Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Bickarts prepared and filed an income tax return containing false income and withholding amounts, supported by fabricated 1099‐OID forms, appearing to come from major financial institutions. The IRS paid a claimed refund of $115,412. Their legitimate refund would have been $263. The IRS discovered the fraud and sent a bill for $217,923. For years, the Bickarts engaged in obstructive conduct, sending a 1040‐V payment coupon and continuing to insist that the bill had been paid. They made baseless accusations against IRS agents. They were convicted of conspiring to file and filing a false claim to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. 286 and 287. The Bickarts represented themselves at trial, asserting “sovereign citizen” claims and making nonsensical accusations. The PSR applied a two‐level enhancement for sophisticated means based on the fictitious Forms 1099‐OID and a two‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice, resulting in a guidelines imprisonment range of 33-41 months. Neither objected to the calculations. The court sentenced each defendant to 24 months in prison. Defendants objected to supervised release conditions requiring them to notify third parties of risks related to their criminal history when directed by the probation office. The court modified it to require the probation office to seek court approval. They also objected to the condition permitting a probation officer to visit them at home or at work at any reasonable time. The court overruled the objection. The Seventh Circuit vacated the third‐party notification condition, but otherwise affirmed the remaining conditions of supervised release and sentence. View "United States v. Bickart" on Justia Law

Milwaukee officers, responding to a domestic violence call, spoke with the victim, who stated that Clinton sold cocaine and had a firearm that she had hidden under clothing. The officers searched, with her consent, and found a pistol under the clothing. Underneath the couch, they discovered 2.29 grams of cocaine base, a razor blade, baggies, and a digital scale. The following day, Clinton called an officer and admitted to possessing the gun. He was arrested and admitted that he owned the firearm and that he cooked and sold crack cocaine. Clinton pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The government dropped a charge of possession with intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and recommended a within-guidelines sentence. The Seventh Circuit vacated his 76-month sentence. Although it is possible that the “addict,” from whom Clinton admitted receiving the gun, conveyed the firearm in exchange for drugs, there was no evidence of that; speculation is insufficient to support a four‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The court noted that that severe health conditions may be a mitigating circumstance that should be considered and that the court’s comments about the impact of the drug trade could “derail” a sentencing hearing. View "United States v. Clinton" on Justia Law

Patterson was an armed-robbery suspect. Officer Strayer and FBI Agent Stewart approached Patterson in a driveway. Neither was in a uniform, but both were armed. They identified themselves as FBI, and asked Patterson to show his hands. Strayer kept his hand on his gun. Stewart explained that Patterson's name came up in an investigation and asked Patterson to go to their office to “clear his name.” Patterson agreed and cooperated by allowing a pat down. Patterson affirmatively indicated that he was going voluntarily and got into the front passenger seat. While they talked in a conference room, there was nothing between Patterson and the door. Stewart accused Patterson of the robbery, then stated Patterson was not going to be arrested that day. After initially denying involvement, Patterson confessed. Following the unrecorded two-hour interview, Patterson asked when he would be arrested. Stewart told Patterson that a warrant would likely be secured in a week or two. Patterson agreed to turn himself in. The agents dropped Patterson off at his requested location. Patterson moved to suppress the incriminating statements as made in violation of Miranda. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Patterson’s motion, agreeing that he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Nothing indicated that Patterson’s consent to accompany the agents and to speak with them was anything but voluntary. A reasonable person in Patterson’s position would have felt free to leave. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

In 2008, two men wearing ski masks staged an armed robbery of a Hoyleton, Illinois bank, taking $115,000 in cash. A teller testified, describing the gun carried by each robber and the getaway vehicle, a “bluish purple Ford.” After the robbers left, she called her husband, who placed himself along the getaway route and saw a blue Ford Ranger driving at high speed. He noted the license plate number. Area residents found the truck, which had been stolen from a dealership, in a field, with its doors open and the interior covered in pink dye. DNA evidence gathered from the truck matched Ridley. Johnson, the other robber, turned on Ridley and confessed in detail. Ridley was convicted of armed bank robbery, brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); making false statements to a federal officer, and obstruction of justice, and was sentenced to 246 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence of brandishing; admission of an FBI agent’s lay testimony regarding cell phone tracking; and supplemental instruction to jurors when they said they were at an impasse. A statement that “The Court requests that the jury continue in their deliberations in an effort to reach a unanimous verdict,” to which neither side objected, was not prejudicial. View "United States v. Ridley" on Justia Law

Marcotte was charged with four counts of making a false claim for federal tax refunds, 18 U.S.C. 287 and falsely pretending to be an officer of the United States to demand a thing of value, 18 U.S.C. 912. The court, on the government’s motion, dismissed Count 5. The tax fraud case went to trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court set the sentencing hearing and allowed Marcotte to be released on home confinement with electronic monitoring pending sentencing. When Marcotte failed to appear his sentencing hearing, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Marcotte was indicted for failure to appear for sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1). The U.S. Marshals Service arrested Marcotte a few months later. Marcotte pled guilty to failure to appear. Based on the PSR’s calculations, the district court accepted an advisory guideline sentence range of 70-87 months and imposed a 78-month sentence, consisting of concurrent 50-month sentences for the tax fraud counts and a consecutive 28-month sentence for failure to appear. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, following other circuits in upholding imposition the 3-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3C1.3 (obstruction of justice) to enhance a sentence for the crime of failing to appear. View "United States v. Marcotte" on Justia Law

The brothers robbed five Madison businesses at gunpoint. Four times, Jack entered alone while William waited in the getaway car; once they reversed roles. During each robbery, one man demanded money while displaying a nonfunctional, unloaded handgun. They took a total of $1,643. After each robbery, except the last one, when police caught them, they immediately used the money to purchase heroin. Each pled guilty to five counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and one count of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, section 942(c)(1). A probation officer calculated a 63-78 month range for the robberies, plus a consecutive, statutory minimum term of seven years for the firearm count. The court sentenced Jack to 30 and William to 24 months for the robberies, noting that, although they “caused numerous victims to fear for their lives,” the crimes were driven by addiction, were “out of character,” and they quickly accepted responsibility and expressed remorse. The court made several statements that indicated consideration of the additional 924(c)(1) sentence in deciding on prison terms for the robberies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences, noting that under its precedent, the district court should have determined the sentence for the underlying crime “entirely independently of the section 924(c)(1) add‐on.” View "United States v. Chukwuemeka Ikegwuonu" on Justia Law

Bell was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and of using a communications facility to commit a felony, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 843(b), 846. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Bell’s 300-month sentence following a limited remand for reconsideration in light of the 2007 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. On remand, the district court explained that the below-Guidelines sentence was imposed after the amendment and noted Bell’s extensive criminal history. Bell then brought a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his attorney had abandoned him on appeal by not replying to that response by the district court to the limited remand. Granting collateral relief, the district court authorized Bell to submit the reply his attorney had not filed to the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court concluded that the submission offered no reason to revise his sentence and affirmed. The court noted that, after granting his section 2255 motion, the district court did not enter a new judgment, and construed Bell’s new notice of appeal as a motion to recall the original mandate, declining to consider additional arguments. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Saunders and Bounds sold heroin on the west side of Chicago. Their co-conspirators testified against them, and they were convicted of conspiring to distribute at least 100 grams but less than one kilogram of heroin. At sentencing, the court held them responsible for between three and ten kilograms of heroin and sentenced each man to 216 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the government’s disclosure of the basis of its expert’s fingerprint testimony failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of the defendants’ guilt. The court upheld admission a stipulation regarding a traffic stop of two alleged co-conspirators who drove away from police while tossing packets that resembled heroin from their car. The stipulation was relevant to the drug conspiracy case and its prejudicial effect did not outweigh its probative value. The special verdict form, properly interpreted, did not contain a jury finding that less than one kilogram was involved; the district court did not err in finding that more than one kilogram was involved. The court properly identified and articulated a reliable basis for its calculation of the drug quantity, justifying the sentencing decisions. View "United States v. Saunders" on Justia Law

The Indiana State Police received a tip that Fogle’s close friend and employee, Taylor, had sent text messages expressing a sexual interest in children. A warranted search of Taylor’s home and electronic devices revealed that, in 2011-2015, Taylor had produced child pornography using secret cameras in his residence. The investigation led law enforcement to Fogle. Taylor worked for Fogle’s charitable foundation and the two traveled together frequently. Authorities discovered multiple connections, then executed a warrant to search Fogle’s home and devices. Fogle had received images and videos from Taylor’s homemade collection and Taylor’s collection of commercial child pornography. Some of the victims were as young as six years old. Fogle had also engaged in commercial sex acts with two minors, ages 16 and 17. Text messages revealed that Fogle had repeatedly found adult escorts online and offered them finder’s fees to provide him with access to minors for commercial sex. Fogle pled guilty to distributing and receiving and conspiring to distribute and receive, child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, section 2423(b) and (e). The government agreed not to recommend a sentence greater than 151 months in prison. Fogle’s advisory guidelines range was 135 to 168 months. The court​ sentenced Fogle to 188 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the lack of mitigating factors and Fogle’s celebrity status. View "United States v. Fogle" on Justia Law

In 2013-2015, defendant and her accomplices defrauded several people in the U.S. and Canada, whom they had met on dating websites, by persuading them to wire money to bank accounts controlled by the schemers to help their fictitious selves deal with fictitious personal tragedies or take advantage of fictitious money‐making opportunities. They repeatedly victimized some of the same people.The defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, was sentenced to 120 months in prison (half the statutory maximum). At sentencing the district judge focused on 21 of the defendant’s victims, who had lost a total of some $2.2 million and who ranged in age from 47 to 71. The judge added a two‐level vulnerable‐victim enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3A1.1(b)(1), without which the guidelines range would have been 63 to 78 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the district court’s concern that the defendant continued to pose a risk and that that “the impact on the victims, although considered under the guidelines to the extent that the guidelines contemplate vulnerable victims … doesn’t actually fully appreciate or really contemplate the specific emotional and financial impact on the victims, and so that is the basis for my departure from the guideline range.” View "United States v. Iriri" on Justia Law