Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Two defendants were charged and convicted for their roles in a large-scale ATM skimming operation that spanned the United States, Europe, and Mexico, resulting in millions of dollars in losses to financial institutions and individual account holders. The scheme involved installing skimming devices and hidden cameras on ATMs to steal debit card numbers and PINs, creating counterfeit cards, withdrawing cash from victims’ accounts, and laundering the proceeds overseas. One defendant was primarily involved in sending and receiving skimming devices and laundering money, while the other built and distributed skimming devices, supervised cash-outs, and was found with skimming equipment and counterfeit cards in his garage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. One defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts, while the other pled guilty to most charges and was convicted by a jury of aggravated identity theft. Both received below-Guidelines sentences (92 and 120 months) and were ordered to pay restitution in installments, with the option to use the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Plan (IFRP). The defendants appealed, jointly challenging their aggravated identity theft convictions, and individually raising issues regarding the suppression of evidence, sentencing enhancements, and the restitution payment schedule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that debit card numbers and PINs are “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, thus supporting the aggravated identity theft convictions. The court also upheld the denial of the suppression motion, finding the search of the garage lawful as a protective sweep incident to arrest. The court found no procedural or substantive error in the sentences. However, it vacated the restitution order for one defendant and remanded for clarification of the installment payment schedule during incarceration. All other aspects of the convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "United States of America v. Constantinescu" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2012 of assaulting the mother of his child, which constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under New York law. Several years later, he was arrested in New York City for possessing a firearm, specifically a .380 caliber pistol, after having been previously convicted of that domestic violence misdemeanor. He pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm after a domestic violence conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). At sentencing, the district court considered his criminal history, including a 2013 state drug conviction, and imposed a forty-eight-month prison term and three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the 2013 state drug conviction did not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a lower base offense level for sentencing. Both the defendant and the government appealed: the defendant challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) under the Second Amendment and the reasonableness of his sentence, while the government contested the district court’s interpretation of the drug conviction under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, both facially and as applied to the defendant, because it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of disarming individuals deemed dangerous, such as those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors. The court also found that the defendant’s sentencing challenges were moot, as he had completed his prison term and there was no indication the district court would reduce his supervised release. Additionally, the court agreed with the government’s concession that its cross-appeal was foreclosed by recent precedent. The court dismissed the appeal in part as moot and otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Luis Rodriguez was convicted by a jury in 2006 for his involvement in a murder-for-hire plot that resulted in the deaths of two individuals, including a fourteen-year-old, as part of a drug trafficking conspiracy. He was also found guilty of related drug and firearm offenses and sentenced to life imprisonment. After his conviction, Rodriguez pursued several post-trial challenges, including a direct appeal and a habeas petition, both of which were unsuccessful. While incarcerated, Rodriguez filed a motion for compassionate release, citing his conduct in prison, alleged harsh conditions and radon exposure, health risks from COVID-19, and purported sentencing errors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied Rodriguez’s motion for compassionate release. The court found that Rodriguez had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, noting his significant disciplinary record while in custody and the lack of evidence supporting his claims about prison conditions and health risks. The court also determined that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the seriousness of his offenses and the need to protect the public, weighed strongly against reducing his sentence. The court declined to consider collateral attacks on his conviction, as such arguments were not appropriate in a compassionate release motion and had already been rejected in prior proceedings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of compassionate release. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the Second Circuit held that the district court acted well within its broad discretion in denying relief based on the § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court found that Rodriguez’s appeal lacked any arguable basis in law or fact and dismissed the appeal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The court also denied his motions for appointment of counsel and for a certificate of appealability. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Two fiduciaries, who managed retirement and welfare funds for a New York City law enforcement union, were found to have improperly withdrawn over $500,000 from the union’s annuity fund. The withdrawals, which occurred over several years, were facilitated by one defendant preparing false authorization forms and the other signing and submitting them to the fund’s custodian. The funds were then transferred to the union’s operating account and used for unauthorized purposes, including personal enrichment and unrelated union expenses. The defendants misrepresented the nature of these withdrawals to both the fund’s custodian and union members, and they continued the scheme even after being warned by auditors that their actions were improper.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over a joint jury trial, where both defendants were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. One defendant was also convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and multiple counts of tax evasion. The district court denied motions to sever the trials, found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, and imposed restitution and forfeiture orders. The court also addressed government discovery errors by granting a continuance and requiring early disclosure of materials, but declined to impose harsher sanctions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed claims of improper joinder, insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and errors in restitution calculation. The court held that joinder was proper because the indictment sufficiently linked the fraud and tax offenses, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and the attorney’s illness did not constitute per se ineffective assistance. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of discovery issues or restitution calculation, and no reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wynder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was ordered removed after being convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree under New York Penal Law (NYPL) § 130.60(2). This conviction was deemed an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because it constituted "sexual abuse of a minor." Approximately a year later, the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the motion as untimely and concluded that he did not warrant equitable tolling.An Immigration Judge (IJ) initially determined that the petitioner’s conviction was an aggravated felony, rendering him removable and ineligible for asylum and cancellation of removal. The IJ also found the conviction to be a "particularly serious crime," barring withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied the petitioner’s motion to remand for consideration of new evidence regarding his mental health and diabetes diagnosis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition challenging the removal order, citing its recent decision in Debique v. Garland, which held that a conviction under NYPL § 130.60(2) is categorically an aggravated felony. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that Debique was not binding and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo undermined its precedential force. The court also denied the petition challenging the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the BIA had a reasonable basis for concluding that the petitioner failed to show due diligence for the entire period between the expiration of the 90-day deadline and the filing of the motion. View "Garcia Pinach v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Victor J. Orena was convicted in 1992 for his involvement in the "Colombo Family War," a violent power struggle within an organized crime family. The jury found him guilty of nine charges, including the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In 2021, Orena successfully petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his § 924(c)(1) conviction based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis. He sought de novo resentencing on the remaining counts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied Orena's request for de novo resentencing. Instead, the court corrected the judgment by excising the § 924(c) conviction and its consecutive sentence but left the sentences for the remaining eight counts unchanged. Orena appealed, arguing that the district court was required to conduct de novo resentencing on all remaining counts, citing the Second Circuit's decision in Kaziu v. United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court distinguished Orena's case from Kaziu, noting that the district court had recently evaluated the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in denying Orena's motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The court found that the district court had thoroughly assessed the relevant factors and the changed circumstances Orena cited. The court also concluded that the fact that Orena's original sentence predated the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, which made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, did not compel resentencing in this case. Additionally, the court found that Orena's arguments regarding alleged government misconduct were not proper considerations for resentencing.The Second Circuit held that the district court did not exceed its discretion in declining to conduct de novo resentencing and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "U.S. v. Orena" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Chastain was convicted of wire fraud and money laundering based on trades he made while employed at OpenSea, an online NFT marketplace. As head of product, Chastain selected NFTs to feature on the website, which increased their value. He purchased NFTs before they were featured and sold them afterward for a profit, making about $57,000. Chastain argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could find him guilty of defrauding OpenSea of its property if he misappropriated an intangible interest unconnected to traditional property rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Chastain's motion to dismiss the indictment and excluded certain evidence he sought to introduce at trial. The jury found Chastain guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to three months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Chastain that confidential business information must have commercial value to qualify as property under the wire fraud statute. The court found that the district court erred by instructing the jury that it could find Chastain guilty even if the information lacked commercial value to OpenSea. The court also found that the district court erred by instructing the jury that it could find Chastain guilty if he conducted himself in a manner that departed from traditional notions of fundamental honesty and fair play.The Second Circuit concluded that these errors were not harmless, as the jury could have convicted Chastain based on unethical behavior rather than the misappropriation of a traditional property interest. The court vacated the judgment of conviction for wire fraud and money laundering and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not find any abuse of discretion in the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Chastain" on Justia Law

Michael Hild, the Defendant-Appellant, was convicted by a jury in 2021 of securities fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy. Hild, as the CEO of Live Well Financial, Inc., engaged in a scheme to inflate the value of a bond portfolio used as collateral for loans. This scheme allowed Live Well to grow its bond portfolio significantly from 2014 to 2016. Hild appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that a new trial was warranted due to a Supreme Court decision invalidating one of the fraud theories used in his jury instructions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Hild's post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial. Hild then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions.The Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that sufficient evidence supported Hild's conviction. The court noted that Hild misrepresented the value of the bonds to secure loans and acted with fraudulent intent. The court also addressed Hild's argument regarding the jury instructions, acknowledging that the instructions included an invalid right-to-control theory of fraud as per the Supreme Court's decision in Ciminelli v. United States. However, the court concluded that this error did not affect Hild's substantial rights because the jury would have convicted him based on a valid theory of fraud.Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Hild's conviction on all counts. View "United States v. Hild" on Justia Law

Karl Greenwood pled guilty to charges related to a cryptocurrency scam that defrauded investors of over $4.5 billion. Prior to sentencing, Greenwood submitted a partially redacted sentencing memorandum and exhibits, many of which were sealed. Matthew Lee, associated with Inner City Press, filed a motion to unseal and unredact these documents, arguing a right of access.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Lee's motion, stating that the redactions were limited to sensitive information such as medical details and personal information of Greenwood and his family. Lee appealed this decision, contending that the district court did not sufficiently justify the sealing of the exhibits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the First Amendment right of access applies to sentencing memoranda and exhibits, requiring specific findings to justify sealing. The court found that while the district court adequately justified the redactions in the sentencing memorandum, it did not sufficiently explain the complete sealing of the exhibits. The appellate court vacated the district court's order in part and remanded the case for further proceedings to provide a more detailed justification for sealing the exhibits. The court affirmed the district court's decision regarding the redactions in the sentencing memorandum. View "Lee v. Greenwood" on Justia Law

Natalia Mikhaylovna Bardakova, a Russian citizen, was indicted for conspiring to help Oleg Deripaska, a Russian industrial magnate, evade U.S. sanctions and for making false statements to the FBI. Bardakova allegedly traveled to California to arrange for Deripaska’s partner to give birth there and lied to FBI agents about her ties to Deripaska. She left for Russia three days after being interviewed by the FBI and has not returned to the U.S. despite being indicted four months later.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Bardakova’s motion to dismiss the indictment, concluding that she was a fugitive from justice and should be disentitled from relief in federal court. Bardakova argued that she was not a fugitive and that even if she were, she should not have been disentitled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Bardakova had constructively fled U.S. jurisdiction by allegedly committing a crime in the U.S. before leaving and refusing to return to face prosecution. The court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion by disentitling her. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Bardakova’s motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applied and that the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying her motion. View "United States v. Bardakova" on Justia Law