Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, for submitting fraudulent invoices to an Illinois town (Riverdale), which paid him $374,000. The district judge sentenced him to 60 months in prison, plus 36 months of supervised release with discretionary conditions of supervised release, most of which concern dealing with the probation department, restitution, and seeking work. The judge also imposed special conditions, requiring community service during unemployment; restricting credit charges; giving the probation officer financial information; notifying the court of material changes in defendant’s circumstances; and requiring defendant to ”contribute an amount thatʹs at least 10 percent of his net monthly income to the extent that other financial obligations have not been met. And he may not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent” without permission. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not give reasons for the conditions or for the term of supervised release as required by 18 U.S.C. 3553(c), nor read the conditions to the defendant. The conditions imposed contained a substance abuse treatment condition that was not contained in the written notice prepared by the probation office. There was also a discrepancy between the oral and written judgments. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Rogers and Hardy hid outside the entrance, then forced a teller into a bank at gunpoint as she was opening the door. Armour directed them by radio from the parking lot. Armour had recruited the two, supplied clothing, reserved their hotel rooms, and orchestrated the plan. When the teller could not open the safe, the two restrained her and stole her car to flee. All three men were arrested quickly; two firearms were found with them. Rogers and Hardy pled guilty. Both testified against Armour, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 371; aiding and abetting attempted armed bank robbery 18 U.S.C. 2113(a); and aiding and abetting using or carrying or brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence 18 U.S.C. 924(c). His 324-month sentence included an 84-month consecutive sentence on the section 924(c) charge, the mandatory minimum for brandishing a firearm. The Seventh Circuit remanded the sentence for the section 924(c) conviction, which was imposed without a jury finding that Armour aided and abetted the “brandishing.” The court rejected an argument that the entire sentence was erroneously based on a finding that Armour was a career offender based on two prior Indiana convictions for robbery and an argument that the section 924(c) conviction must be reversed because the underlying predicate offense, attempted armed bank robbery, should not qualify as a “crime of violence.” View "United States v. Armour" on Justia Law

Curtis asked Lockwood to place a package in her brother’s truck and that it contained a bomb. Lockwood agreed. At the brother’s house, Lockwood failed to locate the truck and placed the bomb in the mailbox. He called the police and reported that the brother had a bomb and planned to blow up his office. The bomb-squad found nothing, but Curtis’s sister-in-law discovered the package in the mailbox later that day. It contained a pipe bomb, incapable of detonation, because it had no power source. After reviewing Curtis’s phone records, agents focused on Lockwood and charged him with possession of a destructive device. Lockwood claimed ignorance that the package contained a bomb. The jury convicted him. The Seventh Circuit vacated imposition the statutory maximum 120 months’ imprisonment (the Guidelines range was 33–41 months), finding the district court’s justifications insufficient. On remand, the district court again imposed a 120-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court properly relied on testimony about Lockwood’s propensity for violence, even while he was on pretrial release, and his “troubling history,” which includes several domestic incidents wherein he threatened to kill women. He had burned down his girlfriend’s apartment, resulting in a conviction for aggravated arson. The court concluded that Lockwood should be incapacitated for a significant time to protect the public and those closest to him, calling Lockwood a “sociopath” who showed little remorse. View "United States v. Lockwood" on Justia Law

Wieckowicz, a confidential informant, alerted FBI agents that Oziemski solicited Wieckowicz’s help in planned robberies; Oziemski planned to travel from Poland to New York, and then to Chicago to meet Stanislawczyk, and then to New York to commit the robberies. Days later, Wieckowicz told agents that Stanislawczyk was in New York, but would return to Chicago and then travel to New York with Oziemski and Wrobel. Wieckowicz, Wrobel, and Stanislawczyk met at Stanislawczyk’s apartment. Oziemski participated via Skype in the recorded conversation, which concerned robbing a diamond merchant at his Brooklyn residence, using a rented van. Under FBI supervision, Wieckowicz rented a van, which the FBI equipped with a recording device. The four left for New York. They were arrested at a New Jersey hotel. Wrobel, Stanislawczyk, and Oziemski were charged with conspiring to obstruct, delay, and affect commerce by robbery of diamonds and other valuables, Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The court allowed the government to introduce expert testimony that all diamonds are mined outside the U.S., and that diamond dealers frequently carry diamonds on their persons, to establish a nexus between the charged offense and interstate commerce and to rebut arguments that defendants’ statements regarding robbing a diamond merchant were mere fantasy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions, rejecting arguments that there was insufficient evidence to establish the required nexus between the crime and interstate commerce and that the court improperly admitted the government’s expert testimony. View "United States v. Stanislawczyk" on Justia Law

In August 2008, a Milwaukee County jury found Carpenter guilty of kidnapping, false imprisonment, four counts of second‐degree sexual assault, and four counts of first‐degree sexual assault. Carpenter was sentenced to 59 years’ imprisonment followed by 24 years of extended supervision. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Carpenter’s petition for review. He unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The petition had been filed almost seven months after the one-year period for filing had passed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Carpenter’s request for equitable tolling. Carpenter did not exercise reasonable diligence in pursuit of his rights. Although he filed two federal motions seeking an extension of time, he ignored the district court’s instructions regarding the proper way to seek such an extension. Carpenter failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his physical and mental health issues, even when combined with the other circumstances he classifies as extraordinary, “actually impaired his ability to pursue his claims.” View "Carpenter v. Douma" on Justia Law

Haney pled guilty to possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that Haney had at least three prior convictions for “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) (ACCA). His convictions were for two burglaries and armed bank robbery in Illinois and three aggravated assaults in Pennsylvania. The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The Illinois burglary statute at the time of Haney’s 1975 conviction included locations other than a “building or other structure,” falling outside the “generic” offense as defined by the Supreme Court, so Haney’s Illinois burglary convictions are not violent felonies under the ACCA. Even assuming that Haney’s convictions for aggravated assault are violent felonies, Haney is one predicate short of being an armed career criminal if, as Haney argues, all three of his assaults occurred on the same “occasion.” The issue was not addressed at sentencing. View "United States v. Haney" on Justia Law

Police responded to a report of a man with a gun and saw Rash take something (a gun) from his waistband and drop it. Rash was arrested. He stated that the gun belonged to his girlfriend, Monica; after she left her gun in his house, he went to return it to her since, as a convicted felon, he could not have a gun in his house. He repeated the story at trial. The government introduced video footage showing that Rash had twice accompanied Monica to the gun store to help purchase it. At sentencing, the court applied a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, finding that the videotape showed “clearly that [he was] engaged in assisting in the purchase of that gun.” The enhancement did not change the Guidelines range. Rash was subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). After the Supreme Court invalidated the part of the ACCA that determined Rash’s sentence, Rash’s attorney unsuccessfully opposed the enhancement, arguing that Rash’s statements were not material because Rash had admitted that he possessed a gun. The court calculated a range of 95-115 months (77-96 months without the enhancement). The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 100-month sentence. The trial court reasonably concluded that Rush’s testimony was intended to encourage the jury to nullify and not convict him of possession. View "United States v. Rash" on Justia Law

In 2013 Elder and others, including his father, were charged with conspiring to traffic methamphetamine from Arizona to Indiana. Elder and his father pleaded not guilty. Six co-defendants pleaded guilty. Some testified for the prosecution. A jury found Elder guilty of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841; 846. The government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. 851 indicating that Elder had a 1999 conviction for possession of equipment or chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs and a 1997 conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and sought application of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which requires a defendant to be sentenced to life if he is convicted of a serious drug offense after having previously been convicted of two drug‐related felonies. The district court stated that it believed a life sentence was overly harsh, but that it had no discretion under the statute. Finding that Elder’s prior convictions qualified as felony drug offenses, the court sentenced Elder to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the admission of testimony by co-conspirators under Rule 800, but vacated the sentence. Elder’s 1997 conviction did not qualify as a drug-related felony. View "United States v. Elder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, was in his fourteenth year at a Wisconsin medium-security prison when he was placed in a cell with DaSilva, who, 12 days later, sexually assaulted plaintiff in their cell. DaSilva was in prison for having sexually assaulted a woman. Both were classified as “medium security” inmates. DaSilva had committed eight violations of the prison’s rules in two years, including fighting, lying, theft, and use of intoxicants—but no sexual offenses. An investigation resulted in a criminal charge being lodged against DaSilva and an official notice that plaintiff and DaSilva were not to share a cell. Plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to the danger of sexual assaulted by DaSilva, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s challenge to the practice of random assignment of cellmates. The court noted the prison’s compliance with the notification requirements of the 2003 Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 15601–15609, and that there was no evidence that plaintiff expressed any concern about being vulnerable to sexual assault. The staff was apparently unaware that the plaintiff was perceived by other prisoners to be homosexual; nor was there any evidence of such a perception, apart from the plaintiff’s unsupported claim. View "Ramos v. Hamblin" on Justia Law

In 2010, Alston was convicted of five charges and placed on probation. Dane County law enforcement agencies established a “Special Investigation Unit” (SIU) to monitor and offer resources to probationers whom they identified as “serious, assaultive offenders.” In 2011, Alston was identified for participation in that program and was offered resources aimed at deterring him from reoffending, with the admonition that any probation violation would result in the Department of Corrections vigorously seeking full revocation of probation. Alston was arrested a month later, for violating his probation. A revocation hearing was held before an ALJ for the Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, who stated that she had attended a presentation on the SIU program and her understanding that “it would be expected that they wouldn’t be given another chance. … [they] would be revoked.” Alston unsuccessfully sought substitution of a “neutral party” who had not attended the presentation. His probation revocation was upheld by state courts, which held that the ALJ's attendance at the presentation did not create an impermissibly high risk of bias in violation of Alston’s due process rights. Rejecting Alston’s federal habeas petition, the district court found, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. View "Alston v. Smith" on Justia Law