Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police executed a search warrant on a storage unit that Miranda rented, where Miranda and Rivas worked on cars. The owner said that he saw Rivas at that unit “just about every day.” The officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, two loaded guns, Rivas’s student handbook, invoices from Rivas’s mechanic business, and a Western Union receipt tied to him. Miranda was arrested. He called Rivas from jail and, in a recorded call, told Rivas the police were looking for him, but that he would not say anything about Rivas to the police. Rivas was arrested. A fingerprint examiner testified at trial that he was certain the partial fingerprint found on a handgun belonged to Rivas. Rivas wanted to question the examiner about an unrelated case in which the FBI used the same method to erroneously conclude that the fingerprint of an Oregon lawyer was on a bag containing detonating devices used in terrorist bombings. The district court ruled the defense could not refer to that case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Rivas’s conviction. The examiner was not involved in the other case, and the cases were wholly unrelated. Rivas’s counsel was not prevented from questioning the examiner on the reliability of the fingerprint identification method. Counsel pursued multiple lines of cross‐examination. Rivas’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated. View "United States v. Rivas" on Justia Law

In 1993 Bradford, then an Evansville police officer, was convicted in Indiana state court of murder and arson and was sentenced to 80 years in prison, where he remains. The victim, who was apparently killed by stabbing before the fire started, was the woman with whom Evans had been having an extramarital affair. In 2013 he filed a federal habeas corpus suit, claiming that he could prove his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief. Bradford had his chance and failed to present reliable evidence that would establish his innocence. The Indiana Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Bradford’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by selecting a particular fire expert as a witness. This was not a case in which counsel made no meaningful investigation or failed to present a defense expert on a critical issue. View "Bradford v. Brown" on Justia Law

Orona‐Ibarra, a citizen of Mexico, was removed from the United States following a 2007 Illinois drug conviction. He reentered the U.S., in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. He was arrested on unrelated charges in Texas and was “found” by immigration officials while in custody in Texas. He was transferred from Texas to the Central District of Illinois. A person violates section 1326 in any location in the United States where she is “found.” Venue in such cases is proper wherever in the United States the violation may occur or where the accused person “may be apprehended,” 8 U.S.C. 1329. Illegal re‐entry is a “continuing offense” that is committed from the moment the defendant reenters the country until federal immigration agents gain actual (not just constructive) knowledge of her presence, her identity, and her unlawful immigration status. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Orona‐Ibarra’s motion to dismiss for improper venue. Orona‐Ibarra did not commit any element of the crime in Illinois: he did not reenter the country in Illinois, he was not “found” in Illinois, and he was not “apprehended” in Illinois. View "United States v. Orona-Ibarra" on Justia Law

From 2009-2011, Robey operated a “chop shop.” He and his associates stole cars, altered their identities using office and computer equipment, and then sold them. He was convicted by a jury. The district court sentenced him to 110 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Robey did not receive a speedy trial, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), 3162, and the Sixth Amendment and that district court erred in allowing the government to amend the indictment by dropping 19 of the 25 charges and erred at sentencing by finding that Robey’s theft of 10 vehicles, in addition to the four vehicles forming the basis of his conviction, constituted relevant conduct. The court upheld a finding that only 28 days had elapsed on Robey’s pre‐trial speedy trial clock. The court did not abuse its discretion in granting 10 ends‐of‐justice continuances for Robey and one for the prosecution. The evidence presented at trial and sentencing was more than sufficient to support the district court’s finding of a “pattern of relevant conduct that far exceeded in its details the four cars that were stolen that were before the jury.” View "United States v. Robey" on Justia Law

Ferguson, then 17 years old, was drunk and high when he approached a woman as she was getting into her car. He pointed a gun and demanded her keys. She hesitated. He shot the woman three times at point‐blank range. Ferguson took her keys and drove away. Police arrested Ferguson the next day after a high‐speed chase. The victim lost sight in one eye and has nerve damage to her ear and face. She cannot drive or work; she has nightmares and panic attacks. Ferguson pled guilty to vehicular robbery by force, 18 U.S.C. 2119(2), and discharge of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The statutory range for the carjacking is up to 300 months; the range for discharging the firearm is a mandatory 120 months to life, which must be consecutive to the carjacking sentence. Ferguson’s total guideline range was 198-217 months.The court sentenced Ferguson to eight years for the carjacking plus 42 years for firing the gun, stating that the sentence: “takes into account and reflects the seriousness of this evil, terrorist act. Seriousness of the offense. Promotes respect for the law. Hopefully that message will get out. Creates a just punishment. Provides adequate deterrence, and protects the public from further crime.” The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. Such a dramatic variance from a guideline range requires a substantial explanation. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

In 2003, a Wisconsin state court convicted Jordan of first‐degree reckless homicide, three counts of first‐degree endangerment, and as a felon in possession of a firearm, based on the shooting of Robinson, who was sitting in a car with three other people when he was killed by shots from a passing car. Before trial, Jordan repeatedly complained about his appointed attorney, Bohach. After a hearing, at which Jordan represented himself, the court denied Jordan’s motion asking for either appointment of new counsel, a delay to enable Bohach to do research Jordan thought necessary, or to waive counsel and represent himself. Jordan had an eighth‐grade education, but a fourth‐grade reading ability. At trial, “Bohach gave Jordan reason to be displeased.” In its closing argument, the prosecution made statements vouching for the detectives’ credibility and urged the jury to consider who had the most to lose—Jordan or the prosecutor. Bohach failed to object. After exhausting state remedies, Jordan filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing concerning Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim. The court affirmed with respect to self-representation. It was reasonable for the court to infer that Jordan would not be able to use necessary documents, which would prevent him from effectively representing himself. View "Jordan v. Hepp" on Justia Law

In 2008, Johnston, a horse racetrack executive, promised a $100,000 campaign contribution to then-Governor Blagojevich in exchange for his signature on a bill to tax the largest casinos in Illinois for the direct benefit of the Illinois horse racing​ industry. After Blagojevich’s corruption came to light, the casinos sued the racetracks, alleging a conspiracy to violate the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, and state‐law claims for civil conspiracy and unjust enrichment. A jury awarded the casinos $25,940,000 in damages, which was trebled under RICO to $77,820,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the jury did not have legally sufficient evidence to support a verdict finding a conspiracy to engage in a “pattern” of racketeering activity, as required for liability on a RICO conspiracy theory. The casinos are still entitled to the $25,940,000 in damages on the state‐law claims, but not to have those damages trebled under RICO. View "Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Gabriel persuaded a 17‐year‐old girl to participate in a “program” he had used previously to manipulate women for his sexual gratification. Gabriel told the girl she could “train” troubled boys to resist Satan by having sex with them, took sexually explicit photographs of the girl, posted them to his website, and arranged for the girl to have sex with a 15‐year‐old boy. Before that happened, the girl’s mother discovered Gabriel’s emails and contacted authorities. After the jury convicted Gabriel of producing child pornography, the court noted that the statutory range for imprisonment was 15-30 years, 18 U.S.C. 2251(e). Gabriel did not file a sentencing memorandum, nor did he object to the presentence report or the government’s memorandum, despite inquiries by the judge. The court imposed the statutory minimum of 15 years' imprisonment plus the recommended life term of supervised release, stating that a longer sentence would be warranted if not for Gabriel's advanced age (80) and poor health. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that a sentencing court need not separately justify the imprisonment and supervised release terms. Gabriel waived any challenge to the conditions of supervised release. He had advance notice, was warned that failure to object could be deemed a waiver, and never objected. View "United States v. Gabriel" on Justia Law

Blackman, a “ranking official in Chicago’s Black Disciples street gang,” pleaded guilty to one count of distributing a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court ordered him to serve a prison term of 180 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s finding that he was responsible for the uncharged distribution of 3,000 grams of crack cocaine to one of his customers as relevant conduct and its additional finding that he possessed a firearm during his narcotics distribution. The court rejected Blackman’s contention that the district court committed procedural error by failing to address his principal arguments in mitigation: his challenge to the 18:1 crack-to-powder-cocaine ratio adopted by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372, and now embodied in the Sentencing Guidelines, and his contention that the government engaged in sentencing manipulation. View "United States v. Blackman" on Justia Law

In 2015, Musgraves was convicted of five crimes stemming from his life as a drug dealer-turned-informant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Musgraves’s motion to suppress evidence (ammunition and cash, but no firearm or evidence of drug dealing) seized based on a search warrant. While police procedures were “sloppy” and one of the affidavits submitted was not sufficient to establish probable cause, the other affidavit was based on information that was recent and specific, the witness (Boner) appeared before the judge, and there was no damning information about Boner’s credibility. The court reversed, for insufficient evidence, Musgraves’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, possession of a firearm as a felon, and distribution of cocaine near a school. The government proved a buyer-seller relationship, but not a conspiracy to distribute, and did not prove a link between Musgrave and the car in which the gun and cocaine were found. The court affirmed the district court’s finding that Musgraves qualifies as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Musgraves" on Justia Law