Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A police informant, wearing a hidden camera, bought heroin and methamphetamine from Winfield during four controlled buys at Winfield’s apartment. Each time, the informant saw additional drugs and paraphernalia in the apartment. Days after the last buy, police obtained a warrant and searched Winfield’s apartment. They found almost $3000 in a closet, and a gram of heroin and drug paraphernalia in Winfield’s girlfriend’s purse. In the garage, in the trunk of Winfield’s car (in a hidden compartment in a brake‐fluid canister), they found 27 grams of methamphetamine and 38 grams of heroin. Winfield admitted that there were not more drugs in the apartment because “[h]e had flushed anything he had down the toilet when the SWAT team was approaching.” Winfield pled guilty to distributing heroin. The court applied a two‐level upward adjustment to Winfield’s sentence because he “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). After calculating a guidelines range of 62-78 months, the court imposed a sentence of 55 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Nothing in the guideline requires a sentencing court to find that the defendant stored multiple kilograms of drugs over an extended time; the court need only find that a drug‐related activity was one of his “primary or principal” uses. Winfield’s drug‐related uses for his apartment were not merely “incidental” to his residence; he was “primarily living off proceeds from drug sales.” View "United States v. Winfield" on Justia Law

Featherly lived in a Wisconsin trailer park when law enforcement discovered that Featherly’s Internet‐service account was sharing child pornography. FBI agent Hauser obtained a warrant to search Featherly’s residence, stating that an agent “was able to determine the IP address of this [user’s] computer” and to ascertain that an Internet‐service provider, Charter, had assigned that unique IP address to Featherly’s account. Based on the images found, Featherly was charged with receipt and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(4). Featherly moved for a “Franks” hearing, seeking to quash the warrant and suppress evidence because Hauser had falsely stated in his affidavit that the IP address was traced to Featherly’s computer; an IP address identifies only a modem, not a particular computer. The magistrate concluded that probable cause supported the warrant, but that even if Featherly’s explanation were correct, Wilkins did not perpetrate any knowing or reckless falsehood. The judge agreed that any mistake was irrelevant because Charter's identification of the modem was sufficient to support an inference that pornography would be found on Featherly's computer. Featherly pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the inaccuracy kept the judge from considering the possibility that someone else in the trailer park connected to Featherly’s modem wirelessly, without his knowledge. Hauser's affidavit specified that he used the term “computer” consistently with 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(1), which includes a “communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with” a computer. View "United States v. Featherly" on Justia Law

After multiple law enforcement agencies investigated drug trafficking in the St. Louis, Missouri area, several conspirators were arrested. Syms, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846. The district court sentenced Syms to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the mandatory minimum sentence contained in the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. The court did exercise its discretion in sentencing, applying the statutory factors and the guidelines to impose a sentence above the mandatory minimum. The court noted that the sentence was at the low end of the guidelines range and rejected a disproportionality argument. The court upheld the district court’s drug-quantity calculation, imposition of a sentencing enhancement, and denial of a safety valve reduction in his sentencing, based on a finding that Syms was a manager or supervisor of the operation. View "United States v. Syms" on Justia Law

Thomas was charged with conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, a mixture or substance containing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and two counts of possessing, with intent to distribute, a mixture or substance containing heroin, section 841(a)(1). A jury later found Thomas guilty and the court concluded that, because of four prior felony controlled substance offenses, Thomas was a career offender, and sentenced him to 216 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conspiracy charge. The court noted that his co-conspirator, Andrews, drove Thomas to and from Chicago to buy heroin, rented vehicles for the trips, and, on at least one occasion, packaged heroin for Thomas. A jury could have concluded reasonably that Andrews was a coconspirator; any lack of profit motive on Andrews’s part does not alter that status. The court also did not err in imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a drug house; the record showed that Thomas lived in Andrews’s home and used that home as part of his distribution process. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Because of the quantity and his criminal history, his guideline sentencing range was 151-188 months and his statutory maximum 240 months. The government recommended, and the court imposed, a 216‐month sentence. The judge generally cited the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, calling the defendant “a poster child for being a career offender,” and saying “unfortunately you may be one of those people that will never be able to conform to be a law‐abiding person.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that, while the sentence lacked sophisticated analysis, “prosecutors as well as the judge are highly experienced, their hunches are likely often to be reliable.” The court suggested that, for the future, consultation with the Sentencing Commission might be a valuable resource. View "United States v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

In Presley v. Georgia (2010), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire. In one of the cases consolidated for appeal, Pinno was convicted of assisting in the mutilation of a corpse and interference with police, having assisted her son in disposing of the body of his girlfriend, whom the son had murdered. The trial judge called for a pool of more than 80 prospective jurors. To assure that enough seats were available for the prospective jurors and to prevent members of the public from influencing the jury by remarks or facial expressions, given the “gruesome and bizarre facts,” the Wisconsin state judge ordered spectators to leave and the door locked until all the prospective jurors were seated. After they were seated the door was unlocked and members of the public were able to enter. The other defendant, Seaton, was convicted of first‐degree reckless homicide. The public was, similarly, temporarily excluded. In neither case did defense counsel object. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of their habeas petitions, noting that the trial judge may have had no option but to exclude the public until all the panel members were seated and that it is possible that the defendants would have been harmed by the presence of the public. View "Seaton v. Smith" on Justia Law

While Cureton was under investigation for dealing crack cocaine, he used a gun to demand ransom from his roommate’s family; her grandfather agreed by telephone to wire Cureton $4,500. A jury convicted Cureton of interstate communication of a ransom demand (18 U.S.C. 875(a)), attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)), and two counts of possessing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The first 924(c) charge, Count 2, was based on the ransom demand; Count 4, was based on attempted extortion. The case was consolidated with Cureton's drug possession case, Case 106. The guideline range in Case 106 was 360-720 months; the range for the ransom demand and attempted extortion was 240 months, the statutory maximum. The district court imposed a sentence of 360 months for Case 106 to run concurrently with a 240-month sentence for ransom and attempted extortion, adding consecutive sentences for the section 924(c) counts—84 months on Count 2 and 300 months on Count 4, for a sentence of 62 years. On first remand the district court sentenced Cureton to 37 years, eliminating the 300 months imposed on Count 4. On second remand, relating to conditions of supervised release, the court re-imposed the 444‐month sentence. In his third appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of an argument that making a ransom demand does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court found no plain error in interpreting that federal crime as necessarily including an implied threat of physical force. View "United States v. Cureton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The judge increased his sentencing guidelines range by four levels, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), for possessing the firearm in connection with the distribution of an illegal drug, to a range of 57-71 months, but then imposed a sentence only 36 months, within the guideline range if the four-level enhancement and the gun’s high-capacity magazine were ignored. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, noting that Defendant’s “use” of the gun consisted of taking it as collateral pending payment for a sale of synthetic marijuana and subsequently selling it to a confidential informant. The court stated, “neither 'use' nor 'carry' accurately describes the defendant’s relation to the Glock” and that there was no evidence that the synthetic marijuana is a “scheduled” (illegal) drug. Although the sentence was within the guideline range for the offense of being a felon in possession of a gun, the judge’s remarks at sentencing suggest that his real concern was that the gun had been used in an illegal-drug transaction. The court stated that it could not “see the legal significance of the gun, taken as collateral, secreted in the garage, and then sold.” View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law

In 2003, Murdock was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. In connection with his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a suppression hearing was held to determine whether Murdock's statements to the police were voluntary, given that Murdock was 16 years old and was without an attorney or other adult present. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision was not unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: the court applied the correct test in a reasonable manner in finding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Murdock gave his statements voluntarily. The court considered Murdock’s age, and that he did not have an attorney or other adult present, but found that he was able to understand and provide an adequate waiver of his rights. The court considered that Murdock was detained for approximately seven hours, but noted that the interview lasted only three hours and that Murdock was given the opportunity to eat and use the restroom. There was no evidence that the officers threatened him or otherwise created a coercive environment. The court found that Murdock did not appear to be under distress or frightened on a video recording. View "Murdock v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

In 1995, Turner was convicted of murder, criminal confinement, and class A felony attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He did not seek certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court; his opportunity to do so expired on September 22, 1997. In 2000, Turner successfully sought state post‐conviction relief. In 2013, the trial court reduced Turner’s robbery conviction to a Class B felony robbery conviction and resentenced Turner on that count. The order did not reference Turner’s other convictions or sentences. In 2014, Turner sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his life sentence for murder was unconstitutional under Apprendi and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court ruled that the deadline for Turner to file had expired on September 23, 1998, one year after the last day on which he could have filed a petition for certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), reasoning that the state post‐conviction relief process could not toll the federal deadline because Turner’s time under federal law had expired before he sought relief. The Seventh Circuit found that Turner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c), but ultimately affirmed the dismissal. The court rejected Turner’s argument that “the date on which the judgment became final” was altered by the state court’s grant of relief on the robbery count; his murder conviction and life sentence were unaffected by the 2013 resentencing. View "Turner v. Brown" on Justia Law