Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The DEA received a tip that Carraway was distributing narcotics in East St. Louis. Agents arranged controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Carraway’s distributors and received authorization to wiretap Carraway’s phone. Carraway was obtaining cocaine from a barbershop; Graham was the intermediary. Carraway distributed cocaine from “the Gate.” On January 14, intercepted calls revealed that Carraway and Graham were going to retrieve narcotics from the barbershop; surveillance teams watched and intercepted calls between Carraway and Jenkins. Two weeks later, agents intercepted calls planning another pickup. Agents followed them to the Gate, where they saw the same vehicle from their previous surveillance. They described it to Illinois Trooper Leckrone. The vehicle had illegally tinted windows; the driver was not wearing a seat belt. Leckrone stopped the vehicle near the Gate. Leckrone observed that Jenkins acted nervous and an odor of burnt cannabis. Leckrone searched the dashboard and center console and found a plastic panel, concealing cocaine, plus ringing cell phones. One phone had the number from which agents had intercepted calls and showed recent calls to Carraway. Jenkins stated that the truck belonged to his cousin. Jenkins was charged with conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846, and 18 U.S.C. 2. The court denied a motion to suppress, citing the collective knowledge doctrine. Jenkins was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute. The court sentenced Jenkins to 27 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to an unrelated sentence for kidnaping and carrying a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of the motion to suppress and the imposition of a consecutive sentence. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Minhas defrauded customers of his Chicago travel agencies and airlines through a scheme in which he collected payment for airline reservations that he canceled without his customers’ knowledge, by manipulating the two-tiered online ticket-reservation system. Minhas was convicted of wire and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343 in two separate cases: one that proceeded to a bench trial and one in which Minhas pleaded guilty in 2015. At a consolidated sentencing hearing, the district court imposed two partially concurrent prison terms totaling 114 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines’ enhancement for causing “substantial financial hardship” to the two sets of victims (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)). The court acknowledged that it had “seen stronger evidence,” but was not convinced that the district court committed clear error in its assessment of the record. View "United States v. Minhas" on Justia Law

Mulvania, arrested for domestic battery, refused to exit the vehicle at the jail. Officers moved her. Mulvania’s speech was slurred, she screamed obscenities, and was physically combative. Mulvania claims she was experiencing a “post‐traumatic stress disorder flashback.” Mulvania tested positive for cocaine and cannabinoids that day. Mulvania refused to change into a jail uniform. The defendants claim that misdemeanor detainees are permitted to change in a private room when they are cooperative. Two female and three male officers restrained her, placed Mulvania on her stomach, held her arms over her head, and lifted her shirt off. Mulvania banged her head against the floor and yelled, “They’re going to rape me.” After removing her clothing, the officers draped a jail uniform over her body and left the cell. Minutes later, Mulvania had a seizure and was taken to the hospital. After she returned, she was released without charges. Mulvania filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans With Disabilities Act, amending her pleadings several times, claiming the jail had a widespread practice of conducting strip searches with excessive force and without accommodating people who are experiencing mental distress. Others joined the suit to challenge a policy that requires female detainees to either wear white underwear or no underwear. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of Mulvania’s claims and denial of class certification, but reversed as to underwear claims. View "Mulvania v. Rock Island County Sheriff" on Justia Law

Gill was in a crowd outside a Milwaukee club when shots were fired, killing Crawley. Detectives collected security videos and interviewed witnesses. Gill’s mother told detectives that Gill had cognitive impairments. Gill voluntarily went to an interview. Gill made statements that were disproved by the video footage, about the people he was with and where he was standing. Police arrested Gill for obstruction and read Gill his Miranda rights. Gill requested a lawyer. The interview ended. Gill said that he wanted to take a polygraph test and would waive his right to a lawyer. The next morning, detectives reiterated that Gill could not take the polygraph without a lawyer present, unless he waived counsel. Gill interpreted this to mean that he could take a polygraph without a lawyer or not take one. Gill stated that he understood and would proceed. He denied any involvement with the shooting. The examination lasted six hours, followed by fives of interrogation. Gill maintained his innocence. The next morning, Gill stated that he wanted a lawyer, but detectives convinced him to waive his rights and employed various interrogation techniques, falsely stating that Gill had been identified as the shooter and had failed his polygraph test. Gill professed innocence more than 140 times, but eventually confessed. He was charged with first-degree reckless homicide and remained in jail. The court suppressed the confession, stating that Gill was “functionally illiterate” and had previously been found incompetent to stand trial for a different crime. Gill filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which were rejected on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gill failed to demonstrate that his right to be free from the interrogation tactics was clearly established; officers had probable cause for Gill’s arrest for obstruction. “Brady” does not require the disclosure of favorable evidence before trial. View "Gill v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Robbing Community Financial Service Center in Milwaukee, Ferrell tackled the security guard, pointing his firearm at the guard’s face. Cook entered, wearing a mask, and approached the teller, who was in on the robbery and opened the safe. Cook took $337,100. Cook and Ferrell fled. Cook was charged with conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery; obstruction of commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) (Hobbs Act); and brandishing a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Cook pled guilty to counts two and three. The government dismissed count one. The government was to recommend a three‐level increase for a loss of over $250,000; a three‐level decrease for acceptance of responsibility; a two-level increase for causing a loss to a financial institution; and a two‐level increase for physically restraining a person. The agreement allowed Cook to oppose the enhancements. The PSR mirrored the plea agreement. Cook argued that the CFSC was not a financial institution and that imposing the physical‐restraint enhancement was impermissible double counting. The court rejected his arguments, applied the calculation included in the PSR, determined that the guidelines range for count two was 77-96 months and that count three carried a mandatory minimum of 84 months’ imprisonment, and imposed consecutive sentences of 60 months on count two and 84 months on count three. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the application of the enhancements. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

In 2009, following a court-authorized interception of phone calls involving suspected drug traffickers, Milwaukee police obtained consent from Cannon’s son to search their home, found $14,000 in cash, and arrested Cannon, based on a report that a government informant had purchased cocaine, and borrowed a gun, from Cannon. Cannon posted bail but was not released because a new complaint charged him with giving a gun to an unauthorized person. Cannon eventually made bail, but was arrested after he moved without notifying the police. In 2011, Cannon was acquitted of the drug charge, but pleaded guilty to illegal possession of the gun, and a warrant issued for his arrest on new gun and drug charges. In 2013 Cannon obtained documents relating to his 2009 arrest and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. That suit was dismissed as premature, because his appeals were pending. In 2014 he was convicted of the 2011 charges and sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment. In 2015 he filed two 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuits based on the 2009 events. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claims as barred by the six‐year statute of limitations and noted that Cannon has incurred four strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), so he may not file a federal civil action or appeal without prepaying all fees, unless he is in imminent danger of serious injury. View "Cannon v. Newport" on Justia Law

Drs. Gupta and Wahi operated Illinois nutrition clinics. In 2011 they were indicted for mail fraud, healthcare fraud, and conspiracy to defraud Medicaid, private insurers, and patients. Gupta fled the country, but Wahi faced the charges. After a year of pretrial proceedings, the government learned that during the execution of a search warrant for electronic records, the FBI had inadvertently accessed emails that might have contained communications covered by the attorney-client privilege. Because the prejudice to Wahi’s case was unknown, the court, on the government’s motion, dismissed the indictment and ordered the government to file all discovery materials with the clerk under seal. The judge retained jurisdiction for the limited purpose of monitoring compliance. The government complied and the case was closed. Two years later, Wahi filed a petition for expungement of the judicial and FBI records related to his case. The court reasoned that Seventh Circuit precedent supported jurisdiction over requests to expunge judicial records but not records maintained by the executive branch, then concluded that Wahi’s circumstances did not justify the extraordinary remedy of expungement. The Seventh Circuit vacated, overruling the precedent cited by the district court in light of the Supreme Court’s 1994 holding in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance. Expungement authority is not inherent and must be grounded in a jurisdictional source found in the Constitution or statutes. View "United States v. Wahi" on Justia Law

Rockford police responded to a report that two individuals were asleep in a running, parked car in a McDonald’s drive-thru. Officers saw a bottle of vodka in the front seat and tried to wake the driver, Dickson. Another officer observed a handgun lodged in the center console, lunged through the passenger’s-side door, and recovered the gun. Dickson was arrested. An inventory search of the car uncovered small amounts of heroin and marijuana. Dickson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Dickson moved to suppress the gun and drugs. The government introduced evidence that the car’s rental agreement did not list Dickson as an authorized driver and that Dickson’s driver’s license was suspended. The court denied the motion, concluding that Dickson lacked standing to challenge the search and that the officers acted reasonably. The court classified Dickson as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 235 months’ imprisonment. Dickson objected to supervised-release conditions requiring that he “remain within the jurisdiction where the defendant is being supervised, unless granted permission” and to “notify, as directed by the Probation Officer, third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant’s criminal record or personal history or characteristics.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress, but remanded for limited resentencing, based on the “vague” conditions. View "United States v. Dickson" on Justia Law

Jenkins was charged with Kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), and Using or Carrying a Firearm to Commit a Crime of Violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Jenkins agreed to cooperate and entered into a proffer agreement, which prohibited the government from making direct use of any statements or information Jenkins provided in its case‐in‐chief, but permitted the government to derivatively use such information. Jenkins told the government where he hid the gun he used during the kidnapping. The government recovered the gun and introduced physical evidence and the testimony of the agents who found the gun during its case‐in-chief. Convicted, Jenkins received sentences of 188 months for kidnapping and 120 months for using a firearm to commit a federal crime of violence, to run consecutively. Jenkins argued that the government breached the proffer agreement. After arguments in Jenkins’ appeal, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, holding the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminals Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to be unconstitutionally vague. Jenkins then challenged his conviction for using a weapon during a “crime of violence,” (kidnapping), arguing that in light of “Johnson,” kidnapping is no longer a “crime of violence” under section 924(c). The Seventh Circuit agreed; kidnapping under section 1201(a) does not have, as an element, the use, threatened use, or attempted use of physical force. The court did not address whether the government breached the proffer agreement. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Wright was arrested by Calumet City police, without a warrant, based on the murder of one individual and the shooting of others. Wright admitted to having a gun. At a minimum, he was to be charged with felony unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, but the prosecutor instructed the officers to wait to charge Wright until lab results came back establishing whether his gun matched casings and bullets at the scene. After being in custody for 55 hours, Wright sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the city violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest. The next day, a judge made a probable cause finding. In the section 1983 action, Wright sought class certification, asserting that the city had a policy or practice authorizing officers to detain persons arrested without a warrant for up to 72 hours before permitting the arrestee to appear before a judge. The city made an offer of judgment. Despite accepting that Rule 68 offer, granting him relief as to "all claims brought under this lawsuit,” Wright appealed the denial of certification of a proposed class of “[a]ll persons who will in the future be detained.” He did not appeal with respect to persons who had been detained. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, finding that Wright is not an aggrieved person with a personal stake in the case as required under Article III of the Constitution. View "Wright v. Calumet City" on Justia Law