Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Carlos Mercado was originally convicted in federal court of conspiracy to distribute heroin and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release, with conditions including a prohibition on committing new offenses. After completing his prison term, Mercado began supervised release in June 2021. In November 2024, he was arrested by Hartford police and charged under Connecticut law with drug offenses after narcotics and cash were found in his possession. The United States Probation Office petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to issue a summons for a hearing on Mercado’s alleged violation of supervised release.The District Court for the District of Connecticut questioned whether it had statutory authority to detain Mercado pending revocation proceedings, citing the Non-Detention Act, which requires statutory authorization for detention of U.S. citizens. The court concluded that neither 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 provided such authority, reasoning that Mercado had not been “found guilty of an offense” with respect to the alleged violation and was not “awaiting imposition or execution” of a sentence. The court denied the government’s motion to detain Mercado, and Mercado moved to dismiss the government’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s order under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Second Circuit further held that 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) authorizes a district court to detain a supervisee charged with a supervised release violation pending revocation proceedings, because the supervisee was previously found guilty and is awaiting execution of a portion of the original sentence. The appellate court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Mercado" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including an individual, a retirement fund, and several investment funds, traded derivatives based on the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor). They alleged that a group of banks and brokers conspired to manipulate Euribor, which affected the pricing of various over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, such as FX forwards, interest-rate swaps, and forward rate agreements. The alleged conduct included coordinated false submissions to set Euribor at artificial levels, collusion among banks and brokers, and structural changes within banks to facilitate manipulation. Plaintiffs claimed this manipulation harmed them by distorting the prices of their Euribor-based derivative transactions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Sherman Act, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and state common law, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court also found that the RICO claims were based on extraterritorial conduct and did not meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). It declined to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed that conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction was not established but held that two plaintiffs—Frontpoint Australian Opportunities Trust and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System—had established specific personal jurisdiction over UBS AG and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC for Sherman Act and RICO claims related to OTC Euribor derivative transactions in the United States. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claims for lack of particularity, but held that the Sherman Act claims were sufficiently pleaded. It vacated the district court’s refusal to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. View "Sullivan v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of possessing child pornography, following an investigation that began when coworkers reported him for viewing such material at work. A forensic analysis confirmed the allegations, and further investigation revealed that he possessed between 10 and 150 images of child pornography, as well as other images indicating a sexual interest in children. During the investigation, authorities also learned that in 2014, the defendant, then a church treasurer and deacon, had sexually abused two young boys at his church on the same day, in separate rooms and separated by non-criminal conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York accepted the defendant’s guilty plea and, at sentencing, applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s abuse of the two boys constituted two separate instances of sexual abuse. The court sentenced the defendant to 97 months’ imprisonment and imposed a 20-year term of supervised release, including special conditions restricting contact with minors, limiting him to one internet-capable device, and prohibiting possession of sexually explicit material.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the application of the pattern enhancement, the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, and the procedural reasonableness of the special conditions of supervised release. The court held that the district court correctly applied the pattern enhancement, finding that the two acts of abuse were separate instances under the relevant guideline, drawing on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wooden v. United States. The appellate court also found the sentence substantively reasonable and upheld the special conditions of supervised release. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Bullock" on Justia Law

A New York resident, known as Lucha El, was twice arrested for unlawful possession of firearms. In both instances, the firearms had been purchased in South Carolina by another individual, Keith Vereen, who acted as a straw purchaser. Lucha El paid Vereen, who then transported the firearms to New York, where Lucha El received them. Lucha El did not have the necessary permits to purchase firearms in New York and did not attempt to obtain a federal license to transport firearms across state lines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charged Lucha El with interstate transport of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) and conspiracy to transport or receive firearms from outside his state of residency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Lucha El moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that § 922(a)(3) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. After a trial, a jury found him guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and forfeiture of the firearms. Lucha El appealed, raising only the Second Amendment challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that § 922(a)(3) is a lawful regulation on the commercial sale of firearms that does not meaningfully constrain the right to keep and bear arms. The court further found that, even if the statute did impose a meaningful constraint, it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Lucha El’s convictions under § 922(a)(3) did not violate the Second Amendment. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Brandon Prawl was convicted after a jury trial of several offenses arising from heroin distribution activities in Schenectady, New York. The evidence at trial showed that Prawl sold heroin to an undercover investigator on four occasions in September 2019, often retrieving the drugs from an apartment at 1526 Devine Street. On October 4, 2019, police raided the apartment and found Prawl in a bedroom with his identification card listing the apartment as his address. In the same room, officers discovered heroin, drug paraphernalia, and an unloaded handgun with a loaded magazine nearby. Prawl did not have a license for the firearm.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Judge Suddaby) presided over the trial. Prawl was indicted for four counts of heroin distribution, one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin. At trial, the government’s arguments and the district court’s jury instructions linked the firearm possession charge to Prawl’s possession with intent to distribute heroin on October 4, rather than to the September sales as specified in the indictment. Prawl did not object to this at trial. The jury convicted him on all counts, and he was sentenced to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Prawl challenged only his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He argued that the evidence was insufficient and that the indictment was constructively amended in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Second Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, that Prawl had abandoned his constructive amendment claim on appeal, and that, even if not abandoned, any error was not plain. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "United States v. Prawl" on Justia Law

Two defendants were charged and convicted for their roles in a large-scale ATM skimming operation that spanned the United States, Europe, and Mexico, resulting in millions of dollars in losses to financial institutions and individual account holders. The scheme involved installing skimming devices and hidden cameras on ATMs to steal debit card numbers and PINs, creating counterfeit cards, withdrawing cash from victims’ accounts, and laundering the proceeds overseas. One defendant was primarily involved in sending and receiving skimming devices and laundering money, while the other built and distributed skimming devices, supervised cash-outs, and was found with skimming equipment and counterfeit cards in his garage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. One defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts, while the other pled guilty to most charges and was convicted by a jury of aggravated identity theft. Both received below-Guidelines sentences (92 and 120 months) and were ordered to pay restitution in installments, with the option to use the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Plan (IFRP). The defendants appealed, jointly challenging their aggravated identity theft convictions, and individually raising issues regarding the suppression of evidence, sentencing enhancements, and the restitution payment schedule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that debit card numbers and PINs are “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, thus supporting the aggravated identity theft convictions. The court also upheld the denial of the suppression motion, finding the search of the garage lawful as a protective sweep incident to arrest. The court found no procedural or substantive error in the sentences. However, it vacated the restitution order for one defendant and remanded for clarification of the installment payment schedule during incarceration. All other aspects of the convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "United States of America v. Constantinescu" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2012 of assaulting the mother of his child, which constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under New York law. Several years later, he was arrested in New York City for possessing a firearm, specifically a .380 caliber pistol, after having been previously convicted of that domestic violence misdemeanor. He pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm after a domestic violence conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). At sentencing, the district court considered his criminal history, including a 2013 state drug conviction, and imposed a forty-eight-month prison term and three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the 2013 state drug conviction did not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a lower base offense level for sentencing. Both the defendant and the government appealed: the defendant challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) under the Second Amendment and the reasonableness of his sentence, while the government contested the district court’s interpretation of the drug conviction under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, both facially and as applied to the defendant, because it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of disarming individuals deemed dangerous, such as those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors. The court also found that the defendant’s sentencing challenges were moot, as he had completed his prison term and there was no indication the district court would reduce his supervised release. Additionally, the court agreed with the government’s concession that its cross-appeal was foreclosed by recent precedent. The court dismissed the appeal in part as moot and otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Luis Rodriguez was convicted by a jury in 2006 for his involvement in a murder-for-hire plot that resulted in the deaths of two individuals, including a fourteen-year-old, as part of a drug trafficking conspiracy. He was also found guilty of related drug and firearm offenses and sentenced to life imprisonment. After his conviction, Rodriguez pursued several post-trial challenges, including a direct appeal and a habeas petition, both of which were unsuccessful. While incarcerated, Rodriguez filed a motion for compassionate release, citing his conduct in prison, alleged harsh conditions and radon exposure, health risks from COVID-19, and purported sentencing errors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied Rodriguez’s motion for compassionate release. The court found that Rodriguez had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, noting his significant disciplinary record while in custody and the lack of evidence supporting his claims about prison conditions and health risks. The court also determined that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the seriousness of his offenses and the need to protect the public, weighed strongly against reducing his sentence. The court declined to consider collateral attacks on his conviction, as such arguments were not appropriate in a compassionate release motion and had already been rejected in prior proceedings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of compassionate release. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the Second Circuit held that the district court acted well within its broad discretion in denying relief based on the § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court found that Rodriguez’s appeal lacked any arguable basis in law or fact and dismissed the appeal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The court also denied his motions for appointment of counsel and for a certificate of appealability. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Two fiduciaries, who managed retirement and welfare funds for a New York City law enforcement union, were found to have improperly withdrawn over $500,000 from the union’s annuity fund. The withdrawals, which occurred over several years, were facilitated by one defendant preparing false authorization forms and the other signing and submitting them to the fund’s custodian. The funds were then transferred to the union’s operating account and used for unauthorized purposes, including personal enrichment and unrelated union expenses. The defendants misrepresented the nature of these withdrawals to both the fund’s custodian and union members, and they continued the scheme even after being warned by auditors that their actions were improper.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over a joint jury trial, where both defendants were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. One defendant was also convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and multiple counts of tax evasion. The district court denied motions to sever the trials, found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, and imposed restitution and forfeiture orders. The court also addressed government discovery errors by granting a continuance and requiring early disclosure of materials, but declined to impose harsher sanctions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed claims of improper joinder, insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and errors in restitution calculation. The court held that joinder was proper because the indictment sufficiently linked the fraud and tax offenses, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and the attorney’s illness did not constitute per se ineffective assistance. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of discovery issues or restitution calculation, and no reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wynder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was ordered removed after being convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree under New York Penal Law (NYPL) § 130.60(2). This conviction was deemed an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because it constituted "sexual abuse of a minor." Approximately a year later, the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the motion as untimely and concluded that he did not warrant equitable tolling.An Immigration Judge (IJ) initially determined that the petitioner’s conviction was an aggravated felony, rendering him removable and ineligible for asylum and cancellation of removal. The IJ also found the conviction to be a "particularly serious crime," barring withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied the petitioner’s motion to remand for consideration of new evidence regarding his mental health and diabetes diagnosis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition challenging the removal order, citing its recent decision in Debique v. Garland, which held that a conviction under NYPL § 130.60(2) is categorically an aggravated felony. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that Debique was not binding and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo undermined its precedential force. The court also denied the petition challenging the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the BIA had a reasonable basis for concluding that the petitioner failed to show due diligence for the entire period between the expiration of the 90-day deadline and the filing of the motion. View "Garcia Pinach v. Bondi" on Justia Law