Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

George Guldi, a former Suffolk County legislator and disbarred real estate attorney, conspired with his former girlfriend, Victoria Davidson, to deceive a mortgage servicer, Ditech Financial LLC, into wiring them $253,236. The funds did not belong to either of them. A jury convicted Guldi of wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. He was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York oversaw the trial. The jury found sufficient evidence to support the existence of a conspiracy, fraudulent intent, and aiding and abetting. The district court also found no reversible error in its jury instructions on conspiracy, wire fraud, and fraudulent intent. Additionally, the court properly considered Guldi’s medical needs during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Guldi’s convictions, finding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings and that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. However, the appellate court concluded that the district court erred in applying a two-offense-level enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for using “sophisticated means” to commit or conceal the offense. The appellate court determined that this procedural error rendered Guldi’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.As a result, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction but vacated and remanded Guldi’s sentence for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Guldi" on Justia Law

William Hines was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York for receipt and possession of child pornography found on his cellphone and laptop. Hines had pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his cellphone. Hines argued that his girlfriend, K.S., acted as an agent of the police when she used his password to unlock his cellphone, observed child pornography, and showed the images to a police officer, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights.The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent when she unlocked the phone and showed the images to the police officer. The court concluded that the private search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment and denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the subsequent search warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the burden lies with the defendant to show that a private search constituted governmental action implicating the Fourth Amendment. The court found no error in the district court's determination that Hines failed to meet this burden. The court concluded that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent, and thus, the private search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the search warrant was admissible. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hines" on Justia Law

A man was accused in Ecuador of repeatedly sexually abusing his partner’s ten-year-old daughter over the course of a year, beginning in August 2016. The alleged abuse included digital penetration and other sexual acts, accompanied by threats to the victim and her family. After the allegations surfaced, the man fled to the United States in 2018. Ecuador requested his extradition, and U.S. authorities arrested him in July 2024. The extradition request was based on charges of sexual abuse under Ecuadorian law, which does not require penetration, unlike the offense of rape.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held an extradition hearing, excluded the defendant’s proposed expert testimony about Ecuadorian evidentiary law, and certified his extradition, finding probable cause that he committed acts constituting rape as defined in the extradition treaty. The defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court, arguing that sexual abuse was not an extraditable offense, that the magistrate judge erred in excluding his expert, and that humanitarian concerns should preclude extradition. The district court denied the petition, rejecting all arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that extradition is permissible when the underlying conduct matches an offense listed in the relevant treaty, regardless of the specific charge’s name in the requesting country. The court found probable cause that the defendant’s conduct constituted rape, an extraditable offense. It also held that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the expert testimony and reaffirmed that humanitarian concerns are for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to consider. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lalama Gomez v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant met a sixteen-year-old runaway in the Bronx and, along with two associates, lured her to their apartment. There, they gave her drug-laced alcohol, sexually assaulted her, and began prostituting her over a period of three weeks. The group took explicit photos, posted online advertisements, arranged clients, and used violence and threats to control the victim. Although the victim initially claimed to be eighteen, the defendant and his associates became suspicious of her age and eventually learned she was sixteen, but continued the operation. The defendant left the group after being injured in a shooting, but remained in contact with his co-conspirators. The victim was eventually rescued by law enforcement, and the defendant was arrested after several months as a fugitive.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. The government charged the defendant with sex trafficking conspiracy, sex trafficking a minor, and conspiracy to use interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on all counts. The defendant moved for acquittal on the sex trafficking count, arguing that the government failed to prove he knew the victim was underage, and objected to the jury instructions, claiming the relevant statutory language was unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), which allows conviction for sex trafficking a minor if the defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim, is not unconstitutionally vague. The court also found no error in the district court’s use of a general verdict form rather than a special verdict form. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Concepcion" on Justia Law

Andrew Lawrence pleaded guilty to selling drugs, including crack cocaine, and was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Lawrence challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court failed to address the Sentencing Guidelines’ differential treatment of crack and powder cocaine and that a supervised release condition permitting him to be searched upon reasonable suspicion lacked adequate on-the-record justification.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Lawrence within the Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months, rejecting the parties' proposal to treat the crack cocaine as powder cocaine, which would have resulted in a lower sentencing range. The court emphasized Lawrence's criminal history and the need for him to change his life trajectory. The court also adopted the search condition from the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), which included a detailed discussion of Lawrence's background and offense conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and rejected Lawrence's arguments. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in treating crack and powder cocaine offenses differently and did not need to address the parties' policy arguments. The appellate court also found that the district court reasonably imposed the search condition, justified by the PSR's recommendations. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Lawrence's sentence and conditions of supervised release were procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Lawrence Ray was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for multiple crimes, including racketeering conspiracy, extortion, sex trafficking, forced labor, money laundering, tax evasion, and committing a violent crime in aid of a racketeering enterprise. These convictions stemmed from Ray's operation of a criminal enterprise that targeted young adults, primarily his daughter's college roommates, for indoctrination and exploitation, including sex trafficking and forced labor in Pinehurst, North Carolina.The district court sentenced Ray to 720 months of imprisonment, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. Ray appealed his conviction, arguing insufficient evidence to support his convictions, the unconstitutionality of the racketeering statutes, improper admission of expert testimony, and the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Ray's appeal. The court found sufficient evidence to support Ray's convictions, including the existence of an enterprise, the commission of violent crimes to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise, and the coercion of victims into sex trafficking and forced labor. The court also rejected Ray's constitutional challenge to the racketeering statutes, noting that such challenges have been consistently rejected in the past.Regarding the expert testimony, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Dr. Hughes, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who provided general background on coercive control tactics without directly linking her testimony to Ray or his victims. The court also found that the district court properly balanced the probative value of the testimony against its potential prejudicial effect.Finally, the court concluded that Ray's 720-month sentence was substantively reasonable, given the gravity of his crimes and the need for deterrence, incapacitation, and just punishment. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Ray" on Justia Law

Defendants Gary Denkberg and Sean Novis were involved in a mass-mailing fraud scheme from 2004 to 2016, sending fake prize notices to consumers, leading them to believe they had won large cash prizes. Victims were instructed to pay a small processing fee to claim their prizes, but instead received a "sweepstakes report" with publicly available information. The scheme generated approximately $80 million from over three million transactions. Despite complaints and a 2012 cease-and-desist agreement with the USPS, Defendants continued their fraudulent activities using new shell companies.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicted Denkberg and Novis of multiple counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, use of fictitious names, and aiding and abetting mail fraud. The jury acquitted Denkberg on some counts but found both defendants guilty on the remaining charges. Denkberg was sentenced to 66 months in prison, while Novis received 90 months. Both were also ordered to pay significant fines and forfeitures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, including evidence of fraudulent intent and material misrepresentations. The court found that the District Court's supplemental jury instructions were not in error and that the admitted testimony and letters from state attorneys general were not hearsay. The court also determined that the admission of the letters did not violate the Confrontation Clause and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from introducing certain evidence due to a failure to comply with a protective order. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgments of conviction. View "United States v. Novis" on Justia Law

Klaudio Sterkaj was charged with transporting aliens within the United States after being stopped by the New York State Police while driving two Albanian citizens who had entered the U.S. illegally. He waived indictment and pleaded guilty to the charge. The government recommended a sentence of 6 to 12 months, while the U.S. Probation Office suggested 0 to 6 months. However, the District Court imposed a 24-month sentence, citing Sterkaj's refusal to cooperate with the government as a factor.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York adopted the Probation Office's findings but varied upward from the recommended sentence due to Sterkaj's lack of cooperation. Sterkaj's counsel objected to the sentence as being outside the guidelines, preserving the argument for appeal. Sterkaj then appealed the sentence, arguing that the District Court committed procedural error by considering his refusal to cooperate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court's decision to increase Sterkaj's sentence based on his refusal to cooperate was procedurally unreasonable. The Court of Appeals held that under United States v. Stratton, a district court may not increase a defendant's sentence due to their refusal to cooperate. The Court rejected the government's argument that intervening Supreme Court decisions had cast doubt on Stratton, maintaining that Stratton remains binding precedent.The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence component of Sterkaj's judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing by a different judge to preserve the appearance of justice. View "United States v. Sterkaj" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Josue Ortiz, claimed that Detective Mark Stambach fabricated and coerced a confession from him regarding a double homicide in 2004. Ortiz, who suffered from severe mental illness, was subsequently charged and convicted based on this false confession. In 2012, a reinvestigation revealed Ortiz's innocence, leading to the conviction of three other individuals for the murders. Ortiz's conviction was vacated, and he was released in 2014 after over a decade of wrongful imprisonment. A jury found Detective Stambach liable for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and violating Ortiz’s right against self-incrimination, awarding Ortiz $5 million in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied Detective Stambach’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and remittitur. Stambach argued that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find in favor of Ortiz on any of the claims and that the damages awarded were excessive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings on all three causes of action. The court noted that the jury could reasonably infer from the circumstantial evidence that Detective Stambach fabricated the confession and acted in bad faith. The court also found that the jury’s award of compensatory and punitive damages was justified based on the evidence presented at trial. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the jury’s verdict and the damages awarded to Ortiz. View "Ortiz v. Wagstaff" on Justia Law

In 2019, Xin “Chris” Gu, a protégé of Qing Ming “Allen” Yu, was shot and killed. Yu, angered by Gu's departure from his company and subsequent competition, conspired with Zhe Zhang and others to murder Gu. Yu promised Zhang business connections in exchange for his participation in the murder. Zhang, along with other conspirators, planned and executed the murder, with Zhang acting as the getaway driver. Both Yu and Zhang were charged with conspiracy to commit murder for hire and murder for hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicted both defendants on both counts and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The defendants appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of an agreement involving pecuniary value, a mid-trial change in the government's theory, failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, and an erroneous interpretation of the mandatory minimum sentence under section 1958(a).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the promise of business connections constituted something of pecuniary value, thus supporting the jury's finding of guilt. The court found no basis in precedent for the defendants' claim of a due-process right against surprise by the government's theory. The court also determined that the withheld evidence was not material and did not prejudice the defendants. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that section 1958(a) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the convictions and life sentences of both defendants. View "United States v. Zhang" on Justia Law