Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Bell was adjudicated a sexually dangerous person and civilly detained. After attacking a guard at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, he was convicted and spent the four years in prison. When his sentence expired in 2010, he was returned to Rushville, where he declined to cooperate with intake procedures and threatened guards. Housed in segregation, he resisted the Facility’s normal operation. After 20 days, Bell was taken to a secure infirmary room, with large windows, and denied clothing. Bell's resistance resulted in some use of force. He spent eight days naked in the infirmary. On the ninth day Bell cooperated, was given clothes ,and moved to the general population. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted all defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded. Because he is a civil detainee, not a prisoner, Bell invoked the Due Process Clause, not the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. To say that harsh conditions are proper as a penalty for crime does not justify Bell’s treatment. Spending eight days naked in a fan-blown stream of chilled air might not be proper for a convicted prisoner, when the goal was to get the prisoner to pose for a photograph. While Bell did not file a timely appeal, he did file other papers that could be treated as notice of appeal or a request for an extension. View "Bell v. McAdory" on Justia Law

Smith, pretending to be pregnant, took her half-sister’s newborn son from his bassinette during the night and started to drive from Beloit, Wisconsin, to her home in Colorado. In Iowa, she learned that Wisconsin police wanted to interview her. She spoke by phone with a Beloit police officer who told her to pull over so that local law enforcement could speak with her. Before dawn, Smith pulled off the interstate, wrapped the baby in blankets, placed him in a plastic container, and put the container behind a gas station, in subzero mid-winter temperatures. She drove to another gas station, called the Beloit officer back, and was eventually arrested on an unrelated Texas warrant. When officers questioned her, she denied any knowledge of the child’s whereabouts until after he was found alive the next day. A jury convicted her of kidnapping. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith’s claims that her statements to officers were the product of coercion; that statements the district court suppressed based on a Miranda violation were improperly admitted for impeachment; that no rational jury could conclude that she lacked parental permission to take the child or that she attained a benefit from the kidnapping; and challenging the government’s inquiry into the conduct underlying the Texas warrant. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Rebolledo contacted a DEA confidential informant (CI), believing him to be a cocaine purchaser. During three meetings at the CI’s horse ranch, Rebolledo offered to connect the CI with a supplier; the CI agreed to purchase $200,000 of cocaine. The CI wore a recording device that only recorded parts of their meetings. Orozco brought the drugs to the ranch, took a duffle bag containing cocaine from his car trunk, and took it into a bathroom. According to Orozco, Rebolledo followed him and asked Orozco to leave the drugs in a specific location on the floor. The CI stood in the doorway. Orozco opened the bag to show its contents. After seeing the drugs, the CI left Rebolledo and Orozco alone for about two minutes. Minutes later, officers arrested Rebolledo and Orozco, finding six kilograms of cocaine in the bag. Rebolledo did not touch the bag or the drugs at any point. Orozco testified at Rebolledo’s trial. Convicted of possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Rebolledo unsuccessfully sought safety valve relief. The court sentenced Rebolledo to 120 months, the mandatory minimum sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of insufficiency of the evidence, that the government presented false evidence and misled the jury during closing arguments, and that Rebolledo was entitled to safety valve relief. View "United States v. Rebolledo-Delgadillo" on Justia Law

During an argument, Burris fired his handgun, hitting Kamal in the neck and paralyzing him. Burris fled and evaded police for five months, before surrendering. The state judge instructed the jury on first-degree reckless injury, possession of a firearm by a felon, and the lesser included offense of second-degree reckless injury. For first-degree liability, the government had to prove circumstances showing an “utter disregard for human life.” Burris argued that the shooting was an accident. The jury submitted a written question: “Regarding the element of utter disregard, all other facts and circumstances relating to the incident, do we consider facts and circumstances after the shooting?” The judge gave a supplemental instruction: First of all, I want to emphasize that you are to rely on the instructions that I gave you. All right? And to rely on all of the instructions that I gave you. And in response to this question, if this clarifies anything, after-the-fact regard for human life does not negate utter disregard otherwise established by the circumstances before and during the crime. It may be considered by the fact-finder as a part of the total factual picture, but it does not operate to preclude a finding of utter disregard for human life. The element of utter disregard for human life is measured objectively on the basis of what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known. The jury convicted Burris of first-degree reckless injury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, although the instruction may have been ambiguous, it was not reasonably likely that it misled the jury. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law . View "Burris v. Smith" on Justia Law

Miller was convicted in Indiana of three counts of child molestation and sentenced to three consecutive 40-year terms. The sexual abuse, including anal intercourse, began when the victim was nine and continued for six years. When imposing the lengthy term the state judge relied on the nature of Miller’s conduct, on his four prior convictions, his failure to reform after stretches of imprisonment, and the absence of any mitigating factors. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in 2004. Miller then filed a collateral attack, contending that his appellate lawyer furnished ineffective assistance by failing to contest his sentence. The state’s court of appeals concluded that counsel should have raised this issue, but that its omission did not result in prejudice under the standard of Strickland v. Washington because Miller did not establish that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. A federal district judge then denied Miller’s petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the state’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” View "Miller v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police officers saw Williams walking in the middle of the road and talking on a cell phone at 1:30 in the morning. When they asked him to stop, he fled, running through a yard and jumping over two fences. He was caught and his cell phone and a gun were recovered near the fences he had leaped. He was convicted as a felon in possession of a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the totality circumstances regarding the jury’s verdict impermissibly coercive. After an initial verdict and polling, during which one juror responded “no,” the judge sent the jurors back to deliberate again. The dissenting juror then claimed to have misunderstood the judge and another poll was conducted. The combination of the polls, the fact of a lone dissenter, the instruction, the content and timing of the jury’s note, and the form of the judge’s direct question—was impermissibly coercive, even if none of those circumstances standing alone would have been. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail, fell and injured his back. It was a month before he was able to see a doctor. Correctional officers did not move him although the doctor determined that he needed to be in a lower bunk. There was no ladder to his upper bunk, so had to sleep on the floor until his term of confinement ended. He sued correctional officers, contending that they had manifested deliberate indifference to an acute medical need. The district judge granted the defendants summary judgment, stating only that “it is undisputed that Plaintiff never received a lower bunk permit at any time while at the jail.” The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that it was disputed and he did receive an order from a doctor directing that he be assigned to a lower bunk. The defendants’ brief did not discuss the dispute and did not substantiate its denial. View "Bolling v. Carter" on Justia Law

Former gang member Herron is serving long sentences. Before his transfer to Terre Haute, he was attacked by inmates and left permanently disabled and confined to a wheelchair. At Terre Haute, Herron was assigned to a wheel-chair-accessible cell. Terre Haute inmates told Herron that he had been targeted because he was believed to be a pedophile. Herron learned that his prison records contained references to the Adam Walsh Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901–91, although his convictions are for other crimes. He filed a grievance; the Bureau of Prisons corrected his record. Hearing other inmates were planning to attack him, he asked to be placed in segregation. The prison complied and assigned him a wheelchair-accessible cell. Within a month, his cellmate attacked him over his “Walsh Act stuff.” Herron rejected another assigned cellmate, whom he viewed as threatening, and filed grievances. Guards took Herron to a non-accessible cell and refused to help him to the toilet. He was found lying near the toilet. He was treated for head lacerations, a shoulder contusion, and a sprained spine. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim and the district court's grant of qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment theory, which accepted a claim that the guard was implementing a policy of moving every inmate who objects to a new cellmate, to prevent inmates from reserving one-person cells. View "Herron v. Meyer" on Justia Law

American Litho was owed $113,772 by Union Transport (Las Vegas), a large amount by Alcan (Wisconsin), and $146,167 by Concrete Media (New Jersey). Dziuban, American's part-owner, unsuccessfully attempted to obtain repayment through legal means, including litigation. In 2010, Dziuban contacted Orlando, a salesman at American, to help collect the debts. Orlando recruited Carparelli and Brown. The four men implied, upon meeting, that they would use physical violence and threats. Dziuban promised half of any money they collected. The men began travelling and making threats. McManus eventually joined them. Brown began cooperating with the FBI. In 2013, acting under the government’s instructions, Brown told Carparelli that he had received a call from New Jersey state police. This prompted recorded conversations between Orlando, Carparelli, and Brown, in which they discussed the scheme and attempted to cover it up. Dziuban, Orlando, Brown, Iozzo, Carparelli, and McManus were charged with Hobbs Act violations, 18 U.S.C. 1951; Orlando and McManus were charged with conspiracy to commit extortion; McManus was also charged with attempted extortion. A jury convicted Orlando and McManus. The court sentenced McManus to two concurrent sentences of 60 months and sentenced Orlando to 46 months imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed McManus’s conviction and Orlando’s sentence. View "United States v. Orlando" on Justia Law

For several months Melendez traveled with Craig to Chicago every two to three days to jointly purchase heroin from a supplier that Melendez introduced to Craig. The two pooled their money to obtain a discounted bulk rate, then would return to Rockford to weigh and divide the heroin for separate distribution. Lambert took care of Craig’s children and rented an apartment and vehicles that Craig used to store and transport heroin and trafficking proceeds. Lambert delivered heroin mixtures and money between Craig and his co-conspirators. Lambert also transmitted messages regarding drug sales activity between Craig and an individual who was an FBI informant. Melendez, Lambert, and Craig were charged with conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846. Craig was charged with distributing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Melendez and Lambert each pled guilty to one count of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Melendez’s within-guidelines range sentence of 135 months’ imprisonment, upholding the district court’s finding that he was liable for between three and 10 kilograms of jointly purchased heroin. The court also affirmed Lambert’s within-guidelines range sentence of 80 months’ imprisonment as substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Lambert" on Justia Law