Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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Defendant challenged the denial of his motion for a sentence modification under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). Defendant had received a sentence modification in 2011 based upon Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines and sought a second modification in 2015 based upon Amendment 782. The court held that when a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment that has been modified pursuant to section 3582(c)(2), his sentence is “based on” the guideline range applied at his most recent sentence modification, rather than the range applied at his original sentencing. In this case, because defendant’s sentence is “based on” a guideline range of 235 to 293 months and that range has not subsequently been lowered by Amendment 782, he is ineligible for a sentence modification. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Derry" on Justia Law

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On this interlocutory appeal, the United States challenges the district court's order suppressing drugs and money seized incident to defendant's arrest in the home of Shonsai Dickson. The court concluded that, whether the subject of an arrest warrant is apprehended in his own home or a third‐party residence where he is a guest, his Fourth Amendment privacy rights with respect to entry of either premises are those stated in Payton v. New York, at the time of entry, arresting officers must possess (a) a valid arrest warrant for the subject and (b) reason to believe that the subject is then in the premises. The third‐party resident’s Fourth Amendment right in such circumstances to have the entry into his home authorized by a search warrant, does not extend to the subject of the arrest warrant. The court also concluded that the totality of circumstances known to law enforcement authorities at the time they entered third party Dickson’s residence to execute a valid warrant for defendant’s arrest supported reason to believe that defendant was then in those premises. Accordingly, the court vacated the suppression order to the extent it concluded that the entry of Dickson’s apartment violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, and remanded. View "United States v. Bohannon" on Justia Law

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Defendants were found liable under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. 1833a, for mail and wire fraud affecting a federally insured financial institution. The Government alleged that defendants violated the federal mail and wire fraud statutes by selling poor-quality mortgages to government-sponsored entities. Defendants argue that the evidence at trial shows at most an intentional breach of contract and is insufficient as a matter of law to find fraud. The court agreed with defendants that the trial evidence fails to demonstrate the contemporaneous fraudulent intent necessary to prove a scheme to defraud through contractual promises. Accordingly, the court reversed with instructions to enter judgment in favor of defendants. View "United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted of charges related to his involvement in a wire fraud conspiracy. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining that defendant was a leader or organizer of an “otherwise extensive” criminal activity and was thus subject to a four‐level sentencing enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(a). In this case, the district court failed to consider the factors the court explained in United States v. Carrozzella are central to the section 3B1.1(a) inquiry: namely, the number of knowing participants and the number of unknowing participants organized by the defendant to render services peculiar and necessary to the criminal scheme. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Kent" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, convicted of drug-related charges, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, alleging that his counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. 3006A, failed to timely inform him of the court's decision affirming his conviction and sentence. Petitioner argued that such failure deprived him of the opportunity to petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The court held that the CJA entitles defendants to representation in filing non‐frivolous petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc. Where counsel determines that a petition would be frivolous, counsel should inform the client of the opportunity to petition pro se, move to withdraw, and at the same time, move on behalf of the CJA client for an extension of time to file a pro se petition. In this case, petitioner has not had an opportunity to substantiate his allegations. Accordingly, the court remanded for further factual development. View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of one count of investment adviser fraud, one count of securities fraud, four counts of wire fraud, and six counts of offenses in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952. Defendant raised numerous issues on appeal. In this opinion, the court concluded that a criminal conviction premised on a violation of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6, does not require proof of intent to harm. Therefore, the district court did not err in not instructing the jury that investment adviser fraud requires proof of intent to harm his clients. In a summary order filed herewith, the court rejected defendant's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tagliaferri" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and related charges. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's 2015 decision modifying the special conditions of supervised release that had been imposed on him at the time of his sentencing in 2004 to include what are now standard conditions of supervision for individuals convicted of sex offenses. Because a change in defendant's circumstances is not a prerequisite to a modification under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the court declined to reverse the district court on that basis. The court held that a court may order special conditions of supervised release in addition to the usual general conditions, so long as they are “reasonably related” to criteria listed in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual section 5D1.3(b). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the new search condition was reasonably related to the offense conduct and purposes of the sentence or that it was a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. Defendant similarly fails to show that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the new polygraph/CVSA condition. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by not holding a second hearing on Probation Services’ modification request. The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Parisi" on Justia Law

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Defendant, a member of the New York City Council, was convicted of two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1346; two counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952; and one count of conspiracy to commit both substantive offenses, 18 U.S.C. 371. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his participation in two bribery schemes: 1) defendant accepted bribes in exchange for promising to funnel City funds to the bribe payers (Discretionary Funds Scheme) and 2) defendant was paid to help his co‐defendant, Malcolm A. Smith, bribe Republican Party officials to obtain what is known in New York as a Wilson‐Pakula certificate or authorization, which would have enabled Smith, a Democrat, to compete for the nomination of the Republican Party in the New York mayoral election (Wilson-Pakula Scheme). The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant took part in the Discretionary Funds Scheme with the intent required to sustain his convictions, and that defendant’s Wilson‐Pakula Scheme conduct violated both the Travel Act and the honest services fraud statute. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Halloran" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his conviction for child pornography-related charges, arguing that his plea was invalid because in accepting his guilty plea the district court failed to adhere strictly to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and because there was insufficient factual basis for finding the interstate commerce element of the production of child pornography count satisfied. Defendant also argued that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court concluded that the failure to comply strictly with all aspects of Rule 11 was not plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights, there was sufficient factual basis for the plea, and there was no procedural or substantive error in his sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pattee" on Justia Law

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Defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's application of a six-level enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) because the offense involved 250 or more victims, and a four-level enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(a) because defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. The court concluded that defendant's sentence is procedurally reasonable and the district court properly applied the enhancements at issue. The court remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to amend the written judgment to conform it to the oral sentence. The court otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Jesrum" on Justia Law