Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Whatley was convicted, under a now‐repealed Indiana law, of possessing about three grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a “youth program center.” Whatley’s father’s home, where he was arrested, was 795 feet from the Robinson Community Church, which hosted events targeted to young persons, including religious services, mentoring programs, a Girl Scout troop, weekly Family Fun Night, and children’s choirs. On direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus proceedings, Whatley argued that the statutory definition of “youth program center,” as any: building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court declined to address the claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Whatley did not procedurally default his claim. The state courts were unreasonable in applying federal law on vagueness: the word “regular” in the definition provides no objective standard and fails to place persons of ordinary intelligence on notice of the conduct proscribed and allows for arbitrary enforcement; defendants are strictly liable for violating the nebulous provision; and the consequences of a violation were extreme. No one in Whatley’s position could have known that the Church would fall within the definition simply because it hosted a few children’s events each week. View "Whatley v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

Duncan was arrested on outstanding warrants. Police discovered a loaded pistol near the site of his arrest. Duncan admitted that it belonged to him. He pled guilty to being a felon and unlawful user of controlled substances in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), (g)(3), and 924(e). Duncan had Indiana state convictions for robbery, one in 2001, and two in 2008. The statute defines robbery as “knowingly or intentionally tak[ing] property from another person or from the presence of another person” either “by using or threatening the use of force on any person” or “by putting any person in fear.” Ind. Code 35-42-5-1. The district court found that the three convictions counted as “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Without the enhancement, Duncan faced a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. With the enhancement, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In the ordinary case, robbery by placing a person in fear of bodily injury under Indiana law involves an explicit or implicit threat of physical force and therefore qualifies as a violent felony under section 924(e)(2)(B)(i). View "United States v. Duncan" on Justia Law

McKenzie was killed when he fell to electrified train tracks during a gang-related fight. An Illinois jury convicted Evans of felony murder based on the felony “mob action.” Evans argued on direct appeal that independent purpose was an element of the crime of mob action and that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to have the jury to determine whether the underlying offense of mob action had a felonious purpose independent of the killing. The state court concluded that the trial court “adequately apprised” the jury. The federal district court denied relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasoning that Evans’s claim improperly asked a federal court to review a state court’s interpretation of state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Evans did properly present a federal claim: the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine each element of a state crime, his assertion that Illinois defines felony murder to include “independent felonious intent” as a factual element is inaccurate. View "Evans v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

After a 2003 shooting, Lisle was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to 37 years in prison. He sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that the state trial court admitted as evidence testimonial statements made by the surviving victim (Hearn) in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that the state courts did not apply Supreme Court precedent unreasonably in holding that the testimony, about a wounded man’s statement to his aunt (Lee) while waiting for an ambulance that Lisle had shot him, was not a “testimonial” out-of-court statement and was permitted under the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court had not held in 2007 that a statement to someone other than a law enforcement officer can be testimonial, and it was not unreasonable for the state court to find that Hearn’s statement to Lee was part of an effort to deal with an ongoing emergency and thus was nontestimonial. View "Lisle v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Hussein and Odeh ran two convenience stores in southern Illinois where they sold counterfeit goods and illegally traded cash or ineligible items for food stamps. They also filed false tax returns on behalf of their businesses. They eventually pleaded guilty to four counts, waiving their right to appeal their sentences so long as their sentences were within the advisory guideline range. After an attempt to withdraw the plea and challenge the loss calculation, the district court sentenced each to a within-guidelines term of imprisonment of 85 months. The Seventh Circuit dismissed appeals, rejecting arguments that the government breached the plea agreement by not recommending reductions for acceptance of responsibility, and not recommending a sentence at the low end of the range for Odeh. and an attempt to challenge the loss calculation. View "United States v. Odeh" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers pulled over a car driven by Rosado for failing to use a turn signal. After stopping the car, the officers “claimed to have seen” a badge, handcuffs, and a handgun in plain view “between the brake lever and center console.” They arrested Rosado for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and for violating the armed habitual criminal statute. Another officer approved the report as establishing probable cause. Rosado spent about 18 months in jail before receiving a copy of the dash cam video recorded when he was arrested, which, contrary to the officers’ accounts, showed that Rosado had used an operable turn signal. The state court dismissed the charges. Rosado filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Rosado’s false‐arrest claim as barred by the two‐year statute of limitations. Because his claims of conspiracy and failure to intervene arose from the false‐arrest claim, those were also dismissed. The court dismissed Rosado’s due‐process and respondeat‐superior claims on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rosado did not promptly file. He knew the officers had fabricated probable cause by February 2014, when he received the video, and still had seven months to timely file suit. Rosado’s unexplained failure to timely file precluded equitable tolling. View "Rosado v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2000, Morris and Smith were sitting in Morris’s car. Morris fired a handgun, killing Smith. Later that day, Smith’s body was found in a Milwaukee alley. Morris, charged with first‐degree reckless homicide while using a dangerous weapon, retained attorney Backes. On the day set for trial, Backes stated that Morris wanted a new lawyer and that he was not prepared for trial because he believed, until two days earlier, that Morris planned to plead guilty. The court offered to postpone the trial for two days. The prosecutor stated, contrary to its earlier position, that if the case went to trial the state would seek leave to increase the charge to first‐degree intentional homicide. The judge never responded. Morris agreed to plead guilty to first‐degree reckless homicide, without the enhancement for being armed. The judge conducted a plea colloquy: Morris stated that no one had made any threats or in any way forced him to plead guilty and that he was satisfied with attorney Backes, who was also satisfied that the plea was knowing and voluntary. After pleading guilty, Morris fired Backes and hired attorney Awen. At no point before or during sentencing did either move to withdraw his guilty plea or question the plea's voluntariness. The court sentenced Morris to 30 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief. Morris was under strong pressures, but the evidence did not show that his plea was involuntary. View "Morris v. Bartow" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with intent to sell, i21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment (the bottom of the guidelines range), which was reduced by 20 percent (to 168 months the following year in exchange for cooperation. Four years later, he sought a further reduction, to 134 months, based on Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782, a retroactive two‐level reduction in the sentencing range. The government acknowledged that the Amendment authorized the 34‐month sentence reduction, but argued that witnesses indicated that the defendant had been at times armed while engaged in his illegal drug dealing, and, during his current imprisonment, had committed five disciplinary infractions. In denying relief, the judge emphasized that the disciplinary infractions had “occurred relatively recently” (most recently three years earlier) and were “serious,” and that the defendant “remains a significant danger to the community.” The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that the judge did not consider defendant’s positive achievements, such as the reduction in his security classification from high to medium and his completion of vocational and adult‐education courses, which will help him to obtain his GED, erred in describing the defendant’s disciplinary infractions as recent, and did not consider whether the defendant will likely remain a danger to the community when he is released, years from now. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant on a storage unit that Miranda rented, where Miranda and Rivas worked on cars. The owner said that he saw Rivas at that unit “just about every day.” The officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, two loaded guns, Rivas’s student handbook, invoices from Rivas’s mechanic business, and a Western Union receipt tied to him. Miranda was arrested. He called Rivas from jail and, in a recorded call, told Rivas the police were looking for him, but that he would not say anything about Rivas to the police. Rivas was arrested. A fingerprint examiner testified at trial that he was certain the partial fingerprint found on a handgun belonged to Rivas. Rivas wanted to question the examiner about an unrelated case in which the FBI used the same method to erroneously conclude that the fingerprint of an Oregon lawyer was on a bag containing detonating devices used in terrorist bombings. The district court ruled the defense could not refer to that case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Rivas’s conviction. The examiner was not involved in the other case, and the cases were wholly unrelated. Rivas’s counsel was not prevented from questioning the examiner on the reliability of the fingerprint identification method. Counsel pursued multiple lines of cross‐examination. Rivas’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated. View "United States v. Rivas" on Justia Law

In 1993 Bradford, then an Evansville police officer, was convicted in Indiana state court of murder and arson and was sentenced to 80 years in prison, where he remains. The victim, who was apparently killed by stabbing before the fire started, was the woman with whom Evans had been having an extramarital affair. In 2013 he filed a federal habeas corpus suit, claiming that he could prove his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief. Bradford had his chance and failed to present reliable evidence that would establish his innocence. The Indiana Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Bradford’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by selecting a particular fire expert as a witness. This was not a case in which counsel made no meaningful investigation or failed to present a defense expert on a critical issue. View "Bradford v. Brown" on Justia Law