Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted of charges related to his involvement in a wire fraud conspiracy. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining that defendant was a leader or organizer of an “otherwise extensive” criminal activity and was thus subject to a four‐level sentencing enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(a). In this case, the district court failed to consider the factors the court explained in United States v. Carrozzella are central to the section 3B1.1(a) inquiry: namely, the number of knowing participants and the number of unknowing participants organized by the defendant to render services peculiar and necessary to the criminal scheme. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Kent" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of drug-related charges, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, alleging that his counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. 3006A, failed to timely inform him of the court's decision affirming his conviction and sentence. Petitioner argued that such failure deprived him of the opportunity to petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The court held that the CJA entitles defendants to representation in filing non‐frivolous petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc. Where counsel determines that a petition would be frivolous, counsel should inform the client of the opportunity to petition pro se, move to withdraw, and at the same time, move on behalf of the CJA client for an extension of time to file a pro se petition. In this case, petitioner has not had an opportunity to substantiate his allegations. Accordingly, the court remanded for further factual development. View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of investment adviser fraud, one count of securities fraud, four counts of wire fraud, and six counts of offenses in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952. Defendant raised numerous issues on appeal. In this opinion, the court concluded that a criminal conviction premised on a violation of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6, does not require proof of intent to harm. Therefore, the district court did not err in not instructing the jury that investment adviser fraud requires proof of intent to harm his clients. In a summary order filed herewith, the court rejected defendant's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tagliaferri" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and related charges. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's 2015 decision modifying the special conditions of supervised release that had been imposed on him at the time of his sentencing in 2004 to include what are now standard conditions of supervision for individuals convicted of sex offenses. Because a change in defendant's circumstances is not a prerequisite to a modification under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the court declined to reverse the district court on that basis. The court held that a court may order special conditions of supervised release in addition to the usual general conditions, so long as they are “reasonably related” to criteria listed in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual section 5D1.3(b). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the new search condition was reasonably related to the offense conduct and purposes of the sentence or that it was a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. Defendant similarly fails to show that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the new polygraph/CVSA condition. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by not holding a second hearing on Probation Services’ modification request. The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Parisi" on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of the New York City Council, was convicted of two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1346; two counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952; and one count of conspiracy to commit both substantive offenses, 18 U.S.C. 371. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his participation in two bribery schemes: 1) defendant accepted bribes in exchange for promising to funnel City funds to the bribe payers (Discretionary Funds Scheme) and 2) defendant was paid to help his co‐defendant, Malcolm A. Smith, bribe Republican Party officials to obtain what is known in New York as a Wilson‐Pakula certificate or authorization, which would have enabled Smith, a Democrat, to compete for the nomination of the Republican Party in the New York mayoral election (Wilson-Pakula Scheme). The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant took part in the Discretionary Funds Scheme with the intent required to sustain his convictions, and that defendant’s Wilson‐Pakula Scheme conduct violated both the Travel Act and the honest services fraud statute. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Halloran" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for child pornography-related charges, arguing that his plea was invalid because in accepting his guilty plea the district court failed to adhere strictly to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and because there was insufficient factual basis for finding the interstate commerce element of the production of child pornography count satisfied. Defendant also argued that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court concluded that the failure to comply strictly with all aspects of Rule 11 was not plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights, there was sufficient factual basis for the plea, and there was no procedural or substantive error in his sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pattee" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's application of a six-level enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) because the offense involved 250 or more victims, and a four-level enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(a) because defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. The court concluded that defendant's sentence is procedurally reasonable and the district court properly applied the enhancements at issue. The court remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to amend the written judgment to conform it to the oral sentence. The court otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Jesrum" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to all counts related to his sexual abuse of his stepdaughter over the course of 5 years. Determining that it has appellate jurisdiction, the court held that a judgment of conviction is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1291 whenever it imposes a sentence of incarceration, even if post‐conviction proceedings to set a restitution amount remain pending. The court also concluded that the district court’s failure to advise defendant that restitution would be imposed did not constitute plain error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tulsiram" on Justia Law

Petitioner moved for remand of his third 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing that the motion is not successive. The court concluded that the section 2255 motion was properly transferred to this court as successive because it was filed after the adjudication of his first section 2255 motion became final. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's motion for remand. View "Fuller v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute or possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and seven counts of transaction structuring for the purpose of evading currency reporting requirements. The court rejected defendant's argument that his conviction for the cocaine conspiracy must be vacated because it constituted a constructive amendment of the indictment, which charged a conspiracy involving a larger amount - five kilograms or more - of cocaine. In this case, the jury was properly charged on the lesser included offense that was the basis for his conviction on count one, and defendant’s conviction on that count is affirmed. The court concluded, however, that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant’s transactions constitute “a pattern of structured transactions” intended to evade currency reporting requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction as to the conspiracy to distribute cocaine, reversed the judgment of conviction as to the transaction structuring counts, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law