Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Nasir Cooper was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of possessing ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Cooper was sentenced to 57 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and a $100 mandatory special assessment. Cooper appealed, arguing that the district court erred in classifying his prior conviction for second-degree attempted assault under New York Penal Law § 120.05(7) as a crime of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that Cooper's prior conviction for second-degree attempted assault was a crime of violence, which resulted in a base offense level of 24 under the Sentencing Guidelines. Cooper objected, arguing that the conviction should not be considered a crime of violence, which would have resulted in a lower base offense level of 20. The district court rejected Cooper's argument and sentenced him based on the higher offense level.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that Cooper had waived any argument that his conviction was not under N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7) by acknowledging it in his sentencing submissions. The court also held that a conviction for second-degree attempted assault under N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7) categorically constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). The court reasoned that the statute requires the use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury, meeting the criteria for a crime of violence under the Guidelines. Consequently, the appellate court found no procedural error in the district court's determination of Cooper's base offense level and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Kenston Harry was convicted of possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute the same. The case centers on the use of a stationary pole camera by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to monitor the exterior of Harry's business, Action Audio, for approximately 50 days without a warrant. The camera captured footage of the business's exterior, parking lot, and occasionally the interior when the garage door was open. Harry was arrested after investigators found narcotics and firearms at Action Audio and his residence.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied Harry's motion to suppress the pole-camera evidence, which was introduced at trial. The jury convicted Harry, and the district court sentenced him to ten years for the fentanyl- and cocaine-related charges, including conspiracy, and five years for the marijuana charge, to run concurrently. The court also denied Harry's request for safety-valve relief from the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the use of the stationary pole camera did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, as Harry did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the publicly visible areas of his business. The court also found that the district court did not err in denying Harry safety-valve relief, as he failed to prove that the firearms found were not connected to his drug-trafficking activities. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Harry" on Justia Law

Lau, a native and citizen of China, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey. While awaiting trial, he left the United States and upon his return, he was paroled for deferred inspection by immigration authorities. Lau was later convicted and sentenced to probation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting he was inadmissible due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lau inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ concluded that Lau’s conviction constituted a CIMT, did not qualify as a petty offense, and that he was properly classified as an applicant for admission upon his return. The IJ also determined that Lau did not meet the continuous residency requirement for a 212(h) waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing with the findings and dismissing Lau’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that DHS improperly classified Lau as an applicant for admission when he returned to the United States while his criminal charge was pending. The court found that a pending charge does not provide clear and convincing evidence of a CIMT necessary for DHS to consider an LPR an applicant for admission. Consequently, the court granted Lau’s petition for review, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings against Lau based on his inadmissibility under section 1182(a), without prejudice to any future deportation proceedings. View "Lau v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves Christopher Poller, who was convicted by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine base, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Poller pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle, which included the drugs and firearms forming the basis of his charges.The District Court denied Poller's motion to suppress, concluding that the officers' use of iPhone cameras to see through the tinted windows of Poller's car did not violate his reasonable expectation of privacy. The court also found that even if the officers' physical touching of the car constituted a trespassory search, suppression was unwarranted because the trespass was not the but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Poller's expectation of privacy from all observation of the interior of his car was unreasonable. The use of iPhone cameras to view the car's interior did not transform those visual observations into "searches" under the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, assuming the officers' physical touching of the car constituted a trespassory search, suppression was unwarranted because the trespass was not the but-for cause of obtaining the evidence. Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Poller" on Justia Law

Edward Mangano, the former County Executive of Nassau County, New York, and his wife, Linda Mangano, were involved in a public corruption case. Edward Mangano was accused of accepting bribes from Harendra Singh, a businessman, in exchange for using his influence to secure loan guarantees from the Town of Oyster Bay for Singh's businesses. Singh provided various gifts and a no-show job for Linda Mangano, paying her approximately $100,000 annually. The Manganos were also accused of conspiring to obstruct a federal grand jury investigation into these bribes by fabricating stories about Linda's employment.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Edward Mangano was convicted of conspiracy to commit federal programs bribery, honest services fraud, and related substantive offenses. Linda Mangano was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice, and making false statements to federal officials. The district court sentenced Edward Mangano to 12 years in prison and Linda Mangano to 15 months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court properly instructed the jury on the conspiracies to commit honest services fraud and obstruction of justice, and that the evidence was sufficient to convict the Manganos on those charges. However, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to convict Edward Mangano of conspiracy to commit federal programs bribery or the related substantive offense. Consequently, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in part, affirming the convictions related to honest services fraud and obstruction of justice, but reversing the convictions related to federal programs bribery. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "United States v. Mangano" on Justia Law

Robert Sylvester Kelly, also known as R. Kelly, was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of racketeering and Mann Act violations. The evidence presented at trial showed that Kelly, with the help of his associates, exploited his fame to lure and abuse young girls and women over a period of twenty-five years. Kelly isolated his victims, controlled their lives, and subjected them to verbal, physical, and sexual abuse.The district court sentenced Kelly to 360 months' imprisonment for racketeering and additional concurrent sentences for the Mann Act violations. Kelly was also fined and ordered to pay restitution to two victims. Kelly appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the state laws underlying his federal convictions, the empaneling of certain jurors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Kelly's appeal. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Kelly's convictions, including the underlying state and federal violations. The court also held that the New York state law was constitutional as applied to Kelly and that Kelly's challenges to the California state law were untimely. The court found no evidence of juror bias or ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire. The court also upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders, finding no abuse of discretion.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Kelly's arguments on appeal were without merit. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Sealed Appellant 1, the former CEO of a publicly traded company, and Sealed Appellants 2 and 3, a lawyer and law firm that represented him and the company, appealed an order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court compelled Sealed Appellants 2 and 3 to produce documents withheld under attorney-client privilege in response to grand jury subpoenas. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied, as there was probable cause to believe that communications between Sealed Appellants 1 and 2 were made to criminally circumvent the company’s internal controls.The district court concluded that the company had an internal control requiring its legal department to review all significant contracts. It found that Sealed Appellant 1 and Sealed Appellant 2 concealed settlement agreements with two former employees who had accused Sealed Appellant 1 of sexual misconduct. These agreements were not disclosed to the company’s legal department or auditors, violating internal controls and resulting in false statements to auditors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It first determined that it had jurisdiction under the Perlman exception, which allows for immediate appeal when privileged information is in the hands of a third party likely to disclose it rather than face contempt. On the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the crime-fraud exception. It held that there was probable cause to believe that the communications were made to circumvent internal controls, thus facilitating or concealing criminal activity. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling the production of the documents. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated September 13, 2023" on Justia Law

Oladayo Oladokun was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. His involvement included directing others to open bank accounts to receive stolen or forged checks and launder money. He was sentenced to 125 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.Oladokun appealed, challenging the district court's calculation of his offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. He argued against the application of an eighteen-level enhancement based on the loss amount, a two-level enhancement for ten or more victims, and a four-level enhancement for his role in an offense involving five or more participants. Additionally, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not requesting a Franks hearing to suppress evidence obtained from his residence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not err in its factual basis for the Guidelines enhancements. It upheld the eighteen-level enhancement for the intended loss amount, the two-level enhancement for ten or more victims, and the four-level enhancement for Oladokun's role in the offense. The court also rejected Oladokun's ineffective assistance claim, noting that even if his counsel had been ineffective, Oladokun failed to show the requisite prejudice because the warrant application was supported by probable cause without the challenged evidence.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Oladokun" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of multiple crimes including conspiracy, firearm, and drug-related offenses. On appeal, defendant principally argued that the district court erred in denying his motions for suppression of his cellphone and of letters addressed to his uncle seized by law enforcement agents without a search warrant, from the bedroom he shared with his uncle. Although the Second Circuit agreed with defendant that the record shows that the cellphone and letters were in fact seized after the protective sweep had been completed and the agents had left and reentered the bedroom, the court concluded that the agents' warrantless reentry into that room did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was justified by the exigencies of the circumstances. The court rejected defendant's challenge to the denial of his suppression motions because the district court did not clearly err in finding that the cellphone and letters were in plain view in that room and were recognizable as evidence. The court affirmed the judgment, rejecting defendant's remaining evidentiary, procedural, and sentencing challenges. View "United States v. Delva" on Justia Law

Collecting IP address information devoid of content is constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register. The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for drug trafficking charges and other crimes related to his creation and operation of an online marketplace known as Silk Road. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, the government did not access the contents of any of defendant's communications, it did not need to obtain a warrant to collect IP address routing information in which defendant did not have a legitimate privacy interest. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's contention that the issuance of such pen/trap orders violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court explained that it saw no constitutional difference between monitoring home phone dialing information and IP address routing data. Furthermore, the Laptop Warrant, as well as the Google and Facebook Warrants, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the court rejected defendant's numerous claims of evidentiary errors, and concluded that defendant's life sentence was not procedurally and substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Ulbricht" on Justia Law