Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Imani and Raziga were charged with bank robbery. While fleeing, Imani forced a driver to give him a ride. Police recovered Imani’s fingerprints from the car. The driver identified Imani, in a photo array and later during a preliminary hearing. Raziga pled guilty and testified against Imani. Imani’s lawyer unsuccessfully moved to suppress the driver’s identification as tainted by television coverage. Imani then sought to represent himself, stating that he questioned his lawyer’s abilities. The judge discounted Imani’s statements that he had been “working on this for 13 months;” that he read at a college level; and that he had appeared in court for at least five previous criminal matters, while represented by lawyers. The judge treated the request as requiring permission and as an “immature decision.” Although Imani said that he had no problem with the trial date, the judge denied permission, stating that, upon a further request, he would reconsider. There was no further request. Imani, represented by counsel, was convicted. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's new trial order and affirmed Imani’s conviction, stating that although the court did not conduct a full colloquy, its determination that Imani was not competent to proceed pro se was supported by the record. The district court stated that the competency finding appeared to violate the right to self‐representation, but denied Imani’s habeas petition, based on the finding that Imani’s invocation of that right was not knowing and voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing Supreme Court precedent, Faretta v. California (1975). A judge may not deny a competent defendant’s timely invocation of his right to represent himself. View "Imani v. Pollard" on Justia Law

After Evans broke the jaw of a customer for a heroin debt, that customer told his probation officer that Evans sold heroin in Beloit, Wisconsin, often from the apartment of his coconspirator. After four controlled buys, Evans was arrested and pleaded guilty to distributing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). After his arrest, Evan put pressure on the informant to change his story. Evans acknowledged that the drug quantity was between 100 and 400 grams of heroin and was sentenced, below the guidelines range, to 144 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a two-level upward adjustment that applies if a drug offender “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12), and to denial of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Responding to a 2011 call reporting “shots fired,” officers found Bloch, a convicted felon, intoxicated, and discovered a loaded Glock semi-automatic handgun, an assault rifle, and ammunition. He was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and unlawful possession of a firearm after conviction for a domestic-violence misdemeanor, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The court imposed a sentence of 138 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit held Bloch’s two 922(g) convictions had to be merged. On remand, the district court sentenced Bloch to 120 months’ imprisonment. On second remand, for resentencing, the district court filed in the electronic “Notice of Proposed Conditions of Supervision” to give advance notice of proposed supervised release conditions, providing an explanation for why it was imposing each condition. Bloch acknowledged he had reviewed that notice and objected only to a home-visit condition. The court reworded the condition. With a guideline range of 84-105 months, the court considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and pronounced a sentence of 105 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court not only adequately explained its justification for imposing supervised release, it adopted a “best practice” for providing adequate notice to defendants of proposed conditions of supervised release and their justifications. View "United States v. Bloch" on Justia Law

The Bickarts prepared and filed an income tax return containing false income and withholding amounts, supported by fabricated 1099‐OID forms, appearing to come from major financial institutions. The IRS paid a claimed refund of $115,412. Their legitimate refund would have been $263. The IRS discovered the fraud and sent a bill for $217,923. For years, the Bickarts engaged in obstructive conduct, sending a 1040‐V payment coupon and continuing to insist that the bill had been paid. They made baseless accusations against IRS agents. They were convicted of conspiring to file and filing a false claim to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. 286 and 287. The Bickarts represented themselves at trial, asserting “sovereign citizen” claims and making nonsensical accusations. The PSR applied a two‐level enhancement for sophisticated means based on the fictitious Forms 1099‐OID and a two‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice, resulting in a guidelines imprisonment range of 33-41 months. Neither objected to the calculations. The court sentenced each defendant to 24 months in prison. Defendants objected to supervised release conditions requiring them to notify third parties of risks related to their criminal history when directed by the probation office. The court modified it to require the probation office to seek court approval. They also objected to the condition permitting a probation officer to visit them at home or at work at any reasonable time. The court overruled the objection. The Seventh Circuit vacated the third‐party notification condition, but otherwise affirmed the remaining conditions of supervised release and sentence. View "United States v. Bickart" on Justia Law

Milwaukee officers, responding to a domestic violence call, spoke with the victim, who stated that Clinton sold cocaine and had a firearm that she had hidden under clothing. The officers searched, with her consent, and found a pistol under the clothing. Underneath the couch, they discovered 2.29 grams of cocaine base, a razor blade, baggies, and a digital scale. The following day, Clinton called an officer and admitted to possessing the gun. He was arrested and admitted that he owned the firearm and that he cooked and sold crack cocaine. Clinton pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The government dropped a charge of possession with intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and recommended a within-guidelines sentence. The Seventh Circuit vacated his 76-month sentence. Although it is possible that the “addict,” from whom Clinton admitted receiving the gun, conveyed the firearm in exchange for drugs, there was no evidence of that; speculation is insufficient to support a four‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The court noted that that severe health conditions may be a mitigating circumstance that should be considered and that the court’s comments about the impact of the drug trade could “derail” a sentencing hearing. View "United States v. Clinton" on Justia Law

Patterson was an armed-robbery suspect. Officer Strayer and FBI Agent Stewart approached Patterson in a driveway. Neither was in a uniform, but both were armed. They identified themselves as FBI, and asked Patterson to show his hands. Strayer kept his hand on his gun. Stewart explained that Patterson's name came up in an investigation and asked Patterson to go to their office to “clear his name.” Patterson agreed and cooperated by allowing a pat down. Patterson affirmatively indicated that he was going voluntarily and got into the front passenger seat. While they talked in a conference room, there was nothing between Patterson and the door. Stewart accused Patterson of the robbery, then stated Patterson was not going to be arrested that day. After initially denying involvement, Patterson confessed. Following the unrecorded two-hour interview, Patterson asked when he would be arrested. Stewart told Patterson that a warrant would likely be secured in a week or two. Patterson agreed to turn himself in. The agents dropped Patterson off at his requested location. Patterson moved to suppress the incriminating statements as made in violation of Miranda. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Patterson’s motion, agreeing that he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Nothing indicated that Patterson’s consent to accompany the agents and to speak with them was anything but voluntary. A reasonable person in Patterson’s position would have felt free to leave. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

In 2008, two men wearing ski masks staged an armed robbery of a Hoyleton, Illinois bank, taking $115,000 in cash. A teller testified, describing the gun carried by each robber and the getaway vehicle, a “bluish purple Ford.” After the robbers left, she called her husband, who placed himself along the getaway route and saw a blue Ford Ranger driving at high speed. He noted the license plate number. Area residents found the truck, which had been stolen from a dealership, in a field, with its doors open and the interior covered in pink dye. DNA evidence gathered from the truck matched Ridley. Johnson, the other robber, turned on Ridley and confessed in detail. Ridley was convicted of armed bank robbery, brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); making false statements to a federal officer, and obstruction of justice, and was sentenced to 246 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence of brandishing; admission of an FBI agent’s lay testimony regarding cell phone tracking; and supplemental instruction to jurors when they said they were at an impasse. A statement that “The Court requests that the jury continue in their deliberations in an effort to reach a unanimous verdict,” to which neither side objected, was not prejudicial. View "United States v. Ridley" on Justia Law

Marcotte was charged with four counts of making a false claim for federal tax refunds, 18 U.S.C. 287 and falsely pretending to be an officer of the United States to demand a thing of value, 18 U.S.C. 912. The court, on the government’s motion, dismissed Count 5. The tax fraud case went to trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court set the sentencing hearing and allowed Marcotte to be released on home confinement with electronic monitoring pending sentencing. When Marcotte failed to appear his sentencing hearing, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Marcotte was indicted for failure to appear for sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1). The U.S. Marshals Service arrested Marcotte a few months later. Marcotte pled guilty to failure to appear. Based on the PSR’s calculations, the district court accepted an advisory guideline sentence range of 70-87 months and imposed a 78-month sentence, consisting of concurrent 50-month sentences for the tax fraud counts and a consecutive 28-month sentence for failure to appear. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, following other circuits in upholding imposition the 3-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3C1.3 (obstruction of justice) to enhance a sentence for the crime of failing to appear. View "United States v. Marcotte" on Justia Law

The brothers robbed five Madison businesses at gunpoint. Four times, Jack entered alone while William waited in the getaway car; once they reversed roles. During each robbery, one man demanded money while displaying a nonfunctional, unloaded handgun. They took a total of $1,643. After each robbery, except the last one, when police caught them, they immediately used the money to purchase heroin. Each pled guilty to five counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and one count of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, section 942(c)(1). A probation officer calculated a 63-78 month range for the robberies, plus a consecutive, statutory minimum term of seven years for the firearm count. The court sentenced Jack to 30 and William to 24 months for the robberies, noting that, although they “caused numerous victims to fear for their lives,” the crimes were driven by addiction, were “out of character,” and they quickly accepted responsibility and expressed remorse. The court made several statements that indicated consideration of the additional 924(c)(1) sentence in deciding on prison terms for the robberies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences, noting that under its precedent, the district court should have determined the sentence for the underlying crime “entirely independently of the section 924(c)(1) add‐on.” View "United States v. Chukwuemeka Ikegwuonu" on Justia Law

Bell was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and of using a communications facility to commit a felony, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 843(b), 846. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Bell’s 300-month sentence following a limited remand for reconsideration in light of the 2007 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. On remand, the district court explained that the below-Guidelines sentence was imposed after the amendment and noted Bell’s extensive criminal history. Bell then brought a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his attorney had abandoned him on appeal by not replying to that response by the district court to the limited remand. Granting collateral relief, the district court authorized Bell to submit the reply his attorney had not filed to the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court concluded that the submission offered no reason to revise his sentence and affirmed. The court noted that, after granting his section 2255 motion, the district court did not enter a new judgment, and construed Bell’s new notice of appeal as a motion to recall the original mandate, declining to consider additional arguments. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law