Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ferguson, then 17 years old, was drunk and high when he approached a woman as she was getting into her car. He pointed a gun and demanded her keys. She hesitated. He shot the woman three times at point‐blank range. Ferguson took her keys and drove away. Police arrested Ferguson the next day after a high‐speed chase. The victim lost sight in one eye and has nerve damage to her ear and face. She cannot drive or work; she has nightmares and panic attacks. Ferguson pled guilty to vehicular robbery by force, 18 U.S.C. 2119(2), and discharge of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The statutory range for the carjacking is up to 300 months; the range for discharging the firearm is a mandatory 120 months to life, which must be consecutive to the carjacking sentence. Ferguson’s total guideline range was 198-217 months.The court sentenced Ferguson to eight years for the carjacking plus 42 years for firing the gun, stating that the sentence: “takes into account and reflects the seriousness of this evil, terrorist act. Seriousness of the offense. Promotes respect for the law. Hopefully that message will get out. Creates a just punishment. Provides adequate deterrence, and protects the public from further crime.” The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. Such a dramatic variance from a guideline range requires a substantial explanation. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

In 2003, a Wisconsin state court convicted Jordan of first‐degree reckless homicide, three counts of first‐degree endangerment, and as a felon in possession of a firearm, based on the shooting of Robinson, who was sitting in a car with three other people when he was killed by shots from a passing car. Before trial, Jordan repeatedly complained about his appointed attorney, Bohach. After a hearing, at which Jordan represented himself, the court denied Jordan’s motion asking for either appointment of new counsel, a delay to enable Bohach to do research Jordan thought necessary, or to waive counsel and represent himself. Jordan had an eighth‐grade education, but a fourth‐grade reading ability. At trial, “Bohach gave Jordan reason to be displeased.” In its closing argument, the prosecution made statements vouching for the detectives’ credibility and urged the jury to consider who had the most to lose—Jordan or the prosecutor. Bohach failed to object. After exhausting state remedies, Jordan filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing concerning Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim. The court affirmed with respect to self-representation. It was reasonable for the court to infer that Jordan would not be able to use necessary documents, which would prevent him from effectively representing himself. View "Jordan v. Hepp" on Justia Law

In 2008, Johnston, a horse racetrack executive, promised a $100,000 campaign contribution to then-Governor Blagojevich in exchange for his signature on a bill to tax the largest casinos in Illinois for the direct benefit of the Illinois horse racing​ industry. After Blagojevich’s corruption came to light, the casinos sued the racetracks, alleging a conspiracy to violate the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, and state‐law claims for civil conspiracy and unjust enrichment. A jury awarded the casinos $25,940,000 in damages, which was trebled under RICO to $77,820,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the jury did not have legally sufficient evidence to support a verdict finding a conspiracy to engage in a “pattern” of racketeering activity, as required for liability on a RICO conspiracy theory. The casinos are still entitled to the $25,940,000 in damages on the state‐law claims, but not to have those damages trebled under RICO. View "Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Gabriel persuaded a 17‐year‐old girl to participate in a “program” he had used previously to manipulate women for his sexual gratification. Gabriel told the girl she could “train” troubled boys to resist Satan by having sex with them, took sexually explicit photographs of the girl, posted them to his website, and arranged for the girl to have sex with a 15‐year‐old boy. Before that happened, the girl’s mother discovered Gabriel’s emails and contacted authorities. After the jury convicted Gabriel of producing child pornography, the court noted that the statutory range for imprisonment was 15-30 years, 18 U.S.C. 2251(e). Gabriel did not file a sentencing memorandum, nor did he object to the presentence report or the government’s memorandum, despite inquiries by the judge. The court imposed the statutory minimum of 15 years' imprisonment plus the recommended life term of supervised release, stating that a longer sentence would be warranted if not for Gabriel's advanced age (80) and poor health. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that a sentencing court need not separately justify the imprisonment and supervised release terms. Gabriel waived any challenge to the conditions of supervised release. He had advance notice, was warned that failure to object could be deemed a waiver, and never objected. View "United States v. Gabriel" on Justia Law

Blackman, a “ranking official in Chicago’s Black Disciples street gang,” pleaded guilty to one count of distributing a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court ordered him to serve a prison term of 180 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s finding that he was responsible for the uncharged distribution of 3,000 grams of crack cocaine to one of his customers as relevant conduct and its additional finding that he possessed a firearm during his narcotics distribution. The court rejected Blackman’s contention that the district court committed procedural error by failing to address his principal arguments in mitigation: his challenge to the 18:1 crack-to-powder-cocaine ratio adopted by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372, and now embodied in the Sentencing Guidelines, and his contention that the government engaged in sentencing manipulation. View "United States v. Blackman" on Justia Law

In 2015, Musgraves was convicted of five crimes stemming from his life as a drug dealer-turned-informant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Musgraves’s motion to suppress evidence (ammunition and cash, but no firearm or evidence of drug dealing) seized based on a search warrant. While police procedures were “sloppy” and one of the affidavits submitted was not sufficient to establish probable cause, the other affidavit was based on information that was recent and specific, the witness (Boner) appeared before the judge, and there was no damning information about Boner’s credibility. The court reversed, for insufficient evidence, Musgraves’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, possession of a firearm as a felon, and distribution of cocaine near a school. The government proved a buyer-seller relationship, but not a conspiracy to distribute, and did not prove a link between Musgrave and the car in which the gun and cocaine were found. The court affirmed the district court’s finding that Musgraves qualifies as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Musgraves" on Justia Law

When he was 29, Ray started to chat over the Internet with a 14-year-old girl. At their first in-person meeting Ray plied Alexia with marijuana and cognac. At their second he took her to a motel (crossing from Indiana into Illinois), where marijuana and alcohol were followed by sexual intercourse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ray’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), for knowingly transporting a minor across state lines to engage in criminal sexual activity, but vacated his sentence of 320 months in prison plus 15 years of supervised release and remanded. The court upheld the jury instructions, noting the potential for confusion inherent in the nature of the offense, which “piggybacks” on a finding of violation of another law, The jury was entitled to find that Ray knew Alexia to be 14 (so that she could not legally consent to sex) and that Ray used drugs and force to overcome her resistance (so that she did not consent). The jury was entitled to infer that Ray knew when he drove into Illinois what he wanted and planned to do. The court noted that several conditions of supervised release were either unwarranted or poorly worded. View "United States v. Ray" on Justia Law

In 1993, Figgs was convicted of murder, committed while on bond for a drug offense. His 40-year sentence was to be served consecutively to his four-year sentence for the drug offense and was to include credit for time served prior to conviction. His planned release date of November 23, 2013, was apparently calculated under the mistaken belief that he had violated the terms of his mandatory supervised release on the drug charge. He was released on June 28, 2012, having survived summary judgment in his state‐court mandamus proceeding, in which he challenged his release date. Figgs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the possibility that he was being held unlawfully. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the warden, whose conduct did not demonstrate a sufficiently culpable state of mind. The court vacated as to the record office supervisor, who did not attempt to calculate Figgs’s sentence until June 2012, nor thoroughly review Figgs’s master file; a jury could find her minimal action so ineffectual that it amounted to criminal recklessness. Her conduct violated Figgs's established constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; the supervisor is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Figgs v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Robinson’s cousin, Carter, led a heroin trafficking ring, buying heroin in Chicago and selling it in Milwaukee, 2012-2014. For two months in 2014, Carter brought Robinson into the operation, just as law enforcement was closing in. Robinson sold heroin to a confidential informant. Police arrested him, Carter, and others. Robinson ultimately pleaded guilty to two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate heroin distribution, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3), and was given within-guidelines sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment. Before imposing the sentence the court engaged in several wide-ranging soliloquies on urban decay, the changing nature of Robinson’s neighborhood, the “pathology” of certain neighborhoods, and the connection between Milwaukee’s 1967 riots and recent protests in Baltimore, Maryland. The judge included several comments about his own experiences of the neighborhood. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, stating that the comments during sentencing strayed so far from the record that it could not trace the legitimate reasons for Robinson’s sentence. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Eberts is a film producer whose credits include Lord of War (2005) and Lucky Number Slevin (2006). After a string of failed movies, in 2009, he filed for bankruptcy. He was introduced to Elliott, an Illinois novice author who wanted to adapt his book into a movie. Eberts and Elliott formed a limited liability company. Both agreed to invest money. Eberts did not disclose his insolvency. Over the next year Elliott wired $615,000 to accounts controlled by Eberts. Eberts applied only 10% of that money toward the movie; he paid his father and bankruptcy attorney and spent the rest on personal items like art, furniture, designer clothing, and fine wines. Eberts also solicited and received a $25,000 loan from Elliott for an unrelated project and never repaid it. After Elliott discovered the scam, he filed suit. Later, Eberts pleaded guilty to seven counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and three counts of money laundering, section 1957, and was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment, the top of the guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors or Eberts’s mitigation arguments, but based the sentence on unsupported facts. View "United States v. Eberts" on Justia Law