Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Harris was part of a group of armed robbers. He robbed a Schererville, Indiana T‐Mobile store, an Addison, Illinois Sprint store; and a LaPorte, Indiana AT&T store. He was charged in Indiana state court for the LaPorte robbery. Harris received a target letter informing him that he might be charged in federal court for the Addison robbery. A federal public defender was appointed, but failed to advise him or his state defense attorney of the progress of the federal proceedings. Harris pled guilty in state court in December 2013 and was later charged in federal court. After serving three years, Harris pled guilty to federal charges of robbery and brandishing a firearm, stipulating that he committed the Schererville robbery and agreeing to its consideration as relevant conduct. The parties agreed to a lower sentencing guideline range, recommending grouping Harris’ state conviction as part of his federal case rather than as a separate conviction to ameliorate federal defense counsel’s failure to communicate. The district court concluded that the state conviction was part of Harris’s criminal history rather than a grouped offense in his federal case and sentenced Harris to an additional 160 months in federal custody to run concurrently with his state court sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s rejection of a “hypothetical guideline range” to compensate for the public defender’s error. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Ortiz was sentenced to prison for 135 months for three bank robberies. The Seventh Circuit twice reversed and remanded for resentencing. On the second remand the judge reimposed the 135-month prison sentence but altered the conditions of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding conditions: permitting a probation office to visit the defendant “at any reasonable time” at home or “any reasonable location” specified by the probation officer; requiring Ortiz to report “any significant change” in his economic circumstances; requiring him to report to the probation officer “in the manner and frequency” directed by the officer; and requiring him to participate in a substance abuse, an alcohol treatment, and a mental health treatment program approved by the probation officer and to “abide by the rules and regulations of [each] program.” The court noted the necessity of a certain level of vagueness and that Ortiz did not question the conditions at his sentencing hearing and, therefore, waived objections. View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Haywood, an inmate at Illinois’s Shawnee Correctional Center, accused a teacher of attacking him. Guards charged him with making false statements. A disciplinary panel found him guilty, ordered him transferred to segregation for two months, and revoked one month of good‐time credit. He was subsequently transferred to a different prison and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment violations and that his conditions of confinement in segregation were cruel and unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected both claims, dismissing the First Amendment claim because the disciplinary panel’s decision, which affected the duration of Haywood’s confinement, had not been set aside on collateral review or by executive clemency. The court cited Supreme Court holdings that section 1983 cannot be used to seek damages when relief necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction or prison discipline that remains in force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the First Amendment theory and reversed with respect to the Eighth Amendment theory, remanding for consideration under the deliberate indifference standard.The warden had actual knowledge of the unusually harsh weather, had been apprised of the specific problem with Haywood’s cell (the windows would not shut), and had toured the segregation unit. View "Haywood v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

Worthen, a FedEx driver, delivered packages to Maxie, the owner of a southern Indiana gun store. Worthen set up a meeting with Maxie, purportedly for a gun trade. He actually wanted to case the store with his brother and cousin. They met with Maxie for an hour, surveyed the store, and left. They returned the next day, having decided to kill Maxie. Worthen conversed with Maxie, then pulled out a gun and shot Maxie in the eye, killing him. The men then stole 45 firearms and Maxie’s laptop, which recorded the video feed from the store’s surveillance cameras. Heading back to Indianapolis, Worthen threw the gun and laptop into a cornfield. Days later, police arrested the men, finding only four of the stolen firearms in Worthen’s possession. They had already distributed most of the firearms throughout Indianapolis.Two guns were recovered in investigating unrelated crimes; 36 remain unrecovered. Worthen pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C.1951(a) and causing death while using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(j), which authorizes a sentence of death or life imprisonment. The government agreed to drop other charges and to not seek the death penalty. The court sentenced Worthen to a total of 60 years’ imprisonment. Based on his appeal waiver, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Worthen’s appeal in which he argued that Hobbs Act robbery (the predicate offense for his 924(j) conviction) is not a “crime of violence.” View "United States v. Worthen" on Justia Law

Patrick, on parole, did not comply with the conditions of his release from state prison. A warrant issued for his arrest. Milwaukee police obtained a second warrant, which authorized them to locate Patrick using cell‐phone data. Police arrested him in a car, on a public street, in possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress evidence of the gun, rejecting Patrick’s challenge to the validity of the location‐tracking warrant, in which he argued that his person was not contraband nor the proceeds of a crime, so that it was off limits to investigation. The court noted that no warrant was required. Patrick was visible to the general public. The court noted that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, even if the police had stopped Patrick’s car for no reason and later learned that he was a fugitive, the gun would have been admissible. The officers who arrested Patrick had both probable cause to believe that he was a fugitive and knowledge of the arrest warrant. The court discussed the use of a cell-site simulator, which potentially reveals information about many persons other than the suspect, but stated that a “fugitive cannot be picky about how he is run to ground.” View "United States v. Patrick" on Justia Law

In 1997, Rodriguez was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 60 years in prison. The Illinois State Police’s Division of Forensic Services had analyzed four semen stains on a blanket from the bed of the 11-year-old victim. Neither side presented the report at trial. The victim’s mother testified that Rodriquez had indicated he was “up all night” doing laundry; during closing arguments the prosecutor asked whether that might be “to get rid of evidence.” Objecting to the statement, in the presence of the jury, defense counsel stated “In fact, counsel knows that there was sperm on various items that was not presented.” The judge instructed the jury to consider only evidence admitted during trial. On direct appeal, Rodriguez argued, that he was denied effective assistance by the comment about evidence of sperm being found on “various items.” The Illinois Appellate Court denied relief, concluding that Rodriguez had not been prejudiced. The district court denied a subsequent federal habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court did not unreasonable the standard from Strickland v. Washington, in light of the other evidence and the judge’s curative instruction. View "Rodriguez v. Gossett" on Justia Law

Flournoy was convicted of conspiring to possess cocaine and of attempting to possess cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846). During closing arguments, the defense referred to the prosecution’s failure to call certain witnesses; the prosecutor responded that “the defense can call witnesses too, if they want.” The court rejected defense counsel’s objection that a defendant has an absolute right not to testify, but instructed the jury not to consider the defendant’s failure to testify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Flournoy’s conviction, rejecting his argument that he was entitled to a new trial because of the prosecutor’s inappropriate comments during closing argument and because the government presented testimony from a cooperating witness that conflicted with that witness’s plea agreement. If it is clear to jurors that the government carries the burden of proof, the prosecutor may tell the jury that a defendant has the power to subpoena witnesses. There was no indication that the witness testified falsely or that the discrepancy between the testimony and the plea agreement was prejudicial. The court remanded Flournoy’s 204-month sentence, which imposed discretionary conditions of supervised release without considering the sentencing factors (18 U.S.C. 3583(d); 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)), and without stating the reasons for the specific conditions. View "United States v. Flournoy" on Justia Law

While conducting surveillance, based on information about a cocaine transaction, agents followed Bausley to a Chicago apartment building. Bausley parked on the street. Thompson came out wearing a backpack and entered Bausley’s car. Bausley drove around the block and again stopped outside the building. Thompson got out and reentered the building. Agents who saw Thompson communicated with agent Reynolds, who was present but could not see Thompson. Reynolds eventually approached Thompson, who had returned to the lobby from the ninth floor without the backpack. Thompson repeatedly denied living in the building but allowed Reynolds to use his keys. Reynolds used Thompson’s key to open unit 902. Inside the apartment, Reynolds again told Thompson that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to talk to the agents. Thompson signed a consent form, then stated that there was a gun in the TV stand and that there were drugs and cash elsewhere in the apartment. The agents recovered the gun, a kilogram of cocaine, and $10,000 in cash. Thompson was not arrested and agreed to cooperate. Days later, when Thompson stopped answering calls, he was arrested. Thompson was indicted for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Thompson’s motion to suppress; the agents did not commit any violations of Thompson’s Fourth Amendment rights that could have tainted his consent to search his apartment. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Jennifer’s mother found her 19-year-old daughter dead. Investigators found a chewed 100-microgram Duragesic fentanyl skin patch. The patch is a powerful opioid, not meant to be ingested. Jennifer did not have a prescription. Her friend, Krieger, had such a prescription for pain from severe spinal problems, and had given Jennifer a patch. Investigators also found a hypodermic needle, a small pipe with burnt residue on it, and two red capsules. Neither the capsules nor the pipe were taken into evidence and tested. The syringe was finally tested three years later. A medical examiner found many drugs in Jennifer's system, but concluded that she died from fentanyl toxicity. Krieger was charged with distribution of fentanyl with death resulting, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(c). After its medical witness fled the country, with legal problems of his own, the government dropped the “death resulting” charge, which it would have had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Krieger pleaded guilty to distribution. The prosecution then proposed that “death resulting” be considered as a sentencing factor. The district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that death had resulted from the distribution, and that it could only give a 20-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court later issued its decisions in “Alleyne” decision and Burrage v. United States, Krieger filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit vacated her sentence. The district court can consider Jennifer’s death, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, as recommended under USSG 2D1.1; implementation of the mandatory minimum sentence, however, would require that a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the patch provided by Krieger was the but-for cause of Curry’s death. The time for such a determination has passed. View "Krieger v. United States" on Justia Law

Chicago officer Lewellen arrested drug dealer Rodriguez in 1996 and turned him into an informant. They developed a more lucrative arrangement. Rodriguez would collect information about drug dealers; during seemingly legitimate detentions, Lewellen would rob the dealers of drugs and money. Over several years, they brought in more participants. Robbery escalated into kidnapping or even murdering dealers for money and drugs. In 2009 the DEA filmed an attempted robbery of 600 kilograms of cocaine from a warehouse. Multiple defendants were charged with racketeering conspiracy to commit murders, kidnappings, robberies, drug trafficking, and obstruction of justice; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of narcotics; and individual participation in those substantive offenses. Several arranged plea agreements, six were tried, and five were convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, but remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 “Alleyne” decision. The court rejected a challenge to dismissal of a juror who had nine convictions; upheld the trial court’s decision to reread the Silvern instruction instead of declaring a mistrial after the jury indicated that it was unsure if it could reach a verdict and failure to hold a hearing concerning a crying juror; rejected a claim that the government knowingly introduced false testimony; held that any error in allowing witnesses to look through the courtroom window to identify defendants was not prejudicial; and upheld denial of Lewellen’s motion to sever and various evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Lewellen" on Justia Law