiro Plascencia-Orozco." Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's March 30, 2015 order. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Plascencia-Orozco" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of ten different state criminal charges, appealed the district court's interlocutory orders requiring an Arizona state corrections official to reimburse petitioner for deposition expenses incurred in his pending habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Determining that it had interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, the court concluded that the district court could not order a state to reimburse an indigent habeas petitioner for deposition expenses in a section 2254 habeas proceeding when, as here, the state did not request the deposition. Accordingly, the court reversed the relevant orders and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether petitioner could obtain reimbursement under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. 3006A, from the federal government. View "Copeland v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 600 month sentence and conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, conspiracy to import methamphetamine, and distribution of methamphetamine. The court concluded that district courts should apply the Ninth Circuit's two-step approach when considering a motion to suppress wiretap evidence where the reviewing district court judge must review de novo whether the application for a wiretap contains a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. If the wiretap application meets these requirements of 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(c), then the district court judge should review for abuse of discretion the issuing judge's conclusion that the wiretap was necessary. In this case, the district court judge erred when it applied an abuse of discretion standard to both determinations made by the issuing judge. Based on a de novo review of both affidavits, the court concluded that they adequately explained why the interception of wire communications was necessary to investigate this conspiracy and the target subjects, and that they contained a full and complete statement of facts to establish necessity under section 2518(1)(c). The court also held that the district court's application of 21 U.S.C. 851 to enhance defendant's sentence did not violate his Sixth Amendment rights; the district court failed to comply with section 851(b) and the error was not harmless; and two additional procedural defects warranted remand. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err by applying an upward adjustment under USSG 3B1.1 or in denying a downward adjustment under USSG 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was acquitted of murder, she filed suit against Detective Karen Thompson and Doe Defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Thompson violated her constitutional rights to compulsory process and a fair trial by intimidating and attempting to dissuade a key witness from testifying on behalf of the defense, and that Thompson and Doe Defendants conspired to violate her civil rights by orchestrating criminal charges against the key witness. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff adequately alleged misconduct by Thompson that rises to the level of substantial interference with a defense witness in contravention of the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; plaintiff pleaded a sufficient causal connection between Thompson's misconduct and the witness's unavailability; the fact that plaintiff was eventually acquitted does not render the witness's testimony immaterial, nor does it bar plaintiff's section 1983 action stemming from violations of her rights during the underlying criminal investigation and prosecution; the witness's testimony was material to plaintiff's defense because evidence of third-party culpability would have cast some doubt on the government's evidence at plaintiff's trial; and, likewise, plaintiff sufficiently alleged a plausible claim for civil conspiracy. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Park v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 365 month sentence and conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The court concluded that the government failed to prove a justification for the warrantless stop and subsequent pat down, and thus the search of defendant's person was unlawful; the evidence discovered during the pat down, the glass pipe and $1450 in cash, should have been suppressed; a Fourth Amendment search waiver cannot provide a justification for a search of a probationer where the officers were unaware of the waiver before they undertook the search; the government failed to prove a valid justification for the search of defendant's car and any evidence seized from the car, including methamphetamine in baggies, should have been suppressed; but the search of defendant's home was lawful and the evidence seized was admissible. The court further concluded that the district court's error in denying the motion to suppress the evidence found on defendant's person and car was harmless as to the conspiracy conviction. However, the court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this evidence did not contribute to the jury's verdict on Count 5, and thus the court vacated defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute and remanded. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to give a multiple conspiracies instruction under either an abuse of discretion or a de novo standard of review. Finally, the court concluded that the district court failed to make an express or explicit ruling, as required under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, to resolve the disputed issues and thus the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Job" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to receipt of child pornography and then appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home computers pursuant to a search warrant. The district court concluded that the investigating agent did not deliberately or recklessly mislead the magistrate judge by omitting material information from the warrant application. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in finding that the agent did not act with at least reckless disregard for the truth because he omitted facts required to prevent technically true statements in the affidavit from being misleading, and had the omitted information been included, the application would not have supported probable cause. Accordingly, the court reversed, vacated, and remanded. View "United States v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for being a removed alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court concluded that the district court's failure to consult defendant's counsel before responding to a jury note, regarding defendant's removal date, violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 and the Sixth Amendment. The court concluded that the error was constitutionally harmful because much of the government's documentary evidence concerning defendant's prior removal contained demonstrable errors, and because defense counsel, had she been consulted, would have specifically requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the government was required to prove the removal date beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence and strike the special finding. On remand, the court explained that the government may elect to retry the removal date issue before a sentencing jury, or it may request that the district court resentence defendant under the two-year sentencing provision in section 1326(a). Upon remand, the court instructed that the case shall be reassigned to a different district court judge. View "United States v. Bladimir" on Justia Law