Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After being convicted in 2012 of drug and firearm offenses, a man was sentenced to 180 months in prison and six years of supervised release. He completed his prison term and began supervised release in 2022, but soon violated several conditions, including failing to notify his probation officer of changes in residence and employment, misrepresenting his place of residence, leaving his job without notice, and failing multiple drug tests. These violations led his probation officer to petition for revocation of his supervised release.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held a revocation hearing in February 2025, where the defendant admitted to the violations. The court determined that the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range was 18 to 24 months. The government sought 30 months’ imprisonment with additional supervised release, while the defendant requested 18 months without further supervision, arguing that supervision would be futile. The court ultimately revoked supervised release and imposed a 36-month prison sentence, citing the seriousness and number of violations, the defendant’s criminal and personal history, and his stated refusal to comply with supervision, while also noting the need for correctional treatment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court improperly lengthened the sentence for rehabilitative purposes, which is prohibited under Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011). The appellate court found that, although the district court mentioned correctional treatment, it had considered multiple proper grounds for the sentence, including accountability and the defendant’s refusal to comply with supervision. The Seventh Circuit held that there was no Tapia error and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Richards" on Justia Law

In this case, federal agents used a confidential informant to conduct two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from a person known as “Black.” The informant, Luis Villegas, met “Black” in a courthouse and later identified him as Antwan Eiland through a driver’s license photograph provided by an ATF agent. Subsequent drug deals were arranged and recorded, but the video evidence did not clearly capture Eiland’s face. Additional testimony came from the informant, the ATF agent, and a woman who drove Eiland to one transaction; all identified Eiland as the dealer. Eiland did not testify and argued at trial that he was not “Black.”A grand jury indicted Eiland on two counts of distributing a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Eiland was found guilty on both counts. Post-verdict, Eiland moved for acquittal based on insufficient evidence and for a new trial arguing juror bias, citing a juror’s remarks about his silence and mask-wearing. The district court denied both motions, finding the evidence sufficient and the juror’s comment inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Eiland guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and declined to reassess witness credibility. It found no plain error in the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, determining that the comments did not improperly reference Eiland’s silence. The court also ruled that the juror’s post-trial comment was inadmissible and did not justify a new trial or evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Eiland" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after a police chase in which he discarded a loaded firearm in a residential area. Prior to this incident, law enforcement had evidence linking the same firearm to a gang-related murder occurring about two weeks earlier. Cell phone records, surveillance footage, and the defendant’s online activity connected him to other gang members and to the murder scene. The firearm discarded during the police chase was later found to have been used in that murder.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant’s presentence investigation report initially recommended a base offense level based solely on the firearm possession charge. However, after the government presented evidence tying him to the earlier murder, it sought to apply the United States Sentencing Guidelines’ cross-reference for homicide, leading to a much higher base offense level. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was culpable in the murder and applied both the murder cross-reference and a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment resulting from his act of tossing the loaded gun during his flight. The court imposed the statutory maximum sentence of 15 years.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines, and for clear error its factual findings. The appellate court held that the district court properly applied the homicide cross-reference and the reckless endangerment enhancement, and found the sentence not substantively unreasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v Taylor" on Justia Law

In 1989, Shannon Agofsky robbed a bank in southwest Missouri and kidnapped the bank president at gunpoint, ultimately drowning him in Oklahoma. A federal jury in the Western District of Missouri convicted Agofsky of bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, resulting in a life sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction, and subsequent motions for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 were denied. In 2001, while serving his sentence in a Texas federal prison, Agofsky murdered a fellow inmate and received a death sentence in the Eastern District of Texas, partly based on his prior firearm conviction.Agofsky later sought to challenge his Missouri firearm conviction by filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Southern District of Indiana, arguing—based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021)—that bank robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). His claim did not meet the conditions for a successive § 2255 motion. Previously, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Davenport allowed such statutory claims to proceed via § 2241, but the Supreme Court overruled that approach in Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023). Accordingly, the district court dismissed Agofsky’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed whether § 2255(e) is a jurisdictional bar or merely a venue provision. After reviewing precedent and circuit splits, the court held that § 2255(e) constitutes a jurisdictional limit on the court’s power to entertain habeas petitions outside the strict confines of § 2255. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Agofsky’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Agofsky v. Baysore" on Justia Law

Donald Felton was investigated after a confidential source informed law enforcement that Felton made trips from Taylorville, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine for resale. The source described Felton’s routine, including his use of a white Mazda SUV registered to his girlfriend and referenced a prior traffic stop involving Felton. Inspector Brown corroborated some details by reviewing police records and speaking with another officer about the earlier stop, but found no drugs during that encounter. Relying on this information and Felton’s criminal history, Inspector Brown prepared an affidavit seeking a warrant to install a tracking device on the SUV.The affidavit, submitted to the Circuit Court of Christian County, supported the issuance of the warrant. However, it omitted substantial information about the confidential source’s credibility, such as payments to the source, the source’s cooperation in exchange for consideration in legal matters, and the source’s own criminal history and pending charges. Based on the warrant, the tracking device was installed, and later, Felton was stopped and methamphetamine was found in the vehicle. Felton was indicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant was not supported by probable cause and requesting a Franks hearing regarding omissions in the affidavit. The district court denied both requests, concluding the affidavit was sufficiently corroborated and that Felton failed to show material omissions affecting probable cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to support probable cause because it relied almost exclusively on the confidential source and omitted material information regarding the source’s credibility. The court further concluded that Felton made a substantial preliminary showing warranting a Franks hearing. The appellate court reversed the denial of Felton’s suppression motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "USA v Felton" on Justia Law

James Cohen accepted monthly payments from an individual who was required to register as a sex offender, in exchange for falsely representing to authorities that this individual lived at his address. Cohen knew that the person had been convicted of a sex offense and was required by law to register his place of residence. When United States marshals investigated the individual's compliance with registration requirements, Cohen knowingly lied to a marshal, claiming the individual resided with him, despite knowing this was untrue.Cohen was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, with making a materially false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). He entered a plea agreement, admitting to an offense with a maximum sentence of eight years, and agreed to a sentencing guidelines calculation that included a four-level enhancement for matters relating to a sex offense under chapter 109B. At sentencing, Cohen objected to the application of this guideline, arguing that his offense did not constitute a sex offense under federal law, but withdrew his other objections. The district court overruled his remaining objection, applied the guideline, and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Cohen’s arguments that the sentencing guideline was improperly applied. The court held that guideline § 2J1.2 properly applied because Cohen’s false statement related to failure to register under chapter 109B, which falls within the guideline’s scope. The court found no merit in Cohen’s remaining arguments, determined that certain claims had been waived or forfeited, and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Cohen" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was convicted in Wisconsin state court for first-degree reckless homicide after selling heroin that resulted in a fatal overdose. The defendant, along with another individual, sold heroin to the victim, who was then injected with the drug and became unconscious. Instead of seeking immediate medical help, the two men drove around with the unconscious victim, later returned to the defendant’s house, and only after several hours did the other individual take the victim to a hospital, where she was pronounced dead. The defendant was arrested about a month later and charged with multiple offenses, but only the homicide conviction is relevant here.After his conviction and sentencing, the defendant sought post-conviction relief in the Wisconsin trial court and then appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. His appellate counsel filed a “no-merit” report, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding no deficiency in trial counsel’s performance. The defendant then attempted to petition the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review, but his petition was filed after the deadline. The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the petition as untimely and denied reconsideration.Subsequently, the defendant filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, again raising ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the defendant had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to timely exhaust state remedies and had not shown cause to excuse the default. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendant’s reliance on a prison law librarian’s miscalculation of the filing deadline did not constitute cause to excuse procedural default, and that the defendant had not preserved any alternative argument regarding lack of law library access. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Jannke v Gierach" on Justia Law

Gary Wilson was previously convicted under Illinois law for possession of child pornography, a statute that criminalizes possession of sexually explicit images of minors as well as individuals with severe or profound intellectual disabilities. Nearly twenty years later, Wilson used gaming systems and social media to solicit sexually explicit images from minors, leading to his guilty plea on two counts of production of child pornography under federal law.At sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, the government argued that Wilson’s prior Illinois conviction triggered a federal sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), which increases the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for defendants with a prior conviction “relating to” possession of child pornography. Wilson’s attorney did not object to the application of this enhancement, and the district court imposed a sixty-year sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Wilson argued for the first time that the Illinois statute was broader than the federal definition because it also covered images of adults with certain disabilities, and therefore should not trigger the federal enhancement. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the issue for plain error due to Wilson’s failure to object below. The court held that, under the plain error standard, it was not “clear or obvious” that the Illinois statute did not “relate to” the possession of child pornography as required by § 2251(e), especially given the broad language Congress used and existing circuit precedent. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement and Wilson’s sentence. View "USA v Wilson" on Justia Law

Andrew Johnston was convicted by a jury of attempted bank robbery and sentenced to 168 months in prison. While awaiting transfer to federal prison, Johnston reported to authorities that a fellow inmate, a Sinaloa Cartel leader, had ordered a hit on another inmate. Johnston assisted law enforcement by recording a conversation with the cartel leader and later testified at the cartel leader’s sentencing hearing. Although the judge in that case did not credit Johnston’s testimony, the recorded conversation was considered in sentencing the cartel leader. In recognition of Johnston’s assistance, the government moved for a 25% reduction in his sentence under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the motion was filed more than two years after Johnston’s sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, addressed the government’s untimely Rule 35(b) motion, accepting the government’s waiver of the one-year time limit. The judge found Johnston’s cooperation useful but determined that his repeated frivolous postconviction litigation undermined any inference of genuine acceptance of responsibility. As a result, the court granted only a 10% reduction, lowering Johnston’s sentence to 151 months, rather than the 25% requested.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first considered whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the untimely Rule 35(b) motion. The Seventh Circuit held that the one-year time limit in Rule 35(b)(1) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, which may be waived, overruling its prior decision in United States v. McDowell. The court further held that no legal rule barred the district judge from considering Johnston’s postconviction litigation conduct in evaluating his acceptance of responsibility. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant only a 10% sentence reduction. View "USA v Johnston" on Justia Law

Kenneth Courtright operated Today’s Growth Consultant (TGC), also known as The Income Store, which promised investors guaranteed, perpetual monthly payments based on website advertising revenue. Investors, called “site partners,” paid upfront fees under Consulting Performance Agreements (CPAs), which stated that these fees would be used exclusively for website-related expenses and that TGC was in satisfactory financial condition. In reality, TGC’s advertising revenue and business loans were insufficient to meet its payment obligations, and Courtright used new investors’ upfront fees to pay existing investors, misrepresenting the company’s financial health and the use of funds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Courtright’s criminal trial for seven counts of wire fraud. The government presented evidence of TGC’s financial shortfall and improper use of upfront fees, including testimony from employees and financial experts. The jury convicted Courtright on all counts. At sentencing, the parties debated the loss calculation, with the court ultimately adopting a $69.3 million loss figure and granting certain deductions, resulting in a final loss amount of $52.5 million. Courtright was sentenced to 90 months in prison and two years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Courtright’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the loss calculation. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Courtright guilty of wire fraud, as he made material false statements about the use of upfront fees and TGC’s financial condition, and acted with intent to defraud. The court also found that Courtright waived his causation argument regarding loss calculation and that the district court did not clearly err in denying deductions for operating expenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v Courtright" on Justia Law