Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In August 2008, a Milwaukee County jury found Carpenter guilty of kidnapping, false imprisonment, four counts of second‐degree sexual assault, and four counts of first‐degree sexual assault. Carpenter was sentenced to 59 years’ imprisonment followed by 24 years of extended supervision. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Carpenter’s petition for review. He unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The petition had been filed almost seven months after the one-year period for filing had passed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Carpenter’s request for equitable tolling. Carpenter did not exercise reasonable diligence in pursuit of his rights. Although he filed two federal motions seeking an extension of time, he ignored the district court’s instructions regarding the proper way to seek such an extension. Carpenter failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his physical and mental health issues, even when combined with the other circumstances he classifies as extraordinary, “actually impaired his ability to pursue his claims.” View "Carpenter v. Douma" on Justia Law

Haney pled guilty to possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that Haney had at least three prior convictions for “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) (ACCA). His convictions were for two burglaries and armed bank robbery in Illinois and three aggravated assaults in Pennsylvania. The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The Illinois burglary statute at the time of Haney’s 1975 conviction included locations other than a “building or other structure,” falling outside the “generic” offense as defined by the Supreme Court, so Haney’s Illinois burglary convictions are not violent felonies under the ACCA. Even assuming that Haney’s convictions for aggravated assault are violent felonies, Haney is one predicate short of being an armed career criminal if, as Haney argues, all three of his assaults occurred on the same “occasion.” The issue was not addressed at sentencing. View "United States v. Haney" on Justia Law

Police responded to a report of a man with a gun and saw Rash take something (a gun) from his waistband and drop it. Rash was arrested. He stated that the gun belonged to his girlfriend, Monica; after she left her gun in his house, he went to return it to her since, as a convicted felon, he could not have a gun in his house. He repeated the story at trial. The government introduced video footage showing that Rash had twice accompanied Monica to the gun store to help purchase it. At sentencing, the court applied a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, finding that the videotape showed “clearly that [he was] engaged in assisting in the purchase of that gun.” The enhancement did not change the Guidelines range. Rash was subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). After the Supreme Court invalidated the part of the ACCA that determined Rash’s sentence, Rash’s attorney unsuccessfully opposed the enhancement, arguing that Rash’s statements were not material because Rash had admitted that he possessed a gun. The court calculated a range of 95-115 months (77-96 months without the enhancement). The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 100-month sentence. The trial court reasonably concluded that Rush’s testimony was intended to encourage the jury to nullify and not convict him of possession. View "United States v. Rash" on Justia Law

In 2013 Elder and others, including his father, were charged with conspiring to traffic methamphetamine from Arizona to Indiana. Elder and his father pleaded not guilty. Six co-defendants pleaded guilty. Some testified for the prosecution. A jury found Elder guilty of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841; 846. The government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. 851 indicating that Elder had a 1999 conviction for possession of equipment or chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs and a 1997 conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and sought application of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which requires a defendant to be sentenced to life if he is convicted of a serious drug offense after having previously been convicted of two drug‐related felonies. The district court stated that it believed a life sentence was overly harsh, but that it had no discretion under the statute. Finding that Elder’s prior convictions qualified as felony drug offenses, the court sentenced Elder to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the admission of testimony by co-conspirators under Rule 800, but vacated the sentence. Elder’s 1997 conviction did not qualify as a drug-related felony. View "United States v. Elder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, was in his fourteenth year at a Wisconsin medium-security prison when he was placed in a cell with DaSilva, who, 12 days later, sexually assaulted plaintiff in their cell. DaSilva was in prison for having sexually assaulted a woman. Both were classified as “medium security” inmates. DaSilva had committed eight violations of the prison’s rules in two years, including fighting, lying, theft, and use of intoxicants—but no sexual offenses. An investigation resulted in a criminal charge being lodged against DaSilva and an official notice that plaintiff and DaSilva were not to share a cell. Plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to the danger of sexual assaulted by DaSilva, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s challenge to the practice of random assignment of cellmates. The court noted the prison’s compliance with the notification requirements of the 2003 Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 15601–15609, and that there was no evidence that plaintiff expressed any concern about being vulnerable to sexual assault. The staff was apparently unaware that the plaintiff was perceived by other prisoners to be homosexual; nor was there any evidence of such a perception, apart from the plaintiff’s unsupported claim. View "Ramos v. Hamblin" on Justia Law

In 2010, Alston was convicted of five charges and placed on probation. Dane County law enforcement agencies established a “Special Investigation Unit” (SIU) to monitor and offer resources to probationers whom they identified as “serious, assaultive offenders.” In 2011, Alston was identified for participation in that program and was offered resources aimed at deterring him from reoffending, with the admonition that any probation violation would result in the Department of Corrections vigorously seeking full revocation of probation. Alston was arrested a month later, for violating his probation. A revocation hearing was held before an ALJ for the Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, who stated that she had attended a presentation on the SIU program and her understanding that “it would be expected that they wouldn’t be given another chance. … [they] would be revoked.” Alston unsuccessfully sought substitution of a “neutral party” who had not attended the presentation. His probation revocation was upheld by state courts, which held that the ALJ's attendance at the presentation did not create an impermissibly high risk of bias in violation of Alston’s due process rights. Rejecting Alston’s federal habeas petition, the district court found, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. View "Alston v. Smith" on Justia Law

Holman used heroin to manage pain associated with rheumatoid arthritis. She became addicted and became a dealer. In 2012, Henschel died of a heroin overdose. Wisconsin law enforcement discovered Holman’s heroin distribution ring; a co-conspirator had provided Henschel with heroin on the day she died. Agents conducted a controlled purchase from Holman. Holman was charged with participating in a drug conspiracy, which caused a death, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C). The government later dropped the causing-death element. Holman pled guilty. At sentencing hearing, the court accounted for downward adjustments under the “safety valve” provision of U.S.S.G. 5C1.2 and for acceptance of responsibility, calculated Holman’s Guidelines range as 57-71 months, found that range higher than necessary, and sentenced Holman to 36 months. While her appeal was pending, the district court found the government’s evidence insufficient to prove that Holman’s co-conspirator’s heroin actually caused Henschel’s overdose. The Seventh Circuit remanded for redetermination​ of Holman’s sentence without consideration of the death. At resentencing Holman asked for probation, noting that she had entered a drug treatment program and had not relapsed. The court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and imposed a 33-month prison sentence, agreeing that she should be eligible for the prison’s residential drug treatment program. The court declined to impose a sentence of probation, noting the need for deterrence and her potential for relapse if returned to the community. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court lengthened the sentence to promote rehabilitation. View "United States v. Holman" on Justia Law

In April 2013, Schrode committed predatory sexual assault against a four‐year‐old family member, Jane. He pled guilty in state court in February 2014 and was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment. In June 2013, the FBI executed a search warrant of Schrode’s Springfield, Illinois home and discovered that Schrode sent child pornography to a man in Michigan. In exchange, Schrode watched that man through streaming video and directed him as he sexually assaulted his son. The FBI discovered images and videos of child pornography on Schrode’s computer. In June 2014, when Schrode was in custody, his wife discovered videos of him sexually assaulting Jane at a friend’s home. The video was turned over to the FBI. Schrode pled guilty to four federal child pornography counts and was sentenced to 630 months’ imprisonment, some to run consecutively to his state sentence, plus a life term of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in requiring some of his federal sentence to run consecutively to his state sentence, because it did not err in finding that his state offense was not relevant conduct for all of his federal offenses. The court adequately justified imposing a life term of supervision; Schrode waived any challenges to his conditions of release at the sentencing hearing. The court granted a limited remand for sentencing calculation in compliance with 18 U.S.C. 2251(e). View "United States v. Schrode" on Justia Law

Wykoff pleaded guilty to wire-fraud charges after soliciting bribes and kickbacks while a Bloomington, Indiana, official. The district judge sentenced him to 55 months in prison and to pay restitution of $446,335 to Bloomington and a $1,100 assessment, with payments “to begin immediately.” The judge added a “special instruction”: “Any unpaid restitution balance during the term of supervision shall be paid at a rate of not less than 10% of the defendant’s gross monthly income.” The government obtained a garnishment under 28 U.S.C. 3205(b)(1), issued to the Indiana pension system because it had an account in Wykoff’s name worth $47,937. Wykoff requested a hearing to determine whether any of the money was exempt. He argued that he had already forfeited two of his homes and the government had seized money from his prison account and that the balance should be deferred to his release because the “special instruction” limited his restitution payments to 10 percent of his monthly income. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument. The instruction says that 10 percent is the minimum amount he must pay. The federal criminal code requires that restitution be paid immediately unless the district court provides otherwise, 18 U.S.C. 3572(d)(1), which it did not. View "United States v. Wykoff" on Justia Law

Kruger was arrested in 2013 after a day-long crime spree in southwestern Wisconsin during which he robbed his uncle, kidnapped a 69-year-old farmer, stole multiple vehicles, and drove over rural roads at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour in an unsuccessful effort to elude capture. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court ordered him to serve a below-guidelines prison term of 180 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no plain error in the enhancement for use of a firearm, and that any potential error in the calculation of his criminal history did not affect his advisory Guidelines sentencing range. The court noted the district court took into consideration that “Kruger has led a troubled life.” He had a sentencing range of 292 to 365 months. Because that range exceeded the statutory maximum term of 240 months, the statutory maximum became the Guidelines sentencing range. U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(a); 5G1.2(d). View "United States v. Kruger" on Justia Law