Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Keefer’s badly beaten body was found by police in Keefer’s Rock Falls backyard on November 27, 2006. A jury convicted Johnson of Keefer’s murder. Johnson admits he beat Keefer the night before, in the same backyard, but insists that he did not kill him. Keefer’s actual murderers, Johnson says, were two men with baseball bats who attacked Keefer later that night, in the same spot. Johnson’s theory apparently came from Manon, who told police that his cellmate at Whiteside County Jail, Masini, told him that Masini had hired two men to kill Keefer with bats and that they did so. Masini denied making the statement when police questioned him. The trial court barred Johnson from introducing Masini’s hearsay statement, reasoning that it was too unreliable to allow into evidence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. After exhausting other options, Johnson sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that exclusion of the hearsay evidence was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent (Chambers v. Mississippi, 1973). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Johnson’s petition; the state court’s decision did not run afoul of Chambers. The court noted the absence of corroborating evidence and obvious untrustworthiness of a murder confession to a stranger‐turned‐cellmate. View "Johnson v. Jaimet" on Justia Law

Whitfield's 2002, 2003, and 2007 prison disciplinary proceedings resulted in the revocation of 16 months of good-conduct credit Whitfield had earned. Whitfield diligently, but unsuccessfully, filed administrative grievances regarding all three actions. In 2003-2004, Whitfield filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the 2002 and 2003 proceedings, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district courts dismissed. Whitfield also, unsuccessfully, sought mandamus relief in Illinois state court alleging due process violations. In 2009, Whitfield attempted to challenge all three revocations of good-conduct credit through a state-law habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed without prejudice. An appeal was dismissed because Whitfield was unable to obtain the record. In March 2011, Whitfield filed a federal habeas petition. The state argued that Whitfield’s petition would be rendered moot in July 2011, when he was scheduled for release, and failure to exhaust state remedies. The district court dismissed the action as moot when Whitfield was released. Whitfield filed the present section 1983 action. Upon preliminary review (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)) the district court found that Whitfield stated claims for due process violations and for retaliation but granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Whitfield’s suit was barred by precedent requiring a plaintiff to pursue timely collateral relief while in custody. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whitfield did his best to obtain timely relief while in custody; precedent requires no more. View "Whitfield v. Howard" on Justia Law

Lynn was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, in 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2; and conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2), 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2. The court imposed a below‐guidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in admitting National Precursor Exchange System (NPLEX) logs concerning pharmacy purchases of products containing pseudoephedrine, an ingredient in methamphetamine; and a video of a chemist demonstrating a particular method for producing methamphetamine, called “shake‐and‐bake,” and that Lynn should not have been sentenced as a career offender because his two predicate offenses for aggravated battery under Illinois las did not qualify as violent felonies under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). The NPLEX logs were nontestimonial; although the “shake‐and‐bake” video showed a different, and perhaps more sophisticated, means of production, the video’s presentation did not prejudice Lynn. View "United States v. Lynn" on Justia Law

After a sting operation, Hilliard was charged with 10 counts relating to several controlled sales of heroin, a heroin‐for‐guns trade, and a gun and heroin found during the execution of a search warrant at his home. Hilliard asserted an entrapment defense. The jury found Hilliard guilty on nine counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting an argument that the testimony of an agent placed that agent in the position of both a factual and an expert witness, in violation of Hilliard's due process rights.. The trial court properly provided the definition of pre‐disposition and the factors to be considered in evaluating Hilliard’s defense. View "United States v. Hilliard" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to three federal drug and money‐laundering offenses, Jimenes was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Jimenes’s argument that his constitutional rights were violated by the use, for Sentencing Guidelines purposes, of a state misdemeanor conviction for driving with a suspended license that was obtained without the use of a Spanish interpreter. The district court reviewed the record of the conviction and was satisfied that enough informal translation took place to support a conclusion that his guilty plea was knowing. The court noted that the district court was not an appropriate forum for collateral attack of that conviction. View "United States v. Jimenes" on Justia Law

On June 30, 2015, Dutcher announced on Facebook that he planned to assassinate President Obama. He then drove to La Crosse, Wisconsin, where the President was scheduled to speak on July 2. Once in La Crosse, Dutcher repeated his plan to a security guard, the police, the Secret Service, a nurse, a doctor, and the Secret Service together. Dutcher was convicted of two counts of threatening the President, 18 U.S.C. 871(a) and sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and to jury instructionsthat it could find willfulness if the government proved Dutcher “either actually intended his statement to be a true threat, or that he knew that other people reasonably would view his statement as a true threat but he made the statement anyway.” View "United States v. Dutcher" on Justia Law

In 2007, Shannon pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Shannon was released and began supervised release. In 2011, the district court found that Shannon had violated the conditions by possessing a web camera without previously notifying his probation officer, and sentenced Shannon to 28 days of incarceration. In 2015, the probation office notified the court that Shannon had temporarily uninstalled the monitoring software on his computer, viewed legal adult pornography, encrypted digital files, possessed external storage devices, and installed “scrubbing” software. The court found that Shannon had done so and was not compliant with his release conditions, but declined to revoke his supervised release. At a subsequent a modification hearing, the parties disputed Special Condition 2, intended to require Shannon to notify the probation office before using certain electronic devices. The district court reasoned that Condition 2 was “related to the offense of conviction which involves the sexual exploitation of minors from a computer in [Shannon’s] home and will protect the public. [Shannon’s] demonstrated non‐compliance with external storage devices indicates he is at a continued risk to reoffend.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the condition justified. View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 24 month prison sentence after pleading guilty to one count of wire fraud. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his participation in a scheme to defraud companies that were interested in obtaining loans for environmentally friendly upgrades to their facilities. Defendant committed the offense while he was on probation for a felony forgery conviction in Indiana. At sentencing, the district court considered defendant's leukemia as it considered what sentence to impose, but it was unpersuaded that defendant's medical condition justified a noncustodial sentence. The court concluded that this was not a case in which the only substantively reasonable sentence would have been one that kept defendant out of prison. In this case, the district court weighed evidence supporting a noncustodial punishment, as well as evidence supporting some time in prison, including the nature of his crime, the fact that he committed it while on probation, and the factual finding that BOP would be able to serve his medical needs. The court concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in its fact finding, and the sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rothbard" on Justia Law

Petitioner, serving a 110 year sentence for two murders he committed when he was 16 years old, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3) application seeking authorization to file a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2254. Petitioner challenged his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, which was made retroactive by Montgomery v. Louisiana. The court agreed with the state that petitioner cannot state a claim to relief under Miller because his sentencing judge was afforded significant discretion by the Indiana Code to fashion an appropriate sentence and, in fact, considered petitioner's age at the time of the offense in mitigation. Accordingly, the court denied the authorization and dismissed the application. View "Kelly v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2010, Moore stole a BMW after showing the driver a gun. He was captured by Chicago police after he crashed into another vehicle during a high-speed chase. A jury was unable to reach a verdict on a charge of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 2119, but convicted him of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and possession of a firearm following a felony conviction, section 922(g)(1). Judge Grady imposed a sentence of 240 months. The Guidelines advisory range was 360 months to life. Moore had three prior convictions for robbery, among other offenses. He had previously used a gun and had assaulted victims and a police officer. When he stole the BMW, he was still wearing an electronic monitoring bracelet. Judge Grady referred to “protecting the public.” After a re-trial on remand, a jury acquitted him of carjacking and carrying a firearm during the offense of carjacking. Judge Kocoras found Moore subject to a minimum prison term of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), and imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 240 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that on remand, Judge Kocoras was bound to re-sentence him to the same 120-month sentence originally imposed on the felon-in-possession conviction and that the government waived reliance on the 15-year minimum specified by the ACCA. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law