Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, “Mickey” Davis made a $300,000 start-up loan to Ideal Motors, a Melrose Park, Illinois car dealership, owned by R.J. Serpico and his father Joseph Serpico. Within months, Joseph had gambled the money away and Ideal Motors had fallen deep in arrears. A man named “Mickey” conspired to have R.J.’s legs broken. Though the scheme was never carried out, Davis was convicted of attempted extortion and using extortionate means to collect a loan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of out-of-court statements by several people involved in the conspiracy, noting independent evidence that the conspiracy existed and tending to show that Davis participated in it. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow prosecutors to impeach the testimony of a key prosecution witness with his prior inconsistent statements to government agents. The court also rejected arguments concerning witness immunity, the scope of cross-examination, and the government’s closing argument. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Hancock, charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5841, 5845(a)(2), and 5861(d), unsuccessfully challenged the search warrant that had led to his arrest by requesting a “Franks” hearing. He argued that critical evidence bearing on a confidential informant’s credibility had been omitted from the probable cause affidavit. Hancock also moved to preclude the use of prior convictions as the basis for the section 922(g)(1) count, arguing that the release document issued by the Colorado Department of Corrections lulled him into believing that all of his rights, including the right to possess a weapon, had been restored. The district court, assessing the release document within its four corners, held that the document did not communicate any restoration of rights to Hancock. After his conviction on both counts, the court imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the affidavit established probable cause, despite the omission of information about the informant’s criminal history, and that the release document did not indicate a restoration of rights. View "United States v. Hancock" on Justia Law

Urena, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted as an alien found in the U.S. after having been deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and was sentenced to 100 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Urena was directed, at the end of his prison sentence, to surrender to the Homeland Security Department for a determination of deportability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s refusal to exclude evidence of Urena’s seven prior removals under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and denial of Urena’s Motion for a Mistrial after the prosecution published to the jury an exhibit that included the fact of Urena’s prior conviction for “Felony Class 4 Cocaine Possession.” The district court found a specific non‐propensity purpose for the evidence of prior removals and was in the best position to find that the jury’s attention had not been drawn to the prior conviction information on the exhibit because the court itself had not noticed it until it was brought to its attention. View "United States v. Urena" on Justia Law

Leaver’s car was struck by a driver whose insurer provided Leaver a rental car. Leaver went to Hertz’s Wisconsin office, signed a rental agreement, and drove to Montana. When Leaver failed to return the car by the contract date, Hertz reported it stolen. Weeks later, the car was located in Montana. Six months later, Leaver was charged with theft by lessee. Leaver contacted the prosecutor, identifying Hertz employees from whom he claimed to have permission to act as he did. The rental agreement contained three inconsistent statements about the maximum time the car could be kept. Leaver claims that he returned the car to the Hertz Belgrade, Montana parking lot within two weeks of the stated return date. Leaver was arrested in Montana, remained in jail for two months, and was extradited to Wisconsin. The court denied motions to dismiss. Weeks later, the prosecutor dropped the charge. Leaver filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming intentional or reckless omission from his police reports of facts that would have affected the probable-cause determination. The judge rejected the claim on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the officer was aware of the information at issue; if he was aware of it, qualified immunity applies. It is unclear whether the information would have negated probable cause. View "Leaver v. Shortess" on Justia Law

Jones was a family counselor and collected dozens of guns and thousands of rounds of ammunition, although he had a prior felony conviction. The FBI discovered the weapons while investigating Jones for fraudulent health care billing. He was convicted of illegally possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. His concurrent sentences amount to 100 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ex parte pretrial restraint of life insurance policies violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; that the court erroneously denied his request for new counsel and he was denied the opportunity to testify during his fraud trial; and challenging the sentencing guideline computation. Jones did not object at the time that his life insurance policies were restrained, nor did he object during the district court proceedings, although the restraining order invited him to “petition for a pre-trial hearing if he can demonstrate that he has no other assets available with which to retain counsel” or if he could show that the policies were “not subject to forfeiture.” Given Jones’s pattern of delay and obstruction, the district judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Jones’s request for appointment of yet another lawyer. Jones willingly waived his right to testify. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Foreman alleged that Rockford police officers came to his restaurant because the man living in an upstairs apartment accused Foreman of cutting off his electricity. Foreman refused to answer questions and was arrested. Prosecutor Leisten charged Foreman with obstructing a police officer. The charge was dismissed. The court ordered Foreman to show cause why claims against Leisten should not be dismissed; the prosecutor would have absolute immunity in her individual capacity and the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims. In a previous case Foreman’s lawyer, Redmond, had raised similar claims against prosecutors that were dismissed, so the court ordered Redmond to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court granted Leisten judgment on the pleadings, noting that Foreman had not offered a basis for challenging the existing law of prosecutorial immunity and that the official capacity claim would not fall under the Eleventh Amendment's exception for injunctive relief because Foreman’s complaint did not allege an ongoing constitutional violation. The court censured Redmond, stating that he did not argue for a change in the law until after he was faced with a recommendation of censure. The court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Foreman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suits under section 1983 for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” View "Foreman v. Wadsworth" on Justia Law

Brown was arrested for selling heroin in Chicago. He offered to assist the police, telling the officers that he knew where a man named “Jimmie” stored large amounts of drugs and that he was supposed to meet Jimmie later that day. A search turned up eight baggies with approximately 1000 capsules containing 135 grams of heroin and the arrest of Sessom. As a hearing on Sessom’s motion to suppress, Brown denied having given the police the information. Sessom accepted a plea bargain and withdrew that motion before a ruling. Brown subsequently pled guilty to conspiring to distribute drugs and, with a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, was sentenced to 60 months, below both the actual guideline range and the range of 70 to 87 months that would have applied without the obstruction enhancement. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The judge who actually heard Brown’s testimony never made findings about the honesty of his testimony or the merits of the Sessom’s motion to suppress, but imposed the obstruction enhancement based on the other judge’s interim impressions about earlier testimony from police officers. That was not a sufficient factual foundation to support the enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Davila pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and to possessing a firearm in connection with the planned robbery and a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The separate drug count was dismissed. The judge sentenced Davila to consecutive sentences of six months’ imprisonment under the Hobbs Act and 60 months’ imprisonment under section 924(c). He did not appeal. After the Supreme Court held, in Johnson v. United States, that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), is unconstitutionally vague, Davila filed a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that conspiracy to commit a robbery could be deemed a crime of violence only under the residual clause in section 924(c)(3)(B) and that this clause should be held unconstitutional under Johnson’s reasoning. The district judge held that Davila’s conviction is valid no matter how conspiracy to rob is classified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, rejecting and argument that the drug deal cannot be considered under section 924(c). The ACCA is a sentence-enhancement statute, but section 924(c) defines a stand-alone crime. Conviction of a drug crime is not essential to a conviction under section 924(c) for possessing a gun in relation to a drug offense; Davila’s guilty plea foreclosed his collateral attack. View "Davila v. United States" on Justia Law

About a decade ago, Holt was convicted of possessing a firearm despite prior convictions that barred gun ownership, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court deemed him an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and imposed a 200-month sentence, counting a burglary conviction as one of his three prior violent felonies. Without that enhancement, Holt’s maximum sentence would have been 120 months. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, Holt challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition. While Holt’s appeal was pending the Seventh Circuit held that the version of the Illinois burglary statute under which he was convicted is not a “violent felony” because it does not satisfy the definition of “burglary” used for indivisible statutes. The court acknowledged that the holdings apply retroactively, but noted that this is Holt’s second section 2255 proceeding. A successive collateral attack is permissible only if the court of appeals certifies that it rests on newly discovered evidence or “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” His current argument rests on a Seventh Circuit precedent and on a decision that has not been declared retroactive by the Supreme Court and is not a new rule of constitutional law. Holt’s claim depends on the meaning of “burglary” rather than the meaning of the Constitution. View "Holt v. United States" on Justia Law

Kluball drove to Tennessee to pick up a 17‐year‐old girl he had met on Facebook, brought her to his Wisconsin apartment, advertised her online for sex acts, and escorted her to prostitution engagements. He pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2421. The probation office calculated a range of 121-151 months’ imprisonment. Because the statutory maximum is 10 years, Kluball’s term became 120 months. The presentence report chronicled Kluball’s diagnoses: oppositional defiant disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and depression. Kluball received counseling and was hospitalized several times. He was unsuccessfully treated with at least 14 drugs. Kluball was expelled from 21 daycare facilities and from high school, given an other‐than‐honorable military discharge, and fired from multiple jobs. Kluball had threatened to kill his parents, his foster parents, and others. Kluball did not object to the description of his history. In imposing the 120-month sentence, the court remarked that Kluball’s history suggested that further treatment would be unlikely to have a “lasting impact” and that he was dangerous to the public. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court violated Kluball’s due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. A sentencing judge may consider whether mental health treatment will succeed in reducing the defendant’s dangerousness or propensity to commit further crimes, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(C). View "United States v. Kluball" on Justia Law