Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants Jibril Adamu and Jean-Claude Okongo Landji were involved in an international narcotics trafficking conspiracy, using a private aircraft to transport cocaine from South America to Africa and Europe. Landji owned an aviation charter business and Adamu was his co-pilot. They were arrested in Croatia in 2018 after flying a test shipment of cocaine. Their cell phones, containing incriminating evidence, were seized. Both defendants were extradited to the United States and charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted both defendants following a jury trial. They were sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. The defendants appealed, arguing that the government lacked jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 959, violated their Sixth Amendment rights by using privileged information, and erred in admitting data extracted from their cell phones.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 21 U.S.C. § 959 applies extraterritorially, affirming the government’s jurisdiction. It also found no Sixth Amendment violation, as the district court correctly determined that the government did not use privileged information in its prosecution. The court concluded that the cell phone data was properly authenticated and its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court noted that any potential error in admitting the cell phone data was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the convictions and sentences of both defendants. View "United States v. Adamu" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, American service members and civilians injured or killed in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, along with their family members, sued Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), and Danske Bank under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). They alleged that the banks aided and abetted terrorist organizations by providing banking services to customers involved in tax fraud and money laundering schemes, with proceeds allegedly funding terrorist activities. Plaintiffs also claimed SCB aided the attacks by providing banking services to fertilizer companies whose products were used to make bombs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' amended complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficient nexus between the banks' actions and the terrorist acts that caused their injuries. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that further amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, which clarified the pleading standard for aiding-and-abetting claims under JASTA. The court held that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the banks were generally aware of their role in the terrorist activities or that they provided knowing and substantial assistance to the terrorist organizations. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs' allegations were too attenuated and speculative to support a claim of aiding-and-abetting liability under JASTA. View "Wildman v. Deutsche Bank" on Justia Law

Pedro Hernandez, a New York State prisoner, was convicted of the 1979 kidnapping and murder of six-year-old Etan Patz. The case hinged on Hernandez's confessions, as there was no physical evidence linking him to the crime. Hernandez, who has a history of mental illness and low IQ, initially confessed to the crime after seven hours of unwarned questioning by police. After this confession, he was given Miranda warnings and repeated his confession on video. He later confessed again to an Assistant District Attorney.Hernandez's first trial ended in a hung jury. In his second trial, the jury convicted him of felony murder and kidnapping but acquitted him of intentional murder. During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court if they must disregard Hernandez's post-Miranda confessions if they found his initial unwarned confession involuntary. The trial court answered "no," without further explanation. Hernandez appealed, arguing that this instruction violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Missouri v. Seibert, which addresses the admissibility of confessions obtained through a two-step interrogation process.The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court's instruction was correct and that any error was harmless. Hernandez's petition for habeas relief was denied by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which found the trial court's instruction erroneous but concluded that the error was harmless under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's instruction was contrary to clearly established federal law under Seibert and that the error was not harmless. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for the conditional granting of the writ, ordering Hernandez's release unless the state affords him a new trial within a reasonable period. View "Hernandez v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Mark Johnson was convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in 2017. The charges stemmed from a 2011 transaction where HSBC, under Johnson's leadership, converted U.S. dollars into British pounds for Cairn Energy. The government presented two theories of fraud to the jury: the now-invalid right-to-control theory and the misappropriation theory. Johnson filed a Petition for a writ of coram nobis after the Supreme Court's decision in Ciminelli v. United States invalidated the right-to-control theory.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Johnson's Petition, concluding that the jury would have convicted him under the valid misappropriation theory, rendering the inclusion of the invalid right-to-control theory harmless. Johnson appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government's case under the misappropriation theory was weak and expressed grave doubt that the presentation of the right-to-control theory was harmless. The court noted that the misappropriation theory required proving a fiduciary relationship between Johnson and Cairn, which was not clearly established, and that Johnson misused confidential information, which was also not convincingly demonstrated.The Second Circuit held that the inclusion of the invalid right-to-control theory was not harmless and that the jury was likely influenced by it. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of an order granting Johnson's Petition for a writ of coram nobis. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

Jamees Cooke was employed at a restaurant when a team from the United States Marshals Service Regional Fugitive Task Force arrived to execute three outstanding warrants for his arrest. Cooke attempted to escape but was confronted by officers. He became disorderly, assaulted a Task Force Officer (TFO) by punching him in the eye, and bit another officer. The assaulted TFO suffered a serious eye injury requiring surgery and resulting in permanent vision impairment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted Cooke after he pleaded guilty to one count of assaulting, resisting, and interfering with federal officers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). The district court sentenced him to eighty-four months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. The court applied a six-level official-victim enhancement under section 3A1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.Cooke appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in applying the six-level enhancement. He contended that section 3A1.2(b) should not apply when the offense guideline already includes an enhancement for the victim's status as a government officer. The Second Circuit agreed that section 3A1.2(b) does not apply if the offense guideline already incorporates such an enhancement but clarified that the only offense guideline incorporating this factor is section 2A2.4, which was not relevant in this case. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the application of the six-level enhancement under section 3A1.2(b). View "United States v. Cooke" on Justia Law

Kenneth Thompson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, following a guilty plea. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced him to thirty-seven months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release. The court also imposed special conditions of supervised release, including submitting to searches, complying with sex offender registration requirements, and undergoing a mental health evaluation and treatment if necessary.Thompson appealed, arguing that the district court erred in imposing the special conditions without an individualized assessment and explanation. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. Additionally, he challenged the district court's Sentencing Guidelines calculation and argued that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Thompson waived any challenge to the mental health treatment condition by consenting to it. The court held that the district court made an individualized assessment and adequately explained its reasons for imposing the special conditions, which were supported by the record. The court declined to consider Thompson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, noting that it was not raised in the district court and lacked sufficient factual development. The court also held that Thompson's remaining challenges to his conviction and sentence were barred by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jere Eaton sued the City of Stamford and police officer Steven Estabrook, alleging that Estabrook used excessive force during a protest on August 8, 2020. Eaton claimed that Estabrook lifted her by her bra strap, drove her backward several feet, and dropped her on the ground without warning, violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights and committing assault and battery under Connecticut state law. Estabrook and the City of Stamford moved for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity and state governmental immunity.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that while there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Estabrook used excessive force, Estabrook was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time that his actions were unconstitutional. The court also granted summary judgment on Eaton’s state law claims, concluding that Estabrook was entitled to state governmental immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the use of excessive force. However, the appellate court concluded that Estabrook was not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage because the same factual disputes also affected whether his actions were clearly established as unconstitutional at the time. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court upheld the district court’s decision regarding state governmental immunity for the state law claims. View "Eaton v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

From the 1990s through the 2010s, Patrice Runner operated a mass-mailing enterprise that used false and misleading advertising to sell purportedly supernatural objects and psychic services. Customers paid for rare gems and personalized psychic services, but received junk items and generic responses. A jury convicted Runner of mail and wire fraud, among other crimes.Runner appealed, arguing that the Government’s theory of fraud was legally defective, which he claimed affected his indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury instructions. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York had denied Runner’s motion to dismiss the indictment and rejected his post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial. The court also sentenced Runner to ten years’ imprisonment, despite a Guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment, based on a loss calculation of over $150,000,000.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Runner’s arguments, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Kousisis v. United States, which supported the Government’s fraudulent-inducement theory. The court found that the indictment sufficiently alleged that Runner used material misstatements to induce customers to pay money. The evidence presented at trial was deemed sufficient to support the jury’s finding of fraudulent intent, as Runner’s promotions contained intentional lies about the origin and nature of the goods and services sold. The jury instructions were also found to be adequate in conveying the intent-to-harm requirement.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that any error in the loss calculation at sentencing was harmless, as the district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless. View "United States v. Runner" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Douglass Mackey, was convicted of conspiring to injure citizens in the exercise of their right to vote in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. The conviction was based on three memes he posted or reposted on Twitter shortly before the 2016 presidential election, which falsely suggested that supporters of then-candidate Hillary Clinton could vote by text message.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Donnelly, J.) oversaw the trial, where a jury found Mackey guilty. Mackey appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly agreed to join the charged conspiracy. The government presented evidence of Mackey's participation in several private Twitter message groups where members discussed strategies to influence the election, including the creation and distribution of misleading memes. However, Mackey was not a member of these groups during the critical period when the conspiracy was allegedly formed and discussed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence that Mackey knowingly agreed to join the conspiracy. The court noted that while Mackey posted the misleading memes, there was no direct evidence that he viewed or participated in the relevant discussions within the private message groups. The court emphasized that mere association with individuals involved in an unlawful undertaking is not enough to prove knowing involvement in a conspiracy.The Second Circuit concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support Mackey's conviction and reversed the judgment of the district court. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for Mackey. View "United States v. Mackey" on Justia Law

James Coonan, a former leader of the "Westies" gang, was convicted in 1987 for crimes including racketeering, extortion, and murder, committed between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. He was sentenced to 75 years in prison. Over his 38 years of incarceration, Coonan has unsuccessfully sought parole multiple times. In 2023, he filed a motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), which allows for sentence reductions based on "extraordinary and compelling reasons."The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Coonan's motion, ruling that § 3582(c)(1) does not apply to offenses committed before November 1, 1987. The court explained that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which includes § 3582, only applies to offenses committed on or after that date. The First Step Act of 2018, which amended § 3582 to allow inmates to file their own motions for sentence reductions, did not change this limitation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that § 3582(c)(1) does not apply to Coonan's pre-1987 offenses. The court emphasized that the Sentencing Reform Act's effective date and its applicability only to post-November 1, 1987, offenses remain unchanged by the First Step Act. The court also rejected Coonan's arguments based on legislative intent and constitutional avoidance, finding no ambiguity in the statute that would allow for a different interpretation. Thus, Coonan remains ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1). View "United States v. Coonan" on Justia Law