Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Brown was arrested for selling heroin in Chicago. He offered to assist the police, telling the officers that he knew where a man named “Jimmie” stored large amounts of drugs and that he was supposed to meet Jimmie later that day. A search turned up eight baggies with approximately 1000 capsules containing 135 grams of heroin and the arrest of Sessom. As a hearing on Sessom’s motion to suppress, Brown denied having given the police the information. Sessom accepted a plea bargain and withdrew that motion before a ruling. Brown subsequently pled guilty to conspiring to distribute drugs and, with a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, was sentenced to 60 months, below both the actual guideline range and the range of 70 to 87 months that would have applied without the obstruction enhancement. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The judge who actually heard Brown’s testimony never made findings about the honesty of his testimony or the merits of the Sessom’s motion to suppress, but imposed the obstruction enhancement based on the other judge’s interim impressions about earlier testimony from police officers. That was not a sufficient factual foundation to support the enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Davila pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and to possessing a firearm in connection with the planned robbery and a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The separate drug count was dismissed. The judge sentenced Davila to consecutive sentences of six months’ imprisonment under the Hobbs Act and 60 months’ imprisonment under section 924(c). He did not appeal. After the Supreme Court held, in Johnson v. United States, that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), is unconstitutionally vague, Davila filed a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that conspiracy to commit a robbery could be deemed a crime of violence only under the residual clause in section 924(c)(3)(B) and that this clause should be held unconstitutional under Johnson’s reasoning. The district judge held that Davila’s conviction is valid no matter how conspiracy to rob is classified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, rejecting and argument that the drug deal cannot be considered under section 924(c). The ACCA is a sentence-enhancement statute, but section 924(c) defines a stand-alone crime. Conviction of a drug crime is not essential to a conviction under section 924(c) for possessing a gun in relation to a drug offense; Davila’s guilty plea foreclosed his collateral attack. View "Davila v. United States" on Justia Law

About a decade ago, Holt was convicted of possessing a firearm despite prior convictions that barred gun ownership, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court deemed him an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and imposed a 200-month sentence, counting a burglary conviction as one of his three prior violent felonies. Without that enhancement, Holt’s maximum sentence would have been 120 months. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, Holt challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition. While Holt’s appeal was pending the Seventh Circuit held that the version of the Illinois burglary statute under which he was convicted is not a “violent felony” because it does not satisfy the definition of “burglary” used for indivisible statutes. The court acknowledged that the holdings apply retroactively, but noted that this is Holt’s second section 2255 proceeding. A successive collateral attack is permissible only if the court of appeals certifies that it rests on newly discovered evidence or “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” His current argument rests on a Seventh Circuit precedent and on a decision that has not been declared retroactive by the Supreme Court and is not a new rule of constitutional law. Holt’s claim depends on the meaning of “burglary” rather than the meaning of the Constitution. View "Holt v. United States" on Justia Law

Kluball drove to Tennessee to pick up a 17‐year‐old girl he had met on Facebook, brought her to his Wisconsin apartment, advertised her online for sex acts, and escorted her to prostitution engagements. He pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2421. The probation office calculated a range of 121-151 months’ imprisonment. Because the statutory maximum is 10 years, Kluball’s term became 120 months. The presentence report chronicled Kluball’s diagnoses: oppositional defiant disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and depression. Kluball received counseling and was hospitalized several times. He was unsuccessfully treated with at least 14 drugs. Kluball was expelled from 21 daycare facilities and from high school, given an other‐than‐honorable military discharge, and fired from multiple jobs. Kluball had threatened to kill his parents, his foster parents, and others. Kluball did not object to the description of his history. In imposing the 120-month sentence, the court remarked that Kluball’s history suggested that further treatment would be unlikely to have a “lasting impact” and that he was dangerous to the public. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court violated Kluball’s due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. A sentencing judge may consider whether mental health treatment will succeed in reducing the defendant’s dangerousness or propensity to commit further crimes, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(C). View "United States v. Kluball" on Justia Law

At USARMS, Burns provided estate-planning services and offered clients an investment in promissory notes that USARMS sold. The notes were allegedly backed by Turkish bonds. USARMS’s owners, Durmaz and Pribilski, claimed to have a connection in the Turkish government that allowed them to purchase the bonds at a below-market rate. USARMS guaranteed an 8.5 percent rate of return and told investors that returns could be as high as 14 percent. In reality, USARMS never purchased Turkish bonds. Durmaz and Pribilski used the investments for their personal use and to pay earlier investors “returns.” Burns was unaware of that deception. Before charges were filed, Durmaz fled the country and Pribilski died. Based on the government’s assertion that that Burns had induced victims to invest by falsely telling them that he had experience managing investments and that he and his family had invested in the bonds, a jury convicted Burns of wire fraud and mail fraud. The district court enhanced Burns’s sentence, ordered restitution, and ordered forfeiture based on the victims’ $3.3 million total loss in the Ponzi scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting a claim of insufficient evidence of material misrepresentations. The court remanded the sentencing enhancement and the restitution order because the district court failed to address proximate cause. View "United States v. Burns" on Justia Law

Martinez, a government informant, arranged for Jones to sell him 20 kilograms of cocaine. At their rendezvous police seized Jones, and in a pat‐down search found a loaded pistol and four 20-bullet magazines. They found an assault rifle in the back seat of Jones’s car, with four 30-bullet magazines, and $353,443 in cash. Pursuant to a warrant, police searched his home and second car, finding another $321,280, more guns and ammunition, a bullet‐proof vest, and a digital scale. There was no evidence of a legal source of the cash. While in jail awaiting trial, he told another prisoner that he never bought less than $100,000 worth of cocaine at a time. Jones was convicted of conspiring (with dealers to whom he had promised Martinez’s cocaine) to possess, with intent to distribute, five or more kilograms of cocaine, and of carrying a gun in connection with drug trafficking. He was sentenced to 270 months, at the top of his guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the cash in the car was “obviously” to purchase cocaine from Martinez, finding that the police had probable cause to suppose that Jones was committing a drug offense, upholding the admission of recordings of Martinez’s conversations with Jones, and upholding the determination that Jones was responsible for more than 50 kilograms of cocaine. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

A barge exploded in 2005, while under way between Joliet and Chicago with a cargo of slurry oil. Deckhand Oliva did not survive. Claiming that Egan, master of the tug that had been pushing the barge, told Oliva to warm a pump using a propane torch, the United States filed a civil suit. Open flames on oil carriers are forbidden by Coast Guard regulations. The judge determined that the government did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Oliva was using a propane torch at the time of the incident. There was no appeal. Two years later, the government charged Egan under 18 U.S.C.1115, which penalizes maritime negligence that results in death, plus other statutes that penalize the negligent discharge of oil into navigable waters. The judge found that the prosecution had established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Egan gave the order to Oliva, that the torch caused the explosion, and that Oliva died and that the barge released oil as results. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has said that the outcome of a civil case has preclusive force in a criminal prosecution. If the government could not prove a claim on the preponderance standard, it cannot show the same thing beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Egan" on Justia Law

Lewisbey purchased guns at Indiana gun shows with a fake I.D., sold them in Illinois, and boasted about it on Facebook. Federal agents began an undercover operation. After Lewisbey sold a total of 43 guns to a confidential informant in five separate controlled purchases, he was charged with unlawful dealing in firearms without a license, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A); illegally transporting firearms across state lines, sections 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D); and traveling across state lines with intent to engage in unlicensed dealing of firearms, section 924(n). Lewisbey was represented by Attorney Brindley, who was facing a criminal contempt proceeding. Questioned by the judge about the potential conflict of interest, Lewisbey expressly waived any conflict and consented to Brindley’s continuation as his counsel. Lewisbey was convicted and sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. The government subsequently obtained a limited remand to address a new criminal investigation targeting Brindley. Brindley withdrew. Another attorney took over Lewisbey’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of violation of Lewisbey’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel; that the Facebook posts and text messages taken from his phones should have been excluded on hearsay and authentication grounds or based on prejudicial impact under Federal Rule 403; and that the government’s cell-phone location expert did not satisfy the “Daubert” factors. View "United States v. Lewisbey" on Justia Law

Freeman was charged in Counts 1 and 2 with distribution of 28 grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); in Count 3, with possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); in Count 4, with distribution of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and (Count 5) with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Freeman pled guilty to Counts 1 and 5 and stipulated to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, the basis of a different indictment. Freeman admitted that he had been selling crack cocaine since 1999 and bought and sold 80 firearms: 40 in 1999-2001 to a high-ranking member Gangster Disciples member and 40 in 2010 to a different member. The court calculated the guidelines range as 140-175 months on Count 1 with the stipulation and 60 months’ consecutive imprisonment on Count 5. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a sentence below that range, sentencing Freeman to 132 months’ imprisonment on Count 1 and to 60 months, consecutive, on Count 5. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that he should have been sentenced using a 1:1 crack-to-powder ratio instead of the 18:1 ratio encompassed within the Sentencing Guidelines and that the district court relied on its own speculations as to uncharged criminal conduct and erred in allowing its frustration with his litigation tactics to affect his sentence. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In 2013, Harris was part of a group of armed robbers. He robbed a Schererville, Indiana T‐Mobile store, an Addison, Illinois Sprint store; and a LaPorte, Indiana AT&T store. He was charged in Indiana state court for the LaPorte robbery. Harris received a target letter informing him that he might be charged in federal court for the Addison robbery. A federal public defender was appointed, but failed to advise him or his state defense attorney of the progress of the federal proceedings. Harris pled guilty in state court in December 2013 and was later charged in federal court. After serving three years, Harris pled guilty to federal charges of robbery and brandishing a firearm, stipulating that he committed the Schererville robbery and agreeing to its consideration as relevant conduct. The parties agreed to a lower sentencing guideline range, recommending grouping Harris’ state conviction as part of his federal case rather than as a separate conviction to ameliorate federal defense counsel’s failure to communicate. The district court concluded that the state conviction was part of Harris’s criminal history rather than a grouped offense in his federal case and sentenced Harris to an additional 160 months in federal custody to run concurrently with his state court sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s rejection of a “hypothetical guideline range” to compensate for the public defender’s error. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law