Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Thomas Wilkinson was charged with drug and firearm offenses, including possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The indictment noted two prior state drug convictions relevant to sentencing. Wilkinson initially pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty. The government filed a notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851 to enhance Wilkinson's sentence based on one prior drug-trafficking conviction.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois accepted Wilkinson's guilty plea. However, before sentencing, it was discovered that the prior conviction cited in the § 851 notice did not qualify as a "serious drug felony" under federal law. The government then sought to use a different prior conviction, not mentioned in the § 851 notice, to enhance Wilkinson's sentence. The district court agreed, finding that the government had substantially complied with § 851's requirements, and sentenced Wilkinson to a total of twenty years in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government failed to comply with the notice requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) by not providing written notice of the specific prior conviction it intended to use for the sentence enhancement before Wilkinson's guilty plea. The court found that this error was not harmless, as it affected Wilkinson's ability to make an informed decision about his plea and the district court's sentencing decision. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated Wilkinson's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "USA v Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Mark Johnson was convicted by an Indiana jury of felony rape, felony criminal confinement, and misdemeanor battery. He appealed, arguing that the exclusion of certain DNA evidence and the destruction of the victim's blood sample before toxicology testing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Indiana Court of Appeals vacated his convictions for criminal confinement and battery on double jeopardy grounds but affirmed the rape conviction. Johnson's petition to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court was denied. He then sought post-conviction review in state court and, after exhausting state remedies, sought federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied Johnson's habeas petition, concluding that his DNA-related claim was procedurally defaulted and that the state court reasonably applied federal law in determining that the State had not acted in bad faith when discarding the blood sample. Johnson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Johnson's claim regarding the exclusion of DNA evidence was procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise it in his petition for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court. Additionally, the court found that the Indiana Court of Appeals reasonably applied federal law in determining that the police had not acted in bad faith when disposing of the blood sample, as the evidence was only potentially exculpatory and there was no clear indication of bad faith. The court concluded that the state court's decision did not deviate from established federal law or constitute an unreasonable determination of the facts. View "Johnson v Sevier" on Justia Law

Steven Lindsey was convicted of murdering his wife in 2016 after three trials. He was sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. Lindsey appealed his conviction, but the Court of Appeals of Indiana denied his appeal, and the Indiana Supreme Court declined to hear his case. In 2019, Lindsey filed a pro se postconviction petition in state court, which has seen little progress over six years due to state court inaction and prosecution delays.The state court appointed a public defender for Lindsey nearly two years after he filed his petition, despite his wish to represent himself. The case experienced multiple delays, including the appointment and withdrawal of special prosecutors and the state court's failure to rule on Lindsey's motions. Lindsey actively tried to move his case forward, filing motions and responding to discovery requests, but the state court and prosecution's actions significantly delayed the proceedings.Lindsey then filed a federal habeas petition in the Northern District of Indiana in 2023, arguing that the inordinate delay in his state postconviction proceedings should excuse the exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The district court dismissed his petition, finding the delays reasonable and attributing them to Lindsey's legal inexperience. Lindsey appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case.The Seventh Circuit found that the six-year delay in Lindsey's state postconviction proceedings was inordinate and attributable to the state. The court held that the delay rendered the state process ineffective in protecting Lindsey's rights, excusing him from the exhaustion requirement. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of Lindsey's habeas petition. View "Lindsey v Neal" on Justia Law

Kevin Hodge was involved in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and pleaded guilty to the charge. The indictment specified that the conspiracy involved more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, which typically carries a ten-year statutory minimum sentence. However, Hodge met the criteria for the statutory "safety valve," which allows courts to disregard mandatory minimum sentences. Despite this, the district court sentenced him to ten years without discussing his eligibility for safety valve relief.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois initially handled the case. Hodge pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty. The court granted multiple continuances for his sentencing, partly due to his wife's serious health issues. The presentence investigation report (PSR) confirmed Hodge's eligibility for the safety valve, recommending a Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. Hodge requested a sentence of time served, citing his wife's health and his role as primary caregiver. The district court sentenced him to 120 months, acknowledging his wife's health issues but emphasizing the large quantity of drugs involved. The court did not address Hodge's safety valve argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had committed procedural error by not addressing Hodge's statutory safety valve argument, which is a principal mitigating argument. The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court's silence on this issue left uncertainty about whether it considered the safety valve's applicability. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated Hodge's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, requiring the district court to engage with the safety valve argument. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Rick Coley and David Duggar were convicted by a jury on drug and firearm charges related to their involvement in a drug-trafficking conspiracy led by Jason Betts in Indianapolis. Coley and Duggar argued that their relationships with Betts were merely buyer-seller relationships, not conspiratorial agreements. Coley also contested the sufficiency of the evidence for his firearm conviction, and both defendants challenged the denial of their motion to sever the drug-trafficking counts from the firearms counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied the motion to sever, noting that the firearms were found in the defendants' rooms along with evidence of drug trafficking. The jury found Coley and Duggar guilty on all counts, and the judge denied their motions for acquittal, sentencing Coley to 360 months and Duggar to 276 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy convictions, citing the recent en banc decision in United States v. Page, which established that repeated, distribution-quantity drug transactions alone can sustain a conspiracy conviction. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Coley's firearm conviction based on constructive possession, as the gun was found in his bedroom along with his personal items and drug-dealing implements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the defendants' arguments regarding the buyer-seller relationship, the sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm conviction, and the denial of the severance motion. The court concluded that the drug and firearm charges were properly joined and that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the severance motion. View "United States v Coley" on Justia Law

Investigators suspected Lamont Coleman of running a heroin operation from his apartment building in Gary, Indiana. They conducted fourteen controlled drug purchases using confidential informants and undercover officers. Evidence from these buys and surveillance led to a search warrant for Coleman’s apartment and a neighboring house he owned. The search uncovered drugs, money, and firearms, leading to Coleman’s conviction on most counts of the indictment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held a Franks hearing and denied Coleman’s motion to suppress evidence, finding sufficient probable cause for the search warrant. At trial, the jury convicted Coleman of being a felon in possession of a firearm, conspiring to distribute heroin, and possessing heroin with intent to distribute. The jury acquitted him of some drug distribution charges and possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. Coleman was sentenced to 240 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Coleman’s appeal, which included four claims. Coleman argued that the district court constructively amended his indictment by issuing generic jury instructions, the government withheld exculpatory information, the court improperly excluded an affidavit as evidence, and the court erred in considering acquitted conduct at sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions on all grounds. The court found no prejudice from the alleged constructive amendment, determined that the new evidence about the surveillance recordings was not material, upheld the exclusion of Leroy Coleman’s affidavit due to its unreliability, and noted that current precedent allows the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing. View "USA v Coleman" on Justia Law

Grant Gambaiani was sentenced to 34 years in prison after being found guilty by an Illinois jury of multiple crimes, including the repeated sexual assault of his minor cousin, D.G. During the trial, the courtroom was partially closed during D.G.'s testimony, which Gambaiani argued violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction, and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied review. Gambaiani then sought postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, but the state courts denied relief.Gambaiani filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, claiming violations of his constitutional rights to a public trial and effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Illinois Appellate Court's conclusion that Gambaiani waived his right to a public trial by failing to object to the partial closure was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The court also found that the partial closure of the courtroom during D.G.'s testimony did not violate Gambaiani's Sixth Amendment right. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit upheld the state court's determination that Gambaiani's attorneys provided effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, as the state court's credibility determinations were reasonable and supported by the record. View "Gambaiani v Greene" on Justia Law

Marcus Dixon, while on supervised release after a federal prison sentence, was arrested based on his suspected involvement in a hit-and-run accident and drug dealing. Probation officers conducted warrantless searches of his property, including a Pontiac, a cellphone, a home in Silvis, Illinois, an Audi, and a duffel bag, finding evidence of drug distribution and firearms. Dixon was convicted on multiple counts related to drug possession and firearms. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from these searches, arguing they exceeded the scope authorized by his supervised release conditions. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied Dixon's motion to suppress, concluding that he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched items and places. The court also found that the searches were supported by reasonable suspicion. Dixon was subsequently convicted on all counts by a jury and sentenced to 260 months in prison. He appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, challenging the searches' legality and the denial of an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Dixon failed to establish Fourth Amendment standing as he did not provide evidence of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched items and places. The court also found that the searches of the Pontiac and cellphone were reasonable and permissible under Dixon's supervised release conditions. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing, as Dixon did not identify any disputed material facts warranting such a hearing. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Edward C. Brown was convicted of distribution and possession of child pornography in 2015. After serving his prison sentence, he was placed on supervised release with conditions, including allowing unannounced visits by probation officers and reporting any cell phones he possessed. During an unannounced visit in April 2023, probation officers discovered an unreported cell phone in Brown's apartment. A forensic search of the phone revealed 75 thumbnail images of child pornography in an inaccessible cache folder. Brown was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography and convicted by a jury.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois admitted Brown's prior child pornography convictions as evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 414 and 404(b). The court also allowed evidence of Brown's supervised release status. At trial, the jury heard testimony from government witnesses, including a probation officer, a police detective, and an FBI special agent, as well as defense witnesses who highlighted deficiencies in the forensic evidence. Despite the lack of metadata and direct evidence linking Brown to the images, the jury found him guilty. The district court denied Brown's motion for acquittal and sentenced him to 78 months in prison, followed by a 15-year term of supervised release. The court also revoked his supervised release from prior convictions, adding a consecutive 6-month prison term.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Brown's conviction. The court held that the combination of the 75 thumbnail images, Brown's prior convictions, his interview admissions, and his failure to report the phone provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the forensic evidence, while flawed, was supported by other incriminating factors, including Brown's technological knowledge and his concealment of the phone from probation. View "USA v Brown" on Justia Law

Carlos Estrada, an Indiana resident, was arrested on February 2, 2023, after arranging the sale of 2,579 grams of heroin to an undercover officer in New Jersey. A search of his Indianapolis residence revealed an additional 371 grams of heroin, a digital scale, and a box containing six pounds of lactose, a cutting agent. Estrada committed this offense six months after being released from prison and starting supervised release for a 2019 heroin-distribution conspiracy conviction in the Southern District of New York.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana accepted Estrada's guilty plea to one count of possessing with intent to distribute at least 100 grams of heroin. The court sentenced him to 87 months in prison, at the low end of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Estrada appealed, arguing that the district court erred procedurally by not varying downward his criminal history category, which included points from a 2018 misdemeanor marijuana possession conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Estrada contended that the district court did not adequately explain its decision and misapprehended its authority to depart downward. The appellate court found that the district court's explanation was sufficient, considering Estrada's extensive criminal history, including serious juvenile offenses and the fact that he committed the current offense while on supervised release. The court also determined that the district court did not err in its understanding of its authority to vary downward. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence of 87 months in prison. View "United States v Estrada" on Justia Law