Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
United States v. Strong, Jr.
Defendant appealed his conviction after pleading guilty to a drug conspiracy count. Prior to the guilty plea, the government filed a prior felony information under 21 U.S.C. 851, alleging that defendant was previously convicted of a drug felony under the New York State Penal Law. Defendant admitted to the fact of a prior conviction and the district court sentenced him principally to the mandatory minimum term of 120 months’ imprisonment. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the United States Attorney need not personally sign a prior felony information and that an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) may do so. In any event, defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice by the fact that an AUSA rather than a United States Attorney signed his information. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the government unconstitutionally contravened an internal Department of Justice policy memorandum, which lists factors relevant to the government’s decision to seek a prior felony enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Strong, Jr." on Justia Law
United States v. Leonard
In 2008, Leonard pled guilty to conspiracies to distribute 100 or more kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846; and to launder the proceeds of that illegal trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). While serving a 114‐month prison term, Leonard unsuccessfully sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court reasoned that an amended, retroactive, 97‐121‐month Sentencing Guidelines range was not lower than the 97-121‐month range agreed to in the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. Leonard is eligible for a section 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction because his original sentence was “based on” the Sentencing Guidelines as that statutory phrase was construed by the Supreme Court in 2011, but the extent of the reduction for which Leonard is eligible is narrower than he urges because his “applicable” Guidelines range, as defined by U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 was the 121‐151‐month range calculated by the district court before accepting what was effectively a downward variance to the 97‐121‐month range prescribed in the 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. Leonard is eligible for a reduction of his sentence, but to no less than 97 months’ incarceration. View "United States v. Leonard" on Justia Law
United States v. Powers
Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction after pleading guilty to thirteen counts of child‐pornography‐related offenses. Defendant challenged the actual basis supporting his plea as to one of the thirteen counts and the reasonableness of his 480‐month sentence. The Government concedes that the district court committed “plain error” by accepting defendant's plea to the count challenged on appeal and that defendant's conviction as to that count must be vacated, but argues that resentencing is unnecessary. The court concluded, however, that the the error was a so‐called “conviction error,” and thus de novo resentencing is required. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to vacate the erroneous count of conviction and for de novo resentencing. View "United States v. Powers" on Justia Law
Garcia v. Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility
Petitioner, pro se, moves for leave to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition challenging his 2009 New York conviction for burglary and sexual abuse. Petitioner filed multiple section 2254 petitions in the past challenging his conviction, but each petition was dismissed as incomprehensible. The court held that an order denying a section 2254 petition as incomprehensible is “on the merits” for the purposes of the successive‐petition requirements if the petitioner was on notice that the district court considered the section 2254 petition to be incomprehensible, and had an opportunity to cure the defect. In this case, because petitioner's motion for leave to file a successive section 2254 petition is as incomprehensible as the others, he has not made a “prima facie showing” that his application satisfies the section 2244(b)(2) requirements. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. View "Garcia v. Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility" on Justia Law
Sanford v. United States
Petitioner seeks leave to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to challenge his 2007 sentence for Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951. Petitioner, in his plea agreement, agreed “not to file an appeal or otherwise challenge the conviction or sentence in the event that the Court impose[d] a term of imprisonment of 210 months or below.” The district court accepted the plea and sentenced him to 151 months in prison. The court concluded that petitioner's collateral attack waiver bars his motion because the waiver encompasses any challenge to his sentence. Accordingly, the court dismissed the motion for leave to file a successive section 2255 motion. View "Sanford v. United States" on Justia Law
United States v. Rosemond
Defendant was convicted of murder for hire and related charges. Defendant argues on appeal that the district court erred in ruling that certain defense arguments would open the door to the admission of statements made during a proffer session; the district court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts; and there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. The court concluded that the district court erred in unduly restricting defendant's ability to defend against the charges, and that such error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rosemond" on Justia Law
United States v. Marinello
Defendant, the owner and operator of a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada, was found guilty of nine counts of tax-related offenses. Defendant was charged with violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who ʺcorruptly or by force or threats of force . . . endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title.” Another portion of the statute, often referred to as the ʺomnibus clause,ʺ imposes criminal liability on one who ʺin any other way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.ʺ On appeal, defendant argued that the court, like the Sixth Circuit, should construe the phrase ʺthe due administration of this titleʺ in the omnibus clause to include only a pending IRS action of which a defendant was aware. The court rejected defendant's argument and joined three of its sister circuits in concluding that section 7212(a)ʹs omnibus clause criminalizes corrupt interference with an official effort to administer the tax code, and not merely a known IRS investigation. The court also concluded that an omission may be a means by which a defendant corruptly obstructs or impedes the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code under section 7212(a). Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not commit procedural error by using the manner of calculating the tax loss and restitution amounts that it did, or by deciding not to apply a two‐level reduction to defendant's base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Marinello" on Justia Law
United States v. Bennett
Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography and then appealed his sentence of 84 months in prison. Defendant argued that the district court erred in calculating the Guidelines range by imposing a five-level enhancement under USSG 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) for distribution of child pornography “for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value” based on his use of a peer-to-peer file-sharing system to trade pornography. The court ultimately concluded that the manner in which defendant used file sharing warranted this enhancement, but held that the district court erred in describing the Guidelines range as above the statutory maximum for the charge. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bennett" on Justia Law
United States v. Sheehan
Defendant was convicted of extortion and use of a destructive device to commit extortion. Defendant's conviction arose out of his plot to extort money from Home Depot by placing a device purporting to be an inert “model” of a pipe bomb in a Home Depot store in Huntington Station, New York, and threatening to plant bombs in other Home Depot locations. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the device used by defendant was an “explosive bomb,” as contemplated by 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(4), and that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the combination‐of‐parts theory of guilt; the prosecutor’s comments during summation did not deprive defendant of a fair trial; and therefore the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Sheehan" on Justia Law
United States v. Harris
Defendant plead guilty to conspiracy to traffic in narcotics and was sentenced to 188 months in prison and five years of supervised release. On appeal, defendant challenged the revocation of his supervised release and imposition of an additional prison term of 27 months based on a finding that he had engaged in new criminal conduct while on federal supervision, specifically, assault, as proscribed by New York Penal Law 120.00(1), and narcotics distribution, in violation of New York Penal Law 220.39. The court concluded that Title 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)’s use of the disjunctive in identifying the actions a district court may take with respect to defendants serving terms of supervised release does not limit a court’s authority so as to preclude it from revoking supervised release after conduct is proved that, when reported, had prompted modification of supervision conditions. Therefore, the district court had authorization to revoke defendant's supervised release in this case. The court also concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting the victim's hearsay statements in determining that defendant, while on federal supervision, had committed a new state crime of assault. In this case, the district court properly balanced defendant's confrontation interest against the assault victim's reasons for refusing to testify. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law