Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Shawn Baldwin operated a fraudulent investment scheme over several years, soliciting more than $10 million from over a dozen victims. He convinced individuals—including friends, business contacts, and a European businessman named Luca Tenuta—to invest in what he claimed were legitimate ventures, such as a purported social media platform for traders called Currency Clicks. In reality, Baldwin used the funds for personal expenses and to repay earlier investors, characteristic of a Ponzi scheme. He consistently misrepresented his professional credentials, concealed regulatory actions against him, and fabricated business opportunities to further his scheme.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Baldwin’s trial. A jury convicted him on seven counts of wire fraud, and the court sentenced him to 204 months in prison. During the proceedings, the court allowed the government to present Tenuta’s testimony via a recorded deposition from London, after finding Tenuta was unavailable to testify in person. Baldwin objected to the deposition and its admission, arguing violations of procedural rules and his constitutional rights. He also challenged the joinder of charges, the admission of evidence regarding uncharged victims, and several sentencing enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Baldwin’s conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Tenuta’s deposition under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15, nor did it violate Baldwin’s Confrontation Clause rights, as Baldwin had waived his right to be present. The appellate court also found no error in the joinder of offenses, the admission of evidence about uncharged victims, or the application of sentencing enhancements. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Baldwin’s conviction and sentence. View "USA v Baldwin" on Justia Law

Deon Pugh was charged with multiple offenses, including conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute controlled substances, distribution of controlled substances, and possession of a firearm as a felon. The government alleged that Pugh, along with several co-defendants, participated in a drug distribution conspiracy centered at the home of Jonathan Mason, who was recognized as a leader of the operation. Evidence at trial showed that Pugh regularly visited Mason’s home, brought drugs for preparation and sale, and directed other participants in the conspiracy.After Pugh waived his right to a jury trial, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, conducted a bench trial and found him guilty on all counts. The court determined that Pugh conspired with at least six others and that it was reasonably foreseeable to him that the conspiracy involved more than 1,000 grams of heroin. The court denied Pugh’s motions for acquittal and a new trial. At sentencing, the court calculated a base offense level based on a drug quantity of approximately 2,236 grams of heroin, applied a four-level leadership enhancement, and designated Pugh as a career offender, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life. The court ultimately sentenced Pugh to 216 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Pugh’s challenges to his career offender designation, the drug quantity attributed to him, and the leadership enhancement. The court held that the career offender designation was proper under both the current and prior versions of the Sentencing Guidelines, found that Pugh had waived any challenge to the drug quantity calculation, and concluded that the leadership enhancement was supported by the evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Pugh" on Justia Law

Jose Farias orchestrated a large-scale drug trafficking operation that brought significant quantities of heroin and cocaine into the Chicago area during 2015 and 2016. He worked with a network of co-conspirators, using tractor-trailers with hidden compartments to transport drugs from Texas to Illinois. Law enforcement, tipped off early by a Texas truck dispatcher, conducted surveillance and seized substantial amounts of drugs at multiple locations. Several co-conspirators were arrested and cooperated with authorities, providing testimony and participating in recorded calls with Farias that further implicated him.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Farias’s trial. The government presented testimony from cooperating witnesses and law enforcement agents, as well as recordings and translated transcripts of Farias’s conversations. The jury convicted Farias of conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The district court denied Farias’s post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of voice identification testimony, and the jury instructions regarding translated transcripts. At sentencing, the court attributed 130 kilograms of heroin and 45 kilograms of cocaine to Farias, applied a leadership enhancement, and sentenced him to 300 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Farias’s challenges to the admission of voice identification testimony, the jury instructions on translated transcripts, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the sentencing calculations. The court held that the admission of the agent’s voice identification did not violate Farias’s constitutional rights, that Farias had waived any objection to the jury instructions on translated transcripts, that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, and that the district court did not clearly err in its drug quantity findings or in applying the leadership enhancement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Farias" on Justia Law

Police began investigating a man after a confidential informant, who had been caught with illegal drugs and firearms, provided detailed information about the man’s drug trafficking activities. The informant described prior drug purchases from the man, his connections to a cartel, and provided specific details about the man’s address, vehicle, and communications. Police corroborated much of this information through surveillance and controlled drug buys, and obtained state and federal search warrants. When executing the warrants, officers found large quantities of methamphetamine, fentanyl, firearms, and evidence of drug sales. The man was charged with multiple drug and firearm offenses.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the defendant moved for a Franks hearing, arguing that the affidavits supporting the initial search warrants omitted important information about the informant’s credibility and cooperation agreement. He also sought to suppress evidence obtained from the warrants and challenged the scope of the firearm charge and several sentencing enhancements. The district court denied the motions, finding the omissions immaterial to probable cause and insufficient to warrant a Franks hearing, and concluded that the evidence and enhancements were properly applied. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the court imposed a life sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in denying a Franks hearing, as the omitted information about the informant was not material given the corroboration and detail provided. The appellate court also found no constructive amendment of the indictment regarding the firearm charge and upheld the application of the sentencing enhancements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "USA v Hecke" on Justia Law

Israel Isbell pleaded guilty in 2010 to receipt of child pornography and was sentenced to 180 months in prison followed by a lifetime of supervised release. As his prison term ended, Isbell violated several conditions of his supervised release, including unauthorized internet use and unsuccessful participation in sex offender and substance abuse treatment programs. These violations led to the revocation of his supervised release, an additional prison term, and a new term of supervised release with specific conditions.After a prior appeal resulted in a remand for resentencing on an unrelated issue, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois resentenced Isbell to 16 months’ imprisonment and 8 years of supervised release. Isbell objected to three conditions: a requirement to participate in a computer and internet monitoring program, a provision regarding medical marijuana use during treatment, and a mandate for substance abuse treatment. The district court overruled his objections and imposed the conditions as proposed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Isbell’s challenges de novo. The court held that the computer monitoring condition was neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad, as its language and purpose provided sufficient notice and guidance. The court also found that the medical marijuana provision did not improperly delegate judicial authority to treatment providers, as it required Isbell to follow generally applicable program rules rather than allowing providers to determine the existence of the condition. Finally, the court determined that the written judgment requiring substance abuse treatment was consistent with the oral pronouncement and did not violate the non-delegation rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Isbell" on Justia Law

Nathan Nissenbaum was convicted in Illinois state court of aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated domestic battery after an incident involving his former girlfriend, D.K. The evidence at trial included testimony from D.K., physical evidence, and Nissenbaum’s own admissions. Nissenbaum’s defense was that the encounter was consensual, based on their prior relationship and history of “rape play.” He was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment.After his conviction, Nissenbaum filed a post-trial motion in the Illinois state court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his attorney failed to properly advise him about the risk of mandatory consecutive sentences and his realistic chances at trial, which he argued led him to reject a plea deal that would have resulted in a lesser sentence. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Nissenbaum had not demonstrated ineffective assistance, concluding he was adequately informed and would not have accepted a plea regardless. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, finding no prejudice from any alleged deficiencies, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied further review.Nissenbaum then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, renewing his ineffective assistance claim. The district court denied the petition, holding that the Illinois Appellate Court had not unreasonably applied federal law in finding no prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Seventh Circuit found that Nissenbaum failed to show a reasonable probability he would have accepted a plea offer but for counsel’s alleged errors, and thus habeas relief was barred. View "Nissenbaum v. Jennings" on Justia Law

On July 21, 2018, Sara Rodriguez and her daughters were carjacked at gunpoint in Chicago as they returned to their parked Chevrolet Equinox. Two armed men forced them out of the vehicle, which was then driven away by the assailants. Later that evening, a shooting occurred at a nearby park, and witnesses saw a man matching the carjacker’s description fleeing in a vehicle resembling the stolen Equinox. Early the next morning, police located the Equinox, but the occupants escaped after a crash. Inside the vehicle, officers found items linking Kashif Dukes to the car, including his cell phone, DNA, and a pistol later connected to the park shooting. Angelica Rodriguez initially gave a tentative identification of Dukes in a photo lineup, but seven months later, she identified him with high confidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Dukes’s trial. The government introduced evidence tying Dukes to the carjacking and shooting, including forensic and social media evidence. Dukes challenged the reliability of the eyewitness identification and objected to the admission of evidence about the uncharged shooting, arguing it was prejudicial. The jury found Dukes guilty of carjacking, brandishing a firearm during the carjacking, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court denied Dukes’s motion for acquittal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that evidence of the shooting was admissible as direct evidence of the charged firearm possession and, under Rule 404(b), as relevant to motive for the carjacking. The court also found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, noting that the jury could reasonably infer Dukes’s guilt from both direct and circumstantial evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Dukes" on Justia Law

In early 2015, Daniel Stewart was stopped by Indianapolis police for a traffic violation, leading to the discovery of a handgun, over $9,000 in cash, and more than 800 grams of illegal narcotics in his car. A subsequent search of his home revealed additional drugs, nearly $500,000 in cash, and five more firearms. Stewart was found to be laundering drug proceeds through sham businesses. He was convicted in November 2016 on multiple counts, including drug distribution, firearm possession, and money laundering.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially sentenced Stewart to life imprisonment plus five years. Stewart appealed, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. He then sought postconviction relief, arguing that recent case law invalidated his sentence enhancements. The government conceded, and the district court ordered resentencing. At resentencing, the court imposed a 360-month term of imprisonment, considering Stewart's efforts at rehabilitation but also the severity of his crimes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Stewart's appeal of his resentencing. Stewart argued that the district court miscalculated his sentencing range under the career-offender guideline and misunderstood its discretion regarding his rehabilitation efforts. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court correctly applied the career-offender guideline and did not err in its consideration of Stewart's rehabilitation. The court also held that the district court provided a sufficient explanation for the increased sentences on the money laundering counts, which did not affect the overall sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Stewart's 360-month sentence. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Eric Skeens was convicted in Indiana of five counts of child molesting, based almost entirely on the detailed testimony of the child victim, K.W. There was no physical evidence presented at trial, but the prosecution relied on K.W.’s account, as well as supporting testimony from her mother, a school counselor, a therapist, and a sexual assault nurse who explained the absence of physical evidence. During closing arguments, Skeens’s attorney made a statement to the jury, “I believe her,” referring to K.W., which Skeens later argued constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After his conviction, Skeens appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and found that the attorney’s statement did not prejudice the outcome, given the strength and detail of K.W.’s testimony. The Indiana Supreme Court declined to review the case, and Skeens’s subsequent state post-conviction and federal habeas petitions were also denied. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied relief, concluding that Skeens had not shown the state court’s decision was unreasonable under federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, applying the deferential standards required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Strickland v. Washington. The court held that the Indiana Court of Appeals did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply the Strickland standard when it concluded that there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different absent the attorney’s statement. The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Skeens’s habeas petition. View "Skeens v Neal" on Justia Law

Mitchell Green was charged with trafficking a child and related offenses in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. During his trial, Green called his cousin, Jonathan Cousin, as a witness, who testified that he, not Green, had driven the minor to a hotel. The state did not initially object to Cousin's testimony but later argued that Green failed to provide pretrial notice as required for a "Denny witness," leading the judge to declare a mistrial. Green, out on bond, argued that a retrial would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.The trial court denied Green's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held that the mistrial was erroneous. However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin sided with the trial judge, finding that he exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial. Green then filed a collateral attack, and the district court denied relief, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial was based on a mistaken belief that pretrial notice for Denny evidence was required. The court noted that no such requirement existed in Wisconsin law. The trial judge failed to exercise sound discretion by not considering alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance. The Seventh Circuit held that there was no manifest necessity for the mistrial, and thus, a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue an unconditional writ. View "Green v. Milwaukee County Circuit Court" on Justia Law