Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Wykoff pleaded guilty to wire-fraud charges after soliciting bribes and kickbacks while a Bloomington, Indiana, official. The district judge sentenced him to 55 months in prison and to pay restitution of $446,335 to Bloomington and a $1,100 assessment, with payments “to begin immediately.” The judge added a “special instruction”: “Any unpaid restitution balance during the term of supervision shall be paid at a rate of not less than 10% of the defendant’s gross monthly income.” The government obtained a garnishment under 28 U.S.C. 3205(b)(1), issued to the Indiana pension system because it had an account in Wykoff’s name worth $47,937. Wykoff requested a hearing to determine whether any of the money was exempt. He argued that he had already forfeited two of his homes and the government had seized money from his prison account and that the balance should be deferred to his release because the “special instruction” limited his restitution payments to 10 percent of his monthly income. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument. The instruction says that 10 percent is the minimum amount he must pay. The federal criminal code requires that restitution be paid immediately unless the district court provides otherwise, 18 U.S.C. 3572(d)(1), which it did not. View "United States v. Wykoff" on Justia Law

Kruger was arrested in 2013 after a day-long crime spree in southwestern Wisconsin during which he robbed his uncle, kidnapped a 69-year-old farmer, stole multiple vehicles, and drove over rural roads at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour in an unsuccessful effort to elude capture. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court ordered him to serve a below-guidelines prison term of 180 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no plain error in the enhancement for use of a firearm, and that any potential error in the calculation of his criminal history did not affect his advisory Guidelines sentencing range. The court noted the district court took into consideration that “Kruger has led a troubled life.” He had a sentencing range of 292 to 365 months. Because that range exceeded the statutory maximum term of 240 months, the statutory maximum became the Guidelines sentencing range. U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(a); 5G1.2(d). View "United States v. Kruger" on Justia Law

Urbana police officers responded to a domestic dispute. In their report, the officers noted that Hamilton called Wright a “pedophile” during the altercation. No arrests were made. The following morning, McNaught, who specializes in crimes against children, reviewed the report as a matter of course, and called Hamilton. Hamilton granted permission to search the couple’s apartment and computers for evidence of child pornography. McNaught seized a desktop computer from the living room; forensic analysis revealed images of child pornography on the hard drive. Wright was charged with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A, and sexually exploiting a minor. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Hamilton lacked authority to consent to the warrantless search. McNaught testified that Hamilton had stated that Wright used his cellphone to visit a website called “Jailbait,” which McNaught recognized as featuring pornographic images of underage girls. Hamilton also mentioned seeing a video with a disturbing title on the computer. McNaught testified that he had “previewed” the hard drive by connecting it to his laptop, a standard procedure. Hamilton described the living arrangements at the apartment, which was leased in her name. The district judge denied the motion. Wright pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of suppression. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Wright owned the computer, Hamilton was a joint user who enjoyed virtually unlimited access to and control over it. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Kubsch was twice convicted of the 1998 murders of his wife, her son, and her ex-husband and was sentenced to death. No eyewitness, DNA evidence, fingerprints, or other forensic evidence linked Kubsch to the murders. After exhausting state remedies, he filed an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, rejecting Kubsch’s arguments that the Indiana trial court wrongfully excluded evidence of a nine-year-old witness’s exculpatory but hearsay statement to police; that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to that witness’s statement; and that his decision to represent himself at sentencing was not knowing and voluntary. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The case concerns the total exclusion of relevant evidence, not with a limitation on the way the evidence can be used; the defendant’s interest in the evidence was at its zenith. The excluded evidence was easily the strongest evidence on Kubsch’s only theory of defense—actual innocence. It was not cumulative, unfairly prejudicial, potentially misleading, or merely impeaching. It was unusually reliable. The Indiana Supreme Court’s conclusion that Supreme Court precedent (Chambers) did not require the admission of this critical evidence was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Chambers line of Supreme Court precedent. View "Kubsch v. Neal" on Justia Law

Kolbusz, a dermatologist, submitted thousands of claims to the Medicare system and private insurers for the treatment of actinic keratosis, a skin condition that sometimes leads to cancer. He received millions of dollars in payments. Convicted of six counts of mail or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, he was sentenced to 84 months in prison plus $3.8 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence permitted a reasonable jury to conclude that many, if not substantially all, of the claims could not have reflected an honest medical judgment and that the treatment Kolbusz claimed to have supplied may have failed to help any patient who actually had actinic keratosis. Because the indictment charged a scheme to defraud, the prosecutor was entitled to prove the scheme as a whole, and not just the six exemplars described in the indictment. The judge did not err in excluding evidence that, after his arrest and indictment, Kolbusz continued to submit claims to Medicare, and many were paid. “It would have been regrettable to divert the trial into an examination of Medicare’s claims-processing procedures in 2013 and 2014, rather than whether Kolbusz knew that he was submitting false claims in 2010 and earlier." View "United States v. Kolbusz" on Justia Law

Williams, serving a 65‐year prison sentence for murder at the Pontiac Illinois maximum‐security prison, ordered the death certificate of the woman whom he murdered. Staff confiscated the certificate (which had arrived from the county clerk's office with an unsigned note: “There is a place in hell waiting for you, as you must know you will reap what you have sowed!” The stated reason for confiscation was “it posed a threat to the safety and security of the institution and would negatively impact Inmate Williams’ rehabilitation.” The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, reasoning that confiscating the certificate had decreased the risk that inmates would retaliate against “boasting inmates” like Williams, and had protected the victim’s family from being identified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to defendants not involved in the confiscation, but otherwise reversed. The right of an inmate to read the mail he receives, provided that his reading it would not infringe legitimate interests, is clearly established. The prison must present “some evidence” to show that the restriction is justified. A prison has a legitimate safety concern about “boasting inmates” carrying around trophies, but Williams asserted that he needed the death certificate for use in state post‐conviction proceedings; the defendants presented no contrary evidence. View "Williams v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Hughes was found to be a sexually violent person who suffers from a mental disorder that creates a substantial risk that, unless confined, he is apt to commit further sexual violence; he was civilly committed, at Rushville, under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1–99, “for control, care and treatment” until he “is no longer a sexually violent person.” In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Hughes claimed that Illinois has improperly curtailed his liberty, by employing detention staff who are unable to provide him with the care and treatment without which he will never be eligible for release. Illinois allows only persons licensed under the Act to treat Rushville’s civil detainees and determine whether they can be released without danger to the public. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of Hughes’ complaint. The Supreme Court understands the Fourteenth Amendment to require that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they are no longer dangerous. It is not clear whether Rushville is providing the plaintiff (and others) with treatment by licensed professionals who have authority to determine the detainees’ right to be released. Liberty Healthcare, which furnishes the Rushville personnel, does not require that all of them be licensed. View "Hughes v. Dimas" on Justia Law

Williams, scheduled for release from prison in 2030 if he earns and retains all good-time credits, asked the district court to revise some conditions that will apply to supervised release when his sentence ends. The district court declined, deeming the application premature. District judges may revise terms of supervised release “at any time,” 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2)). The judge reasoned that, between now and Williams’s scheduled release, “he may have totally other issues that he might want to deal with regarding supervised release.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the governing law may change in the next 14 years. The court stated that it “would be reluctant to allow a judge to deem premature a request in the final year or two of imprisonment,” but treating a request 14 years in advance as premature, and requiring the prisoner to make all potential arguments at one time in the year or so before release, is a sound exercise of discretion. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hinesley was convicted of molesting his 13-year‐old former foster daughter, V.V. At trial, the prosecution had elicited the initial, inculpatory out‐of‐court statements of V.V. and her former foster brother, Billy, at length, with no objection. Before trial, it had come to light that V.V. and Billy (age 20) had been in a sexual relationship and had tried to conceal that relationship. The two had changed their accounts. Defense counsel did not object to the admission of statements by the investigating detective and by Billy that they believed V.V. The defense highlighted the changed stories. The trial judge found V.V.’s testimony credible. After exhausting state court remedies, Hinesley sought federal habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance by trial counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition. The Indiana Court of Appeals took the constitutional standard seriously and produced an answer within the range of defensible positions. The defense had a pre‐trial run‐through with V.V. and Billy at their depositions and knew that they would acknowledge inconsistencies in their statements. The risks of allowing the prosecution to elicit their original statements were low. With the judge serving as the trier of fact, it was unlikely that undue weight would be given to the out‐of‐court statements rather than their in‐court testimony. View "Hinesley v. Knight" on Justia Law

Following an extensive sting operation by federal law enforcement of a Chicago drug distribution ring, Tankson was indicted on three counts of distributing 100 grams of heroin and one count of distributing a detectable amount of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). After waiving his Miranda rights, Tankson acknowledged membership in the Black Disciples gang, admitted to participating in the four transactions ultimately charged in the indictment and indicated that three of them involved 100 grams of heroin and that the fourth involved 150 grams. He gave extensive information about his other involvement in drug trafficking. He entered a written plea declaration without an agreement. At sentencing, the government introduced Tankson’s post-arrest statement to authorities in order to establish significant additional drug quantities as relevant conduct. The district court credited the statement and, on that basis, increased his offense level under the quantity table and determined that he was subject to the career offender guideline. The court calculated a guidelines range of 360 months to life, then sentenced him to 228 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was entitled to credit his statement and to consider his 1995 drug-related conviction, for which he was paroled in 1997. View "United States v. Tankson" on Justia Law