Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Williams, serving a 65‐year prison sentence for murder at the Pontiac Illinois maximum‐security prison, ordered the death certificate of the woman whom he murdered. Staff confiscated the certificate (which had arrived from the county clerk's office with an unsigned note: “There is a place in hell waiting for you, as you must know you will reap what you have sowed!” The stated reason for confiscation was “it posed a threat to the safety and security of the institution and would negatively impact Inmate Williams’ rehabilitation.” The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, reasoning that confiscating the certificate had decreased the risk that inmates would retaliate against “boasting inmates” like Williams, and had protected the victim’s family from being identified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to defendants not involved in the confiscation, but otherwise reversed. The right of an inmate to read the mail he receives, provided that his reading it would not infringe legitimate interests, is clearly established. The prison must present “some evidence” to show that the restriction is justified. A prison has a legitimate safety concern about “boasting inmates” carrying around trophies, but Williams asserted that he needed the death certificate for use in state post‐conviction proceedings; the defendants presented no contrary evidence. View "Williams v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Hughes was found to be a sexually violent person who suffers from a mental disorder that creates a substantial risk that, unless confined, he is apt to commit further sexual violence; he was civilly committed, at Rushville, under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1–99, “for control, care and treatment” until he “is no longer a sexually violent person.” In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Hughes claimed that Illinois has improperly curtailed his liberty, by employing detention staff who are unable to provide him with the care and treatment without which he will never be eligible for release. Illinois allows only persons licensed under the Act to treat Rushville’s civil detainees and determine whether they can be released without danger to the public. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of Hughes’ complaint. The Supreme Court understands the Fourteenth Amendment to require that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they are no longer dangerous. It is not clear whether Rushville is providing the plaintiff (and others) with treatment by licensed professionals who have authority to determine the detainees’ right to be released. Liberty Healthcare, which furnishes the Rushville personnel, does not require that all of them be licensed. View "Hughes v. Dimas" on Justia Law

Williams, scheduled for release from prison in 2030 if he earns and retains all good-time credits, asked the district court to revise some conditions that will apply to supervised release when his sentence ends. The district court declined, deeming the application premature. District judges may revise terms of supervised release “at any time,” 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2)). The judge reasoned that, between now and Williams’s scheduled release, “he may have totally other issues that he might want to deal with regarding supervised release.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the governing law may change in the next 14 years. The court stated that it “would be reluctant to allow a judge to deem premature a request in the final year or two of imprisonment,” but treating a request 14 years in advance as premature, and requiring the prisoner to make all potential arguments at one time in the year or so before release, is a sound exercise of discretion. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hinesley was convicted of molesting his 13-year‐old former foster daughter, V.V. At trial, the prosecution had elicited the initial, inculpatory out‐of‐court statements of V.V. and her former foster brother, Billy, at length, with no objection. Before trial, it had come to light that V.V. and Billy (age 20) had been in a sexual relationship and had tried to conceal that relationship. The two had changed their accounts. Defense counsel did not object to the admission of statements by the investigating detective and by Billy that they believed V.V. The defense highlighted the changed stories. The trial judge found V.V.’s testimony credible. After exhausting state court remedies, Hinesley sought federal habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance by trial counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition. The Indiana Court of Appeals took the constitutional standard seriously and produced an answer within the range of defensible positions. The defense had a pre‐trial run‐through with V.V. and Billy at their depositions and knew that they would acknowledge inconsistencies in their statements. The risks of allowing the prosecution to elicit their original statements were low. With the judge serving as the trier of fact, it was unlikely that undue weight would be given to the out‐of‐court statements rather than their in‐court testimony. View "Hinesley v. Knight" on Justia Law

Following an extensive sting operation by federal law enforcement of a Chicago drug distribution ring, Tankson was indicted on three counts of distributing 100 grams of heroin and one count of distributing a detectable amount of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). After waiving his Miranda rights, Tankson acknowledged membership in the Black Disciples gang, admitted to participating in the four transactions ultimately charged in the indictment and indicated that three of them involved 100 grams of heroin and that the fourth involved 150 grams. He gave extensive information about his other involvement in drug trafficking. He entered a written plea declaration without an agreement. At sentencing, the government introduced Tankson’s post-arrest statement to authorities in order to establish significant additional drug quantities as relevant conduct. The district court credited the statement and, on that basis, increased his offense level under the quantity table and determined that he was subject to the career offender guideline. The court calculated a guidelines range of 360 months to life, then sentenced him to 228 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was entitled to credit his statement and to consider his 1995 drug-related conviction, for which he was paroled in 1997. View "United States v. Tankson" on Justia Law

Morris pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing heroin. The plea agreement called for the government to make sentencing recommendations: what quantity of drugs should count as relevant conduct, what Morris’s base offense level should be, and whether Morris was entitled to an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The government was to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range as determined by the court. The judge determined that Morris’s Guidelines range was 70–87 months after applying a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug offense, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1). Morris objected. The plea agreement did not mention a dangerous-weapon enhancement; the government responded that the enhancement was appropriate because agents recovered a handgun from Morris’s residence. The government recommended a sentence at the high end of the Guidelines range calculated by the judge. The judge imposed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, an 87-month sentence. There was no breach; the agreement expressly stated that the parties remained free to make sentencing recommendations not mentioned in the agreement. The government satisfied its obligation to recommend a sentence within the Guidelines range calculated by the judge. The handgun that was found in Morris’s residence justified application of the dangerous-weapon enhancement. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

From 2003-2008, Brown distributed millions of dollars worth of cocaine. He was convicted of conspiring to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). At sentencing, Brown argued that he should be held responsible only for five kilograms, as the jury had found. The government sought to hold him responsible for nearly 3000 kilograms, based on the testimony of cooperating witnesses. The court determined that 150 kilograms were “within the zone of this defendant’s responsibility,” and had been “proven and probably proven twice over.” The quantity corresponded to a base offense level of 38—the highest level provided in U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(1), yielding a guidelines range of 292-360 months. His conviction—but not the drug quantity calculation—was affirmed. Brown later moved (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)) to reduce his sentence under Amendment 782, which raised the amount of cocaine qualifying for level 38 from 150 kilograms to 450 kilograms. The government maintained that Brown’s level was unchanged because he was responsible for over 450 kilograms based on witness testimony. The court agreed and declined to disturb its guideline calculation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Brown’s offense level was not lowered. He has an offense level of 38, which applies under both the older and the revised guidelines and reflects very large quantities of cocaine. The court’s statements indicated its determination that Brown was responsible for 450 kilograms or more of cocaine. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendants pleaded guilty to firearms offenses that carry an enhanced base offense level for prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a). The Guidelines then defined “crime of violence” to include “any offense under federal or state law … that … is burglary of a dwelling,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). Both had Wisconsin convictions for burglary; each judge applied the higher offense level. The Seventh Circuit vacated. To determine whether a conviction is a crime of violence requires a categorical approach that focuses on the statutory definition. If state law defines the offense more broadly than the Guidelines, the conviction is not a crime of violence, even if the defendant’s conduct satisfies all of the elements of the Guidelines offense. When a single statute creates multiple offenses and is “divisible,” the court may consult a limited universe of documents to determine which offense the defendant was convicted of (modified categorical approach). In 2016, the Supreme Court clarified that a statute is divisible only if it creates multiple offenses by setting forth alternative elements. Wisconsin defines burglary more broadly than the Guidelines, referring to burglary of a “building or dwelling.” WIS. STAT. 943.10(1m)(a). The judges consulted charging documents, which revealed that defendants were charged with burgling dwellings. It is now clear that this recourse to state-court charging documents was improper. Wisconsin’s burglary statute sets forth alternative means of satisfying the location element of the state’s burglary offense. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

In 2014, Shannon was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud; two counts of identity theft (Counts 2 and 3); and two counts of aggravated identity theft. Following a bench trial, he was found guilty on all counts and was sentenced to 14 months each on Counts 1, 2 and 3, to run concurrently, and 24 months on Counts 4 and 5, to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively as to Counts 1–3. Shannon’s total prison sentence amounted to 38 months of incarceration followed by 3 years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the prosecution’s evidence was heavily dependent of the uncorroborated testimony of Taylor, a cooperating witness with “powerful motivation to falsify.” Shannon had provided Taylor, an accountant, with 107 stolen identities, directing him to use the stolen identities to prepare and file false tax returns. The court upheld the application of a 2-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for the organizer or leader of a criminal enterprise. The district court appropriately considered the relevant facts in concluding that the preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that Shannon was a “supervisor” under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law

In 1999, Werner was convicted of multiple sex offenses and was a Special Bulletin Notification (SBN) sex offender under Wisconsin law. Werner’s release was deferred until his 2010 mandatory release date. Werner and his probation agents were unable to secure an approved residence as required by his rules of supervision, so the Department of Corrections detained him pursuant to Administrative Directive No. 02‐10, under which persons who had reached their mandatory release date but could not secure approved housing were detained in the county jail at night but permitted to seek housing during certain hours of the day. In 2011, he moved into an approved residence. Werner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court permitted Werner to proceed on individual‐capacity claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause and to maintain an official‐capacity claim, for injunctive relief, that AD 02‐10 violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The court ultimately granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims, finding the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims barred by qualified immunity and that his challenge to the policy was moot. AD 02‐10 was replaced in 2015 by AD 15‐12, under which SBN sex offenders lacking approved residences are no longer held in jail. Werner has twice violated probation and is again incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; clearly established law at the time would not have notified the defendants that the AD 02‐10 procedures were unlawful. View "Werner v. Wall" on Justia Law