Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At both his first trial and his subsequent re-trial, defendant testified that before being stopped at a checkpoint, he had given a ride to three teenagers he did not know as a favor to his cousin’s husband, Christian Rios Campos. Rios was a known drug smuggler who recruited juveniles, and defendant's primary defense was that the teenagers had planted the drugs in the car without his knowledge. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the district court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial motion for discovery relating to the constitutionality of the San Clemente checkpoint, and the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for discovery on Rios’s drug smuggling operation. The court agreed with defendant that the district court abused its discretion in denying discovery that could have revealed an unconstitutional seizure and led to the suppression of the evidence that illicit drugs were found in defendant's car. In this case, whether the primary purpose of the checkpoint has evolved from controlling immigration to detecting“ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” is a question that is subject to discovery under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E). Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on this issue. The court also reversed the district court’s denial of discovery of the government’s investigation into Rios’s drug smuggling operation. After reviewing documents submitted by the government, the court disagreed both with the district court’s characterization of the documents and with its application of the law. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of defendant's discovery motion, vacated the conviction, and remanded with instructions to grant the motion. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress; rejected defendant's challenge to a jury instruction; and concluded that defendant's knowledge of the type and quantity of the drugs found in his car is not an element under 21 U.S.C. 841. View "United States v. Soto-Zuniga" on Justia Law

Defendant, a urologist, appeals his felony conviction for conspiracy to commit adulteration in violation of 21 U.S.C. 331(k) with the intent to defraud or mislead. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his reuse of single-use plastic needle guides during prostate biopsy exams. The court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that a physician's use of a consumable, single-use device on a paying patient satisfies the "held for sale" element under section 331(k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 331(k); in this case, defendant's use of the guides in the course of treating his urology patients constituted a "sale" under section 331(k); and thus the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction that defendant conspired to commit adulteration in violation of section 331(k) and to support the special finding that he intended to defraud his patients, the public, the FDA, and the Medical Board; the district court properly rejected defendant's proposed jury instructions because his proposed “theory of the case” instructions merely duplicated what the jury was already told, and there was no plain error in the district court’s refusal to give the “practice of medicine” instruction; the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment where it contained the elements of defendant's fraud in adequate detail and any error in omitting the materiality element was harmless; and defendant waived challenges to the jury instructions and special verdict form as they relate to the felony conviction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Federal agents, acting pursuant to the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-22, secured a wiretap order for a San Diego phone number based on evidence that Ignacio Escamilla Estrada (Escamilla) was using the number in a drug smuggling and distribution conspiracy. At some point during a seven-day period, the agents realized that Escamilla was not using the phone. Agents continued listening, however, believing at least initially that the people speaking on the phone might have been part of the Escamilla conspiracy. Appellant Michael Carey was eventually identified as a speaker in some of the phone calls, and he was then charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court denied Carey's motion to suppress. The court saw no reason to depart from principles requiring cessation of a wiretap once the government knows or reasonably should know that the person speaking on the tapped line is not involved in the target conspiracy. Once the officers know or should know they are listening to conversations outside the scope of the wiretap order, they must discontinue monitoring the wiretap until they secure a new wiretap order, if possible. Applying this rule, the court noted that Carey does not challenge the validity of the wiretap order as to Escamilla, so the agents were justified in initially listening to the conversations at issue. But because the order did not authorize agents to listen to Carey or his associates, the government may only use evidence obtained in accordance with the “plain hearing” doctrine discussed above. The record does not indicate what evidence was obtained before the agents knew or should have known that they were listening to calls outside of the Escamilla conspiracy. The court vacated and remanded to allow the parties to present more evidence on remand to determine whether any evidence should be suppressed under the proper legal standard. View "United States v. Carey" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct in 1982. In this appeal, petitioner challenges the district court's denial of habeas relief, contending that an Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision that Arizona’s modern sex offender registration statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3821, is not an ex post facto law is both contrary to and involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court concluded that the state court’s decision in the present case is neither contrary to, nor does it unreasonably apply, the relevant Supreme Court precedent, Smith v. Doe I. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Clark v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transportation of aliens in the United States illegally in exchange for the government’s promise to recommend a custodial term on the low end of the sentencing guideline range and a special assessment fee of $100.00. On appeal, defendant argues, among other things, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Paroline v. United States, established that restitution is a form of punishment and thus cannot be imposed as a condition of supervised release. The court concluded that restitution is not clearly a form of punishment and can be imposed as a condition of supervised release. Because Paroline did not establish that restitution is a punishment, the court concluded that defendant also cannot succeed on his argument that the district court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey by imposing restitution based on facts not found by a jury. In this case, the causal nexus between the crime of transporting aliens and the resulting damage to the car in which the aliens were being transported “is not too attenuated,” and restitution is appropriate. The court also concluded that the government did not violate the plea agreement and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder with a special circumstance for committing the murder during the commission of a kidnapping, appealed the denial of his habeas petition. Based on an erroneous jury instruction regarding the element of asportation, the jury also found true the special circumstance that petitioner committed the murder during the commission of a kidnapping. Applying Chapman v. California, the state court found that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under state law. The court concluded that the state court’s harmless-error determination was not an objectively unreasonable application of Chapman where the error did not prejudice petitioner. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Rademaker v. Paramo" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty in two separate federal drug distribution cases, the district court, in a consolidated sentencing proceeding, imposed the mandatory minimum sentence for each plea, and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. Defendant subsequently moved for modification of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the consecutive nature of the sentences is not modifiable according to section 3582(c)(2) because it was not “based on” the Guideline range, notwithstanding the fact that it might have been if the district court had chosen to impose a different sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion. View "United States v. Aguilar-Canche" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of second degree murder, appealed the denial of habeas relief. In Tarango v. McDaniel, the court stated that Mattox v. United States “compels a criminal trial court to consider the prejudicial effect of any external contact that has a ‘tendency’ to influence the verdict.” The court held further that a tendency to influence the verdict exists per se and triggers a presumption of prejudice whenever there is “unauthorized external contact between a juror and a government agent, whose official position ‘beyond question carries great weight with a jury.’” Because the court is bound by Tarango, the court assumed that petitioner was entitled to a presumption of prejudice under clearly established federal law by a juror's alleged misconduct. Even assuming a presumption of prejudice applies in petitioner's case, however, the court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s analysis did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law by concluding the government had rebutted the presumption. The court also concluded that, because the Court of Appeal did not act contrary to or unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when analyzing prejudice, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground; the court rejected petitioner's argument that the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it concluded that the state trial court was within its discretion in refusing petitioner's request for an additional evidentiary hearing to investigate his juror misconduct claim; and petitioner is not entitled to relief where the trial court did not unreasonably deny his request for a third continuance where the trial judge had several reasons for denying the motion that were neither unreasonable or arbitrary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Godoy v. Spearman" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her convictions for money laundering, arguing that the prosecutor’s errors before the grand jury constitute structural error, requiring reversal. Defendant also argues that the government’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence about a hostile defense witness mandates a new trial. The court held that where the intentional misconduct by the prosecution goes to a witness’s credibility, it is not structural error. While the court shared concerns that its holding could encourage prosecutorial misconduct, United States v. Mechanik makes clear that something other than dismissal - such as a state bar inquiry or an investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility - is the proper recourse under these facts. The court also concluded that the prosecution's actions at trial - asking the district court ex parte to decide in camera whether the witness's informant activity need be disclosed - were not improper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harmon" on Justia Law

In these ten consolidated cases, appellants moved to dismiss their indictments for infractions of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., or to enjoin their prosecutions on the grounds that the DOJ is prohibited from spending funds to prosecute them. At issue is whether criminal defendants may avoid prosecution for various federal marijuana offenses on the basis of a congressional appropriations rider that prohibits the DOJ from spending funds to prevent states’ implementation of their own medical marijuana laws. See the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 542, 129 Stat. 2242, 2332-33. The court concluded that is has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) to consider the interlocutory appeals from these direct denials of requests for injunctions. The court also concluded that appellants have standing to invoke separation-of-powers provisions of the Constitution to challenge their criminal prosecutions. The court concluded that section 542 prohibits the federal government only from preventing the implementation of those specific rules of state law that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana. The DOJ does not prevent the implementation of rules authorizing conduct when it prosecutes individuals who engage in conduct unauthorized under state medical marijuana laws. Individuals who do not strictly comply with all state-law conditions regarding the use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana have engaged in conduct that is unauthorized, and prosecuting such individuals does not violate section 542. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for further consideration. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law