Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Kankakee County Sheriff has a written policy requiring a strip search of every arrestee before that person enters the detention center’s general population. The policy permits manual body-cavity inspections of some arrestees. Arrestees filed suit to contest the policy as applied to persons whose custody has not yet been approved by a judge. The district judge certified a class: “All persons held in the custody of the Sheriff of Kankakee County from April 20, 2010 to the date of entry of judgment who, following a warrantless arrest, were strip searched in advance of a judicial determination of probable cause,” but later dismissed, finding the policy valid as applied to the class, relying on the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Florence v. Burlington County. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the written policy may be valid, while its application is not. The district judge implied that the class had forfeited its opportunity to contest how the policy works in practice, but when the suit began, and the definition was proposed, class counsel had no reason to think that the jail’s staff was doing something other than what the written policy required. Two members of the class contend that they were arrested, strip searched, and then immediately released. View "Fonder v. Kankakee County" on Justia Law

In 1990 Schmidt, then age 27, was convicted in a Wisconsin state court of raping a woman multiple times, burglarizing her apartment, falsely imprisoning her, and intimidating her as a witness. He was sentenced to prison and paroled in 2003. His parole was revoked five years later as a result of violation of its terms: he viewed sexually explicit materials on the Internet and was expelled from a treatment program for sexually violent persons. He returned to prison. As his sentence was drawing to an end, the state had him tried civilly on the ground that he was a sexually violent person as a consequence of mental disorder. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 980.06, he was committed for an indefinite period to a secure treatment center. In 2014, having appealed the civil commitment unsuccessfully in the state courts, Schmidt sought federal habeas corpus, claiming that the state violated his due process rights by presenting the jury with evidence of his past sexual misconduct, the prejudicial effect of which outweighed its probative value. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Schmidt’s constitutional rights were not infringed by the presentation at his civil commitment trial of the detailed first-person accounts of his crimes. View "Schmidt v. McCullough" on Justia Law

Peterson, a Madison Wisconsin entrepreneur, owned a polyurethane scrap-foam material company and a development company, with Shapiro and Spahr. Peterson made unauthorized intercompany loans and used corporate funds to pay off his personal gambling debts. Eventually all of his businesses failed, the companies defaulted, and federal agents investigated. Peterson was indicted on 13 counts: bank fraud, making false statements to banks, money laundering, and pension theft. The judge entered judgment of acquittal on two counts and at sentencing imposed a within-guidelines prison term of 84 months on the remaining six. The Seventh Circuit rejected claims of evidentiary and instructional error and his arguments for judgment of acquittal or a new trial as having no merit; the evidence was easily sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The court also upheld the joinder of the pension-theft count for trial with the others. The court vacated the sentence. The judge correctly calculated the gross receipts Peterson derived from his fraud; because he was the sole perpetrator, all proceeds of the fraud were properly attributed to him. But Peterson repaid in full a $300,000 wire transfer before detection of his fraud, so that sum should not have been included in the total loss amount. View "United States v. Peterson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Orlando was indicted on charges of producing and possessing child pornography. He agreed to plead guilty to four counts of producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) in exchange for a sentencing recommendation of 35 years imprisonment, followed by lifetime supervision.” The district court, however, imposed a sentence of 40 years in prison followed by a lifetime of supervised release, with mandatory and discretionary conditions of supervision. The court did not evaluate or discuss the sentencing factors from 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), or determine whether each discretionary condition was “reasonably related” to the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1). On remand, the court stated that the remand was limited to the imposition of term and conditions of supervised release and refused to reconsider the length of the sentence of imprisonment. Neither the government nor Orlando objected to the court’s characterization of the order. The Seventh Circuit again vacated and remanded, finding that the district court erred in interpreting the remand order. The court declined to reassign Orlando’s case to a different judge, finding no breach of the plea agreement. When the government had an opportunity to recommend a term of imprisonment at Orlando’s original sentencing, it performed as required. View "United States v. Orlando" on Justia Law

Phelps was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and was sentenced to 120 months in prison, the statutory minimum. The Sentencing Guidelines range was 188–235 months. A year later the government moved for a sentence reduction as a reward for his substantial assistance. The court reduced the sentence to 60 months. Months later, Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782 took effect, retroactively reducing Phelps’s guideline range to 151–188 months. Phelps moved, under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), for a sentence reduction to 48 months. The judge calculated that a “reduction comparably less than” the amended range in Phelps’s case would be 75 months, not 48 months, by comparing Phelps’s 60-month sentence to the below-guideline sentence of 120 months that the court had originally imposed. The 60-month term was 50% of the original sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed. To calculate a sentence that is “comparably less than the amended guideline range,” the Sentencing Commission instructs the court to compare the defendant’s current below-guideline sentence to the original unamended guideline range, convert the difference to a percentage, and apply that percentage reduction to the amended range. This approach applies even where the government’s substantial-assistance motion came after the court imposed a below-range sentence for some other reason. View "USA v. Joseph Phelps" on Justia Law

Lewis was convicted of five federal sex offenses. The district court sentenced Lewis, who is 66 years old and in poor health, to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 35 years in prison. The district judge, while recognizing that the chances Lewis will survive his prison sentence are low, also included in his sentence a life term of supervised release. Lewis raised no objections in the district court to any aspect of the supervised release term and conditions. Represented by new counsel on appeal, however, Lewis argued that the court’s findings and explanations were not sufficient. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defense had ample advance notice of the terms of proposed release that were contemplated and ultimately imposed. Before sentence was actually imposed, the court expressly invited objections and requests for further findings or elaboration. The defense expressly declined the invitation. That was waiver. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Waters cooked methamphetamine at locations throughout southern Illinois and also taught others to do so. He eventually pled guilty to conspiring to manufacture a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). Waters had several prior convictions, including for enhanced domestic battery under Illinois law, which the probation office characterized as a crime of violence (U.S.S.G. 4B1.1a) in the presentence investigation report. The court overruled Waters’s challenge to that characterization and sentenced him as a career offender. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Precedent forecloses a defense argument that the Illinois statute prohibiting domestic battery does not include the use of physical force as an element of the offense and thus, is not a crime of violence. No intervening Supreme Court decision justifies a different result. View "United States v. Waters" on Justia Law

On July 4, 2002, Cox was standing outside a Chicago restaurant when he was gunned down by two men. Two women driving cars near the scene saw the murder and the shooters’ faces. Less than two months later, both women independently chose Blackmon’s photograph out of arrays. They repeated those identifications at a live line-up and again at trial. Primarily on the strength of their testimony, Blackmon was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 60 years in prison. Blackmon petitioned the state courts for post-conviction relief, arguing that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to present eyewitness and alibi testimony, and in the alternative, that he was actually innocent. The state courts summarily denied relief. Blackmon then unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of habeas relief and remanded for determination of whether Blackmon “is actually ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” The record supported conclusions that Blackmon’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate alibi witnesses and that the state court’s summary dismissal of the claim was unreasonable. Because of that summary dismissal, the alibi witnesses have not yet been tested in any adversary proceeding. View "Blackmon v. Williams" on Justia Law

Maxwell, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of a substance containing a cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, but remanded twice for resentencing in light of recent Supreme Court opinions. On second remand, the court had acknowledged that Maxwell’s prior Minnesota conviction for fleeing from an officer no longer constituted a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines for purposes of the career offender enhancement. Maxwell also argued that his prior conviction for simple robbery was not a crime of violence. The court responded: "I didn’t feel bound by the career offender guideline. I arrived at a sentence based on the factors of Section 3553(a) of Title 18 … . I did consider the career offender guidelines ... but I have not relied upon those guidelines in arriving at the sentence here. And so whether or not simple robbery is an appropriate consideration or not, I am comfortable with the sentence that has been imposed independent of those guidelines. The court again sentenced Maxwell to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that even if the court had relied on the career offender guideline, the Minnesota statute for simple robbery is not broader than U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Tate was convicted of conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine (2013-2014) and of a single count of distribution stemming from a 2014 controlled buy. Tate’s criminal history category was VI, regardless of the career offender Guideline. The court found that Tate’s relevant conduct made him responsible for 400 grams of methamphetamine, yielding an adjusted offense level of 28 and that Tate qualified as a career offender, raising his adjusted offense level to 32, producing a range of 210-262 months. Tate’s conviction for distribution of methamphetamine involved just 0.2 grams of methamphetamine, but at sentencing the district court considered the trial testimony of Tate’s former girlfriend and another woman about his manufacturing activities. The judge rejected challenges to their credibility, acknowledging that the estimates were not exact. The court sentenced Tate to concurrent terms of 210 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding no error in the credibility determination, but holding that conviction under an Illinois law that prohibits attempted procurement of anhydrous ammonia with intent that it be used to manufacture methamphetamine does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender provision, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law