Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a federal prisoner, seeks bail pending a decision by the district court on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Defendant contends that he should be released on bail because if he prevails on his habeas petition, he will likely receive a reduced sentence of only 71 months, a period of confinement he has already served. In the habeas petition, defendant contends that his sentence is unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States because his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was enhanced under the similar residual clause of the Guidelines’ career-offender provision. The court explained that its precedent holds that a district court’s order denying bail pending resolution of a habeas petition is not a final decision subject to review under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and is not otherwise appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Nor is the order subject to interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) because a bail determination cannot materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Therefore, the court construed this appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s refusal to grant defendant's motion for bail. In this case, the district court did not commit clear error in denying the request for bail where defendant has failed to show either a high probability of success on the merits of his habeas petition or special circumstances that would warrant his release on bail. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "United States v. McCandless" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, she was sentenced to a 172 months in prison. The United States Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered the sentencing range for defendant's crime and she moved to reduce her sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2) permits such reductions when the Commission has lowered the applicable Guidelines range after sentencing. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. When granting a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2), a court cannot reduce the sentence to a term “that is less than the minimum of the amended [G]uideline[s] range.” There is an exception to this rule for a defendant who originally received a below-Guidelines sentence as the result of “a government motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities.” The court held that the government's conduct in this case did not amount to a motion and the commentary to Guidelines 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) buttresses this conclusion. The court also rejected defendant's arguments regarding the canon of constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Finazzo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition after his earlier California conviction for the same conduct. At issue is whether the district court erred by denying his motion to compel information he contends will support a motion to dismiss the federal indictment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that defendant failed to either make the requisite showing of materiality under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 or adequately challenge the government’s representation that it does not have any Brady material. In this case, defendant's proffer is insufficient to compel the government to provide the information he seeks and thus the district court did not err in denying his request for that information. View "United States v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of, inter alia, first-degree murder and sentenced to death, brought a federal habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The district court granted his habeas petition as to the penalty phase and denied it as to his conviction. The court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254. Following remand and further proceedings, the district court denied petitioner's remaining claims. Petitioner presents two IAC claims in this appeal. The court concluded that, whether or not these claims have merit, they are foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Visciotti IV, so the court may not grant habeas relief. Petitioner also contends that the trial judge’s closure of the courtroom for six-and-a-half days during the death qualification portion of voir dire violated this Sixth Amendment right. The court could not conclude that counsel’s failure to object to the closure of the death qualification voir dire constituted deficient performance. Therefore, petitioner failed to demonstrate cause to excuse his default of the public trial claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Visciotti v. Martel" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d), for continuing crimes that, according to the government, spanned defendant’s eighteenth birthday. Defendant argues that the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031, prohibits consideration of his pre-majority conduct as proof of the substantive crimes. The district court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant only if it found that defendant continued his participation after turning 18, and the jury’s special verdict form makes clear that the jury found that defendant, in fact, continued his participation after turning 18. The court held that the district court’s instruction, which comported with the law of most circuits that have addressed this issue, was not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Camez" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native of China, was convicted of visa fraud, making a false statement, and conspiracy to defraud the United States. On appeal, defendant argues that she has been deprived of her constitutional right to an independent federal judiciary because the Northern Mariana Islands District Court (NMI District Court) is not properly established under the Constitution. The court concluded that the NMI District Court was established by Congress pursuant to its authority under Article IV of the Constitution; Congress clearly intended that the NMI District Court have jurisdiction over criminal cases; the language of 48 U.S.C. 1821 and 1822 clearly shows that Congress intentionally created the NMI District Court and gave it jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions; Congress did so based on the authority conferred on it by Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution; and defendant's challenge to the NMI District Court’s authority fails completely in light of Supreme Court precedent that has rejected challenges similar to hers. The court rejected defendant's remaining challenges and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Xiaoying Tang Dowai" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to aiding and abetting the maintenance of a drug-involved premise and was sentenced to three years of probation. As a condition of probation, the district court required that defendant refrain from unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to periodic drug testing. Congress later enacted an omnibus appropriations bill that included a rider regarding using certain funds to prosecute individuals for engaging in conduct permitted by state medical marijuana laws. Defendant moved the district court to modify his conditions of probation on the ground that the appropriations rider required that he be permitted to use marijuana for medical purposes in compliance with California’s Compassionate Use Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code 11362.5, during his probationary term. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the congressional appropriations rider at issue here does not impact the ability of a federal district court to restrict the use of medical marijuana as a condition of probation. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to modify the conditions of defendant's probation to allow him to possess and use marijuana for medical purposes in violation of federal law, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Nixon" on Justia Law

Defendants Kaplan and Strycharske were convicted of charges related to their quest to manufacture homemade hash oil and the resulting fire that severely injured six victims and killed one victim due to complications arising out of her injuries. On appeal, defendants challenged their 36-month sentence and final judgment of restitution in the amount of $2,771,929 on the ground that the district court erred by calculating the restitution award using replacement value instead of fair market value. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that fair market value generally provides the best measure to ensure restitution in the “full amount” of the victim’s loss, but that “replacement value” is an appropriate measure of destroyed property under 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(1)(B) where the fair market value is either difficult to determine or would otherwise be an inadequate or inferior measure of the value necessary to make the victim whole. In this case, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in using replacement value to calculate the value of destroyed personal belongings like clothes, furniture, and home appliances. The court rejected Strycharske's contentions that the district court made clearly erroneous findings of fact when it stated the apartment contained 64 cans of butane and that an open flame was involved; that the district court made a highly inflammatory analogy that prejudiced his sentencing; and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of wire fraud and mail fraud. On appeal, defendant challenged the restitution order and a forfeiture money judgment, both in the amount of $2,232,894. The court concluded that, as a preliminary matter, the circumstances surrounding the signing and entry of the plea agreement support the conclusion that defendant entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. The court also concluded that the plea agreement shows that it provided sufficient information from which defendant could have derived an accurate estimate of the amount of restitution for which he was liable; the plain language of the plea agreement clearly states the minimum amounts of restitution that defendant would have to pay rather than the maximum agreed-upon restitution amount, and the district court’s imposition of a larger amount of restitution was not in conflict with the plea agreement; the award of restitution is not an illegal sentence in this case and the district court did not err in ordering restitution for all losses caused by the schemes to defraud, and the order was not illegal; and the court rejected defendant's arguments as to the forfeiture order and concluded that it did not constitute an illegal sentence. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Lo" on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss evidence of the crack cocaine in his pockets and the firearm in his vehicle. The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, the officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain defendant and the district court erred in concluding otherwise; the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant and performed a valid search incident to arrest of defendant's person - which lawfully extended to the insides of defendant's pockets - after apprehending defendant for obstruction under Nevada Revised Statute 171.123; the court rejected defendant's contention that the government waived its argument that the officers had probable cause to arrest him for violating the Nevada statute; the government, having advanced its probable cause theory before the district court, is able to make a more precise argument on appeal as to why the officers had probable cause; and, in this case, the officers had probable cause to believe that evidence of contraband would be found in defendant's vehicle. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law