Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003 Wilkozek pleaded guilty mail fraud for participation in a mortgage-fraud scheme. Wilkozek drafted and submitted phony mortgage applications for buyers (participants in the scheme) to purchase properties from realtors (also participants) at artificially high prices. Mortgage lenders approved them and distributed the funds to the buyers, who divided the funds among the participants and abandoned the underwater properties. As Wilkozek expected, the original lenders quickly sold the mortgages to third-party lenders on the strength of the applications. By the time the third-party lenders uncovered the scheme, all they could do was foreclose and sell the properties. They suffered losses of more than $700,000. Wilkozek was ordered to pay restitution to the third-party lenders. The government asked the judge to order garnishment of Wilozek’s wages. Wilkozek challenged the request by petition for coram nobis—an ancient writ used to collaterally attack a criminal judgment. Wilkozek claimed to have “new evidence,” proving the third-party lenders were not actually victims entitled to restitution and that the government miscalculated the amount of unpaid restitution. The judge entered the order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Misclassifying a lender as a victim is not a fundamental error remediable by coram nobis, and even if it were, Wilkozek was not close to proving misclassification. View "United States v. Wilkozek" on Justia Law

Thomas was convicted of the 2001 murder of Shakir. In 2005, after his conviction was final, Thomas received a letter informing him that unidentified gang members told police that Thomas did not commit the murder and that the shooter was Pinkston, a drug dealer. Thomas filed an unsuccessful state court petition for post‐conviction relief, arguing that he was actually innocent in light of the newly discovered evidence. Thomas filed a second state court petition in 2007, this time alleging that the government withheld evidence that the officer was told that Pinkston was the shooter in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The state court held that the claim was defaulted; Thomas had not raised it in his first petition. The district court denied federal habeas corpus petition raising the Brady claim, holding that it was procedurally defaulted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt and the questionable reliability of his alibi, it was not more likely than not that a jury would have acquitted Thomas based solely on evidence that unidentified gang members told someone who told someone that Thomas did not commit the murder. Thomas’s gateway claim of actual innocence was, therefore, insufficient to excuse his procedural default. View "Thomas v. Williams" on Justia Law

At his Reedsville, Wisconsin home, Dessart manufactured and sold products containing the active chemical ingredients in numerous prescription drugs, offering them for sale online with the disclaimer “for research only” to evade FDA oversight. After receiving an anonymous tip, investigating Dessart’s website, and intercepting three packages connected to Dessart’s operation, agents obtained a warrant, conducted a controlled delivery, and search Dessart’s house. He was convicted of violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 331, with the intent to defraud or mislead the agency, which converted his violations from strict-liability misdemeanors into specific-intent felonies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the FDA’s investigator lied in procuring a search warrant and the warrant otherwise lacked probable cause; the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted with deceptive intent; and the district court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “prescription drug.” The evidence of Dessart’s intent to mislead the FDA was ample and easily sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. View "United States v. Dessart" on Justia Law

In 2012 Brown pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), and was sentenced to 18 months in prison followed by 60 months of supervised release. Within months of being released from prison, Brown was arrested for violating the Illinois sex-offender registration law, 730 ILCS 150/3(a). He pled guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in state prison. Brown’s federal probation officer then petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), citing Brown’s state case and his failure to submit timely supervision reports on five occasions. Brown admitted the allegations. The district court revoked his supervised release, ordered him to serve an additional 12 months in prison (consecutive to his new state sentence) and imposed a 10-year term of supervised release. Brown filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserted that the appeal was frivolous and sought to withdraw under Anders v. California. The Seventh Circuit granted the Anders motion and dismissed. There is no constitutional right to counsel in a revocation proceeding when the defendant admits violating the conditions of his supervision and neither challenges the appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police saw a car stopped within 15 feet of a crosswalk, which is unlawful unless the car is “actually engaged in loading or unloading or in receiving or discharging passengers”. One police car drew up parallel to the stopped car, and another drew up behind. Shining lights through the car’s windows (it was after sunset), police saw a passenger in the back seat try to hide a firearm. Johnson, the passenger, was prosecuted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his motion to suppress the gun, Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the statutory exception for receiving or discharging cargo or passengers means that the police could not have probable cause until they had observed the car long enough to know that it was not within the scope of the exception. The police would have discovered the same evidence without a seizure because any officer was free to walk up to the parked car, which lacking a driver, was not going anywhere. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Koglin was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1) and separately charged with engaging in a monetary transaction worth more than $10,000 involving property he knew to be derived from criminal activity, 18 U.S.C. 1957. Koglin pleaded guilty to the conspiracy and the drug-money counts and agreed to assist the prosecution. Koglin’s PSR began with a base level of 32 (for the amount of marijuana); a “mitigating role” adjustment dropped the level to 30. The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for possessing firearms in connection with drug-trafficking, a two-level “mitigating role” reduction. and a three-level reduction for accepting responsibility, yielding an offense level of 27 and a guidelines range of 70-87 months, but Koglin’s conspiracy conviction carried a 10-year minimum sentence. The government successfully moved for a sentence below the statutory minimum to reflect Koglin’s substantial assistance, 18 U.S.C. 3553(e). The judge sentenced Koglin to 57 months. Guidelines Amendment 782 subsequently reduced the base offense levels for most drug crimes. Koglin moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The government agreed that Koglin was eligible, but asked the judge to deny Koglin an “unjustified windfall” of a further sentence reduction. The judge denied Koglin’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Koglin’s guideline range would not have been lower had Amendment 782 been in place when he was originally sentenced. View "United States v. Koglin" on Justia Law

Guzman-Rivadeneira came to the U.S. from Ecuador. In 1993 he was convicted in California of possession of counterfeit prescription blanks. After returning to Ecuador, he returned to the U.S. and became a lawful permanent resident because his mother is a U.S. citizen. On his application, he falsely responded that he had never been arrested or convicted of a crime. In 2012, Guzman-Rivadeneira pled guilty to a controlled substance misdemeanor. Guzman-Rivadeneira returned from another trip abroad in 2014 and was charged as removable for: conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (1993 conviction), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); conviction of a controlled substance offense; procurement of a visa by fraud; and lack of a valid entry document. He argued that a 1997 California court order reducing the 1993 conviction to a misdemeanor should be given retroactive effect; that he was eligible for a discretionary waiver of removability for his visa fraud, and that as a legal permanent resident he would be eligible for cancellation of other grounds of removal. The BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit declined a petition based on the “moral turpitude” issue. Guzman-Rivadeneira’s original lawyer conceded that the 1993 conviction involved moral turpitude, and in appealing to the BIA, his new lawyer did not seek relief from that concession, not did she take the steps needed to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Guzman-Rivadeneira v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Spotting an opportunity for profit, Chicago drug dealer Coleman began to focus on Kewanee in 2008. Eventually, Brown, Capers, Clark, Qubid, and Tatum joined the operation as runners. In 2012, they were charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 280 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. Coleman and Tatum pleaded guilty; Qubid, Brown, Capers, and Clark were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 120 months in prison (runners) to life in prison, and supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting challenges to the district court’s admission of Western Union and MoneyGram and testimony about those records into evidence. The court also rejected “Brady” claims with respect to background on certain witnesses, finding that the defendants had access to the information they needed. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Titus and others were indicted for a mortgage fraud scheme involving Chicago-area residential properties. Defendants recruited straw buyers, helped them fill out fraudulent mortgage applications, and took kickbacks from the loans. The indictment alleged that the lenders incurred losses of over eight million dollars. The scheme operated from 2004-2012 and involved approximately 52 fraudulent loans. Titus pled guilty to bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and admitted to participating in the scheme, but claimed that his fraud was limited to two fraudulent applications. After Titus’s guilty plea, the government claimed that Titus was involved in 18 of the loans obtained in the scheme. An agent from the Department of Housing and Urban Development provided the probation office with a spreadsheet detailing those 18 loans. The presentence investigation report adopted the government’s assertion and estimated that the total loss attributable to Titus was at least $3,334,627; began with a base offense level of 7 and added 18 levels because of the loss amount; added another two levels because the offense involved 10 or more victims; and subtracted three levels because Titus accepted responsibility. The Seventh Circuit vacated his 36-month sentence and remanded because the district court did not provide sufficient factual findings. View "United States v. Titus" on Justia Law

Becker sued Evansville, Indiana police officer Elfreich under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Elfreich used excessive force in arresting him because, after Becker had surrendered, Elfreich pulled him down three steps and placed his knee on his back while allowing a police dog to continue to bite him. Officers had arrived with an arrest warrant, which alleged that three weeks earlier Becker had held a knife to his brother-in-law’s neck and threatened to kill him. Elfreich claimed that he released the dog only after Becker failed to respond to warnings to come out of hiding and that the dog could not hear the release command because of screaming; he argued he was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not constitute excessive force or, alternatively, that it did not violate clearly established constitutional law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Elfreich’s motion for summary judgment. A jury could reasonably find the force was excessive; it was clearly established at the time of Becker’s arrest that no more than minimal force was permissible to arrest a non-resisting, or passively resisting, suspect. View "Becker v. Effriechs" on Justia Law