Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

McDonald was diagnosed with arthritis and high cholesterol while serving a life sentence at Stateville Correctional Center in Illinois. For 10 years, he received a low-cholesterol diet planned by a prison dietician In 2009, a new warden discharged the dietician and cancelled all special diets; decreased the frequency of outdoor recreation for inmates; and altered the prison’s job-assignment policy to restrict inmates from working in a particular job for more than one year. McDonald filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Equal Protection Clause (inmates at the other Illinois maximum-security prisons were allowed to have prescription diets and more time for outdoor recreation). The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The wardens were not entitled to summary judgment on McDonald’s claim concerning the cancellation of his prescription diet. View "McDonald v. Hardy" on Justia Law

The manager of a Milwaukee pub arrived with cash and was followed inside by a man who drew a gun, demanded and fled with the cash. The manager offered a confident identification of the robber as Sweeney, who had previously worked at the pub, and described the gun. Officers went to Sweeney’s six-unit apartment building. Officer Wilcox covered the building's rear door. Delgado and Gasser entered through the front door, which was propped open, found Sweeney’s second-floor apartment, and knocked. Sweeney’s girlfriend responded. While talking to her, the officers received a call from Wilcox saying he had caught Sweeney trying to leave by the back door. With consent from Sweeney’s girlfriend, Delgado searched the apartment. Gasser went through the apartment, out its rear door, and down the common rear staircase to the basement, where he walked to the crawl space under the stairs. There he found a bag containing a handgun, magazine, and ammunition. In searching the apartment, Sweeney’s car, and Sweeney himself, the officers found money and sunglasses matching the description of the robber’s. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Sweeney’s conviction of armed robbery (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)), brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), finding no Fourth Amendment violation. The court remanded for reconsideration of conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Morris pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The agreement contained a typographical error that was repeated at the sentencing hearing. The sentencing range, stated as 118-235 months, should have been 188 to 235 months, as reflected in the presentence investigation report (PSR), which was filed after Morris’s plea. Morris tried, unsuccessfully, to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court found that Morris met the requirements of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA), and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; a discrepancy between the sentencing range stated in the plea agreement and the sentencing range found by the court is an insufficient basis for withdrawing a guilty plea. View "United States v.l Morris" on Justia Law

Carson, a former employee of the U.S. Postal Service, pleaded guilty to delaying the mail, 18 U.S.C. 1703(a), and was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment plus one year’s supervised release, three months of which must be spent in community confinement. One condition of his supervised release required Carson to submit to a visit by his probation officer, “at home or elsewhere” between the hours of 6 AM and 11 PM. The condition does not permit a home search, but allows the probation officer to confiscate any contraband in plain view. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the condition, while noting that a condition of one person’s release cannot authorize a probation officer to barge into someone else’s home over the objection of its occupants. Terms of supervised release (other than those that are mandatory for all persons under supervision) require justification under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). Although the judge’s statement that the home-visit condition will enable the probation office to “keep watch” and help enforce the other terms of release implies that a home-visit condition would be appropriate in every case, it is adequate to justify the imposition of this “standard” condition in this case. View "USA v. Paul Carson" on Justia Law

Dominguez-Pulido unlawfully entered the U.S with his parents around 1993. Approximately 15 years later, Dominguez-Pulido was convicted of burglary, a felony offense under Illinois law. An Immigration Judge concluded that he was removable as an alien present without admission and denied various forms of relief from removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denials, citing 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C), which limits judicial review of final orders for removal that involve a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. The court rejected claims that the “moral turpitude” clause was void for vagueness; that Dominguez-Pulido’s fear of persecution bears a nexus to his membership in a particular social group— individuals deported from the U.S. who have or who are perceived to have money, and who have family members in the U.S. who could pay ransom; and that his removal would violate the Eighth Amendment. View "Dominguez-Pulido v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Cairel and Johnson, lawfully repossessing cars, were stopped for a traffic violation. The officers, aware of recent robberies in the area, grew suspicious and called a victim to the scene. The victim identified Cairel and Johnson as the men who had robbed him the night before. The officers arrested them. During subsequent questioning, Cairel, who has a learning disability and low IQ, confessed to several robberies and implicated Johnson. Prosecutors filed charges. Johnson pled guilty in exchange for probation. Further investigation revealed that both men were innocent. A year later, prosecutors dismissed Cairel’s case and allowed Johnson to withdraw his plea. Neither man was imprisoned. They sued the detectives under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly fabricating Johnson’s confession, failing to disclose a potential alibi witness, and coercing Cairel’s confession. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs were not deprived of sufficient liberty to support their fabrication claim. There was no evidence that defendants concealed evidence unknown to plaintiffs supporting their alibi or that any failure to disclose caused a deprivation of liberty. No reasonable jury could find that Cairel’s interrogation “shocked the conscience” or that defendants’ conduct was so “extreme and outrageous” as to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress.Probable cause for the criminal charges defeated claims for malicious prosecution. View "Cairel v. Alderden" on Justia Law

In 2008, Resnick, a long‐haul truck driver, took T.M., the nine‐year‐old son of family friends, on a cross‐country work trip that was supposed to end at Disneyland. Instead, they traveled to Washington State and back to Indiana. Over the two‐week trip, Resnick sexually abused T.M. repeatedly. Eventually, T.M. told his parents about Resnick’s conduct. Resnick was convicted of child abuse and firearms offenses and sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the charge of brandishing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), despite T.M.’s imperfect description of the gun. The court also upheld the district court's admission of testimony of a second minor victim and testimony and argument about Resnick’s refusal to take a polygraph. The court noted that Resnick forfeited his objection to that evidence at trial. View "United States v. Resnick" on Justia Law

Crisp was convicted 25 times of various crimes, including seven convictions involving a controlled substance. In 2013, Crisp sold crack cocaine twice to a person cooperating with law enforcement. A subsequent search of his apartment turned up another 41 grams of crack. Crisp pled guilty to possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. His original sentence was 240 months in prison followed by eight years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit held that the supervised release conditions Crisp challenged had not been adequately tailored and justified and remanded for a full resentencing. The district court reduced Crisp’s sentence to 168 months in prison followed by the same eight years of supervised release. Among the conditions of supervised release, the court ordered Crisp to “participate in a program for substance abuse treatment,” to “pay for these services, if financially able, as directed by the U.S. Probation Office.” Crisp objected, unsuccessfully, that 18 U.S.C. 3672 required the court to decide his ability to pay for treatment, without delegating the matter to the probation office. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that a probation officer’s actions are always subject to judicial review. View "United States v. Crisp" on Justia Law

Arrazabal , a Salvadoran, entered the U.S. in 1995 at age 19, and became a lawful permanent resident alien because his mother and sister were naturalized citizens. He became involved with the Los Angeles chapter of the MS-13 gang, which has members in El Salvador. He was imprisoned for illegal gun possession and, later, for possessing cocaine. In prison he obtained prominent MS-13 tattoos. In 2001 Arrazabal’s status was revoked. His application for asylum was denied; he was removed. Years later, Arrazabal attempted to reenter illegally and was charged under 8 U.S.C. 1326. He again sought asylum, claiming that he feared he would be killed if returned to El Salvador because he wanted to quit MS-13, but his tattoos made him a target. The officer found that Arrazabal had shown reasonable probability that he had been tortured in El Salvador and that these police beatings created a reasonable possibility that he would be tortured if returned. Because his 2001 removal order made him ineligible for asylum, Arrazabal applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection, which were denied for lack of credibility. The judge did not believe that Arrazabal had refrained from criminal activity while active in MS-13, that he had been framed by U.S. police officers twice, that the IJ who ordered him removed was racist, that he suffered abuse by Salvadoran police, or that he had received death threats from fellow gang members. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the IJ overlooked key evidence. View "Arrazabal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Four persons were charged with arranging the murder of “Montes” in Mexico to reduce competition against a Chicago-based criminal organization that created bogus immigration documents. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal on grounds that the indictment proposed the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. On remand, one defendant pleaded guilty. Three were convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1959, the Racketeer​ Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); 18 U.S.C. 956(a)(1), which forbids any person “within the jurisdiction of the United States” from conspiring to commit a murder abroad; and conspiring to produce false identification documents, 18 U.S.C. 371. On appeal, defendants cited the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Morrison v. National Australia Bank, which reiterated the presumption against extraterritorial application of civil statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that its earlier decision recognized that presumption and thought it not controlling, because of the differences between criminal and civil law, and because the murder in Mexico was arranged and paid for from the U.S., and was committed with the goal of protecting a criminal organization that conducted business in the U.S., to defraud U.S. officials and employers. View "United States v. Leija-Sanchez" on Justia Law