Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Chicago officer Lewellen arrested drug dealer Rodriguez in 1996 and turned him into an informant. They developed a more lucrative arrangement. Rodriguez would collect information about drug dealers; during seemingly legitimate detentions, Lewellen would rob the dealers of drugs and money. Over several years, they brought in more participants. Robbery escalated into kidnapping or even murdering dealers for money and drugs. In 2009 the DEA filmed an attempted robbery of 600 kilograms of cocaine from a warehouse. Multiple defendants were charged with racketeering conspiracy to commit murders, kidnappings, robberies, drug trafficking, and obstruction of justice; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of narcotics; and individual participation in those substantive offenses. Several arranged plea agreements, six were tried, and five were convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, but remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 “Alleyne” decision. The court rejected a challenge to dismissal of a juror who had nine convictions; upheld the trial court’s decision to reread the Silvern instruction instead of declaring a mistrial after the jury indicated that it was unsure if it could reach a verdict and failure to hold a hearing concerning a crying juror; rejected a claim that the government knowingly introduced false testimony; held that any error in allowing witnesses to look through the courtroom window to identify defendants was not prejudicial; and upheld denial of Lewellen’s motion to sever and various evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Lewellen" on Justia Law

Morrison and Novak (defendants) sold “herbal incense” from their retail store, JC Moon, in Ashland, Wisconsin. The substances included XLR-11, UR-144, PB- 22, and 5F-PB-22, which then were not listed on the controlled substance schedules but were similar to scheduled controlled substances. Undercover law enforcement officers made 28 controlled purchases at JC Moon and learned that defendants hid a significant portion of their cash income from the IRS by “skimming” large bills from the cash registers. From 2010 to 2012, defendants under-reported JC Moon’s business income by $575,752 for a tax loss of $186,095. Defendants pleaded guilty to violation of the Controlled Substances Analogue Act, 21 U.S.C. 813 and tax fraud, Novak was sentenced to 96 months and Morrison to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting a Supreme Court holding that holding that the Analogue Act is not unconstitutionally vague due to its scienter requirement and rejecting challenges to the court’s acceptance of their pleas and to the sentences. The totality of the circumstances surrounding Novak’s and Morrison’s guilty pleas indicated that they entered into those pleas voluntarily and with sufficient understanding of the charges against them; there was sufficient factual basis for the pleas. View "United States v. Novak" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, for submitting fraudulent invoices to an Illinois town (Riverdale), which paid him $374,000. The district judge sentenced him to 60 months in prison, plus 36 months of supervised release with discretionary conditions of supervised release, most of which concern dealing with the probation department, restitution, and seeking work. The judge also imposed special conditions, requiring community service during unemployment; restricting credit charges; giving the probation officer financial information; notifying the court of material changes in defendant’s circumstances; and requiring defendant to ”contribute an amount thatʹs at least 10 percent of his net monthly income to the extent that other financial obligations have not been met. And he may not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent” without permission. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not give reasons for the conditions or for the term of supervised release as required by 18 U.S.C. 3553(c), nor read the conditions to the defendant. The conditions imposed contained a substance abuse treatment condition that was not contained in the written notice prepared by the probation office. There was also a discrepancy between the oral and written judgments. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Rogers and Hardy hid outside the entrance, then forced a teller into a bank at gunpoint as she was opening the door. Armour directed them by radio from the parking lot. Armour had recruited the two, supplied clothing, reserved their hotel rooms, and orchestrated the plan. When the teller could not open the safe, the two restrained her and stole her car to flee. All three men were arrested quickly; two firearms were found with them. Rogers and Hardy pled guilty. Both testified against Armour, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 371; aiding and abetting attempted armed bank robbery 18 U.S.C. 2113(a); and aiding and abetting using or carrying or brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence 18 U.S.C. 924(c). His 324-month sentence included an 84-month consecutive sentence on the section 924(c) charge, the mandatory minimum for brandishing a firearm. The Seventh Circuit remanded the sentence for the section 924(c) conviction, which was imposed without a jury finding that Armour aided and abetted the “brandishing.” The court rejected an argument that the entire sentence was erroneously based on a finding that Armour was a career offender based on two prior Indiana convictions for robbery and an argument that the section 924(c) conviction must be reversed because the underlying predicate offense, attempted armed bank robbery, should not qualify as a “crime of violence.” View "United States v. Armour" on Justia Law

Curtis asked Lockwood to place a package in her brother’s truck and that it contained a bomb. Lockwood agreed. At the brother’s house, Lockwood failed to locate the truck and placed the bomb in the mailbox. He called the police and reported that the brother had a bomb and planned to blow up his office. The bomb-squad found nothing, but Curtis’s sister-in-law discovered the package in the mailbox later that day. It contained a pipe bomb, incapable of detonation, because it had no power source. After reviewing Curtis’s phone records, agents focused on Lockwood and charged him with possession of a destructive device. Lockwood claimed ignorance that the package contained a bomb. The jury convicted him. The Seventh Circuit vacated imposition the statutory maximum 120 months’ imprisonment (the Guidelines range was 33–41 months), finding the district court’s justifications insufficient. On remand, the district court again imposed a 120-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court properly relied on testimony about Lockwood’s propensity for violence, even while he was on pretrial release, and his “troubling history,” which includes several domestic incidents wherein he threatened to kill women. He had burned down his girlfriend’s apartment, resulting in a conviction for aggravated arson. The court concluded that Lockwood should be incapacitated for a significant time to protect the public and those closest to him, calling Lockwood a “sociopath” who showed little remorse. View "United States v. Lockwood" on Justia Law

Wieckowicz, a confidential informant, alerted FBI agents that Oziemski solicited Wieckowicz’s help in planned robberies; Oziemski planned to travel from Poland to New York, and then to Chicago to meet Stanislawczyk, and then to New York to commit the robberies. Days later, Wieckowicz told agents that Stanislawczyk was in New York, but would return to Chicago and then travel to New York with Oziemski and Wrobel. Wieckowicz, Wrobel, and Stanislawczyk met at Stanislawczyk’s apartment. Oziemski participated via Skype in the recorded conversation, which concerned robbing a diamond merchant at his Brooklyn residence, using a rented van. Under FBI supervision, Wieckowicz rented a van, which the FBI equipped with a recording device. The four left for New York. They were arrested at a New Jersey hotel. Wrobel, Stanislawczyk, and Oziemski were charged with conspiring to obstruct, delay, and affect commerce by robbery of diamonds and other valuables, Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The court allowed the government to introduce expert testimony that all diamonds are mined outside the U.S., and that diamond dealers frequently carry diamonds on their persons, to establish a nexus between the charged offense and interstate commerce and to rebut arguments that defendants’ statements regarding robbing a diamond merchant were mere fantasy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions, rejecting arguments that there was insufficient evidence to establish the required nexus between the crime and interstate commerce and that the court improperly admitted the government’s expert testimony. View "United States v. Stanislawczyk" on Justia Law

In August 2008, a Milwaukee County jury found Carpenter guilty of kidnapping, false imprisonment, four counts of second‐degree sexual assault, and four counts of first‐degree sexual assault. Carpenter was sentenced to 59 years’ imprisonment followed by 24 years of extended supervision. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Carpenter’s petition for review. He unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The petition had been filed almost seven months after the one-year period for filing had passed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Carpenter’s request for equitable tolling. Carpenter did not exercise reasonable diligence in pursuit of his rights. Although he filed two federal motions seeking an extension of time, he ignored the district court’s instructions regarding the proper way to seek such an extension. Carpenter failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his physical and mental health issues, even when combined with the other circumstances he classifies as extraordinary, “actually impaired his ability to pursue his claims.” View "Carpenter v. Douma" on Justia Law

Haney pled guilty to possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that Haney had at least three prior convictions for “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) (ACCA). His convictions were for two burglaries and armed bank robbery in Illinois and three aggravated assaults in Pennsylvania. The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The Illinois burglary statute at the time of Haney’s 1975 conviction included locations other than a “building or other structure,” falling outside the “generic” offense as defined by the Supreme Court, so Haney’s Illinois burglary convictions are not violent felonies under the ACCA. Even assuming that Haney’s convictions for aggravated assault are violent felonies, Haney is one predicate short of being an armed career criminal if, as Haney argues, all three of his assaults occurred on the same “occasion.” The issue was not addressed at sentencing. View "United States v. Haney" on Justia Law

Police responded to a report of a man with a gun and saw Rash take something (a gun) from his waistband and drop it. Rash was arrested. He stated that the gun belonged to his girlfriend, Monica; after she left her gun in his house, he went to return it to her since, as a convicted felon, he could not have a gun in his house. He repeated the story at trial. The government introduced video footage showing that Rash had twice accompanied Monica to the gun store to help purchase it. At sentencing, the court applied a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, finding that the videotape showed “clearly that [he was] engaged in assisting in the purchase of that gun.” The enhancement did not change the Guidelines range. Rash was subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). After the Supreme Court invalidated the part of the ACCA that determined Rash’s sentence, Rash’s attorney unsuccessfully opposed the enhancement, arguing that Rash’s statements were not material because Rash had admitted that he possessed a gun. The court calculated a range of 95-115 months (77-96 months without the enhancement). The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 100-month sentence. The trial court reasonably concluded that Rush’s testimony was intended to encourage the jury to nullify and not convict him of possession. View "United States v. Rash" on Justia Law

In 2013 Elder and others, including his father, were charged with conspiring to traffic methamphetamine from Arizona to Indiana. Elder and his father pleaded not guilty. Six co-defendants pleaded guilty. Some testified for the prosecution. A jury found Elder guilty of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841; 846. The government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. 851 indicating that Elder had a 1999 conviction for possession of equipment or chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs and a 1997 conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and sought application of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which requires a defendant to be sentenced to life if he is convicted of a serious drug offense after having previously been convicted of two drug‐related felonies. The district court stated that it believed a life sentence was overly harsh, but that it had no discretion under the statute. Finding that Elder’s prior convictions qualified as felony drug offenses, the court sentenced Elder to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the admission of testimony by co-conspirators under Rule 800, but vacated the sentence. Elder’s 1997 conviction did not qualify as a drug-related felony. View "United States v. Elder" on Justia Law