Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013 Elder and others, including his father, were charged with conspiring to traffic methamphetamine from Arizona to Indiana. Elder and his father pleaded not guilty. Six co-defendants pleaded guilty. Some testified for the prosecution. A jury found Elder guilty of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841; 846. The government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. 851 indicating that Elder had a 1999 conviction for possession of equipment or chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs and a 1997 conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and sought application of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which requires a defendant to be sentenced to life if he is convicted of a serious drug offense after having previously been convicted of two drug‐related felonies. The district court stated that it believed a life sentence was overly harsh, but that it had no discretion under the statute. Finding that Elder’s prior convictions qualified as felony drug offenses, the court sentenced Elder to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the admission of testimony by co-conspirators under Rule 800, but vacated the sentence. Elder’s 1997 conviction did not qualify as a drug-related felony. View "United States v. Elder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, was in his fourteenth year at a Wisconsin medium-security prison when he was placed in a cell with DaSilva, who, 12 days later, sexually assaulted plaintiff in their cell. DaSilva was in prison for having sexually assaulted a woman. Both were classified as “medium security” inmates. DaSilva had committed eight violations of the prison’s rules in two years, including fighting, lying, theft, and use of intoxicants—but no sexual offenses. An investigation resulted in a criminal charge being lodged against DaSilva and an official notice that plaintiff and DaSilva were not to share a cell. Plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to the danger of sexual assaulted by DaSilva, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s challenge to the practice of random assignment of cellmates. The court noted the prison’s compliance with the notification requirements of the 2003 Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 15601–15609, and that there was no evidence that plaintiff expressed any concern about being vulnerable to sexual assault. The staff was apparently unaware that the plaintiff was perceived by other prisoners to be homosexual; nor was there any evidence of such a perception, apart from the plaintiff’s unsupported claim. View "Ramos v. Hamblin" on Justia Law

In 2010, Alston was convicted of five charges and placed on probation. Dane County law enforcement agencies established a “Special Investigation Unit” (SIU) to monitor and offer resources to probationers whom they identified as “serious, assaultive offenders.” In 2011, Alston was identified for participation in that program and was offered resources aimed at deterring him from reoffending, with the admonition that any probation violation would result in the Department of Corrections vigorously seeking full revocation of probation. Alston was arrested a month later, for violating his probation. A revocation hearing was held before an ALJ for the Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, who stated that she had attended a presentation on the SIU program and her understanding that “it would be expected that they wouldn’t be given another chance. … [they] would be revoked.” Alston unsuccessfully sought substitution of a “neutral party” who had not attended the presentation. His probation revocation was upheld by state courts, which held that the ALJ's attendance at the presentation did not create an impermissibly high risk of bias in violation of Alston’s due process rights. Rejecting Alston’s federal habeas petition, the district court found, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. View "Alston v. Smith" on Justia Law

Holman used heroin to manage pain associated with rheumatoid arthritis. She became addicted and became a dealer. In 2012, Henschel died of a heroin overdose. Wisconsin law enforcement discovered Holman’s heroin distribution ring; a co-conspirator had provided Henschel with heroin on the day she died. Agents conducted a controlled purchase from Holman. Holman was charged with participating in a drug conspiracy, which caused a death, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C). The government later dropped the causing-death element. Holman pled guilty. At sentencing hearing, the court accounted for downward adjustments under the “safety valve” provision of U.S.S.G. 5C1.2 and for acceptance of responsibility, calculated Holman’s Guidelines range as 57-71 months, found that range higher than necessary, and sentenced Holman to 36 months. While her appeal was pending, the district court found the government’s evidence insufficient to prove that Holman’s co-conspirator’s heroin actually caused Henschel’s overdose. The Seventh Circuit remanded for redetermination​ of Holman’s sentence without consideration of the death. At resentencing Holman asked for probation, noting that she had entered a drug treatment program and had not relapsed. The court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and imposed a 33-month prison sentence, agreeing that she should be eligible for the prison’s residential drug treatment program. The court declined to impose a sentence of probation, noting the need for deterrence and her potential for relapse if returned to the community. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court lengthened the sentence to promote rehabilitation. View "United States v. Holman" on Justia Law

In April 2013, Schrode committed predatory sexual assault against a four‐year‐old family member, Jane. He pled guilty in state court in February 2014 and was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment. In June 2013, the FBI executed a search warrant of Schrode’s Springfield, Illinois home and discovered that Schrode sent child pornography to a man in Michigan. In exchange, Schrode watched that man through streaming video and directed him as he sexually assaulted his son. The FBI discovered images and videos of child pornography on Schrode’s computer. In June 2014, when Schrode was in custody, his wife discovered videos of him sexually assaulting Jane at a friend’s home. The video was turned over to the FBI. Schrode pled guilty to four federal child pornography counts and was sentenced to 630 months’ imprisonment, some to run consecutively to his state sentence, plus a life term of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in requiring some of his federal sentence to run consecutively to his state sentence, because it did not err in finding that his state offense was not relevant conduct for all of his federal offenses. The court adequately justified imposing a life term of supervision; Schrode waived any challenges to his conditions of release at the sentencing hearing. The court granted a limited remand for sentencing calculation in compliance with 18 U.S.C. 2251(e). View "United States v. Schrode" on Justia Law

Wykoff pleaded guilty to wire-fraud charges after soliciting bribes and kickbacks while a Bloomington, Indiana, official. The district judge sentenced him to 55 months in prison and to pay restitution of $446,335 to Bloomington and a $1,100 assessment, with payments “to begin immediately.” The judge added a “special instruction”: “Any unpaid restitution balance during the term of supervision shall be paid at a rate of not less than 10% of the defendant’s gross monthly income.” The government obtained a garnishment under 28 U.S.C. 3205(b)(1), issued to the Indiana pension system because it had an account in Wykoff’s name worth $47,937. Wykoff requested a hearing to determine whether any of the money was exempt. He argued that he had already forfeited two of his homes and the government had seized money from his prison account and that the balance should be deferred to his release because the “special instruction” limited his restitution payments to 10 percent of his monthly income. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument. The instruction says that 10 percent is the minimum amount he must pay. The federal criminal code requires that restitution be paid immediately unless the district court provides otherwise, 18 U.S.C. 3572(d)(1), which it did not. View "United States v. Wykoff" on Justia Law

Kruger was arrested in 2013 after a day-long crime spree in southwestern Wisconsin during which he robbed his uncle, kidnapped a 69-year-old farmer, stole multiple vehicles, and drove over rural roads at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour in an unsuccessful effort to elude capture. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court ordered him to serve a below-guidelines prison term of 180 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no plain error in the enhancement for use of a firearm, and that any potential error in the calculation of his criminal history did not affect his advisory Guidelines sentencing range. The court noted the district court took into consideration that “Kruger has led a troubled life.” He had a sentencing range of 292 to 365 months. Because that range exceeded the statutory maximum term of 240 months, the statutory maximum became the Guidelines sentencing range. U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(a); 5G1.2(d). View "United States v. Kruger" on Justia Law

Urbana police officers responded to a domestic dispute. In their report, the officers noted that Hamilton called Wright a “pedophile” during the altercation. No arrests were made. The following morning, McNaught, who specializes in crimes against children, reviewed the report as a matter of course, and called Hamilton. Hamilton granted permission to search the couple’s apartment and computers for evidence of child pornography. McNaught seized a desktop computer from the living room; forensic analysis revealed images of child pornography on the hard drive. Wright was charged with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A, and sexually exploiting a minor. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Hamilton lacked authority to consent to the warrantless search. McNaught testified that Hamilton had stated that Wright used his cellphone to visit a website called “Jailbait,” which McNaught recognized as featuring pornographic images of underage girls. Hamilton also mentioned seeing a video with a disturbing title on the computer. McNaught testified that he had “previewed” the hard drive by connecting it to his laptop, a standard procedure. Hamilton described the living arrangements at the apartment, which was leased in her name. The district judge denied the motion. Wright pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of suppression. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Wright owned the computer, Hamilton was a joint user who enjoyed virtually unlimited access to and control over it. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Kubsch was twice convicted of the 1998 murders of his wife, her son, and her ex-husband and was sentenced to death. No eyewitness, DNA evidence, fingerprints, or other forensic evidence linked Kubsch to the murders. After exhausting state remedies, he filed an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, rejecting Kubsch’s arguments that the Indiana trial court wrongfully excluded evidence of a nine-year-old witness’s exculpatory but hearsay statement to police; that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to that witness’s statement; and that his decision to represent himself at sentencing was not knowing and voluntary. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The case concerns the total exclusion of relevant evidence, not with a limitation on the way the evidence can be used; the defendant’s interest in the evidence was at its zenith. The excluded evidence was easily the strongest evidence on Kubsch’s only theory of defense—actual innocence. It was not cumulative, unfairly prejudicial, potentially misleading, or merely impeaching. It was unusually reliable. The Indiana Supreme Court’s conclusion that Supreme Court precedent (Chambers) did not require the admission of this critical evidence was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Chambers line of Supreme Court precedent. View "Kubsch v. Neal" on Justia Law

Kolbusz, a dermatologist, submitted thousands of claims to the Medicare system and private insurers for the treatment of actinic keratosis, a skin condition that sometimes leads to cancer. He received millions of dollars in payments. Convicted of six counts of mail or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, he was sentenced to 84 months in prison plus $3.8 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence permitted a reasonable jury to conclude that many, if not substantially all, of the claims could not have reflected an honest medical judgment and that the treatment Kolbusz claimed to have supplied may have failed to help any patient who actually had actinic keratosis. Because the indictment charged a scheme to defraud, the prosecutor was entitled to prove the scheme as a whole, and not just the six exemplars described in the indictment. The judge did not err in excluding evidence that, after his arrest and indictment, Kolbusz continued to submit claims to Medicare, and many were paid. “It would have been regrettable to divert the trial into an examination of Medicare’s claims-processing procedures in 2013 and 2014, rather than whether Kolbusz knew that he was submitting false claims in 2010 and earlier." View "United States v. Kolbusz" on Justia Law