Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography and was sentenced to 10 years in prison plus a fine and restitution and 5 years of supervised release. He filed a notice of appeal, but his federal public defender, asserting that the appeal is frivolous, filed an Anders brief asking to withdraw and advising that the defendant does not wish to challenge his guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a determination that the defendant knowingly waived all challenges to the conditions of supervised release, noting that the conditions of release were not mentioned in the Anders brief. The trial judge did not recite the conditions at the sentencing hearing. Although the defendant said that he had read the proposed conditions and discussed them with his lawyer, the judge did not ask whether he was waiving possible objections. The Seventh Circuit noted the “vagueness of so many of the conditions of supervised release imposed in this case,” making it harder “for the defendant to determine what restrictions it actually imposes and whether any of them are so onerous that he should object.” View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

Hill, an Indiana inmate, sued prison staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they had violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from inmates who threw feces at him on four occasions in 2011-2012. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that Hill had not exhausted administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Hill claimed that prison staff had prevented him from filing formal grievances. For the first two incidents, they had improperly refused to process grievance forms. For the third and fourth incidents, they prevented him from filing formal grievances. His counselor refused to give him a grievance form after the third incident, and after the fourth incident, defendant Snyder demanded to know its exact time. Hill is now time-barred by the prison’s grievance policy from further pursuing administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit concluded that summary judgment was improper for three of the incidents. Evidence of refusals to give Hill an available form was sufficient to permit a finding that Hill was prevented from grieving these incidents. The administrative remedies were not available to him. He was not required to hunt for a form from others. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

In 2008, Boulb was charged with three counts related to methamphetamine manufacturing materials, appeared in an Illinois court via video conference, and waived his right to appointed counsel. Boulb alleges that he met Hyde, his public defender in a 1998 DUI case, and that when Hyde offered him a plea deal, Boulb thought Hyde was his attorney discussing the prosecutor's offer. In fact, in 2008, Hyde was the State’s Attorney. Boulb entered a negotiated plea for a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. Weeks later, Boulb sought transcripts from his case, permission to proceed as a poor person, and appointment of counsel. The court ordered preparation of transcripts. Boulb took no further action. In 2012, Boulb pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 846; 841(c)(2); and 843(a)(6), in connection with a methamphetamine conspiracy. The court classified him as a career offender based on his prior state court convictions, including his 2008 conviction. In 2013, Boulb appealed his 2008 conviction, with a motion to withdraw his plea because there was no verbatim transcript of his waiver of counsel, as required. The Illinois appellate court dismissed the request as untimely. Boulb filed an affidavit in his federal criminal case concerning his interactions with Hyde. Relying on 28 U.S.C. 2255’s one-year limitations period, the court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have held a hearing to determine whether the limitations period was equitably tolled by Boulb’s purported mental incompetence. View "Boulb v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2008, Boulb was charged with three counts related to methamphetamine manufacturing materials, appeared in an Illinois court via video conference, and waived his right to appointed counsel. Boulb alleges that he met Hyde, his public defender in a 1998 DUI case, and that when Hyde offered him a plea deal, Boulb thought Hyde was his attorney discussing the prosecutor's offer. In fact, in 2008, Hyde was the State’s Attorney. Boulb entered a negotiated plea for a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. Weeks later, Boulb sought transcripts from his case, permission to proceed as a poor person, and appointment of counsel. The court ordered preparation of transcripts. Boulb took no further action. In 2012, Boulb pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 846; 841(c)(2); and 843(a)(6), in connection with a methamphetamine conspiracy. The court classified him as a career offender based on his prior state court convictions, including his 2008 conviction. In 2013, Boulb appealed his 2008 conviction, with a motion to withdraw his plea because there was no verbatim transcript of his waiver of counsel, as required. The Illinois appellate court dismissed the request as untimely. Boulb filed an affidavit in his federal criminal case concerning his interactions with Hyde. Relying on 28 U.S.C. 2255’s one-year limitations period, the court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have held a hearing to determine whether the limitations period was equitably tolled by Boulb’s purported mental incompetence. View "Boulb v. United States" on Justia Law

Chicago Officers were patrolling a high‐crime area. They noticed Common walking with his hand clenched, as if concealing something, and a bulge near Common’s waistband. They called out to Common, who dropped bags of crack cocaine and ran toward his residence, tripping on his stairs. The officers claim that a gun fell from Common’s pants. At the police station, the officers claim, Common was advised of his Miranda rights. Common stated: “I’m making sure nothing happens to me out there. They’re shooting.” The officers did not ask Common to write, sign, or review this alleged confession. At trial, Common admitted to possessing a personal use amount of cocaine but denied having a gun. According to Common, an officer said, “Give us a gun or you’ll get a gun.” Common’s mother, stepfather, brother, girlfriend, neighbor, and friend each testified that, during the arrest, officers referred to drugs and did not mention a gun. Common claims that he did not learn about the gun charge until he was transported to jail and that he did not know about the alleged confession until his attorney told him. After two mistrials, Common was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of Common’s motion to suppress and the admission of expert testimony about the difficulty of recovering fingerprints from firearms. View "United States v. Common" on Justia Law

Chicago Officers were patrolling a high‐crime area. They noticed Common walking with his hand clenched, as if concealing something, and a bulge near Common’s waistband. They called out to Common, who dropped bags of crack cocaine and ran toward his residence, tripping on his stairs. The officers claim that a gun fell from Common’s pants. At the police station, the officers claim, Common was advised of his Miranda rights. Common stated: “I’m making sure nothing happens to me out there. They’re shooting.” The officers did not ask Common to write, sign, or review this alleged confession. At trial, Common admitted to possessing a personal use amount of cocaine but denied having a gun. According to Common, an officer said, “Give us a gun or you’ll get a gun.” Common’s mother, stepfather, brother, girlfriend, neighbor, and friend each testified that, during the arrest, officers referred to drugs and did not mention a gun. Common claims that he did not learn about the gun charge until he was transported to jail and that he did not know about the alleged confession until his attorney told him. After two mistrials, Common was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of Common’s motion to suppress and the admission of expert testimony about the difficulty of recovering fingerprints from firearms. View "United States v. Common" on Justia Law

Gardner was shot to death in front of a Chicago apartment building in 1999. The state charged three men, including Carter, with Gardner’s murder. Carter was tried alongside his brother, Stone. Both were convicted of murder; Carter was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Following an unsuccessful state postconviction proceeding, Carter filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief on each of eight grounds presented. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to a single claim: ineffective assistance of counsel. The claim turned on the potential effect of the testimony of two witnesses who were not called in his defense at trial. The Illinois Appellate Court determined that the proffered testimony would not have changed the outcome. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that, while trial counsel’s performance may have been deficient in failing to investigate potential witnesses, the state court’s resolution of the prejudice analysis was not unreasonable. The result have been the same even if the witnesses had testified that Carter was unarmed; such testimony would not have illuminated whether Carter was legally accountable for the actions of his co‐defendants. View "Carter v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Ortiz was sentenced to prison for 135 months for three bank robberies. The Seventh Circuit reversed the judge’s supervised‐release rulings and remanded for full resentencing. On remand the judge reimposed the 135‐month prison sentence but altered the conditions of supervised release. Ortiz again appealed. The Seventh Circuit again remanded, noting the judge’s failure, at the hearing, to specify the term of supervised release. Finding most of the 18 discretionary conditions “unexceptional,” the court questioned the wording of conditions requiring Ortiz to “seek, and work conscientiously, at lawful employment” or pursue a course of study equipping him for such work and to “remain within the jurisdiction where [he] is being supervised,” unless granted permission to leave; permitting a probation officer to visit the defendant at any reasonable time at home, at work, or at any other reasonable location; and requiring that “if unemployed after the first 60 days of supervision, or … for 60 days after termination or lay‐off from employment,” the defendant must “perform at least 20 hours of community service per week at the direction of the U.S. Probation Service until gainfully employed.” View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

A drug-dealer-turned-informant (Weil) identified Hernandez and Gonzalez his suppliers. Weil had sold methamphetamine provided by Gonzalez, who lived in California but had designated Hernandez as a local go-between. The men had discussed the arrangement in recorded phone calls. After a controlled buy, arranged by Weil, a search of Hernandez’s apartment revealed four pounds of methamphetamine found in the lining of a cooler. Both Hernandez and Gonzalez were present in the apartment. Gonzalez was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 360 months in prison for the drug crimes plus a consecutive 60 months for the firearm offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence that he possessed the methamphetamine. A rational jury could find from the evidence at trial both that the drugs recovered were the same drugs discussed in the recordings—the shipment that Gonzalez planned to send by courier from California ahead of his own his arrival—and that Gonzalez retained control over those drugs after they arrived in Illinois. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 1995, Neal was working on Mitchell’s car in the backyard of Neal’s home when Mitchell hit Neal in the head with a brick, causing Neal’s death. Mitchell asserted that Neal had attacked him with a wrench. A post‐mortem toxicology report revealed that Neal had been using alcohol and cocaine. The prosecution presented forensic evidence and a witness (also using alcohol and drugs at the time of the incident) to refute Mitchell’s claim of self‐defense. A jury convicted Mitchell of first degree murder. The court sentenced him to 57 years in prison. After unsuccessful direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings, Mitchell unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and a due process violation. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed. Mitchell did not show that his trial counsel acted unreasonably in failing to request a second-degree murder “provocation” jury instruction or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s decision. The due process claim, concerning an unsworn, unsigned affidavit, which avers that the state offered not to charge the witness as an accessory to murder in exchange for her testimony against Mitchell, was procedurally defaulted. View "Mitchell v. Enloe" on Justia Law