Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Haslam pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, possessing unregistered silencers, and possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense. His presentence report included as relevant conduct an incident in which Haslam held a woman hostage in his apartment on the mistaken belief that she was an undercover police officer. Haslam moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement by giving this hostage-taking information to the probation office and the court. The district judge denied the motion and imposed a sentence of 181 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Haslam’s plea agreement did not limit the information the government could give the court about the offense or his background, but explicitly reserved the government’s right to fully inform the court, so there was no breach. The judge properly rejected Haslam’s alternative claim that he pleaded guilty unknowingly based on a misunderstanding that the plea agreement contained such a limitation. View "United States v. Haslam" on Justia Law

Mandell was convicted for conspiring to kidnap, and for conspiring and attempting to extort, a wealthy businessman. His plan involved a gun, and he was also convicted for possessing a gun in furtherance of a crime of violence, and for possessing a gun as a convicted felon. The evidence included videos from hidden cameras that the FBI installed at the site of the planned extortion. As required by statute, a federal court authorized the installation of the cameras. Arguing that the court only did so because the FBI’s application was misleading due to certain omissions, Mandell moved to suppress the video evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of that motion, stating that the omissions Mandell were not material. Rejecting an argument that the prosecution withheld important exculpatory information, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district judge that the information, concerning the source of the gun, was irrelevant and the evidence supporting Mandell’s gun convictions was overwhelming. View "USA v. Steven Mandell" on Justia Law

Mobley pleaded guilty to bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 137 months’ imprisonment for bank fraud, and a consecutive sentence of 24 months for identity theft, with a five-year term of supervised release and 13 standard conditions, with no further explanation. On remand, the government requested the same sentence. Defense counsel did not file any documents. At a hearing, there was confusion about the scope of the remand. Mobley’s counsel argued that full resentencing was required; he wanted to argue for a lower sentence and to present new mitigation evidence--that Mobley had recently completed his G.E.D. The court commented that because Mobley had no substantive objection to the conditions, the remand was “sort of an end run around my sentence.” The court reimposed its original sentence, stating, “I really don’t think there is anything that you could say that would make me change that,” imposed the conditions of supervised release, and explained the justification for each. Mobley argued that his sentence was based on the incorrect criminal history category. The court responded, “those are issues you could have raised on appeal …. I have no reason to reconsider your sentence.” The Seventh Circuit again vacated, stating that it could not determine whether the resentencing was procedurally sound. In imposing a new sentence, a court may reconsider the prison term, conditions of supervised release, and any relevant evidence or arguments that are properly admissible. While the court is not required to consider new arguments or evidence or any other element of the sentence, it must exercise its discretion in declining to do so. View "United States v. Mobley" on Justia Law

In 2005 the defendant was sentenced by Judge Reinhard to 300 months in prison for possessing a shotgun illegally. The sentence was later invalidated; in 2015 the defendant was resentenced by Judge Reinhard to 176 months. The defendant was then 54 years old, had a serious vision problem, and had been a model prisoner during the 140 months that he had served: because of his good behavior he was credited with having served 160 months of imprisonment, so that the 176‐month sentence was effectively a sentence of 16 more months in prison. Both the probation service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office had recommended that he be sentenced to time served. The judge rejected the suggestions, citing the gravity of the defendant’s criminal history before 2005 and the fact that, while he had never threatened any officials, defendant had filed complaints (and one civil suit) critical of judicial behavior by Reinhard and other judges and alleging conspiracies linking judges and other officials to grievances the defendant had suffered decades ago. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that most of the defendant’s criminal history before the shotgun incident consisted of driving offenses and that defendant had a constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances. The court called the judge’s reasoning “flimsy” and stated that further crimes by the defendant were unlikely. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Blount led a narcotics‐trafficking ring with Thomas serving as security. Ultimately, law enforcement broke up the ring and charged many of its participants, including Thomas, under 21 U.S.C. 846, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and 21 U.S.C. 843(b). After a series of disagreements with several attorneys, Thomas represented himself at his trial. He called Blount as a witness in his defense, and Blount denied Thomas’s involvement in the conspiracy. Nevertheless, the jury convicted Thomas of all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s decision to give Thomas the choice to either continue with his fourth attorney or proceed pro se, its finding that he waived his right to counsel, and the imposition of a 2‐level sentencing enhancement for suborning Blount’s perjured testimony. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Whatley was convicted, under a now‐repealed Indiana law, of possessing about three grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a “youth program center.” Whatley’s father’s home, where he was arrested, was 795 feet from the Robinson Community Church, which hosted events targeted to young persons, including religious services, mentoring programs, a Girl Scout troop, weekly Family Fun Night, and children’s choirs. On direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus proceedings, Whatley argued that the statutory definition of “youth program center,” as any: building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court declined to address the claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Whatley did not procedurally default his claim. The state courts were unreasonable in applying federal law on vagueness: the word “regular” in the definition provides no objective standard and fails to place persons of ordinary intelligence on notice of the conduct proscribed and allows for arbitrary enforcement; defendants are strictly liable for violating the nebulous provision; and the consequences of a violation were extreme. No one in Whatley’s position could have known that the Church would fall within the definition simply because it hosted a few children’s events each week. View "Whatley v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

Duncan was arrested on outstanding warrants. Police discovered a loaded pistol near the site of his arrest. Duncan admitted that it belonged to him. He pled guilty to being a felon and unlawful user of controlled substances in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), (g)(3), and 924(e). Duncan had Indiana state convictions for robbery, one in 2001, and two in 2008. The statute defines robbery as “knowingly or intentionally tak[ing] property from another person or from the presence of another person” either “by using or threatening the use of force on any person” or “by putting any person in fear.” Ind. Code 35-42-5-1. The district court found that the three convictions counted as “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Without the enhancement, Duncan faced a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. With the enhancement, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In the ordinary case, robbery by placing a person in fear of bodily injury under Indiana law involves an explicit or implicit threat of physical force and therefore qualifies as a violent felony under section 924(e)(2)(B)(i). View "United States v. Duncan" on Justia Law

McKenzie was killed when he fell to electrified train tracks during a gang-related fight. An Illinois jury convicted Evans of felony murder based on the felony “mob action.” Evans argued on direct appeal that independent purpose was an element of the crime of mob action and that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to have the jury to determine whether the underlying offense of mob action had a felonious purpose independent of the killing. The state court concluded that the trial court “adequately apprised” the jury. The federal district court denied relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasoning that Evans’s claim improperly asked a federal court to review a state court’s interpretation of state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Evans did properly present a federal claim: the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine each element of a state crime, his assertion that Illinois defines felony murder to include “independent felonious intent” as a factual element is inaccurate. View "Evans v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

After a 2003 shooting, Lisle was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to 37 years in prison. He sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that the state trial court admitted as evidence testimonial statements made by the surviving victim (Hearn) in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that the state courts did not apply Supreme Court precedent unreasonably in holding that the testimony, about a wounded man’s statement to his aunt (Lee) while waiting for an ambulance that Lisle had shot him, was not a “testimonial” out-of-court statement and was permitted under the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court had not held in 2007 that a statement to someone other than a law enforcement officer can be testimonial, and it was not unreasonable for the state court to find that Hearn’s statement to Lee was part of an effort to deal with an ongoing emergency and thus was nontestimonial. View "Lisle v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Hussein and Odeh ran two convenience stores in southern Illinois where they sold counterfeit goods and illegally traded cash or ineligible items for food stamps. They also filed false tax returns on behalf of their businesses. They eventually pleaded guilty to four counts, waiving their right to appeal their sentences so long as their sentences were within the advisory guideline range. After an attempt to withdraw the plea and challenge the loss calculation, the district court sentenced each to a within-guidelines term of imprisonment of 85 months. The Seventh Circuit dismissed appeals, rejecting arguments that the government breached the plea agreement by not recommending reductions for acceptance of responsibility, and not recommending a sentence at the low end of the range for Odeh. and an attempt to challenge the loss calculation. View "United States v. Odeh" on Justia Law