Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with five counts of wire fraud stemming from his involvement in a broad scheme to defraud, spanning six years, several states, and numerous alleged victims. Each of the five counts pertains to a particular wire transfer in which a defrauded investor wired money to defendant; the five charged transactions involve a total of three investors; and all involve the scheme as perpetrated in Montana. The government intended to offer evidence of investor victims not specifically named in the indictment, additional uses of the wires and aspects of the scheme carried out in states other than Montana (“uncharged transactions”).The district court granted defendant's motion in limine to exclude the evidence in part. The government appealed and the district court stayed proceedings pending disposition of this interlocutory appeal. The court held that it has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3731. The court also held that the evidence of uncharged transactions is not evidence of “other” crimes or acts under Rule 404(b), because it is evidence of part of the crime charged in the indictment – the overall scheme to defraud. The court explained that, even if the uncharged transactions at issue were not part of the crime charged, they would not be subject to exclusion under Rule 404(b) because they are “part of the same transaction” as the charged transactions. The inextricably intertwined doctrine, therefore, affords a second basis for concluding the evidence should not be treated as “other” crimes or “other” acts evidence under Rule 404(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "United States v. Loftis" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. 1028A, for knowingly possessing and using the name, birth date, and social security number of another person when he applied to renew a Nevada driver’s license and when he submitted a Form I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification form to his employer. The court addressed an issue of first impression and held that evidence of a defendant’s repeated submission of false identifying information as part of successful applications to a government agency is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that the defendant knew that the information belonged to a real person. Therefore, defendant's convictions were based upon sufficient evidence. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to a substantively reasonable sentence of 78-months in prison. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. After the district court made it clear that the base offense level for defendant's crime would be 34, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, based on his attorney’s erroneous advice that his base offense level would be 14. The district court denied defendant's motion, and sentenced him to 235 months in prison. The court held that common sense, the plain language of the guidelines, and the Sentencing Commission’s commentary, all show that U.S.S.G. 2G1.1(a)(1) only applies to defendants who are subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. 1591(b)(1). In this case, defendant was not subject to 18 U.S.C. 1591(b)(1)’s mandatory minimum and thus the district court erred in applying section 2G1.1(a)(1) to him. Because the error was not harmless, the court reversed the district court's base offense level determination, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Wei Lin" on Justia Law

Defendant, a federal prisoner, seeks bail pending a decision by the district court on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Defendant contends that he should be released on bail because if he prevails on his habeas petition, he will likely receive a reduced sentence of only 71 months, a period of confinement he has already served. In the habeas petition, defendant contends that his sentence is unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States because his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was enhanced under the similar residual clause of the Guidelines’ career-offender provision. The court explained that its precedent holds that a district court’s order denying bail pending resolution of a habeas petition is not a final decision subject to review under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and is not otherwise appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Nor is the order subject to interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) because a bail determination cannot materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Therefore, the court construed this appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s refusal to grant defendant's motion for bail. In this case, the district court did not commit clear error in denying the request for bail where defendant has failed to show either a high probability of success on the merits of his habeas petition or special circumstances that would warrant his release on bail. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "United States v. McCandless" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, she was sentenced to a 172 months in prison. The United States Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered the sentencing range for defendant's crime and she moved to reduce her sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2) permits such reductions when the Commission has lowered the applicable Guidelines range after sentencing. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. When granting a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2), a court cannot reduce the sentence to a term “that is less than the minimum of the amended [G]uideline[s] range.” There is an exception to this rule for a defendant who originally received a below-Guidelines sentence as the result of “a government motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities.” The court held that the government's conduct in this case did not amount to a motion and the commentary to Guidelines 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) buttresses this conclusion. The court also rejected defendant's arguments regarding the canon of constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Finazzo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition after his earlier California conviction for the same conduct. At issue is whether the district court erred by denying his motion to compel information he contends will support a motion to dismiss the federal indictment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that defendant failed to either make the requisite showing of materiality under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 or adequately challenge the government’s representation that it does not have any Brady material. In this case, defendant's proffer is insufficient to compel the government to provide the information he seeks and thus the district court did not err in denying his request for that information. View "United States v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of, inter alia, first-degree murder and sentenced to death, brought a federal habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The district court granted his habeas petition as to the penalty phase and denied it as to his conviction. The court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254. Following remand and further proceedings, the district court denied petitioner's remaining claims. Petitioner presents two IAC claims in this appeal. The court concluded that, whether or not these claims have merit, they are foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Visciotti IV, so the court may not grant habeas relief. Petitioner also contends that the trial judge’s closure of the courtroom for six-and-a-half days during the death qualification portion of voir dire violated this Sixth Amendment right. The court could not conclude that counsel’s failure to object to the closure of the death qualification voir dire constituted deficient performance. Therefore, petitioner failed to demonstrate cause to excuse his default of the public trial claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Visciotti v. Martel" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d), for continuing crimes that, according to the government, spanned defendant’s eighteenth birthday. Defendant argues that the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031, prohibits consideration of his pre-majority conduct as proof of the substantive crimes. The district court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant only if it found that defendant continued his participation after turning 18, and the jury’s special verdict form makes clear that the jury found that defendant, in fact, continued his participation after turning 18. The court held that the district court’s instruction, which comported with the law of most circuits that have addressed this issue, was not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Camez" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native of China, was convicted of visa fraud, making a false statement, and conspiracy to defraud the United States. On appeal, defendant argues that she has been deprived of her constitutional right to an independent federal judiciary because the Northern Mariana Islands District Court (NMI District Court) is not properly established under the Constitution. The court concluded that the NMI District Court was established by Congress pursuant to its authority under Article IV of the Constitution; Congress clearly intended that the NMI District Court have jurisdiction over criminal cases; the language of 48 U.S.C. 1821 and 1822 clearly shows that Congress intentionally created the NMI District Court and gave it jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions; Congress did so based on the authority conferred on it by Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution; and defendant's challenge to the NMI District Court’s authority fails completely in light of Supreme Court precedent that has rejected challenges similar to hers. The court rejected defendant's remaining challenges and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Xiaoying Tang Dowai" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to aiding and abetting the maintenance of a drug-involved premise and was sentenced to three years of probation. As a condition of probation, the district court required that defendant refrain from unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to periodic drug testing. Congress later enacted an omnibus appropriations bill that included a rider regarding using certain funds to prosecute individuals for engaging in conduct permitted by state medical marijuana laws. Defendant moved the district court to modify his conditions of probation on the ground that the appropriations rider required that he be permitted to use marijuana for medical purposes in compliance with California’s Compassionate Use Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code 11362.5, during his probationary term. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the congressional appropriations rider at issue here does not impact the ability of a federal district court to restrict the use of medical marijuana as a condition of probation. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to modify the conditions of defendant's probation to allow him to possess and use marijuana for medical purposes in violation of federal law, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Nixon" on Justia Law