Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officer Johnson spotted defendant driving on an interstate highway in Bloomington, Illinois. Defendant was not speeding, swerving, or committing any moving violation, but had an Indiana temporary vehicle registration tag “that was unlike any Indiana registration tag” Johnson had seen before. In Johnson’s experience temporary Indiana tags were normally “in the back of a window, not a piece of paper where the license plate normally goes.” When his own check and then a dispatcher’s separate check of the database found no record of the registration, Johnson made a traffic stop to investigate whether the tag might be a forgery. When Johnson asked defendant for his license, he admitted that he was driving on a suspended license. Johnson arrested him. During an inventory search, police discovered two guns that led to defendant’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. The officer based the stop on the fact that the number on the car’s temporary registration tag did not appear in the law enforcement database. That discrepancy gave the officer a reasonable suspicion that the car was either stolen or not properly registered. The court remanded for reconsideration of certain conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo" on Justia Law

Mbaye and three co‐defendants ran a mortgage‐fraud scheme that involved “straw buyers” who purchased homes at inflated prices using borrowed funds and then defaulted. Their “take” was about $600,000. Mbaye admitted to all of his conduct and that the scheme was fraudulent, but argued that his co‐defendants duped him into helping them without knowing they were committing fraud. The jury convicted him. At sentencing, the judge found that Mbaye had obstructed justice by lying about material facts. The enhancement increased Mbaye’s offense level so that the Guidelines recommended a sentence of 70 to 87 months. The judge imposed a sentence of 35 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the underlying findings were adequately explained and were supported by the evidence. View "United States v. Mbaye" on Justia Law

Secret Service agents observed Graf twice sell counterfeit U.S. currency to an informant. Under a plea agreement, Graf pled guilty to one charge of dealing in counterfeit currency, 18 U.S.C. 473. The court accepted Graf’s plea following a thorough colloquy. Graf later failed to appear for a bond revocation hearing and avoided law enforcement for several months. After his re‐arrest, Graf’s newly‐assigned lawyer told him about the possibility of moving to compel the government to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. Graf moved to withdraw his guilty plea so he could file such a motion. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Graf to 63 months in prison, at the high end of the Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Graf had not shown a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his plea within the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B). Graf had “not offered any reasons, much less any just reasons, why the disclosure of the confidential informant would have substantially altered the course of his case or the factual scenario to which Graf admitted his guilt.” View "United States v. Graf" on Justia Law

Sainz pled guilty to possessing child pornography, including six images of “Cindy.” Unlawful images of Cindy have circulated widely on the internet. The government argued that Sainz should pay restitution to Cindy, 18 U.S.C. 2259(b)(4), who has incurred financial losses such as future lost earnings, attorney fees, and medical and psychiatric expenses. Sainz argued that he did not cause her losses. He possessed images, but had no role in creating or distributing them, and that she would have been harmed by others even if he had never possessed the images. The court rejected this argument, based on Cindy’s statement that his viewing the images re-victimized her and made her feel that the abuse was continuing. The court’s approach to causation was confirmed by the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Paroline v. United States (2014). The Court stated: “While it is not possible to identify a discrete, readily definable incremental loss [the defendant] caused, it is indisputable that he was a part of the overall phenomenon that caused her general losses.” Sainz did not appeal the causation ruling, but only the amount he was ordered to pay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the calculation of $8,387.43: 1/136 of Cindy’s total loss for the time period. Sainz was the 136th offender who was prosecuted and ordered to pay Cindy restitution. The court remanded with respect to some conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Sainz" on Justia Law

Stanley was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to distributing crack cocaine. The court found that he was a career offender. Stanley did not appeal his sentence or file a collateral attack within the year allowed by 28 U.S.C. 2255(f). After the Supreme Court held, in Johnson v. United States (2015), that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was invalid, Stanley filed a motion under 2255(f)(3), which allows a fresh year from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” The district judge denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that the Johnson decision applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, it does not apply to Stanley. His drug conviction counts under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b); his conviction for aggravated battery of a peace officer also is outside the scope of Johnson and was counted under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). His conviction for illegal possession of a firearm never qualified as a violent felony and should not have been counted, but the classification is unaffected by Johnson; section 2255(f)(3) does not grant Stanley a fresh window to file a collateral attack. View "Stanley v. United States" on Justia Law

Stoller, the beneficiary of a trust that holds title to a house, assigned his beneficial interest to his daughter but reserved a “power of direction” with the right to obtain loans for himself, secured by the property. He directed the trust to rent out the property; he received the income. IStoller filed for bankruptcy. None of his filings mentioned the property. A question specifically asked about “all property owned by another person that [he] [held] or control[led].” Under penalty of perjury, he answered “none.” Stoller was charged with two counts of knowingly and fraudulently concealing property that belonged to a bankruptcy estate, 18 U.S.C. 152(1), and seven counts of knowingly and fraudulently making a false statement in a bankruptcy proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). Represented by an appointed lawyer, he pled guilty to one count of making a false statement; the government dismissed the remaining counts. Before sentencing, Stoller considered moving to withdraw his plea on the ground that he was not mentally competent. A new lawyer was appointed. Stoller was examined by a board‐certified neuropsychologist, who concluded that Stoller was competent to plead guilty. Stoller’s lawyer then unsuccessfully moved to withdraw the plea based on alleged defects in the plea colloquy. Stoller was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Stoller was competent to plead guilty, his plea was not coerced, the colloquy included most of the basics, and Stoller was not prejudiced by any deficiency. View "United States v. Stoller" on Justia Law

In 2003, Hill was convicted of several drug offenses, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), 846. Hill was a career offender based on Illinois convictions for attempted murder (shooting at a car and wounding two occupants) and for aggravated discharge of a firearm (toward a person, not a car), both “crimes of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. His 360-month sentence was within his guidelines range of 360 months to life. His sentence was reduced to 226 months when the Sentencing Guidelines were held not to be mandatory in 2005. In 2016 he sought permission to file a successive motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), based the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which held unconstitutionally vague the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, (mirrored in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)), which deemed any crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” a “crime of violence.” The Seventh Circuit denied the motion, stating that the judge who sentenced Hill and the appellate panel "know with certainty that Hill committed two crimes of violence and that his sentence—amplified by those crimes—for the federal drug offenses of which he was convicted was light, considering the circumstances.” View "Hill v. United States" on Justia Law

Imani and Raziga were charged with bank robbery. While fleeing, Imani forced a driver to give him a ride. Police recovered Imani’s fingerprints from the car. The driver identified Imani, in a photo array and later during a preliminary hearing. Raziga pled guilty and testified against Imani. Imani’s lawyer unsuccessfully moved to suppress the driver’s identification as tainted by television coverage. Imani then sought to represent himself, stating that he questioned his lawyer’s abilities. The judge discounted Imani’s statements that he had been “working on this for 13 months;” that he read at a college level; and that he had appeared in court for at least five previous criminal matters, while represented by lawyers. The judge treated the request as requiring permission and as an “immature decision.” Although Imani said that he had no problem with the trial date, the judge denied permission, stating that, upon a further request, he would reconsider. There was no further request. Imani, represented by counsel, was convicted. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's new trial order and affirmed Imani’s conviction, stating that although the court did not conduct a full colloquy, its determination that Imani was not competent to proceed pro se was supported by the record. The district court stated that the competency finding appeared to violate the right to self‐representation, but denied Imani’s habeas petition, based on the finding that Imani’s invocation of that right was not knowing and voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing Supreme Court precedent, Faretta v. California (1975). A judge may not deny a competent defendant’s timely invocation of his right to represent himself. View "Imani v. Pollard" on Justia Law

After Evans broke the jaw of a customer for a heroin debt, that customer told his probation officer that Evans sold heroin in Beloit, Wisconsin, often from the apartment of his coconspirator. After four controlled buys, Evans was arrested and pleaded guilty to distributing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). After his arrest, Evan put pressure on the informant to change his story. Evans acknowledged that the drug quantity was between 100 and 400 grams of heroin and was sentenced, below the guidelines range, to 144 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a two-level upward adjustment that applies if a drug offender “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12), and to denial of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Responding to a 2011 call reporting “shots fired,” officers found Bloch, a convicted felon, intoxicated, and discovered a loaded Glock semi-automatic handgun, an assault rifle, and ammunition. He was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and unlawful possession of a firearm after conviction for a domestic-violence misdemeanor, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The court imposed a sentence of 138 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit held Bloch’s two 922(g) convictions had to be merged. On remand, the district court sentenced Bloch to 120 months’ imprisonment. On second remand, for resentencing, the district court filed in the electronic “Notice of Proposed Conditions of Supervision” to give advance notice of proposed supervised release conditions, providing an explanation for why it was imposing each condition. Bloch acknowledged he had reviewed that notice and objected only to a home-visit condition. The court reworded the condition. With a guideline range of 84-105 months, the court considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and pronounced a sentence of 105 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court not only adequately explained its justification for imposing supervised release, it adopted a “best practice” for providing adequate notice to defendants of proposed conditions of supervised release and their justifications. View "United States v. Bloch" on Justia Law