Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

When he was 29, Ray started to chat over the Internet with a 14-year-old girl. At their first in-person meeting Ray plied Alexia with marijuana and cognac. At their second he took her to a motel (crossing from Indiana into Illinois), where marijuana and alcohol were followed by sexual intercourse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ray’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), for knowingly transporting a minor across state lines to engage in criminal sexual activity, but vacated his sentence of 320 months in prison plus 15 years of supervised release and remanded. The court upheld the jury instructions, noting the potential for confusion inherent in the nature of the offense, which “piggybacks” on a finding of violation of another law, The jury was entitled to find that Ray knew Alexia to be 14 (so that she could not legally consent to sex) and that Ray used drugs and force to overcome her resistance (so that she did not consent). The jury was entitled to infer that Ray knew when he drove into Illinois what he wanted and planned to do. The court noted that several conditions of supervised release were either unwarranted or poorly worded. View "United States v. Ray" on Justia Law

In 1993, Figgs was convicted of murder, committed while on bond for a drug offense. His 40-year sentence was to be served consecutively to his four-year sentence for the drug offense and was to include credit for time served prior to conviction. His planned release date of November 23, 2013, was apparently calculated under the mistaken belief that he had violated the terms of his mandatory supervised release on the drug charge. He was released on June 28, 2012, having survived summary judgment in his state‐court mandamus proceeding, in which he challenged his release date. Figgs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the possibility that he was being held unlawfully. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the warden, whose conduct did not demonstrate a sufficiently culpable state of mind. The court vacated as to the record office supervisor, who did not attempt to calculate Figgs’s sentence until June 2012, nor thoroughly review Figgs’s master file; a jury could find her minimal action so ineffectual that it amounted to criminal recklessness. Her conduct violated Figgs's established constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; the supervisor is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Figgs v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Robinson’s cousin, Carter, led a heroin trafficking ring, buying heroin in Chicago and selling it in Milwaukee, 2012-2014. For two months in 2014, Carter brought Robinson into the operation, just as law enforcement was closing in. Robinson sold heroin to a confidential informant. Police arrested him, Carter, and others. Robinson ultimately pleaded guilty to two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate heroin distribution, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3), and was given within-guidelines sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment. Before imposing the sentence the court engaged in several wide-ranging soliloquies on urban decay, the changing nature of Robinson’s neighborhood, the “pathology” of certain neighborhoods, and the connection between Milwaukee’s 1967 riots and recent protests in Baltimore, Maryland. The judge included several comments about his own experiences of the neighborhood. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, stating that the comments during sentencing strayed so far from the record that it could not trace the legitimate reasons for Robinson’s sentence. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Eberts is a film producer whose credits include Lord of War (2005) and Lucky Number Slevin (2006). After a string of failed movies, in 2009, he filed for bankruptcy. He was introduced to Elliott, an Illinois novice author who wanted to adapt his book into a movie. Eberts and Elliott formed a limited liability company. Both agreed to invest money. Eberts did not disclose his insolvency. Over the next year Elliott wired $615,000 to accounts controlled by Eberts. Eberts applied only 10% of that money toward the movie; he paid his father and bankruptcy attorney and spent the rest on personal items like art, furniture, designer clothing, and fine wines. Eberts also solicited and received a $25,000 loan from Elliott for an unrelated project and never repaid it. After Elliott discovered the scam, he filed suit. Later, Eberts pleaded guilty to seven counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and three counts of money laundering, section 1957, and was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment, the top of the guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors or Eberts’s mitigation arguments, but based the sentence on unsupported facts. View "United States v. Eberts" on Justia Law

n 2008, Dorsey, a convicted drug felon, sold 5.5 grams of crack cocaine. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, the mandatory minimum under the 1986 Drug Act; the court declined to apply the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), enacted in the interim. In 2012, the Supreme Court vacated Dorsey’s sentence, holding that the FSA’s lower mandatory minimums applied retroactively to the post‐FSA sentencing of pre‐FSA offenders. On remand, the district court reduced Dorsey’s sentence to time served, with eight years of supervised release. Dorsey returned to crack‐cocaine trafficking. In 2014, Dorsey pled guilty to three counts of distribution of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The court calculated a guidelines range of 262-327 months. Dorsey argued that he should receive a lower sentence because, in the pending revocation proceeding of his prior federal supervised release, the guidelines called for a consecutive sentence. The court sentenced Dorsey to 276 months’ imprisonment. Weeks later Dorsey pled guilty to violating supervised release in the earlier case. The court imposed a sentence of 51 months’ imprisonment, to run concurrently with Dorsey’s 276-month sentence. Dorsey then appealed the 276-month sentence, successfully challenging his supervised‐release conditions. On remand, the court increased Dorsey’s sentence, explaining that at the first sentencing, it had wanted to impose a 327‐month sentence, but had believed Dorsey would receive a 51‐month consecutive sentence in his revocation case. The court imposed a within‐guidelines sentence of 327 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit rejected his second appeal, in which Dorsey argued that the district judge should have recused himself. The court’s reasoning more than adequately justified Dorsey’s final sentence; there was no procedural error. View "United States v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

Fowler pleaded guilty in Indiana to unlawful possession of a firearm by a “serious violent felon” who was also a habitual offender. The judge sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment for the possession offense and 15 extra based on his criminal history. While his case was on appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana held (Mills) that a prior conviction used to establish “serious violent felon” status cannot also be used to establish habitual offender status. Fowler’s appellate lawyer did not raise Mills before the appellate court, which affirmed his sentence. On collateral review, the same court held that Fowler’s plea bargain waived reliance on the approach that Mills adopted. Fowler then sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied this petition, relying on the state judiciary’s conclusion that Fowler had waived the benefit of Mills. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Judge Magnus-Stinson, who denied Fowler’s federal collateral attack, had also sentenced Fowler during her time on the state’s bench; 28 U.S.C. 455(a) requires the case to be heard by a different federal judge. Section 2254 is designed to ensure that a fresh pair of eyes looks at the matter, from a different perspective. View "Robertson v. Butts" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2011 to aiding and abetting marriage fraud, 18 U.S.C.1546(a), and was sentenced to three years in prison. Marriage fraud is an aggravated felony if the defendant is sentenced to at least 12 months in prison, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(P); a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and ineligible for cancellation of removal, asylum, or naturalization. The defendant unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his plea, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not warned that pleading guilty would be virtually certain to result in his deportation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, noting that one of the defense attorneys, an immigration specialist, had explained a possible, but barely viable, defense to the deportation that would inevitably follow his conviction, so the defendant had “full knowledge of the great risk that he faced of deportation,” and “actively strategized with his attorneys.” The court noted that the defendant, currently a fugitive, avoided conviction for mortgage fraud by pleading guilty to marriage fraud. He would have been likely to receive a longer prison sentence if convicted after a trial. View "United States v. Chezan" on Justia Law

Officers followed Carter after observing his cocaine transaction. A high-speed chase ensued. Carter wove through traffic, ignoring stop signs, and drove 80 mph through residential streets and alleyways. He narrowly missed hitting a child on a bicycle and drove over a sidewalk. Carter eventually lost control of the car and slammed into a curb. He attempted to flee on foot. A struggle ensued; officers sustained minor injuries before subduing Carter. Carter pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The PSR credited the officer’s version of events and concluded that the punches and Carter’s unsheathing of a knife created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. The judge applied a six-level upward adjustment to his total offense level, based on a finding that he had assaulted officers while attempting to flee an arrest, U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Carter’s argument that the judge failed to make a specific finding that Carter's conduct during the struggle was serious enough to pose “a substantial risk of serious bodily injury” to the officers, as required by section 3A1.2(c)(1). The judge was permitted to adopt the PSR findings, including the finding that the blow to the head sustained by an officer created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 1998, Montana was convicted of aiding and abetting a bank robbery in which an accomplice used a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 2113 and 924(c), and was sentenced to a total of 322 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. He then filed unsuccessful postconviction petitions, including a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In 2014, Montana filed a new petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, challenging only his section 924(c) conviction for use of a firearm in a crime of violence. He contended that the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision (Rosemond) narrowed the scope of criminal liability for aiding and abetting section 924(c) offenses and that the court, therefore, had erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of the offense. The district court dismissed the petition on the merits at the screening stage under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting Montana’s prior section 2255 motion and the consequent statutory bar on successive petitions. Rosemond significantly changed the landscape for his offense of conviction and therefore applies retroactively, but Montana cannot avail himself of the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) because he could have brought his current argument at an earlier time. View "Montana v. Cross" on Justia Law

Dawkins was convicted of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment, as a career offender, based on Illinois convictions for aggravated vehicular hijacking and residential burglary. He was previously has been denied permission to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States. The Seventh Circuit concluded that residential burglary in Illinois is equivalent to generic burglary of a dwelling, which is an enumerated crime of violence, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). Dawkins again sought to challenge his sentence, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 holding in Mathis v. United States, that Iowa’s burglary statute, which forbids entering “an occupied structure” with the intent to commit a felony is broader than “generic burglary,” and categorically not a violent felony. The Seventh Circuit dismissed. Even if Mathis made reliance on an Illinois burglary conviction suspect for purposes of the career‐offender guideline or Armed Career Criminal Act, Dawkins has already been denied permission to file a successive section 2255 motion, so this claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1). An independent claim based on Mathis must be brought, if at all, under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the district where he is in custody. View "Dawkins v. United States" on Justia Law