Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Todd sold 22.1 grams of cocaine to an undercover police officer. In 2010, he pled guilty and, having a criminal record that included five prison sentences totaling 22 years, was sentenced to 25 years in prison. He unsuccessfully appealed, claiming ineffective assistance because his lawyer told him the government would recommend no more than a 10‐year sentence. Four years later he unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus in federal court on the same ground. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, noting the evidence in support of state court findings that Todd had not been confused about the terms of the plea agreement and that defense counsel was not ineffective. Even if Todd believed in the claimed 10‐year cap, he either lied or was confused in replying “no” when asked by the judge whether any promises had been made to him other than that his bond would be reduced and the other charge against him dropped. If he was confused and still believed there was a sentencing cap, the trial judge disabused him of his mistake by telling him he could be sentenced to anywhere from six to 60 years even if he pleaded guilty. View "Todd v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Officer McVicker pulled over a vehicle with Colorado license plates, traveling in Madison County, Illinois. The vehicle contained Smoot, the driver, and Walton, a passenger and had been traveling 68 mph in a 65 mph zone. It was following too closely; it appeared that Walton was not wearing his seatbelt, a violation of Illinois law. McVicker informed them that he intended only to issue a written warning. Walton stated that they had been stopped in Kansas the previous evening and had received a warning for an improper signal. Walton gave the written warning to McVicker. The warning noted that Walton was driving with a suspended license. Walton said that the police had searched their vehicle, which was a rental car. He produced the rental agreement, which showed that the Suburban had been rented at the Denver International Airport and that Smoot was not an authorized driver; neither could legally drive the Suburban. McVicker stated that he could have the vehicle towed, but would not do so. McVicker noted that Smoot appeared “extremely nervous.” After 22 minutes of conversation, McVicker learned, from dispatch, that Walton’s extensive criminal history included a drug trafficking offense. The two denied permission to search the vehicle. Approximately 33 minutes after the stop, McVicker requested a canine unit, which arrived 22 minutes later. The dog alerted that drugs were present. McVicker searched the interior; seven minutes into the search, McVicker located cocaine concealed in a void within the rear quarter panel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. McVicker was justified in detaining the two beyond the time necessary to complete the written warning in order to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion and acted with reasonable diligence in requesting a canine unit. View "United States v. Walton" on Justia Law

Around 4:30 a.m. on January 14, 2012, the Chicago Fire Department responded to a fire at a two‐story building. The first floor was vacant commercial space and the second floor was split into two apartments.One apartment was leased by Ortiz; the other by Maca. Seeing smoke coming from the second floor, the crew entered and discovered a fire in Ortiz’s apartment. No one was present in the apartment. The crew extinguished the fire and searched the other apartment, where they found Maca dead from smoke inhalation. Adame, Ortiz’s ex‐boyfriend, was convicted of maliciously causing damage by fire to a building used in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 844(i). Ortiz provided significant testimony tying Adame to the crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the “overwhelming” evidence of Adame’s guilt. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the admission of expert testimony regarding historical cell site analysis; an incriminating statement Adame made during interrogation that he “didn’t mean to hurt Jimmy”; and a cell phone video of Adame remarking that Ortiz’s skin looked like it was “on fire” that went back to the jury room during deliberations. View "United States v. Adame" on Justia Law

Officer Johnson spotted defendant driving on an interstate highway in Bloomington, Illinois. Defendant was not speeding, swerving, or committing any moving violation, but had an Indiana temporary vehicle registration tag “that was unlike any Indiana registration tag” Johnson had seen before. In Johnson’s experience temporary Indiana tags were normally “in the back of a window, not a piece of paper where the license plate normally goes.” When his own check and then a dispatcher’s separate check of the database found no record of the registration, Johnson made a traffic stop to investigate whether the tag might be a forgery. When Johnson asked defendant for his license, he admitted that he was driving on a suspended license. Johnson arrested him. During an inventory search, police discovered two guns that led to defendant’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. The officer based the stop on the fact that the number on the car’s temporary registration tag did not appear in the law enforcement database. That discrepancy gave the officer a reasonable suspicion that the car was either stolen or not properly registered. The court remanded for reconsideration of certain conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo" on Justia Law

Mbaye and three co‐defendants ran a mortgage‐fraud scheme that involved “straw buyers” who purchased homes at inflated prices using borrowed funds and then defaulted. Their “take” was about $600,000. Mbaye admitted to all of his conduct and that the scheme was fraudulent, but argued that his co‐defendants duped him into helping them without knowing they were committing fraud. The jury convicted him. At sentencing, the judge found that Mbaye had obstructed justice by lying about material facts. The enhancement increased Mbaye’s offense level so that the Guidelines recommended a sentence of 70 to 87 months. The judge imposed a sentence of 35 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the underlying findings were adequately explained and were supported by the evidence. View "United States v. Mbaye" on Justia Law

Secret Service agents observed Graf twice sell counterfeit U.S. currency to an informant. Under a plea agreement, Graf pled guilty to one charge of dealing in counterfeit currency, 18 U.S.C. 473. The court accepted Graf’s plea following a thorough colloquy. Graf later failed to appear for a bond revocation hearing and avoided law enforcement for several months. After his re‐arrest, Graf’s newly‐assigned lawyer told him about the possibility of moving to compel the government to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. Graf moved to withdraw his guilty plea so he could file such a motion. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Graf to 63 months in prison, at the high end of the Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Graf had not shown a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his plea within the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B). Graf had “not offered any reasons, much less any just reasons, why the disclosure of the confidential informant would have substantially altered the course of his case or the factual scenario to which Graf admitted his guilt.” View "United States v. Graf" on Justia Law

Sainz pled guilty to possessing child pornography, including six images of “Cindy.” Unlawful images of Cindy have circulated widely on the internet. The government argued that Sainz should pay restitution to Cindy, 18 U.S.C. 2259(b)(4), who has incurred financial losses such as future lost earnings, attorney fees, and medical and psychiatric expenses. Sainz argued that he did not cause her losses. He possessed images, but had no role in creating or distributing them, and that she would have been harmed by others even if he had never possessed the images. The court rejected this argument, based on Cindy’s statement that his viewing the images re-victimized her and made her feel that the abuse was continuing. The court’s approach to causation was confirmed by the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Paroline v. United States (2014). The Court stated: “While it is not possible to identify a discrete, readily definable incremental loss [the defendant] caused, it is indisputable that he was a part of the overall phenomenon that caused her general losses.” Sainz did not appeal the causation ruling, but only the amount he was ordered to pay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the calculation of $8,387.43: 1/136 of Cindy’s total loss for the time period. Sainz was the 136th offender who was prosecuted and ordered to pay Cindy restitution. The court remanded with respect to some conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Sainz" on Justia Law

Stanley was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to distributing crack cocaine. The court found that he was a career offender. Stanley did not appeal his sentence or file a collateral attack within the year allowed by 28 U.S.C. 2255(f). After the Supreme Court held, in Johnson v. United States (2015), that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was invalid, Stanley filed a motion under 2255(f)(3), which allows a fresh year from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” The district judge denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that the Johnson decision applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, it does not apply to Stanley. His drug conviction counts under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b); his conviction for aggravated battery of a peace officer also is outside the scope of Johnson and was counted under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). His conviction for illegal possession of a firearm never qualified as a violent felony and should not have been counted, but the classification is unaffected by Johnson; section 2255(f)(3) does not grant Stanley a fresh window to file a collateral attack. View "Stanley v. United States" on Justia Law

Stoller, the beneficiary of a trust that holds title to a house, assigned his beneficial interest to his daughter but reserved a “power of direction” with the right to obtain loans for himself, secured by the property. He directed the trust to rent out the property; he received the income. IStoller filed for bankruptcy. None of his filings mentioned the property. A question specifically asked about “all property owned by another person that [he] [held] or control[led].” Under penalty of perjury, he answered “none.” Stoller was charged with two counts of knowingly and fraudulently concealing property that belonged to a bankruptcy estate, 18 U.S.C. 152(1), and seven counts of knowingly and fraudulently making a false statement in a bankruptcy proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). Represented by an appointed lawyer, he pled guilty to one count of making a false statement; the government dismissed the remaining counts. Before sentencing, Stoller considered moving to withdraw his plea on the ground that he was not mentally competent. A new lawyer was appointed. Stoller was examined by a board‐certified neuropsychologist, who concluded that Stoller was competent to plead guilty. Stoller’s lawyer then unsuccessfully moved to withdraw the plea based on alleged defects in the plea colloquy. Stoller was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Stoller was competent to plead guilty, his plea was not coerced, the colloquy included most of the basics, and Stoller was not prejudiced by any deficiency. View "United States v. Stoller" on Justia Law

In 2003, Hill was convicted of several drug offenses, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), 846. Hill was a career offender based on Illinois convictions for attempted murder (shooting at a car and wounding two occupants) and for aggravated discharge of a firearm (toward a person, not a car), both “crimes of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. His 360-month sentence was within his guidelines range of 360 months to life. His sentence was reduced to 226 months when the Sentencing Guidelines were held not to be mandatory in 2005. In 2016 he sought permission to file a successive motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), based the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which held unconstitutionally vague the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, (mirrored in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)), which deemed any crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” a “crime of violence.” The Seventh Circuit denied the motion, stating that the judge who sentenced Hill and the appellate panel "know with certainty that Hill committed two crimes of violence and that his sentence—amplified by those crimes—for the federal drug offenses of which he was convicted was light, considering the circumstances.” View "Hill v. United States" on Justia Law