Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a member of the New York City Council, was convicted of two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1346; two counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952; and one count of conspiracy to commit both substantive offenses, 18 U.S.C. 371. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his participation in two bribery schemes: 1) defendant accepted bribes in exchange for promising to funnel City funds to the bribe payers (Discretionary Funds Scheme) and 2) defendant was paid to help his co‐defendant, Malcolm A. Smith, bribe Republican Party officials to obtain what is known in New York as a Wilson‐Pakula certificate or authorization, which would have enabled Smith, a Democrat, to compete for the nomination of the Republican Party in the New York mayoral election (Wilson-Pakula Scheme). The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant took part in the Discretionary Funds Scheme with the intent required to sustain his convictions, and that defendant’s Wilson‐Pakula Scheme conduct violated both the Travel Act and the honest services fraud statute. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Halloran" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for child pornography-related charges, arguing that his plea was invalid because in accepting his guilty plea the district court failed to adhere strictly to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and because there was insufficient factual basis for finding the interstate commerce element of the production of child pornography count satisfied. Defendant also argued that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court concluded that the failure to comply strictly with all aspects of Rule 11 was not plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights, there was sufficient factual basis for the plea, and there was no procedural or substantive error in his sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pattee" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's application of a six-level enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) because the offense involved 250 or more victims, and a four-level enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(a) because defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. The court concluded that defendant's sentence is procedurally reasonable and the district court properly applied the enhancements at issue. The court remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to amend the written judgment to conform it to the oral sentence. The court otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Jesrum" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to all counts related to his sexual abuse of his stepdaughter over the course of 5 years. Determining that it has appellate jurisdiction, the court held that a judgment of conviction is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1291 whenever it imposes a sentence of incarceration, even if post‐conviction proceedings to set a restitution amount remain pending. The court also concluded that the district court’s failure to advise defendant that restitution would be imposed did not constitute plain error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tulsiram" on Justia Law

Petitioner moved for remand of his third 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing that the motion is not successive. The court concluded that the section 2255 motion was properly transferred to this court as successive because it was filed after the adjudication of his first section 2255 motion became final. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's motion for remand. View "Fuller v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute or possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and seven counts of transaction structuring for the purpose of evading currency reporting requirements. The court rejected defendant's argument that his conviction for the cocaine conspiracy must be vacated because it constituted a constructive amendment of the indictment, which charged a conspiracy involving a larger amount - five kilograms or more - of cocaine. In this case, the jury was properly charged on the lesser included offense that was the basis for his conviction on count one, and defendant’s conviction on that count is affirmed. The court concluded, however, that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant’s transactions constitute “a pattern of structured transactions” intended to evade currency reporting requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction as to the conspiracy to distribute cocaine, reversed the judgment of conviction as to the transaction structuring counts, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree manslaughter and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of fifteen years, to be followed by five years of supervised release, on the manslaughter and weapons convictions. The district court subsequently issued a certificate of appealability as to: (1) whether a State court decision denying an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of the prejudice requirement in Strickland v. Washington, where petitioner received concurrent sentences, only one of which is the subject of the ineffective assistance claim; and (2) whether, when a State court has held that a claim is procedurally barred, and that the bar will not be excused by ineffective assistance of counsel, a federal habeas court should apply the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), deference in considering whether that ineffective assistance of counsel claim can serve as cause and prejudice for excusing the procedural default. The court concluded that the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Even assuming that petitioner can establish cause to excuse procedural default of his fair-trial and double-jeopardy claims, the underlying claims also fail under the extremely deferential AEDPA standard that applies to them. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief. View "Tavarez v. Larkin" on Justia Law

Count 21 of the indictment charged Defendants Martinez and Ortega with aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence or possessing a firearm in furtherance of that crime, in connection with a murder. The court held that, in the wake of Rosemond v. United States, general instructions on aiding and abetting liability, such as the instructions at issue here, are insufficient and plainly erroneous in the context of a section 924(c) charge. The court also held that this error affected Ortega’s, but not Martinez’s, substantial rights, and therefore vacated Ortega’s conviction on Count 21. View "United States v. Prado" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for illegally reentering the United States. The court agreed with defendant that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court erred in holding that his prior Connecticut conviction for attempted second‐degree assault was a conviction for an “aggravated felony” under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) and therefore triggered an eight‐level increase in his guideline offense level. As there is no evidence in the record of conviction that would enable the court to determine which section of the divisible Connecticut statute defendant pled guilty to, it cannot be determined, applying the categorical or modified categorical approach, that defendant’s Connecticut conviction was an aggravated felony. Accordingly, the court remanded for vacatur of the judgment and resentencing. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawyer and real estate broker, appealed the district court's imposition of criminal forfeiture in the amount of $1,273,285.50, arguing that the district court erred when it declined to consider defendant’s age, health, and financial condition when it issued the forfeiture order. Defendant was convicted of charges related to his participation in a kickback scheme involving the construction of new Dick Sporting Goods stores. The court held that the court reviewing a criminal forfeiture under the Excessive Fines Clause may consider - as part of the proportionality determination required by United States v. Bajakajian - whether the forfeiture would deprive the defendant of his future ability to earn a living. However, the court held that courts should not consider a defendant’s personal circumstances as a distinct factor. In this case, the court concluded that the challenged forfeiture is constitutional because it is not “grossly disproportional” to the gravity of defendant’s offenses. View "United States v. Viloski" on Justia Law