Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Cisneros came to the U.S. in 1988 at age 17 and stayed after the expiration of his visa. In 1995, he married U.S. citizen; his status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident. They divorced in 2002. Cisneros consistently supported his ex-wife and the couple’s children and now has grandchildren. He has a history of alcoholism. In 2012, Cisneros committed unarmed robbery, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), resulting in loss of his legal permanent resident status and making him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because robbery is a crime of moral turpitude. Cisneros applied for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(1)(B), which gives the Attorney General the discretionary power to waive inadmissibility for the spouse, parent, or child of a U.S. citizen who would suffer “extreme hardship” if removed. An immigration judge granted Cisneros’s application. DHS appealed; the BIA revoked the waiver. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that its authority extends only to legal or constitutional issues, not discretionary determinations. View "Cisneros v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Weldon, Fields, and Roth pooled $120 to buy heroin from Weldon’s drug dealer. Roth drove. Weldon got out of Roth’s car, walked to the dealer’s car, gave the dealer the $120, and returned with the heroin. At Roth’s home, Fields mixed the heroin with water, divided it, and injected it into the three of them. Roth died as a result. Fields was tried, but argued that injecting Roth was not distribution; she was acquitted. Weldon pleaded guilty to having distributed an illegal drug, resulting in a death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Because he agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of another person he received a prison sentence of only eight years. Three years later he moved to vacate his conviction on grounds that his lawyer had rendered ineffective assistance by persuading him to plead guilty. The Seventh Circuit vacated denial of the motion. Individuals who “simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a drug for their own use, intending only to share it together,” are not distributors, “since both acquire possession from the outset and neither intends to distribute the drug to a third person.” Fields was acquitted and the defendants were participants in the same transaction. The insistence of Weldonʹs lawyer that a defense to the charge of distribution had no chance of success was constitutionally deficient. View "Weldon v. United States" on Justia Law

Arias came to the U.S. without authorization in 2000. She has raised three children here and has consistently paid income tax. Her longtime employer calls her an “excellent employee.” Her sole criminal conviction, falsely using a social security number to work (42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B)), was classified as a “crime involving moral turpitude” by the BIA, which disqualified Arias from seeking discretionary cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The Seventh Circuit remanded for reconsideration. Many violations of the cited statute would amount to crimes involving moral turpitude, but for both legal and pragmatic reasons, it is unlikely that every violation of the statute necessarily qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA misapplied the framework for identifying crimes involving moral turpitude that it was bound to apply at the time of its decision; after the BIA’s decision, the Attorney General vacated that framework in its entirety. The court noted the current vacuum of authoritative guidance on how the Board should determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude. View "Arias v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Sutton has been convicted of violent crimes in multiple separate Illinois prosecutions, including 1991 and 1997 convictions for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The state concedes that it unlawfully collected a sample of Sutton’s blood during the 1991 prosecution and then used that blood sample in the 1997 prosecution. In his habeas conviction, relating to the 1997 case, the district court granted relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing the inevitable discovery doctrine. Although the court order under which the blood was collected was not supported by probable cause, the blood (and thus the DNA) would inevitably have been produced under a state law that provided legal authority for collecting the sample. The relevant statute stated that persons convicted of certain sexual offenses “shall … be required to submit blood samples and saliva to the Illinois State Police.” (currently codified at 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3). View "Sutton v. Pfister" on Justia Law

In 2002, Nina Buckner was found brutally murdered in her home. Forensic testing confirmed that the blood on a hammer and knife found at the scene belonged to Buckner; the blood was also found on King’s clothes. Buckner’s neighbors reported seeing King near Buckner’s home the night of Buckner’s murder. When questioned, King gave multiple, very different, versions of his actions during that night. King was convicted of the first‐degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.The trial judge that presided over King’s trial and sentencing had represented King over 15 years earlier as an assistant public defender. King’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and denied review by the Illinois Supreme Court. King's petition for post‐conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court, affirmed on appeal, and denied review by the Illinois Supreme Court. Subsequently, King unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, for not seeking substitution of the trial judge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, noting that the judge had no independent recollection of King and that the evidence against King was overwhelming. King did not “fairly present” a federal due process claim of ineffective assistance in a complete round of state court review. View "King v. Pfister" on Justia Law

A 49-count indictment charged 51 Outlaws Motorcycle Club members with racketeering, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, extortion, running an illegal gambling business, witness tampering, and firearms offenses; 19 were charged under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute. The indictment included a forfeiture notice. The FBI executed search warrants on Indiana clubhouses and residences and seized items bearing the Outlaws insignia. The FBI sought forfeiture of patches, shirts, hats, belt buckles, signs, mirrors, flags, calendars, and pictures, which were use to deter other groups from infringing on Outlaw territory. In plea agreements, 18 Outlaws agreed to forfeiture. The court received Carlson’s letter, which it interpreted as a motion to intervene under 18 U.S.C. 1963(l)(2). Carlson asserted that he was entitled to direct notice, having been elected by the collective membership to manage Outlaws' indicia and memorabilia, which were owned by the collective membership, not by individuals. The government had provided notice to each defendant and had posted notice on the of government forfeiture website. The district court denied Carlson’s motions, finding that Carlson had not shown that the government was aware of Carlson or his alleged interest, nor demonstrated a property interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Indiana law: “[o]wnership cannot be conferred by a wave of a magic semantic wand.” The asserted collective ownership mechanism was “designed solely ‘to insulate from forfeiture.” View "United States v. Bowser" on Justia Law

In 1996, a jury convicted Poe of narcotics‐related offenses, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. 848(c). In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. United States, rendering the CCE jury instructions used in Poe’s trial erroneous: “You must unanimously find that the defendant committed at least two violations of the federal drug laws, but you do not have to agree on which two violations.” Poe sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, challenging his conviction under Richardson. Fourteen months later, the district court dismissed Poe’s petition without prejudice, because he should have filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Poe’s June 18, 2001 habeas petition, under section 2255, was denied as time‐barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2006. In 2014, Poe filed a new section 2241 petition, citing Alleyne v. United States (2013). The district court denied his petition, again for not filing it under section 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Construing Poe’s petition as a successive one under section 2255 would be futile; that section allows a successive motion for “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review.” View "Poe v. LaRiva" on Justia Law

Miller and Wagner used and sold methamphetamine together in northwestern Wisconsin. After law enforcement learned of the couple’s illicit activity, Miller pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. The district judge found that Miller and Wagner were jointly engaged in the distribution of between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine and sentenced Miller to eight years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejecting an argument that the district judge’s drug quantity finding was erroneous because Miller sold only a small portion of the drugs in question. Miller’s relevant conduct includes not only the sales he directly made himself but also the drug sales that Wagner foreseeably made in furtherance of their joint distribution scheme. There was no genuine dispute that Miller’s relevant conduct involved between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms. The district judge adequately explained why Miller’s sentence was necessary, given his history of drug use and drug sales; Miller did not overcome the presumption that his below‐Guidelines sentence is reasonable. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

A year after Harrington, a drug dealer, was sentenced, by Judge St. Eve, to 264 months in prison (subsequently reduced to 212 months by a change in the sentencing guidelines) the government asked for his cooperation in its investigation of his attorney Brindley. Brindley was accused of encouraging his clients to lie on the witness stand. Despite Brindley’s acquittal after a bench trial (Judge Leinenweber presiding) the government moved under FRCP 35(b)(2)(C) asking Judge St. Eve to reduce Harrington’s sentence by 25 percent for his substantial assistance. The judge granted only a 14 percent reduction, reasoning that Harrington’s testimony did not convict Brindley; that Harrington “lied to this Court during his trial,” in addition to the underlying drug crime: and that Harrington got the benefit of the doubt during his original sentencing and did not receive enhancements requested by the prosecution. The Seventh Circuit vacated. There is no indication that Harrington lied at Brindley’s trial or had any incentive to see Brindley acquitted and cannot be blamed for Brindley’s acquittal. His previous lies could be the basis of a prosecution for perjury, but there was no such prosecution. The lack of clarity in explaining the ruling requires reconsideration. View "United States v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Someone used the email address gslabs@hotmail.com to contact a Vietnamese website in an attempt to buy sassafras oil, a chemical that can be used to make the illegal drug known as ecstasy. The website was being monitored by the Drug Enforcement Administration, which began an investigation that culminated in Caira being convicted on drug charges. A key step in the investigation was learning that Caira was the person behind the gslabs@hotmail.com address. The DEA made that discovery by issuing administrative subpoenas to technology companies, without getting a warrant. The district court denied a motion to suppress and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the DEA conducted an “unreasonable search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Because Caira voluntarily shared the relevant information with technology companies, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information, so his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The court characterized as “harmless” the district court’s errors imposing conditions of supervised release without justifying them on the record. Caira is serving a life sentence for another conviction. He is not expected to be released from prison so the conditions are not expected to be imposed. View "United States v. Caira" on Justia Law