Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officers followed Carter after observing his cocaine transaction. A high-speed chase ensued. Carter wove through traffic, ignoring stop signs, and drove 80 mph through residential streets and alleyways. He narrowly missed hitting a child on a bicycle and drove over a sidewalk. Carter eventually lost control of the car and slammed into a curb. He attempted to flee on foot. A struggle ensued; officers sustained minor injuries before subduing Carter. Carter pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The PSR credited the officer’s version of events and concluded that the punches and Carter’s unsheathing of a knife created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. The judge applied a six-level upward adjustment to his total offense level, based on a finding that he had assaulted officers while attempting to flee an arrest, U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Carter’s argument that the judge failed to make a specific finding that Carter's conduct during the struggle was serious enough to pose “a substantial risk of serious bodily injury” to the officers, as required by section 3A1.2(c)(1). The judge was permitted to adopt the PSR findings, including the finding that the blow to the head sustained by an officer created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 1998, Montana was convicted of aiding and abetting a bank robbery in which an accomplice used a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 2113 and 924(c), and was sentenced to a total of 322 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. He then filed unsuccessful postconviction petitions, including a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In 2014, Montana filed a new petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, challenging only his section 924(c) conviction for use of a firearm in a crime of violence. He contended that the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision (Rosemond) narrowed the scope of criminal liability for aiding and abetting section 924(c) offenses and that the court, therefore, had erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of the offense. The district court dismissed the petition on the merits at the screening stage under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting Montana’s prior section 2255 motion and the consequent statutory bar on successive petitions. Rosemond significantly changed the landscape for his offense of conviction and therefore applies retroactively, but Montana cannot avail himself of the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) because he could have brought his current argument at an earlier time. View "Montana v. Cross" on Justia Law

Dawkins was convicted of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment, as a career offender, based on Illinois convictions for aggravated vehicular hijacking and residential burglary. He was previously has been denied permission to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States. The Seventh Circuit concluded that residential burglary in Illinois is equivalent to generic burglary of a dwelling, which is an enumerated crime of violence, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). Dawkins again sought to challenge his sentence, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 holding in Mathis v. United States, that Iowa’s burglary statute, which forbids entering “an occupied structure” with the intent to commit a felony is broader than “generic burglary,” and categorically not a violent felony. The Seventh Circuit dismissed. Even if Mathis made reliance on an Illinois burglary conviction suspect for purposes of the career‐offender guideline or Armed Career Criminal Act, Dawkins has already been denied permission to file a successive section 2255 motion, so this claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1). An independent claim based on Mathis must be brought, if at all, under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the district where he is in custody. View "Dawkins v. United States" on Justia Law

Miller cut a hole into his basement bathroom wall, installed a clear shower curtain, then took photos and videos of girls, aged 12-16, undressing or showering. He specifically directed some of them to shower in the basement bathroom. One victim was half‐sister to Miller’s son. Miller’s older son discovered nude videos on Miller’s computer and confronted him. Miller stated that the female was Miller’s adult girlfriend. The computer disappeared; Miller continued to film girls in the bathroom. Eventually, Miller’s son found the hole in the drywall and contacted the police. Miller was convicted of 22 counts of sexual exploitation of children, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The court stated that there was “only one reasonable inference," that he intended to view the girls for sexual arousal. With a guidelines range of 324-405 months, Miller was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment, with 15 years of supervised release. Special conditions required that Miller allow probation to notify others of any relevant risk associated with his history, that he submit to physiological testing, and that he not have contact with any person under the age of 18 unless supervised, including his own children. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that there was insufficient evidence to find that the videos he created were “lascivious” and challenges to his sentence and conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

Gaylord pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to distribution of oxycodone. Evins had ingested the oxycodone pills distributed by Gaylord, as well as cocaine from another source, and died. Gaylord was sentenced to 240 months imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence when death results from the distribution of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). Gaylord later brought a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing that as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the “death results” enhancement of section 841(b)(1)(C) was inappropriately applied to his sentence. Gaylord contended that the oxycodone he distributed was not shown to be the but-for cause of Evins’s death, so counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the sentencing enhancement incorporated in the plea agreement. The district court dismissed Gaylord’s motion. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Gaylord’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to provide Gaylord’s counsel with an opportunity to explain whether he was aware of the “but-for” causation requirement and whether he examined the postmortem and forensic pathology reports and shared the results of his analysis with Gaylord. View "Gaylord v. United States" on Justia Law

Banks was charged based on four separate bank robbery incidents in 2007-2008, all involving the use of a gun. During the four years preceding his trial, Banks terminated his counsel five times. On the first day of trial, Banks’s counsel informed the court that Banks intended to proceed pro se. A colloquy ensued. Banks insisted that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. Counsel agreed to stay in a stand‐by capacity. Banks was informed of the potential penalties he would face if convicted. He confirmed that he intended to represent himself. The court concluded that Banks had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Banks declined to object to the government’s motions in limine, strike any jurors, present witnesses, cross‐examine the government’s witnesses, object to any prosecution questions, or comment on jury instructions. He repeatedly stated that he was “captive” and would not be “partaking in this proceeding,” asked to be excused from attending the trial, and rebuffed suggestions that standby counsel represent him. Banks attempted to make opening and closing statements, but failed to confine his remarks to evidence; the judge cut him off. After he was convicted, Banks escaped from a Chicago jail, rappelling 17 stories down an exterior wall during the night, using bedsheets. After he was apprehended, he consented to representation by counsel, and unsuccessfully moved for a new trial, arguing that he had not knowingly or voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The court sentenced him to 432 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Banks knowingly waived counsel and that the court adequately explained the sentence. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

Torres‐Chavez, a member of the drug‐trafficking cartel “La Familia,” which is based in Michoacán, Mexico, was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment after his convictions for conspiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, and using a cellular phone to facilitate the distribution conspiracy, After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Torres‐Chavez sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that six months before trial, the government offered a plea agreement that provided for 10 years’ imprisonment (the statutory minimum for conspiring to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II)) and that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for advising him that the government lacked enough evidence to convict him. The district court denied Torres‐Chavez’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding that this advice was not objectively unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit reversed the ruling as premature. The record contains no evidence about what Torres‐Chavez’s counsel knew about the government’s case against his client at the time of the offer, and the government’s case at trial was quite strong. View "Torres-Chavez v. United States" on Justia Law

A woman reported that Viren had raped her, that he possessed child pornography, that he possessed nude photographs of her, and that he was using the photographs as blackmail. Rock Island Police executed a search warrant. Viren admitted downloading child pornography. Forensic examinations of Viren’s digital devices revealed 876 images and 130 videos, including 334 images of infants and prepubescent females with their genitals exposed. There were sexually explicit photographs of Viren’s daughter (age three months) and of Viren’s fiancee’s nieces (two and three years old). Several images were of young children in bondage; two entailed bestiality. After being given Miranda warnings, Viren admitted that he took the photographs of his daughter and his fiancee’s nieces; that he rubbed, kissed, and licked their genitals; and that he used the photographs for sexual gratification. He pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251, and one count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A, in exchange for an agreement that Viren’s sentence would not exceed 30 years. Viren told the court that he understood that it was not bound by the agreed-upon sentence. After reviewing the PSR, the court rejected the agreement and allowed Viren to withdraw his plea. Later, Viren entered an “open” guilty plea with no negotiated sentence. The court advised Viren of the possible penalties and ultimately sentenced him to 600 months (the statutory maximum). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the judge adequately explained his rejection of the first agreement. View "United States v. Viren" on Justia Law

Morris filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3), seeking authorization to file a successive motion to vacate under section 2255. Morris was sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and wanted to challenge his sentence under the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding, in Johnson v. United States, that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court made Johnson retroactive. The Seventh Circuit granted the petition. Morris made a prima facie showing that he may be entitled to relief. Morris proposes to challenge only one of his three predicate offenses: his conviction for attempted robbery in Illinois, 720 ILCS 5/8‐4(a), 18‐1(a). To determine whether an attempt offense constitutes a violent felony, a court must examine how state courts have applied the general attempt statute to the particular crime attempted. View "Morris v. United States" on Justia Law

Woods and other gang members robbed two convenience stores. People were shot during the robberies, but did not die. At the time the government charged Woods he was 20, but at the time of the crime he was 15; under the Juvenile Delinquency and Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 5031, Woods was considered a juvenile. The government successfully moved to transfer Woods’s case for adult prosecution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To charge Woods under the Juvenile Act, the Attorney General was required to certify that the case should be transferred for adult prosecution because it met certain factors, which were not at issue here, and that “there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.” The government must also submit the juvenile’s court records as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a transfer proceeding. The district court must then consider: the juvenile’s age and social background; the nature of the offense; any prior delinquency record; the present intellectual development and psychological maturity; past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response; the availability of programs to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems. In this case, the court thoroughly considered those factors. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law