Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Gary Wilson was previously convicted under Illinois law for possession of child pornography, a statute that criminalizes possession of sexually explicit images of minors as well as individuals with severe or profound intellectual disabilities. Nearly twenty years later, Wilson used gaming systems and social media to solicit sexually explicit images from minors, leading to his guilty plea on two counts of production of child pornography under federal law.At sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, the government argued that Wilson’s prior Illinois conviction triggered a federal sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), which increases the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for defendants with a prior conviction “relating to” possession of child pornography. Wilson’s attorney did not object to the application of this enhancement, and the district court imposed a sixty-year sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Wilson argued for the first time that the Illinois statute was broader than the federal definition because it also covered images of adults with certain disabilities, and therefore should not trigger the federal enhancement. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the issue for plain error due to Wilson’s failure to object below. The court held that, under the plain error standard, it was not “clear or obvious” that the Illinois statute did not “relate to” the possession of child pornography as required by § 2251(e), especially given the broad language Congress used and existing circuit precedent. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement and Wilson’s sentence. View "USA v Wilson" on Justia Law

Andrew Johnston was convicted by a jury of attempted bank robbery and sentenced to 168 months in prison. While awaiting transfer to federal prison, Johnston reported to authorities that a fellow inmate, a Sinaloa Cartel leader, had ordered a hit on another inmate. Johnston assisted law enforcement by recording a conversation with the cartel leader and later testified at the cartel leader’s sentencing hearing. Although the judge in that case did not credit Johnston’s testimony, the recorded conversation was considered in sentencing the cartel leader. In recognition of Johnston’s assistance, the government moved for a 25% reduction in his sentence under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the motion was filed more than two years after Johnston’s sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, addressed the government’s untimely Rule 35(b) motion, accepting the government’s waiver of the one-year time limit. The judge found Johnston’s cooperation useful but determined that his repeated frivolous postconviction litigation undermined any inference of genuine acceptance of responsibility. As a result, the court granted only a 10% reduction, lowering Johnston’s sentence to 151 months, rather than the 25% requested.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first considered whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the untimely Rule 35(b) motion. The Seventh Circuit held that the one-year time limit in Rule 35(b)(1) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, which may be waived, overruling its prior decision in United States v. McDowell. The court further held that no legal rule barred the district judge from considering Johnston’s postconviction litigation conduct in evaluating his acceptance of responsibility. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant only a 10% sentence reduction. View "USA v Johnston" on Justia Law

Kenneth Courtright operated Today’s Growth Consultant (TGC), also known as The Income Store, which promised investors guaranteed, perpetual monthly payments based on website advertising revenue. Investors, called “site partners,” paid upfront fees under Consulting Performance Agreements (CPAs), which stated that these fees would be used exclusively for website-related expenses and that TGC was in satisfactory financial condition. In reality, TGC’s advertising revenue and business loans were insufficient to meet its payment obligations, and Courtright used new investors’ upfront fees to pay existing investors, misrepresenting the company’s financial health and the use of funds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Courtright’s criminal trial for seven counts of wire fraud. The government presented evidence of TGC’s financial shortfall and improper use of upfront fees, including testimony from employees and financial experts. The jury convicted Courtright on all counts. At sentencing, the parties debated the loss calculation, with the court ultimately adopting a $69.3 million loss figure and granting certain deductions, resulting in a final loss amount of $52.5 million. Courtright was sentenced to 90 months in prison and two years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Courtright’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the loss calculation. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Courtright guilty of wire fraud, as he made material false statements about the use of upfront fees and TGC’s financial condition, and acted with intent to defraud. The court also found that Courtright waived his causation argument regarding loss calculation and that the district court did not clearly err in denying deductions for operating expenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v Courtright" on Justia Law

Police responded to a 911 call in Marshfield, Wisconsin, reporting that Jaison Coleman had threatened to kill his wife, Lisa Coleman, and was still inside their home. Officer Jamie Kizer arrived and spoke with Lisa on the porch, asking about the safety of her children and the location of her husband. Lisa hesitated to answer questions about her children’s safety and initially declined to allow the officer inside. After a brief pause, Lisa returned to the doorway, and following further discussion, she agreed to let Officer Kizer and his colleagues enter the home. Once inside, Lisa directed the officers to the children’s location and indicated where Coleman might be. The officers found Coleman, conducted a protective pat down, and learned from the children that Coleman had threatened Lisa with a gun.Based on information obtained during their entry, the officers secured a warrant to search the home, which led to the discovery of several firearms. Coleman was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the firearms, arguing that Lisa had not consented to the officers’ entry. A magistrate judge found that Lisa had consented and recommended denial of the motion. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and denied the suppression motion, also concluding that the officers did not exceed the scope of Lisa’s consent. Coleman pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error. The appellate court held that Lisa’s consent was voluntary and that the officers acted within the scope of her consent. The court affirmed Coleman’s conviction, finding no error in the district court’s rulings. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Devin Seats was convicted in Illinois state court in 2012 of three felonies related to a shooting, including aggravated battery with a firearm, armed habitual criminal, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. His pre-sentence investigation report listed six prior felonies, three of which were for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The sentencing judge referenced Seats’s “considerable criminal background” but did not specifically mention the vacated convictions. Seats was sentenced to concurrent prison terms.After his conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied review, Illinois law changed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that certain subsections of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute were unconstitutional, which affected two of Seats’s prior convictions. Seats sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was based on inaccurate information due to the inclusion of these now-invalid convictions. The Illinois Appellate Court vacated his armed habitual criminal conviction but declined to order resentencing, finding that the vacated convictions did not result in a greater sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court denied further review.Seats then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, arguing that his sentence was based on inaccurate information and that the statute of limitations should run from the date his prior convictions were vacated. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely, calculating the limitations period from the date his conviction became final. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Seats forfeited his argument for a later limitations period by not raising it in the district court and that the circumstances did not warrant plain error review. The court also found that the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably determined the sentencing judge did not rely on the vacated convictions. View "Seats v Nurse" on Justia Law

Otis Elion pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine in federal court in 2017. His sentence was enhanced under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a “career offender” based on three prior convictions, including two Illinois state convictions for delivery of a look-alike substance. The enhancement depended on whether those state convictions qualified as “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines, which required a categorical approach comparing the elements of the state statutes to the federal definition.After sentencing, Elion filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, arguing that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the career offender enhancement. The district court initially denied relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (in Elion I) found Elion was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object and remanded for the district court to determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington.On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Elion’s attorney had identified the correct legal issues, researched the relevant law, and reasonably applied the categorical approach, even though she ultimately reached an incorrect legal conclusion. The district court concluded her performance was not deficient.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that an attorney’s reasonable but mistaken legal conclusion does not automatically constitute deficient performance under Strickland. The court found that, at the time of sentencing, existing caselaw did not sufficiently foreshadow the argument that ultimately succeeded, and that counsel’s overall performance met prevailing professional norms. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Elion v USA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who, in 2005, forcibly entered his estranged wife’s home, threatened her with a knife, and sexually assaulted her. He was convicted by a jury in Allen County, Indiana, of rape, burglary, and related offenses, and sentenced to 70 years in prison. The evidence at trial included testimony from the victim, their daughter, and other witnesses, as well as the defendant’s own statements to police. The defendant had a history of domestic abuse and was subject to a protective order at the time of the offenses.After his conviction, the defendant appealed, but the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied review. He then filed a state postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that his trial attorney failed to pursue plea negotiations and made poor decisions regarding witness strategy. For over a decade, his postconviction attorneys took no substantive action to develop the record. When he proceeded pro se, the state court required him to submit affidavits, but he was unable to obtain one from his trial counsel. The state trial court denied relief, finding insufficient evidence that plea negotiations would have changed the outcome, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the lack of corroborating evidence for his claims. The Indiana Supreme Court again denied review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case after the district court denied federal habeas relief and an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit held that, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the failure of postconviction counsel to develop the record is attributed to the petitioner, and the statutory exceptions for evidentiary hearings did not apply. The court also found that the state appellate court’s decision was not unreasonable under federal law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Ford v Reagle" on Justia Law

John Seiwert, who had a long history of daily heroin and crack cocaine use, was found in possession of firearms at his home in Illinois shortly after his father’s death. Law enforcement, investigating Seiwert’s drug dealer, observed frequent contact between the two and recovered firearms and drug paraphernalia from Seiwert’s residence. Seiwert admitted to using crack cocaine just hours before police arrived and to being a daily user for twenty years. He was charged with two counts of possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of, or addict to, a controlled substance under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Seiwert’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which argued that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Second Amendment, both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. At trial, the government presented evidence of Seiwert’s drug use and firearm possession, and the jury convicted him on both counts. The district court denied Seiwert’s post-trial motions and sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Seiwert’s arguments that § 922(g)(3) violated the Second Amendment, was unconstitutionally vague, and that the evidence was insufficient. The court held that, under the Bruen framework, § 922(g)(3) does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Seiwert, finding it analogous to historical laws disarming the intoxicated and mentally ill. The court also found that its prior decision in United States v. Cook foreclosed Seiwert’s vagueness challenge, and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Seiwert" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company participated in a federal program that required it to report the average price it received for drugs sold to wholesalers, which in turn affected the rebates it owed the government under Medicaid. From 2005 to 2017, the company sold drugs to wholesalers at an initial price, but if it raised the price before the wholesaler resold the drugs to pharmacies, it required the wholesaler to pay the difference. The company reported only the initial price as the average manufacturer price (AMP), excluding the subsequent price increases, which resulted in lower reported AMPs and thus lower rebate payments to the government. The company justified this exclusion by categorizing the price increases as part of a bona fide service fee to wholesalers, even though the increased value was ultimately paid by pharmacies.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case after a qui tam action was filed by a relator, who alleged that the company’s AMP calculations were false and violated the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court granted summary judgment to the relator on the issue of falsity, finding the AMP calculations and related certifications were factually and legally false. The issues of scienter (knowledge) and materiality were tried before a jury, which found in favor of the relator and awarded substantial damages. The company appealed, challenging the findings on falsity, scienter, and materiality, while the relator cross-appealed on the calculation of the number of FCA violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the company’s exclusion of price increase values from AMP was unreasonable and contradicted the plain language and purpose of the relevant statutes, regulations, and agreements. The court also held that the jury reasonably found the company acted knowingly and that the false AMPs were material to the government’s payment decisions. The court rejected the cross-appeal on damages, finding the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. View "Streck v Eli Lilly and Company" on Justia Law

Tyree M. Neal, Jr. was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine under federal law. After evading arrest in a high-speed chase and carjacking, he was eventually apprehended. The government sought a sentencing enhancement based on Neal’s prior Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of cocaine, which, if applied, increased his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years. Neal pleaded guilty, represented by several attorneys during plea negotiations and sentencing. At sentencing, the district court found the enhancement applicable and imposed the 30-year maximum. Neal appealed, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and lacked a factual basis, but did not challenge the enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction.Subsequently, Neal filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his appellate, sentencing, and plea counsel were deficient for failing to raise the argument that his Illinois cocaine conviction could not support the federal enhancement, an argument that later succeeded in United States v. Ruth. The district court denied relief, finding that counsel were not deficient for failing to anticipate a change in law, and held an evidentiary hearing regarding appellate counsel’s performance. The court concluded appellate counsel was not ineffective, as the unraised argument was not “obvious nor clearly stronger” than those presented.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, although later precedent established the categorical approach to such enhancements, counsel’s failure to raise the argument did not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that none of Neal’s attorneys performed below an objective standard of reasonableness given the law at the time, and thus denied collateral relief. View "Neal v USA" on Justia Law