Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Saunders and Bounds sold heroin on the west side of Chicago. Their co-conspirators testified against them, and they were convicted of conspiring to distribute at least 100 grams but less than one kilogram of heroin. At sentencing, the court held them responsible for between three and ten kilograms of heroin and sentenced each man to 216 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the government’s disclosure of the basis of its expert’s fingerprint testimony failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of the defendants’ guilt. The court upheld admission a stipulation regarding a traffic stop of two alleged co-conspirators who drove away from police while tossing packets that resembled heroin from their car. The stipulation was relevant to the drug conspiracy case and its prejudicial effect did not outweigh its probative value. The special verdict form, properly interpreted, did not contain a jury finding that less than one kilogram was involved; the district court did not err in finding that more than one kilogram was involved. The court properly identified and articulated a reliable basis for its calculation of the drug quantity, justifying the sentencing decisions. View "United States v. Saunders" on Justia Law

The Indiana State Police received a tip that Fogle’s close friend and employee, Taylor, had sent text messages expressing a sexual interest in children. A warranted search of Taylor’s home and electronic devices revealed that, in 2011-2015, Taylor had produced child pornography using secret cameras in his residence. The investigation led law enforcement to Fogle. Taylor worked for Fogle’s charitable foundation and the two traveled together frequently. Authorities discovered multiple connections, then executed a warrant to search Fogle’s home and devices. Fogle had received images and videos from Taylor’s homemade collection and Taylor’s collection of commercial child pornography. Some of the victims were as young as six years old. Fogle had also engaged in commercial sex acts with two minors, ages 16 and 17. Text messages revealed that Fogle had repeatedly found adult escorts online and offered them finder’s fees to provide him with access to minors for commercial sex. Fogle pled guilty to distributing and receiving and conspiring to distribute and receive, child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, section 2423(b) and (e). The government agreed not to recommend a sentence greater than 151 months in prison. Fogle’s advisory guidelines range was 135 to 168 months. The court​ sentenced Fogle to 188 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the lack of mitigating factors and Fogle’s celebrity status. View "United States v. Fogle" on Justia Law

In 2013-2015, defendant and her accomplices defrauded several people in the U.S. and Canada, whom they had met on dating websites, by persuading them to wire money to bank accounts controlled by the schemers to help their fictitious selves deal with fictitious personal tragedies or take advantage of fictitious money‐making opportunities. They repeatedly victimized some of the same people.The defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, was sentenced to 120 months in prison (half the statutory maximum). At sentencing the district judge focused on 21 of the defendant’s victims, who had lost a total of some $2.2 million and who ranged in age from 47 to 71. The judge added a two‐level vulnerable‐victim enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3A1.1(b)(1), without which the guidelines range would have been 63 to 78 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the district court’s concern that the defendant continued to pose a risk and that that “the impact on the victims, although considered under the guidelines to the extent that the guidelines contemplate vulnerable victims … doesn’t actually fully appreciate or really contemplate the specific emotional and financial impact on the victims, and so that is the basis for my departure from the guideline range.” View "United States v. Iriri" on Justia Law

Schmid was convicted of murdering her boyfriend. She testified that she had heard a voice telling her that she is the Messiah and that the boyfriend had sexually abused her daughter. The jury found her guilty but mentally ill. Her conviction and sentence of 55 years were affirmed in 2004. Schmid unsuccessfully sought Indiana state court collateral review, after which, appointed counsel stopped representing her. Federal law gives state prisoners one year to commence proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 2254, with time suspended while state collateral proceedings are pending. When Schmid sought state collateral review, 178 days remained in the one-year period. Schmid filed a federal petition 15 months after state proceedings ended. Schmid, representing herself, contended that equitable tolling was justified, given her mental problems and delay by former counsel in turning over legal papers. The court denied Schmid’s petition as untimely, stating that Schmid failed to explain which documents she needed in order to file or why she needed them, and did not address Schmid’s claim of mental disability. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court’s first step should have been to appoint counsel for Schmid under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(a)(2)(B). Counsel could have investigated Schmid’s mental condition and explored the contents of prior counsel’s files, formulating an explanation for delay satisfactory to the judge. View "Schmid v. McCauley" on Justia Law

An undercover agent connected with Hancock using peer-to-peer software to download child pornography. Hancock granted access to his files and shared his password, allowing the agent to download child pornography from Hancock’s computer. Hancock pled guilty to knowingly transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). He admitted that he had about 1200 videos and 16,000 images of child pornography, many of which “involved sexual acts, including sexual intercourse, with prepubescent children.” The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 151-188 months. Hancock fell within criminal history category I and his offense level was 34, with enhancements because: the material involved prepubescent minors; Hancock distributed material; the material portrayed violence or sadistic or masochistic conduct; Hancock used a computer; and Hancock had more than 600 images. Reductions were taken because Hancock accepted responsibility and timely pled guilty, Hancock argued, with factual support, that with technological advances, many offense-level increases prescribed by the Guidelines apply to the majority of offenders, even those whose conduct is typical, rather than unusually harmful. Hancock also provided the court with information about the sentences of seven other child pornography offenders, and urged the court to avoid an unwarranted sentencing disparity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence of 120 months; the judge adequately addressed his sentencing arguments. View "United States v. Hancock" on Justia Law

Amaya, a ranking officer in the Latin Kings street gang, was convicted of drug‐related crimes (distributing cocaine, possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute it, and carrying a gun in furtherance of his cocaine distribution) and organized‐gang‐related crimes (conspiring to conduct racketeering activity and aiding and abetting a violent crime in aid of racketeering). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for the gun count and the two racketeering convictions. The court upheld the admission of an out‐of‐court statement made by an undercover law‐enforcement agent. The statement, an exclamation about a gun, was not hearsay because it was not offered for its truth, and its admission was not unduly prejudicial. The admission of an out‐of‐court statement made by a confidential informant did not violate Amaya’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him; the statement was not the type of “testimonial” statement covered by the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. View "United States v. Amaya" on Justia Law

Gill and Bostic both pled guilty to participating in a heroin distribution conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Gill challenged his sentence of 280 months’ imprisonment as procedurally unsound, disputing his criminal history point assessment and supervised release conditions. Bostic challenged his 360-month sentence as procedurally unsound and substantively unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded Gill’s sentence for complete resentencing, but affirmed Bostic’s sentence. The district court committed plain error under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2 when it assigned five criminal history points based on Gill’s previously invalidated aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an above-guidelines sentence for Bostic. View "United States v. Gill" on Justia Law

In 2009 Crespo applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits for his mother, representing that she lived with him in Illinois and that he took care of her. He served as her representative payee. By signing the form, Crespo acknowledged that he could be held liable for any improper overpayments he caused. Crespo’s mother was not entitled to those benefits because she lived in Puerto Rico (20 C.F.R. 416.215), which Crespo hid from the Social Security Administration by falsely representing, in three subsequent reports as representative payee, that she lived with him. Airline records established that she resided in Puerto Rico; his mother was serving as representative payee for her own mother’s retirement benefits, declaring herself a resident of Puerto Rico. An ALJ imposed a $114,956 civil penalty on Crespo for misrepresentation. The Departmental Appeals Board of the Department of Health and Human Services dismissed his appeal as untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Board did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Crespo’s untimely appeal and finding good cause lacking. Appeals are due 30 days after the ALJ’s initial decision is deemed served. A copy of the regulation is included when the decision is delivered. Crespo offered no reason why he did not request an extension. View "Crespo v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Officers attempted to serve a warrant on probationer Hayden on April 9, 2012. A gun fight ensued, leaving Hayden dead and one officer injured. Using the serial number, officers identified Hayden's Glock firearm as registered to Moore. In an interview with ATF agents on April 10, 2012, Moore acknowledged that he knew Hayden. Investigation revealed that 4:30 p.m. on March 2, 2012, Moore purchased a new gun (Ruger) from a Fort Wayne store. Roughly 30 minutes later, he claims to have discovered his older weapon, the Glock, had been stolen. He called the Fort Wayne police to report the theft at 5:30 p.m. and filed a stolen-property report. On that date, Moore's phone placed and received numerous calls to and from a number ending in 9312. The government believes Hayden was on the other end of those calls. In his upcoming trial for selling that weapon to Hayden, a known felon, and falsely reporting that the weapon was stolen, the government sought to introduce evidence that Hayden had provided his probation officer with the 9312 number. The court granted Moore’s motion to exclude that evidence as inadmissible hearsay. The Seventh Circuit vacated, citing the residual hearsay exception. Hayden's statements bear markers of reliability that are equivalent to those found in statements specifically covered by federal rules. View "United States v.. Moore" on Justia Law

Shaw, a convicted bank robber in custody at the Pekin Correctional Institution appealed his conviction for possession of heroin while in a federal prison, 18 U.S.C. 1791. A search of Shaw’s cell was planned after two anonymous calls through an inmates’ hotline. Before the search, officers found marijuana in Shaw’s clothing. Shaw then reached into the front pocket of his sweatpants, and pulled out four brown balls wrapped in plastic. Testing revealed that the balls contained heroin at a purity level of less than one percent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and upholding denial of a motion to suppress. As a prisoner, Shaw has highly curtailed Fourth Amendment protection. The court held that Shaw was not entitled to know the identities of the anonymous tipsters; rejected challenges to the testing of the heroin balls; and upheld the 60-month, above-guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law