Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A 49-count indictment charged 51 Outlaws Motorcycle Club members with racketeering, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, extortion, running an illegal gambling business, witness tampering, and firearms offenses; 19 were charged under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute. The indictment included a forfeiture notice. The FBI executed search warrants on Indiana clubhouses and residences and seized items bearing the Outlaws insignia. The FBI sought forfeiture of patches, shirts, hats, belt buckles, signs, mirrors, flags, calendars, and pictures, which were use to deter other groups from infringing on Outlaw territory. In plea agreements, 18 Outlaws agreed to forfeiture. The court received Carlson’s letter, which it interpreted as a motion to intervene under 18 U.S.C. 1963(l)(2). Carlson asserted that he was entitled to direct notice, having been elected by the collective membership to manage Outlaws' indicia and memorabilia, which were owned by the collective membership, not by individuals. The government had provided notice to each defendant and had posted notice on the of government forfeiture website. The district court denied Carlson’s motions, finding that Carlson had not shown that the government was aware of Carlson or his alleged interest, nor demonstrated a property interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Indiana law: “[o]wnership cannot be conferred by a wave of a magic semantic wand.” The asserted collective ownership mechanism was “designed solely ‘to insulate from forfeiture.” View "United States v. Bowser" on Justia Law

In 1996, a jury convicted Poe of narcotics‐related offenses, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. 848(c). In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. United States, rendering the CCE jury instructions used in Poe’s trial erroneous: “You must unanimously find that the defendant committed at least two violations of the federal drug laws, but you do not have to agree on which two violations.” Poe sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, challenging his conviction under Richardson. Fourteen months later, the district court dismissed Poe’s petition without prejudice, because he should have filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Poe’s June 18, 2001 habeas petition, under section 2255, was denied as time‐barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2006. In 2014, Poe filed a new section 2241 petition, citing Alleyne v. United States (2013). The district court denied his petition, again for not filing it under section 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Construing Poe’s petition as a successive one under section 2255 would be futile; that section allows a successive motion for “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review.” View "Poe v. LaRiva" on Justia Law

Miller and Wagner used and sold methamphetamine together in northwestern Wisconsin. After law enforcement learned of the couple’s illicit activity, Miller pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. The district judge found that Miller and Wagner were jointly engaged in the distribution of between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine and sentenced Miller to eight years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejecting an argument that the district judge’s drug quantity finding was erroneous because Miller sold only a small portion of the drugs in question. Miller’s relevant conduct includes not only the sales he directly made himself but also the drug sales that Wagner foreseeably made in furtherance of their joint distribution scheme. There was no genuine dispute that Miller’s relevant conduct involved between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms. The district judge adequately explained why Miller’s sentence was necessary, given his history of drug use and drug sales; Miller did not overcome the presumption that his below‐Guidelines sentence is reasonable. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

A year after Harrington, a drug dealer, was sentenced, by Judge St. Eve, to 264 months in prison (subsequently reduced to 212 months by a change in the sentencing guidelines) the government asked for his cooperation in its investigation of his attorney Brindley. Brindley was accused of encouraging his clients to lie on the witness stand. Despite Brindley’s acquittal after a bench trial (Judge Leinenweber presiding) the government moved under FRCP 35(b)(2)(C) asking Judge St. Eve to reduce Harrington’s sentence by 25 percent for his substantial assistance. The judge granted only a 14 percent reduction, reasoning that Harrington’s testimony did not convict Brindley; that Harrington “lied to this Court during his trial,” in addition to the underlying drug crime: and that Harrington got the benefit of the doubt during his original sentencing and did not receive enhancements requested by the prosecution. The Seventh Circuit vacated. There is no indication that Harrington lied at Brindley’s trial or had any incentive to see Brindley acquitted and cannot be blamed for Brindley’s acquittal. His previous lies could be the basis of a prosecution for perjury, but there was no such prosecution. The lack of clarity in explaining the ruling requires reconsideration. View "United States v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Someone used the email address gslabs@hotmail.com to contact a Vietnamese website in an attempt to buy sassafras oil, a chemical that can be used to make the illegal drug known as ecstasy. The website was being monitored by the Drug Enforcement Administration, which began an investigation that culminated in Caira being convicted on drug charges. A key step in the investigation was learning that Caira was the person behind the gslabs@hotmail.com address. The DEA made that discovery by issuing administrative subpoenas to technology companies, without getting a warrant. The district court denied a motion to suppress and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the DEA conducted an “unreasonable search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Because Caira voluntarily shared the relevant information with technology companies, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information, so his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The court characterized as “harmless” the district court’s errors imposing conditions of supervised release without justifying them on the record. Caira is serving a life sentence for another conviction. He is not expected to be released from prison so the conditions are not expected to be imposed. View "United States v. Caira" on Justia Law

Paz-Giron entered the U.S. without authorization around 1985 when he was 15 years old. Between 1998 and 2001, he was convicted four times in California for driving under the influence of alcohol. He was removed to Mexico in 2002. Paz-Giron returned to the U.S. and, in January 2013, he was again convicted of driving under the influence. Two months later he pleaded guilty to identity theft to obtain medical services, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) because it involved more than $10,000 in loss to the victim. In 2015 he was convicted of another DUI. In 2015 Paz-Giron was indicted and pled guilty to being unlawfully present in the United States after removal. He and was sentenced to 24 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court misapplied an 8-level upward adjustment in the Sentencing Guidelines for aliens who unlawfully remain in the U.S. after being convicted of an aggravated felony, U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). Paz-Giron was removed in 2002, long before he committed the aggravated felony of identity theft. View "United States v. Paz-Giron" on Justia Law

O’Malley is serving 10 years in prison for violating the Clean Air Act by improperly removing and disposing of insulation containing regulated asbestos, 42 U.S.C. 7413(c)(1). After the Seventh Circuit upheld his convictions on direct appeal, O’Malley filed what he called a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(1) for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. That rule authorizes a district court to grant a timely request for a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” The district court concluded that O’Malley’s submission contained constitutional theories that, the court reasoned, are incompatible with Rule 33 and cognizable only under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and that the remainder of O’Malley’s motion could not entitle him to relief under Rule 33, because the new evidence, purportedly discrediting a prosecution witness, was not material. The Seventh Circuit vacated, concluding that the entirety of O’Malley’s submission was within the scope of Rule 33(b)(1) even if his theories overlap with section 2255 and that the district court should have respected his choice between these available means of relief. View "United States v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

Haslam pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, possessing unregistered silencers, and possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense. His presentence report included as relevant conduct an incident in which Haslam held a woman hostage in his apartment on the mistaken belief that she was an undercover police officer. Haslam moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement by giving this hostage-taking information to the probation office and the court. The district judge denied the motion and imposed a sentence of 181 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Haslam’s plea agreement did not limit the information the government could give the court about the offense or his background, but explicitly reserved the government’s right to fully inform the court, so there was no breach. The judge properly rejected Haslam’s alternative claim that he pleaded guilty unknowingly based on a misunderstanding that the plea agreement contained such a limitation. View "United States v. Haslam" on Justia Law

Mandell was convicted for conspiring to kidnap, and for conspiring and attempting to extort, a wealthy businessman. His plan involved a gun, and he was also convicted for possessing a gun in furtherance of a crime of violence, and for possessing a gun as a convicted felon. The evidence included videos from hidden cameras that the FBI installed at the site of the planned extortion. As required by statute, a federal court authorized the installation of the cameras. Arguing that the court only did so because the FBI’s application was misleading due to certain omissions, Mandell moved to suppress the video evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of that motion, stating that the omissions Mandell were not material. Rejecting an argument that the prosecution withheld important exculpatory information, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district judge that the information, concerning the source of the gun, was irrelevant and the evidence supporting Mandell’s gun convictions was overwhelming. View "USA v. Steven Mandell" on Justia Law

Mobley pleaded guilty to bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 137 months’ imprisonment for bank fraud, and a consecutive sentence of 24 months for identity theft, with a five-year term of supervised release and 13 standard conditions, with no further explanation. On remand, the government requested the same sentence. Defense counsel did not file any documents. At a hearing, there was confusion about the scope of the remand. Mobley’s counsel argued that full resentencing was required; he wanted to argue for a lower sentence and to present new mitigation evidence--that Mobley had recently completed his G.E.D. The court commented that because Mobley had no substantive objection to the conditions, the remand was “sort of an end run around my sentence.” The court reimposed its original sentence, stating, “I really don’t think there is anything that you could say that would make me change that,” imposed the conditions of supervised release, and explained the justification for each. Mobley argued that his sentence was based on the incorrect criminal history category. The court responded, “those are issues you could have raised on appeal …. I have no reason to reconsider your sentence.” The Seventh Circuit again vacated, stating that it could not determine whether the resentencing was procedurally sound. In imposing a new sentence, a court may reconsider the prison term, conditions of supervised release, and any relevant evidence or arguments that are properly admissible. While the court is not required to consider new arguments or evidence or any other element of the sentence, it must exercise its discretion in declining to do so. View "United States v. Mobley" on Justia Law