Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Kluball drove to Tennessee to pick up a 17‐year‐old girl he had met on Facebook, brought her to his Wisconsin apartment, advertised her online for sex acts, and escorted her to prostitution engagements. He pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2421. The probation office calculated a range of 121-151 months’ imprisonment. Because the statutory maximum is 10 years, Kluball’s term became 120 months. The presentence report chronicled Kluball’s diagnoses: oppositional defiant disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and depression. Kluball received counseling and was hospitalized several times. He was unsuccessfully treated with at least 14 drugs. Kluball was expelled from 21 daycare facilities and from high school, given an other‐than‐honorable military discharge, and fired from multiple jobs. Kluball had threatened to kill his parents, his foster parents, and others. Kluball did not object to the description of his history. In imposing the 120-month sentence, the court remarked that Kluball’s history suggested that further treatment would be unlikely to have a “lasting impact” and that he was dangerous to the public. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court violated Kluball’s due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. A sentencing judge may consider whether mental health treatment will succeed in reducing the defendant’s dangerousness or propensity to commit further crimes, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(C). View "United States v. Kluball" on Justia Law

At USARMS, Burns provided estate-planning services and offered clients an investment in promissory notes that USARMS sold. The notes were allegedly backed by Turkish bonds. USARMS’s owners, Durmaz and Pribilski, claimed to have a connection in the Turkish government that allowed them to purchase the bonds at a below-market rate. USARMS guaranteed an 8.5 percent rate of return and told investors that returns could be as high as 14 percent. In reality, USARMS never purchased Turkish bonds. Durmaz and Pribilski used the investments for their personal use and to pay earlier investors “returns.” Burns was unaware of that deception. Before charges were filed, Durmaz fled the country and Pribilski died. Based on the government’s assertion that that Burns had induced victims to invest by falsely telling them that he had experience managing investments and that he and his family had invested in the bonds, a jury convicted Burns of wire fraud and mail fraud. The district court enhanced Burns’s sentence, ordered restitution, and ordered forfeiture based on the victims’ $3.3 million total loss in the Ponzi scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting a claim of insufficient evidence of material misrepresentations. The court remanded the sentencing enhancement and the restitution order because the district court failed to address proximate cause. View "United States v. Burns" on Justia Law

Martinez, a government informant, arranged for Jones to sell him 20 kilograms of cocaine. At their rendezvous police seized Jones, and in a pat‐down search found a loaded pistol and four 20-bullet magazines. They found an assault rifle in the back seat of Jones’s car, with four 30-bullet magazines, and $353,443 in cash. Pursuant to a warrant, police searched his home and second car, finding another $321,280, more guns and ammunition, a bullet‐proof vest, and a digital scale. There was no evidence of a legal source of the cash. While in jail awaiting trial, he told another prisoner that he never bought less than $100,000 worth of cocaine at a time. Jones was convicted of conspiring (with dealers to whom he had promised Martinez’s cocaine) to possess, with intent to distribute, five or more kilograms of cocaine, and of carrying a gun in connection with drug trafficking. He was sentenced to 270 months, at the top of his guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the cash in the car was “obviously” to purchase cocaine from Martinez, finding that the police had probable cause to suppose that Jones was committing a drug offense, upholding the admission of recordings of Martinez’s conversations with Jones, and upholding the determination that Jones was responsible for more than 50 kilograms of cocaine. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

A barge exploded in 2005, while under way between Joliet and Chicago with a cargo of slurry oil. Deckhand Oliva did not survive. Claiming that Egan, master of the tug that had been pushing the barge, told Oliva to warm a pump using a propane torch, the United States filed a civil suit. Open flames on oil carriers are forbidden by Coast Guard regulations. The judge determined that the government did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Oliva was using a propane torch at the time of the incident. There was no appeal. Two years later, the government charged Egan under 18 U.S.C.1115, which penalizes maritime negligence that results in death, plus other statutes that penalize the negligent discharge of oil into navigable waters. The judge found that the prosecution had established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Egan gave the order to Oliva, that the torch caused the explosion, and that Oliva died and that the barge released oil as results. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has said that the outcome of a civil case has preclusive force in a criminal prosecution. If the government could not prove a claim on the preponderance standard, it cannot show the same thing beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Egan" on Justia Law

Lewisbey purchased guns at Indiana gun shows with a fake I.D., sold them in Illinois, and boasted about it on Facebook. Federal agents began an undercover operation. After Lewisbey sold a total of 43 guns to a confidential informant in five separate controlled purchases, he was charged with unlawful dealing in firearms without a license, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A); illegally transporting firearms across state lines, sections 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D); and traveling across state lines with intent to engage in unlicensed dealing of firearms, section 924(n). Lewisbey was represented by Attorney Brindley, who was facing a criminal contempt proceeding. Questioned by the judge about the potential conflict of interest, Lewisbey expressly waived any conflict and consented to Brindley’s continuation as his counsel. Lewisbey was convicted and sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. The government subsequently obtained a limited remand to address a new criminal investigation targeting Brindley. Brindley withdrew. Another attorney took over Lewisbey’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of violation of Lewisbey’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel; that the Facebook posts and text messages taken from his phones should have been excluded on hearsay and authentication grounds or based on prejudicial impact under Federal Rule 403; and that the government’s cell-phone location expert did not satisfy the “Daubert” factors. View "United States v. Lewisbey" on Justia Law

Freeman was charged in Counts 1 and 2 with distribution of 28 grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); in Count 3, with possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); in Count 4, with distribution of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and (Count 5) with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Freeman pled guilty to Counts 1 and 5 and stipulated to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, the basis of a different indictment. Freeman admitted that he had been selling crack cocaine since 1999 and bought and sold 80 firearms: 40 in 1999-2001 to a high-ranking member Gangster Disciples member and 40 in 2010 to a different member. The court calculated the guidelines range as 140-175 months on Count 1 with the stipulation and 60 months’ consecutive imprisonment on Count 5. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a sentence below that range, sentencing Freeman to 132 months’ imprisonment on Count 1 and to 60 months, consecutive, on Count 5. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that he should have been sentenced using a 1:1 crack-to-powder ratio instead of the 18:1 ratio encompassed within the Sentencing Guidelines and that the district court relied on its own speculations as to uncharged criminal conduct and erred in allowing its frustration with his litigation tactics to affect his sentence. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In 2013, Harris was part of a group of armed robbers. He robbed a Schererville, Indiana T‐Mobile store, an Addison, Illinois Sprint store; and a LaPorte, Indiana AT&T store. He was charged in Indiana state court for the LaPorte robbery. Harris received a target letter informing him that he might be charged in federal court for the Addison robbery. A federal public defender was appointed, but failed to advise him or his state defense attorney of the progress of the federal proceedings. Harris pled guilty in state court in December 2013 and was later charged in federal court. After serving three years, Harris pled guilty to federal charges of robbery and brandishing a firearm, stipulating that he committed the Schererville robbery and agreeing to its consideration as relevant conduct. The parties agreed to a lower sentencing guideline range, recommending grouping Harris’ state conviction as part of his federal case rather than as a separate conviction to ameliorate federal defense counsel’s failure to communicate. The district court concluded that the state conviction was part of Harris’s criminal history rather than a grouped offense in his federal case and sentenced Harris to an additional 160 months in federal custody to run concurrently with his state court sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s rejection of a “hypothetical guideline range” to compensate for the public defender’s error. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Ortiz was sentenced to prison for 135 months for three bank robberies. The Seventh Circuit twice reversed and remanded for resentencing. On the second remand the judge reimposed the 135-month prison sentence but altered the conditions of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding conditions: permitting a probation office to visit the defendant “at any reasonable time” at home or “any reasonable location” specified by the probation officer; requiring Ortiz to report “any significant change” in his economic circumstances; requiring him to report to the probation officer “in the manner and frequency” directed by the officer; and requiring him to participate in a substance abuse, an alcohol treatment, and a mental health treatment program approved by the probation officer and to “abide by the rules and regulations of [each] program.” The court noted the necessity of a certain level of vagueness and that Ortiz did not question the conditions at his sentencing hearing and, therefore, waived objections. View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Haywood, an inmate at Illinois’s Shawnee Correctional Center, accused a teacher of attacking him. Guards charged him with making false statements. A disciplinary panel found him guilty, ordered him transferred to segregation for two months, and revoked one month of good‐time credit. He was subsequently transferred to a different prison and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment violations and that his conditions of confinement in segregation were cruel and unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected both claims, dismissing the First Amendment claim because the disciplinary panel’s decision, which affected the duration of Haywood’s confinement, had not been set aside on collateral review or by executive clemency. The court cited Supreme Court holdings that section 1983 cannot be used to seek damages when relief necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction or prison discipline that remains in force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the First Amendment theory and reversed with respect to the Eighth Amendment theory, remanding for consideration under the deliberate indifference standard.The warden had actual knowledge of the unusually harsh weather, had been apprised of the specific problem with Haywood’s cell (the windows would not shut), and had toured the segregation unit. View "Haywood v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

Worthen, a FedEx driver, delivered packages to Maxie, the owner of a southern Indiana gun store. Worthen set up a meeting with Maxie, purportedly for a gun trade. He actually wanted to case the store with his brother and cousin. They met with Maxie for an hour, surveyed the store, and left. They returned the next day, having decided to kill Maxie. Worthen conversed with Maxie, then pulled out a gun and shot Maxie in the eye, killing him. The men then stole 45 firearms and Maxie’s laptop, which recorded the video feed from the store’s surveillance cameras. Heading back to Indianapolis, Worthen threw the gun and laptop into a cornfield. Days later, police arrested the men, finding only four of the stolen firearms in Worthen’s possession. They had already distributed most of the firearms throughout Indianapolis.Two guns were recovered in investigating unrelated crimes; 36 remain unrecovered. Worthen pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C.1951(a) and causing death while using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(j), which authorizes a sentence of death or life imprisonment. The government agreed to drop other charges and to not seek the death penalty. The court sentenced Worthen to a total of 60 years’ imprisonment. Based on his appeal waiver, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Worthen’s appeal in which he argued that Hobbs Act robbery (the predicate offense for his 924(j) conviction) is not a “crime of violence.” View "United States v. Worthen" on Justia Law