Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Morris pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing heroin. The plea agreement called for the government to make sentencing recommendations: what quantity of drugs should count as relevant conduct, what Morris’s base offense level should be, and whether Morris was entitled to an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The government was to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range as determined by the court. The judge determined that Morris’s Guidelines range was 70–87 months after applying a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug offense, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1). Morris objected. The plea agreement did not mention a dangerous-weapon enhancement; the government responded that the enhancement was appropriate because agents recovered a handgun from Morris’s residence. The government recommended a sentence at the high end of the Guidelines range calculated by the judge. The judge imposed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, an 87-month sentence. There was no breach; the agreement expressly stated that the parties remained free to make sentencing recommendations not mentioned in the agreement. The government satisfied its obligation to recommend a sentence within the Guidelines range calculated by the judge. The handgun that was found in Morris’s residence justified application of the dangerous-weapon enhancement. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

From 2003-2008, Brown distributed millions of dollars worth of cocaine. He was convicted of conspiring to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). At sentencing, Brown argued that he should be held responsible only for five kilograms, as the jury had found. The government sought to hold him responsible for nearly 3000 kilograms, based on the testimony of cooperating witnesses. The court determined that 150 kilograms were “within the zone of this defendant’s responsibility,” and had been “proven and probably proven twice over.” The quantity corresponded to a base offense level of 38—the highest level provided in U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(1), yielding a guidelines range of 292-360 months. His conviction—but not the drug quantity calculation—was affirmed. Brown later moved (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)) to reduce his sentence under Amendment 782, which raised the amount of cocaine qualifying for level 38 from 150 kilograms to 450 kilograms. The government maintained that Brown’s level was unchanged because he was responsible for over 450 kilograms based on witness testimony. The court agreed and declined to disturb its guideline calculation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Brown’s offense level was not lowered. He has an offense level of 38, which applies under both the older and the revised guidelines and reflects very large quantities of cocaine. The court’s statements indicated its determination that Brown was responsible for 450 kilograms or more of cocaine. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendants pleaded guilty to firearms offenses that carry an enhanced base offense level for prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a). The Guidelines then defined “crime of violence” to include “any offense under federal or state law … that … is burglary of a dwelling,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). Both had Wisconsin convictions for burglary; each judge applied the higher offense level. The Seventh Circuit vacated. To determine whether a conviction is a crime of violence requires a categorical approach that focuses on the statutory definition. If state law defines the offense more broadly than the Guidelines, the conviction is not a crime of violence, even if the defendant’s conduct satisfies all of the elements of the Guidelines offense. When a single statute creates multiple offenses and is “divisible,” the court may consult a limited universe of documents to determine which offense the defendant was convicted of (modified categorical approach). In 2016, the Supreme Court clarified that a statute is divisible only if it creates multiple offenses by setting forth alternative elements. Wisconsin defines burglary more broadly than the Guidelines, referring to burglary of a “building or dwelling.” WIS. STAT. 943.10(1m)(a). The judges consulted charging documents, which revealed that defendants were charged with burgling dwellings. It is now clear that this recourse to state-court charging documents was improper. Wisconsin’s burglary statute sets forth alternative means of satisfying the location element of the state’s burglary offense. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

In 2014, Shannon was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud; two counts of identity theft (Counts 2 and 3); and two counts of aggravated identity theft. Following a bench trial, he was found guilty on all counts and was sentenced to 14 months each on Counts 1, 2 and 3, to run concurrently, and 24 months on Counts 4 and 5, to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively as to Counts 1–3. Shannon’s total prison sentence amounted to 38 months of incarceration followed by 3 years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the prosecution’s evidence was heavily dependent of the uncorroborated testimony of Taylor, a cooperating witness with “powerful motivation to falsify.” Shannon had provided Taylor, an accountant, with 107 stolen identities, directing him to use the stolen identities to prepare and file false tax returns. The court upheld the application of a 2-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for the organizer or leader of a criminal enterprise. The district court appropriately considered the relevant facts in concluding that the preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that Shannon was a “supervisor” under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law

In 1999, Werner was convicted of multiple sex offenses and was a Special Bulletin Notification (SBN) sex offender under Wisconsin law. Werner’s release was deferred until his 2010 mandatory release date. Werner and his probation agents were unable to secure an approved residence as required by his rules of supervision, so the Department of Corrections detained him pursuant to Administrative Directive No. 02‐10, under which persons who had reached their mandatory release date but could not secure approved housing were detained in the county jail at night but permitted to seek housing during certain hours of the day. In 2011, he moved into an approved residence. Werner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court permitted Werner to proceed on individual‐capacity claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause and to maintain an official‐capacity claim, for injunctive relief, that AD 02‐10 violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The court ultimately granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims, finding the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims barred by qualified immunity and that his challenge to the policy was moot. AD 02‐10 was replaced in 2015 by AD 15‐12, under which SBN sex offenders lacking approved residences are no longer held in jail. Werner has twice violated probation and is again incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; clearly established law at the time would not have notified the defendants that the AD 02‐10 procedures were unlawful. View "Werner v. Wall" on Justia Law

In 2001, Carrion entered the apartment of 69‐year‐old Zymal and stabbed her, causing her death. Carrion, who lived in an apartment above Zymali’s, was a 19-year‐old immigrant who spoke almost no English. He was interviewed in Spanish, denied involvement with Zymali’s death, but agreed to provide fingerprint samples. His fingerprint was found on a knife recovered from Zymali’s apartment. Illinois courts affirmed his convictions for residential burglary and first‐degree murder on direct appeal and on post-conviction review. Carrion’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 was denied. The court concluded that although it probably was timely filed, most of the claims were procedurally defaulted and remaining claims were meritless. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to address: whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions, whether Carrion’s confession was voluntary, and whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the voluntariness of his confession. The court concluded that, whether applying the deferential review of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act or de novo review, Carrion is not entitled to relief. The prosecution met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no due process violation in the reception into evidence of Carrion’s statement, as translated by an investigating officer. Any ambiguities in the statement were examined thoroughly at trial. View "Carrion v. Butler" on Justia Law

McGuire pleaded guilty to interfering with commerce by threat or violence. The district court classified McGuire as a career offender under section 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which increases the offense level if the defendant has two prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence.” “Crime of violence” is defined in section 4B1.2 and includes “any offense … that … is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” (the residual clause). The district judge counted two of McGuire’s prior convictions as crimes of violence. One conviction, for fleeing the police, qualified only under the residual clause. With the career-offender enhancement, McGuire’s Guidelines range increased from 63–78 months to 151–188 months. Citing McGuire’s extensive criminal history, the judge imposed a sentence of 188 months, noting her surprise that the government hadn’t asked for the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson holding that the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. McGuire" on Justia Law

Waldman, an inmate, was convicted of forcibly assaulting a correctional officer after head‐butting him during an argument about a pat‐down search. Waldman and the guard dispute how the pat-down request advanced to a confrontation. Waldman advanced an unsuccessful self‐defense argument at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. While the district court erred in holding that there needed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm before he could justifiably use force in self‐defense, the court was correct in finding that Waldman had a legal alternative to force in complying with the pat‐down. Requiring that an inmate fear serious bodily harm or death before using force to protect himself is in‐ consistent with both the Eighth Amendment and common law principles justifying the use of self‐defense. Congress intended to protect correctional officers from harm in passing 28 U.S.C. 111, but that purpose must be harmonized with Eighth Amendment protections. View "United States v. Waldman" on Justia Law

Hurlburt and Gillespie pleaded guilty in separate cases to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). To calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range in each case, the district court began with U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a), which assigns progressively higher offense levels if the defendant has one or more prior convictions for a “crime of violence.” The term “crime of violence” is defined in the career-offender guideline to include any offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” (residual clause).” The U.S.S.G. residual clause mirrors the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). One year ago the Supreme Court’s “Johnson decision” invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. The Seventh Circuit previously held that the Guidelines are not susceptible to challenge on vagueness grounds. Overruling that precedent and applying Johnson, the Seventh Circuit vacated the sentences imposed on Hurlburt and Gillespie, holding that the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Hurlburt" on Justia Law

Rollins pleaded guilty to selling crack cocaine and was sentenced to 84 months in prison. In his second appeal, he challenged the application of the career-offender guideline, which assigns a higher offense level if the defendant has two prior convictions for a “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), including “any offense … that … otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” (residual clause). The district judge classified Rollins as a career offender based in part on a prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, a crime that would qualify only under the residual clause of this definition. The Supreme Court’s “Johnson” decision invalidated the identically phrased residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. In light of the government’s concession that Johnson’s constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2), the Seventh Circuit granted rehearing and held that under Johnson, the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague and vacated Rollins’s sentence. View "United States v. Rollins" on Justia Law