Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Lewis, representing himself at trial, was convicted and sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment for a four-count wire fraud conviction, and 120 months for the 11-count money-laundering conviction, to be served consecutively. After the parties filed briefs, but before oral argument, the government conceded that it had not presented sufficient evidence that Lewis had in fact laundered money; there was no evidence that he had “engage[d] or attempt[ed] to engage in a monetary transaction using criminally derived property,” 18 U.S.C. 1957(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated that conviction and remanded for resentencing, but affirmed the wire fraud conviction. Lewis’s court-appointed amicus attorney had not challenged that conviction, but only the severity of the sentence. The record demonstrates that Lewis was an irritant during the trial process, but it is not permissible to lengthen his sentence on that basis, particularly given his pro se status. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Indiana Pendleton Correctional Facility inmate Ellison was notified of a disciplinary proceeding concerning his possession of heroin that was confiscated by Officer Bynum during a cell-search. Ellison told Officer Guffey that two unfamiliar guards, not Bynum, had conducted the search and found nothing. Although Bynum's report stated that he found heroin in cell 10-5D, assigned to Ellison, a photo of the heroin is labeled “Cell 10-6D.” Ellison requested the identities of the guards who searched his cell and that they appear as witnesses, and sought surveillance video and test results for the substance. He later recognized one of the guards, who identified himself as Dorethery, and confirmed that he had searched Ellison’s cell on the day in question and that no contraband was found. Ellison specifically requested his presence. No witnesses, not even Bynum, appeared at the hearing and Ellison was not permitted to view the video. The hearing officer stripped Ellison of 90 days’ good-time credit. After exhausting administrative remedies, Ellison unsuccessfully sought collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Ellison was entitled to present evidence refuting Bynum’s report, and given the conflict between that report and the photo, the refusal to permit Ellison to exercise that right was “particularly troubling.” View "Ellison v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

DEA and Chicago Police officers observed Soto at the residence of a major drug supplier. They followed Soto as he entered his car with large garbage bags, which he discarded in a dumpster. Officers recovered the bags; they contained clear plastic tape, latex gloves, coffee grounds and aluminum foil molded into a brick-shape the size of a kilogram of cocaine. A canine alerted to the presence of narcotics and laboratory testing revealed the presence of cocaine. Officers had never heard of Contreras until they followed Soto to his house. An officer testified that after Soto went inside, the garage door opened and that, using binoculars, the officer saw the men touch hands in what he thought indicated the passing of money or drugs. A box removed from Conteras' Mercedes buckled and a rectangular, white, plastic-wrapped object fell out. Later, officers determined that the shoebox contained five wrapped bricks of cocaine. The officers moved in and read Contreras his Miranda rights; he signed a consent to search in both English and Spanish. Contreras expressed willingness to cooperate and admitted that he had been selling drugs with Soto for about one year. Contreras provided the combination to a bedroom safe that contained $99,153 in cash, two guns and ammunition. He told officers where to find 2.5 kilograms of cocaine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, rejecting an argument that the initial entry and protective sweep were illegal and that Contreras’ consent was tainted by the illegal acts. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted for defrauding Medicare and Blue Cross Blue Shield by submitting claims for reimbursement for respiratory therapy that had not been provided and was sentenced to 75 months in prison and also ordered to pay restitution of some $2.5 million. Three days after the jury rendered its guilty verdict, a juror sent the court a three-page “report on jury misconduct.” It was a follow-on to a phone call, in which he’d told a staff member that he wanted to retract his vote to convict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that his constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury was violated because the judge refused to order the jurors to return to court for a hearing about alleged juror misconduct or to order a new trial. The court also upheld the application of a four-level enhancement for crimes involving more than 50 victims, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B), and a two-level increase in his offense level for abuse of a position of public or private trust. The patients, whose identification information was used, were victims, although they suffered no financial loss. View "United States v. Roy" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Flynn claims that the prison impermissibly favored Honor Program participants by allowing them more time outside their cells, more visits, exclusive access to video games, and greater use exercise machines and microwaves. To be eligible for the Program, inmates must be at least 30 (previously 35) years old and cannot have committed any infraction for 24 months or an infraction involving violence for 48 months. Flynn alleges that his first application was denied because he was too young. His reapplication after the minimum age was lowered was denied because the program and waiting list were full. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking the same privileges as Program inmates. The court construed the complaint as claiming age discrimination and dismissed because using age as a proxy for maturity is rationally related to conferring greater trust and responsibility. Flynn unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, arguing that the court ignored his equal protection claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Where disparate treatment is not based on a suspect class and does not affect a fundamental right, prison administrators may treat inmates differently if that treatment is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. There are obvious reasons to extend preferential treatment to Program inmates; there are rational reasons for evaluating the prisoner before awarding benefits. The court noted that Flynn incurred one “strike” for filing his complaint and another for his appeal. View "Flynn v. Thatcher" on Justia Law

Acting on information that drugs were being sold from a certain Madison apartment, law enforcement obtained permission from the apartment property manager and brought a narcotics- detecting dog to the locked, shared hallway of the apartment building. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs at a nearby apartment door and then went to the targeted apartment where Whitaker lived. After the officers obtained a search warrant, Whitaker was arrested and charged with drug and firearm crimes based on evidence found in the apartment. At the time, Whitaker was serving a term of supervised release for a conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his pretrial motions challenging the search and the dog’s reliability, Whitaker entered a conditional guilty plea that preserved his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the use of the dog was a search under the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Florida v. Jardines. No “good faith” exception applied. View "United States v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

In 2009, Tolliver agreed to deliver drugs for Tyson. Tolliver left Tyson's house with cocaine. A confidential informant had described Tolliver’s car and a drug packaging operation at Tyson’s house. Two officers, in plain clothes, stopped Tolliver, exited their unmarked car, and pointed a gun at Tolliver. According to Tolliver, he backed up about a car length. Tolliver, who was unarmed, then realized that he was dealing with police. He claims that he did not want the officer to think that he was reaching for a gun, so he sat motionless, with his hands on the steering wheel, and his foot on the brake. He claims that the officer shot him while he was in that position and that he became unable to control the car, which rolled toward the officers. The officers fired 14 times and Tolliver was struck by seven bullets. He pled guilty to aggravated battery of a peace officer and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, but then sued for excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. A convicted criminal may not bring a civil suit questioning his conviction until the conviction has been set aside. Tolliver’s suit rests on a version of the event that completely negates the basis for his conviction. View "Tolliver v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Mays left the scene of a fight, followed by an investigating officer who wanted to interview him about the altercation. Mays repeatedly declined to stop and talk to the officer, using “colorful and abusive language.” Observing Mays’s demeanor and suspecting that he might be armed, the officer told him to stop and touched his shoulder in order to keep a distance between the two. Mays’s manner of turning made the officer concerned for his safety, and he employed his already drawn Taser. A semi-automatic firearm fell to the ground. Mays ultimately was prosecuted for possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal the court’s denial of his motions to suppress the firearm, which he contended was the product of an illegal seizure, and to suppress a statement he had made to while he was in pretrial confinement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The officer’s stop was supported by reasonable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment. With respect to the statement, there was no independent violation of Mays’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel; there was no evidence that his waiver of his right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. View "United States v. Mays" on Justia Law

During the 2008–09 financial crisis, Wisconsin’s AnchorBank was struggling. Needing cash to pay its lenders, the bank’s president told vice president Weimert to try to sell the bank’s share in a Texas commercial real estate development. Weimert arranged a sale that exceeded the bank’s target price by one-third. Weimert persuaded potential buyers that he would be a useful partner. Their offer letters included having Weimert buy a minority interest in the property. The bank agreed and agreed to pay Weimert an unusual bonus to enable him to buy that interest. The government prosecuted Weimert for wire fraud on the theory that his actions established a scheme to obtain money or property by fraud. He was convicted on five of six counts under 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered judgment of acquittal. Federal wire fraud is an expansive tool, but does not criminalize a person’s lack of candor about the negotiating positions of parties to a business deal. Weimert led the buyer to believe the seller wanted him to have a piece of the deal. He led the seller to believe the buyer insisted he have a piece of the deal. All the actual terms, however, were fully disclosed and subject to negotiation. View "United States v. Weimert" on Justia Law

Hernandez and his mother entered the U.S. unlawfully when he was a small child. They adjusted their status to that of lawful permanent residents in 1989, when Hernandez was seven. His mother became a naturalized citizen when he was 16, but her naturalization did not confer citizenship on him automatically. Both of his parents would have had to naturalize before he turned 18, or they would have had to legally separate. Neither happened. Over the next 15 years, Hernandez was convicted for three controlled-substance violations, two retail thefts, and as a felon-in-possession of a firearm. In 2015 the government instituted removal proceedings based on his criminal history, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); (A)(iii); (C); and (A)(ii), At his hearing, the IJ informed Hernandez of his right to representation and asked whether he wanted a continuance. Hernandez did not respond, but explained that he thought he was a citizen. The IJ determined that Hernandez never obtained citizenship and asked Hernandez whether he feared being harmed if he were returned to Mexico, offering to continue the case to allow him to apply for asylum. Hernandez again declined. After the IJ entered an order of removal, Hernandez obtained counsel. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review, rejecting an argument that Hernandez was denied representation by counsel. View "Estrada-Hernandez v. Lynch" on Justia Law