Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

While Cureton was under investigation for dealing crack cocaine, he used a gun to demand ransom from his roommate’s family; her grandfather agreed by telephone to wire Cureton $4,500. A jury convicted Cureton of interstate communication of a ransom demand (18 U.S.C. 875(a)), attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)), and two counts of possessing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The first 924(c) charge, Count 2, was based on the ransom demand; Count 4, was based on attempted extortion. The case was consolidated with Cureton's drug possession case, Case 106. The guideline range in Case 106 was 360-720 months; the range for the ransom demand and attempted extortion was 240 months, the statutory maximum. The district court imposed a sentence of 360 months for Case 106 to run concurrently with a 240-month sentence for ransom and attempted extortion, adding consecutive sentences for the section 924(c) counts—84 months on Count 2 and 300 months on Count 4, for a sentence of 62 years. On first remand the district court sentenced Cureton to 37 years, eliminating the 300 months imposed on Count 4. On second remand, relating to conditions of supervised release, the court re-imposed the 444‐month sentence. In his third appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of an argument that making a ransom demand does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court found no plain error in interpreting that federal crime as necessarily including an implied threat of physical force. View "United States v. Cureton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The judge increased his sentencing guidelines range by four levels, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), for possessing the firearm in connection with the distribution of an illegal drug, to a range of 57-71 months, but then imposed a sentence only 36 months, within the guideline range if the four-level enhancement and the gun’s high-capacity magazine were ignored. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, noting that Defendant’s “use” of the gun consisted of taking it as collateral pending payment for a sale of synthetic marijuana and subsequently selling it to a confidential informant. The court stated, “neither 'use' nor 'carry' accurately describes the defendant’s relation to the Glock” and that there was no evidence that the synthetic marijuana is a “scheduled” (illegal) drug. Although the sentence was within the guideline range for the offense of being a felon in possession of a gun, the judge’s remarks at sentencing suggest that his real concern was that the gun had been used in an illegal-drug transaction. The court stated that it could not “see the legal significance of the gun, taken as collateral, secreted in the garage, and then sold.” View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law

In 2003, Murdock was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. In connection with his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a suppression hearing was held to determine whether Murdock's statements to the police were voluntary, given that Murdock was 16 years old and was without an attorney or other adult present. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision was not unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: the court applied the correct test in a reasonable manner in finding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Murdock gave his statements voluntarily. The court considered Murdock’s age, and that he did not have an attorney or other adult present, but found that he was able to understand and provide an adequate waiver of his rights. The court considered that Murdock was detained for approximately seven hours, but noted that the interview lasted only three hours and that Murdock was given the opportunity to eat and use the restroom. There was no evidence that the officers threatened him or otherwise created a coercive environment. The court found that Murdock did not appear to be under distress or frightened on a video recording. View "Murdock v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

In 1995, Turner was convicted of murder, criminal confinement, and class A felony attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He did not seek certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court; his opportunity to do so expired on September 22, 1997. In 2000, Turner successfully sought state post‐conviction relief. In 2013, the trial court reduced Turner’s robbery conviction to a Class B felony robbery conviction and resentenced Turner on that count. The order did not reference Turner’s other convictions or sentences. In 2014, Turner sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his life sentence for murder was unconstitutional under Apprendi and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court ruled that the deadline for Turner to file had expired on September 23, 1998, one year after the last day on which he could have filed a petition for certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), reasoning that the state post‐conviction relief process could not toll the federal deadline because Turner’s time under federal law had expired before he sought relief. The Seventh Circuit found that Turner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c), but ultimately affirmed the dismissal. The court rejected Turner’s argument that “the date on which the judgment became final” was altered by the state court’s grant of relief on the robbery count; his murder conviction and life sentence were unaffected by the 2013 resentencing. View "Turner v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2012, “Mickey” Davis made a $300,000 start-up loan to Ideal Motors, a Melrose Park, Illinois car dealership, owned by R.J. Serpico and his father Joseph Serpico. Within months, Joseph had gambled the money away and Ideal Motors had fallen deep in arrears. A man named “Mickey” conspired to have R.J.’s legs broken. Though the scheme was never carried out, Davis was convicted of attempted extortion and using extortionate means to collect a loan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of out-of-court statements by several people involved in the conspiracy, noting independent evidence that the conspiracy existed and tending to show that Davis participated in it. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow prosecutors to impeach the testimony of a key prosecution witness with his prior inconsistent statements to government agents. The court also rejected arguments concerning witness immunity, the scope of cross-examination, and the government’s closing argument. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Hancock, charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5841, 5845(a)(2), and 5861(d), unsuccessfully challenged the search warrant that had led to his arrest by requesting a “Franks” hearing. He argued that critical evidence bearing on a confidential informant’s credibility had been omitted from the probable cause affidavit. Hancock also moved to preclude the use of prior convictions as the basis for the section 922(g)(1) count, arguing that the release document issued by the Colorado Department of Corrections lulled him into believing that all of his rights, including the right to possess a weapon, had been restored. The district court, assessing the release document within its four corners, held that the document did not communicate any restoration of rights to Hancock. After his conviction on both counts, the court imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the affidavit established probable cause, despite the omission of information about the informant’s criminal history, and that the release document did not indicate a restoration of rights. View "United States v. Hancock" on Justia Law

Urena, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted as an alien found in the U.S. after having been deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and was sentenced to 100 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Urena was directed, at the end of his prison sentence, to surrender to the Homeland Security Department for a determination of deportability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s refusal to exclude evidence of Urena’s seven prior removals under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and denial of Urena’s Motion for a Mistrial after the prosecution published to the jury an exhibit that included the fact of Urena’s prior conviction for “Felony Class 4 Cocaine Possession.” The district court found a specific non‐propensity purpose for the evidence of prior removals and was in the best position to find that the jury’s attention had not been drawn to the prior conviction information on the exhibit because the court itself had not noticed it until it was brought to its attention. View "United States v. Urena" on Justia Law

Leaver’s car was struck by a driver whose insurer provided Leaver a rental car. Leaver went to Hertz’s Wisconsin office, signed a rental agreement, and drove to Montana. When Leaver failed to return the car by the contract date, Hertz reported it stolen. Weeks later, the car was located in Montana. Six months later, Leaver was charged with theft by lessee. Leaver contacted the prosecutor, identifying Hertz employees from whom he claimed to have permission to act as he did. The rental agreement contained three inconsistent statements about the maximum time the car could be kept. Leaver claims that he returned the car to the Hertz Belgrade, Montana parking lot within two weeks of the stated return date. Leaver was arrested in Montana, remained in jail for two months, and was extradited to Wisconsin. The court denied motions to dismiss. Weeks later, the prosecutor dropped the charge. Leaver filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming intentional or reckless omission from his police reports of facts that would have affected the probable-cause determination. The judge rejected the claim on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the officer was aware of the information at issue; if he was aware of it, qualified immunity applies. It is unclear whether the information would have negated probable cause. View "Leaver v. Shortess" on Justia Law

Jones was a family counselor and collected dozens of guns and thousands of rounds of ammunition, although he had a prior felony conviction. The FBI discovered the weapons while investigating Jones for fraudulent health care billing. He was convicted of illegally possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. His concurrent sentences amount to 100 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ex parte pretrial restraint of life insurance policies violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; that the court erroneously denied his request for new counsel and he was denied the opportunity to testify during his fraud trial; and challenging the sentencing guideline computation. Jones did not object at the time that his life insurance policies were restrained, nor did he object during the district court proceedings, although the restraining order invited him to “petition for a pre-trial hearing if he can demonstrate that he has no other assets available with which to retain counsel” or if he could show that the policies were “not subject to forfeiture.” Given Jones’s pattern of delay and obstruction, the district judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Jones’s request for appointment of yet another lawyer. Jones willingly waived his right to testify. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Foreman alleged that Rockford police officers came to his restaurant because the man living in an upstairs apartment accused Foreman of cutting off his electricity. Foreman refused to answer questions and was arrested. Prosecutor Leisten charged Foreman with obstructing a police officer. The charge was dismissed. The court ordered Foreman to show cause why claims against Leisten should not be dismissed; the prosecutor would have absolute immunity in her individual capacity and the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims. In a previous case Foreman’s lawyer, Redmond, had raised similar claims against prosecutors that were dismissed, so the court ordered Redmond to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court granted Leisten judgment on the pleadings, noting that Foreman had not offered a basis for challenging the existing law of prosecutorial immunity and that the official capacity claim would not fall under the Eleventh Amendment's exception for injunctive relief because Foreman’s complaint did not allege an ongoing constitutional violation. The court censured Redmond, stating that he did not argue for a change in the law until after he was faced with a recommendation of censure. The court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Foreman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suits under section 1983 for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” View "Foreman v. Wadsworth" on Justia Law