Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to engage in a racketeering enterprise in violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d); using, carrying, and possessing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and operating an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1955. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of certain predicate racketeering acts; even assuming there was error, defendant failed to demonstrate that the district court's use of the wrong version of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings; and the district court properly denied defendant's motion for a new trial where the newly discovered evidence at issue was essentially more of the same, and therefore cumulative or impeachment evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Vernace" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 46-month sentence after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court affirmed the sentence but wrote to suggest to the Sentencing Commission and the Judicial Conference of the Uniteds States that the Statement of Reasons form included within the statutorily‐required form for the entry of criminal judgments ‐‐ Form AO 245B ‐‐ be amended to bring it into conformity with 18 U.S.C. 3553(c) and Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, a check‐a‐box section of the form, which was checked by the district court in this case, invites sentencing judges to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range simply because the judge finds no reason to depart. View "United States v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 20 year sentence after pleading guilty to three firearms violations. The court held that there was no error in the district court’s decision not to expressly discuss and reject defendant’s arguments for a downward departure and a variance; the district court’s application of the other‐felony‐offense enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) constituted impermissible double‐counting clearly prohibited by the Guidelines, and that its rulings concerning the obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 and the acceptance‐of‐responsibility adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 were not supported by the necessary factual findings; and in light of these holdings, the court did not reach defendant’s argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendant, who conditionally plead guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence recovered and statements made following his warrantless arrest while he was standing inside the threshold of his home. The district court concluded that although defendant was inside the threshold of his home when he was arrested, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the police were able to effect the arrest without crossing the threshold themselves. The court concluded that, because it is uncontested that defendant remained inside his home, and was in his home when the officers placed him under arrest, his warrantless arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court vacated, reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire and substantive murder-for-hire. The court joined the First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in affirming that the district court was correct to use U.S.S.G. 2E1.4, cmt. n.1 to calculate an offense level based on U.S.S.G. 2A1.5, rather than section 2E1.4 itself, for a defendant who has been convicted of 18 U.S.C. 1958 where the underlying conduct violated state law. Therefore, the district court properly computed defendant' s offense level based on U.S.S.G. 2A1.5 for conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder rather than U.S.S.G. 2E1.4 for use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant and defendant failed to demonstrate plain error in the jury instruction given by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Lisyansky" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to one count of securities fraud. The district court sentenced defendant principally to a term of imprisonment of 121 months, which it incorporated into an amended judgment, from which defendant has not filed a second notice of appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not err, much less clearly err, in determining that defendant's offense involved 50 or more victims. In this case, the district court properly counted each married couple jointly holding investments as two individual “victims” within the meaning of that term as used in U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2). The court further found no error in the district court's rejection of defendant's claim that there were only 31 or 32 victims on the ground that the list defendant submitted with his sentencing memorandum was based on his personal recollection and was unsubstantiated. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the sentence fell within the Guidelines range. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, remanding for the sole purpose of making ministerial corrections. View "United States v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder and drug possession, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, alleging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleged that counsel was ineffective because his attorneys failed to argue on direct appeal that the admission at trial of a co-defendant's grand jury testimony violated petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because the state court's decision was not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal and Supreme Court law. In this case, the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington where petitioner failed to show that any fairminded jurist would conclude that appellate counsel’s omission of a challenge to the admission of the grand jury testimony - which petitioner expressly acquiesced to at trial - fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Chrysler v. Guiney" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of one count of racketeering conspiracy as an associate of the Bonanno crime family within the charged enterprise of La Cosa Nostra. The court held that defendant's below‐Guidelines 18‐year sentence for racketeering conspiracy is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable because the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting the government’s non‐binding 10‐year sentencing recommendation, based on the nature of defendant’s crime, which included both foreseeable felony murder and attempted murder, his longstanding participation in the Bonanno crime family, and his ongoing loansharking and firearms trafficking; the district court did not misconstrue commentary to U.S.S.G. 6B1.2(b) in concluding that defendant’s guilty plea and plea agreement did not provide justifiable reasons for imposing a sentence half the effective 20‐year Guidelines range; and an 18‐year prison term falls within the range of reasonable sentencing choices available to the district court in this case. Finally, the court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in ordering restitution with interest for income lost by the victim as a result of the armed robbery offense that ended his life. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Messina" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his 2007 New York state conviction for charges including murder in the second degree. Petitioner failed to file his petition within the one‐year limitations period provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), and the district court denied equitable tolling because petitioner had not acted with reasonable diligence. The court concluded that the district court's analysis of petitioner's degree of diligence was premised on the district court's misapplication of this court's decision in Doe v. Menefee. In this case, there are significant indications that petitioner acted with reasonable diligence and these indications justified a more detailed inquiry and findings by the district court. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martinez v. Superintendent of Eastern Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the dismissal of his claims for false arrest and excessive force under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Halfway through deliberations, the jury sent a note asking whether “refusal to acknowledge/respond to police questions [is] considered obstruction of governmental administration.” The district court equivocally answered that “[r]efusal to answer police questions alone, without more, would not constitute obstruction of governmental administration,” but that such a determination would “depend[] on the totality of the circumstances as you find them.” However, New York law unambiguously holds that one cannot obstruct governmental administration merely by refusing to answer police questions or to provide identification, both because such conduct is constitutionally protected, and because obstruction of governmental administration requires as an element a physical or independently unlawful act. The court vacated the verdict and remanded for a new trial because this prejudicial error was indisputably preserved. View "Uzoukwu v. Krawiecki" on Justia Law