Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Radford boarded a train in Flagstaff, to deliver heroin to Toledo. The train stopped in Galesburg. Officer Mings, who goes to the station daily to study passengers, noted indicators of drug trafficking. Radford had purchased a one-way ticket two days earlier, paying a premium for a roomette, and was traveling between locations associated with illegal drugs. Radford had been arrested seven years earlier for assisting undocumented aliens and for possessing marijuana. Mings, in uniform, knocked on Radford’s door and stated that he was doing “security checks” for ”illegal narcotics.” Radford answered Ming’s questions. He asked to search her luggage. Radford responded, “I guess so. You’re just doing your job.” He never advised Radford that she could refuse his requests. The search revealed heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of her motion to suppress, finding that the encounter was consensual, not a seizure, and that Radford voluntarily consented to the search. Even with no basis for suspecting a particular individual, officers may pose questions, request identification, and request consent to search—"provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.” No seizure occurs if “a reasonable person would feel free to … terminate the encounter.” Rejecting claims of intimidation, the court noted Mings did not enter Radford’s roomette before her consent, told her why he wanted to search, and did not threaten Radford; there cannot be a rule that an "officer is forbidden to speak to a person of another race.” View "United States v. Radford" on Justia Law

Wheeler pleaded guilty to an attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)), and to discharging a gun during that crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The plea did not reserve any issue for appeal. The court sentenced him to 108 months for the Hobbs Act offense and the required consecutive 120 months for the firearms offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Wheeler’s argument that attempted robbery is not a “crime of violence” because an attempt to rob a retail establishment does not have the use of physical force as an element and the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the elements clause in section 924(c) is a statutory issue; an unconditional guilty plea waives any contention that an indictment fails to state an offense. The court also rejected Wheeler’s argument that he should be resentenced in light of a 2017 Supreme Court holding that 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which requires a sentence under section 924(c) to run consecutively to the sentence for the offense in which the firearm was used, does not forbid the court to choose a term of imprisonment for the predicate offense so that the aggregate imprisonment comports with 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing criteria. View "United States v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

On remand, court was entitled to rely upon the record established at the original sentencing concerning the Guidelines range.Armand pleaded guilty to distributing crack and powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Applying Amendment 782 decreased the total offense level, for a Guidelines range of 84-105 months. At his hearing, Armand repeatedly acknowledged that Guidelines range, but contended that the court should depart downward to impose a sentence that would apply if the crack and powder cocaine Guidelines reflected a one-to-one ratio; the court declined and imposed a sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. On remand for resentencing, Armand did not dispute that range, but reiterated his argument regarding the sentencing disparity and his mitigation arguments. The court discussed the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and sentenced Armand to 104 months’ imprisonment, recognizing efforts Armand undertook to improve his life while imprisoned. The court expressed skepticism that mental health treatment and his age would lower his risk of recidivism. The court also stated that its position on the crack cocaine Guidelines had not changed since the original sentencing hearing, and declined to decrease the ratio. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court was entitled to rely upon the record established at the original sentencing. View "United States v. Armand" on Justia Law

Seventh Circuit finds that 10 years of prison segregation raised serious constitutional concerns. In 1989, Isby was incarcerated for robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. Months later, Isby hit a prison counselor. Officers gassed Isby and entered his cell. During the altercation, a dog was killed, and Isby stabbed two officers. Isby was convicted of attempted murder and battery, and sentenced to an additional 40 years. Isby was moved among Indiana prisons and received several major‐conduct reports. Since October 2006, Isby has been in long‐term segregation. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. Unaware that Isby had accumulated three “strikes” for filing frivolous suits or appeals and was restricted under the Prison Litigation Reform Act from seeking pauper status, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the court granted Isby’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, but rejected his claims, and allowed him to appeal as a pauper. The Seventh Circuit declined to dismiss the appeal, affirmed with respect to the Eighth Amendment claim, and remanded for further proceedings on Isby’s due process claim. The court noted serious constitutional concerns: the “repeated issuance of the same uninformative language (without any updates or explanation of why continued placement is necessary) and the length of Isby’s confinement, could cause a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Isby has been deprived” of liberty without due process. View "Isby v. Brown" on Justia Law

Challenge to sentencing as an armed career criminal, based on Supreme Court’s holding in “Johnson,” is precluded by waiver in plea agreement. Carson robbed a convenience store by pulling a gun on the cashier. After he was apprehended, he pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, section 924(c), and possessing a firearm as a felon, section 922(g)(1). He waived his right to appeal, with limited exceptions; the prosecution agreed to recommend a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a prison sentence of 272 months, at the low end of the range calculated by the parties based on a shared assumption that Carson would be sentenced as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) The district court sentenced Carson to 272 months as an armed career criminal, classifying as violent felonies prior convictions for robbery and armed robbery. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Carson’s appeal, in which he argued that under Johnson v. United States (2010), none of his prior convictions was a violent felony. The appeal waiver in Carson’s plea agreement precluded that argument. View "United States v. Carson" on Justia Law

Enhancement for possession of a firearm capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine was appropriate, despite defendant’s claim that he only constructively possessed the gun at issue. After a police officer observed an apparent drug transaction, Cherry and Crews fled. They crashed their car, in which the officers found hundreds of individual capsules of heroin, numerous effects related to the sale of heroin, and a Glock .40 caliber pistol. They also found a 9 mm pistol with 16 rounds in the magazine and one round in the chamber, in a trash can where Crews had been observed throwing an object. Cherry pleaded guilty to four counts involving heroin distribution and gun possession, without a plea agreement. The district court applied U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(3), which enhanced his base offense level for possession of a firearm capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine. He was sentenced to 106 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Cherry’s argument that he constructively possessed the firearm at issue as it was actually possessed by Crews. Cherry pled guilty to knowingly possessing the gun, making it relevant conduct under section 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). View "United States v. Cherry" on Justia Law

Unreliable corporate meeting minutes were properly excluded in tax fraud trial. Petrunak was the sole proprietor of Abyss, a fireworks business regulated by ATF. In 2001, ATF inspectors inspected Abyss and reported violations. An ALJ revoked Abyss’s explosives license. Abyss went out of business. Five years later, Petrunak mailed the inspectors IRS W-9 forms requesting identifying information and then sent them 1099s, alleging that Abyss had paid each of them $250,000. Because the inspector’s tax return did not include the fictional $250,000, the IRS audited her and informed her that she owed $101,114 in taxes; she spent significant time and energy unraveling the situation. Petrunak submitted those sham “payments” as business expenses; he reported a loss exceeding $500,000 in his personal taxes. Petrunak admitted to filing the forms and was charged with making and subscribing false and fraudulent IRS forms, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1). He sought to introduce corporate meeting minutes under the business records exception, claiming that the records would have demonstrated his state of mind in preparing the forms. The minutes included statements bemoaning that the IRS was not more helpful, and declarations that the ATF agents perjured themselves. The Seventh Circuit upheld exclusion of the records, noting that the records contained multiple instances of hearsay and had no indicia of reliability. View "United States v. Petrunak" on Justia Law

Order that juveniles submit to psychological evaluation before court ruling on motion to transfer for adult prosecution is not subject to immediate appellate review. Juveniles allegedly robbed a pharmacy. They were charged with Hobbs Act Robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and possession of a firearm during that robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government sought transfer for adult prosecution, 18 U.S.C. 5032 and moved to have the juveniles examined by government psychologists. The juveniles argued that the examinations—without counsel present—would violate their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The magistrate granted the motion, ordering that the psychologists “not talk … about the specific allegations.” The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without addressing the merits. The order did not fit within the “small class” of nonfinal orders that “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” The juvenile will not be irreparably harmed by failure to review his constitutional claims now; he can raise these same claims on an immediate appeal if the district court grants the motion to transfer. If the court denies that motion, the government will be prohibited from using at any subsequent prosecution any information obtained during the examination. View "United States v. Sealed Defendant Juvenile Male (4)" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial (without an evidentiary hearing) of a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, which had claimed that Spiller’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the plea-bargaining process after Spiller was charged with two counts of distributing a controlled substance 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and one count of selling a firearm to a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1). The government had filed a notice, under 21 U.S.C. 851, that it would seek an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence based on Spiller’s three prior drug felonies. The government had offered an agreement that, it conceded, did “not offer a whole lot beyond a blind plea.” Spiller executed a blind plea. With a Guidelines range of 262-327 months, Spiller was sentenced to 240 months; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. In rejecting the ineffective assistance claim, the Seventh Circuit noted that his attorney reviewed Spiller’s plea options, specifically inquired of the government whether there were differences, examined the government’s response, and suggested that Spiller plead blindly, reserving the right to challenge the government’s Guidelines calculation, a right he would have sacrificed under the government’s proposal. The record was sufficient to explain counsel’s decision as strategic, thereby eliminating the need for an evidentiary hearing. View "Spiller v. United States" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to search warrants executed on his home. Defendant cared for young children at his Wisconsin home. After a parent reported to the Rock County Sheriff that she had found a video camera concealed in the bathroom of defendant’s house, officers discovered that he was on the sex‐offender registry and applied for a search warrant. The supporting affidavit listed several categories of items the detective believed could be found in connection with hidden‐camera recordings, indicating that defendant had violated Wis. Stat. 942.09, “Representations depicting nudity.” About a week after the initial search, officers requested a follow‐on search warrant for evidence of child pornography, supported by evidence gathered during the initial search. On the basis of evidence collected from those searches, defendant was charged with unlawfully creating child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251(a)). After denial of a motion to suppress, defendant pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal that denial, and was sentenced to 25 years’ incarceration. The district court found, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that the warrant was supported by probable cause, was not overly broad, and in any case was subject to the good‐faith exception. View "United States v. Wenzel" on Justia Law