Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Carrion entered the apartment of 69‐year‐old Zymal and stabbed her, causing her death. Carrion, who lived in an apartment above Zymali’s, was a 19-year‐old immigrant who spoke almost no English. He was interviewed in Spanish, denied involvement with Zymali’s death, but agreed to provide fingerprint samples. His fingerprint was found on a knife recovered from Zymali’s apartment. Illinois courts affirmed his convictions for residential burglary and first‐degree murder on direct appeal and on post-conviction review. Carrion’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 was denied. The court concluded that although it probably was timely filed, most of the claims were procedurally defaulted and remaining claims were meritless. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to address: whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions, whether Carrion’s confession was voluntary, and whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the voluntariness of his confession. The court concluded that, whether applying the deferential review of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act or de novo review, Carrion is not entitled to relief. The prosecution met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no due process violation in the reception into evidence of Carrion’s statement, as translated by an investigating officer. Any ambiguities in the statement were examined thoroughly at trial. View "Carrion v. Butler" on Justia Law

McGuire pleaded guilty to interfering with commerce by threat or violence. The district court classified McGuire as a career offender under section 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which increases the offense level if the defendant has two prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence.” “Crime of violence” is defined in section 4B1.2 and includes “any offense … that … is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” (the residual clause). The district judge counted two of McGuire’s prior convictions as crimes of violence. One conviction, for fleeing the police, qualified only under the residual clause. With the career-offender enhancement, McGuire’s Guidelines range increased from 63–78 months to 151–188 months. Citing McGuire’s extensive criminal history, the judge imposed a sentence of 188 months, noting her surprise that the government hadn’t asked for the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson holding that the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. McGuire" on Justia Law

Waldman, an inmate, was convicted of forcibly assaulting a correctional officer after head‐butting him during an argument about a pat‐down search. Waldman and the guard dispute how the pat-down request advanced to a confrontation. Waldman advanced an unsuccessful self‐defense argument at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. While the district court erred in holding that there needed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm before he could justifiably use force in self‐defense, the court was correct in finding that Waldman had a legal alternative to force in complying with the pat‐down. Requiring that an inmate fear serious bodily harm or death before using force to protect himself is in‐ consistent with both the Eighth Amendment and common law principles justifying the use of self‐defense. Congress intended to protect correctional officers from harm in passing 28 U.S.C. 111, but that purpose must be harmonized with Eighth Amendment protections. View "United States v. Waldman" on Justia Law

Hurlburt and Gillespie pleaded guilty in separate cases to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). To calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range in each case, the district court began with U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a), which assigns progressively higher offense levels if the defendant has one or more prior convictions for a “crime of violence.” The term “crime of violence” is defined in the career-offender guideline to include any offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” (residual clause).” The U.S.S.G. residual clause mirrors the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). One year ago the Supreme Court’s “Johnson decision” invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. The Seventh Circuit previously held that the Guidelines are not susceptible to challenge on vagueness grounds. Overruling that precedent and applying Johnson, the Seventh Circuit vacated the sentences imposed on Hurlburt and Gillespie, holding that the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Hurlburt" on Justia Law

Rollins pleaded guilty to selling crack cocaine and was sentenced to 84 months in prison. In his second appeal, he challenged the application of the career-offender guideline, which assigns a higher offense level if the defendant has two prior convictions for a “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), including “any offense … that … otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” (residual clause). The district judge classified Rollins as a career offender based in part on a prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, a crime that would qualify only under the residual clause of this definition. The Supreme Court’s “Johnson” decision invalidated the identically phrased residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. In light of the government’s concession that Johnson’s constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2), the Seventh Circuit granted rehearing and held that under Johnson, the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague and vacated Rollins’s sentence. View "United States v. Rollins" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers executed a warrant and found a loaded pistol, a second gun, a plastic baggie containing 17 grams of heroin, a digital scale, and documents in Thomas’s name. Thomas was arrested. He moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was deficient because it was supported by a confidential informant “of unknown background and unknown reliability.” According to Thomas, the judge did not know whether the informant was under arrest or on probation, whether he received favorable treatment or was paid, how he knew Thomas, whether he used aliases, whether he was a rival gang member, his criminal history, and his record as an informant. The district court denied Thomas’s motion and found that Thomas had not made the showing necessary for a Franks hearing. Thomas entered a conditional guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “Brady” argument. Even if Brady applies to pretrial motions to suppress, the warrant was supported by probable cause, so the information he sought concerning the CI is not material.The informant provided details about Thomas’s apartment, that Thomas was a member of a particular gang, and described the firearms in detail. The information was corroborated by a prior arrest report that noted Thomas’s nickname, description, gang affiliation, age, and residence. The informant selected Thomas from a photo array and identified Thomas’s residence. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Walker, convicted in 2006 of robbery, was adjudicated a habitual offender pursuant to Indiana Code 35-50-2-8. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison; 20 of those years were attributable to his habitual-offender status. The Indiana habitual-offender statute applied if a defendant had been convicted of two prior unrelated felonies: the second felony had to have been committed after the sentencing for the first, and the present crime had to have been committed after the sentencing of the second earlier offense. At Walker’s trial, the state provided evidence of three prior felonies but failed to offer evidence of the date when one of the crimes was committed. Seeking federal habeas relief, Walker argued that his lawyer on direct appeal should have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the habitual-offender conviction, given the missing date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the petition. Even assuming that counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional minimum, the state appellate court’s conclusion that Walker’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not infringed meets the generous standards that apply under 28 U.S.C. 2254. View "Walker v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Officer Sell saw a car turn right from the center lane on a three-lane road and then drive through private property to avoid a red light. Using his computer, Sell saw that the car was registered to McPhaul, whose license was suspended, and that the driver looked like McPhaul’s displayed picture. The driver led the police on a mile-long “slow-speed” chase, even after Sell activated his lights and siren. When the driver stopped and was arrested, a pat-down revealed that he was wearing body armor; a loaded gun was found in the car’s center console. The driver was McPhaul, who had been convicted of a crime of violence. He was charged as a felon in possession of a gun, and with being a violent felon in possession of body armor. While in pre-trial custody, he wrote to his cousin, telling her she could ignore a grand jury subpoena, and asking her to swear that she put the gun in his car without his knowledge. McPhaul unsuccessfully moved to suppress the body armor. At sentencing, the judge applied Guidelines enhancements for using the body armor in connection with another felony offense, and for attempting to obstruct justice. McPhaul’s Guidelines range was 24–30 months and the judge imposed a 24-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the sentencing enhancements. The pat-down was lawful because officers had probable cause to stop McPhaul. View "United States v. McPhaul" on Justia Law

High‐ranking Latin Kings gang members pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy and extortion (Zamora) and (Gutierrez) to racketeering conspiracy and to possessing an illegal drug with intent to distribute it. The judge credited Zamora with acceptance of responsibility, but failed to indicate Zamora’s guidelines range, and imposed a 240-month prison term plus supervised release with special conditions, requiring Zamora to participate in job‐training and to perform community service if unemployed. The judge refused to credit Gutierrez with acceptance of responsibility, stating that he had fallen “substantially short of accepting responsibility,” then sentenced Gutierrez at the bottom of a calculated 210-262-month range, plus supervised release with special conditions requiring a mental‐health evaluation, mental‐health treatment, working to obtain a GED, and, if unemployed, community service. The Seventh Circuit vacated. On remand the judge commended Zamora for good behavior; calculated a range of 168-210 months; imposed a sentence of 200 months; and reimposed supervised release. After questioning Gutierrez, the judge, not calculating a guidelines range, reduced his sentence, with “all other aspects of the [original] judgment ... [to] remain in effect.” The Seventh Circuit again vacated. The judge failed to give advance notice that he was considering discretionary conditions; imposed conditions that have been previously deemed invalid; and failed to determine the compatibility of those conditions with 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The judge failed to calculate Gutierrez’s guidelines range and did not indicate how the issue of acceptance of responsibility was resolved. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Vasquez-Hernandez pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. 846, and admitted transporting 200 kilograms of cocaine, worth about $5 million, on behalf of the Sinaloa Cartel, and to receiving an additional 76 kilograms to be sold on consignment for about $2 million. The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment and sentenced him to 264 months, above the high end of the range. Although Vasquez-Hernandez conceded being an agent of others, the district judge concluded that he also had a supervisory role, reasoning that anyone entrusted with $7 million of someone else’s cocaine must have high status in the organization, and added three offense levels under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b), which applies when the defendant was “a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive”. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence as not clearly erroneous. No one can carry 276 kilograms of cocaine on his back or hide it in the glove compartment of a car. Moving any substance of this weight and bulk requires the assistance of multiple people. Vasquez-Hernandez effectively admitted supervising some others for the transportation of the cocaine. View "United States v. Vasquez-Hernandez" on Justia Law