Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Sheboygan officer Fickett stopped a car driving without license plates. He recognized Guidry, the driver, who was suspected of using and dealing drugs. Fickett called officer Saeger, who handled a drug-detection canine. Saeger arrived about five minutes later. Fickett was still preparing Guidry’s citation. Guidry initially stated that he did not consent to a dog sniff, and remained in the car. After another request, Guidry exited, leaving his door open. As the dog passed that door, he alerted. Guidry admitted that he had smoked marijuana at home and still had a “half blunt” in the car. Saeger searched the car and found the blunt, and a “safe can” containing baggies of heroin and cocaine. The next day, officers described the car search and provided information obtained from confidential informants during an ongoing investigation and obtained a warrant. A search of Guidry’s residence uncovered heroin, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana. A woman present during the search stated that Guidry maintained another residence where he prostituted women, feeding them heroin. Hours later, a commissioner authorized another warrant. Ultimately, Guidry was sentenced to 25 years in prison after pleading guilty to possessing and distributing illegal drugs and prostituting women. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence, upholding denial of motions to suppress evidence found during searches of his car and residences, but remanded disputed conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Guidry" on Justia Law

In 1992, Holmes, was convicted of two murders committed three years earlier at the restaurant where he worked. He and Vance had stabbed three people and stolen the till. He was sentenced to death. Holmes’s conviction and sentence were affirmed and state post‐conviction relief was denied. He sought federal habeas corpus, raising 18 grounds and claiming that he was not mentally competent to assist his lawyers in the habeas corpus proceeding. The judge found him competent and denied his claims on the merits. On remand, the court again found Holmes competent and reinstated the denial of his claims. The Seventh Circuit again reversed, instructing the court to suspend the habeas corpus proceeding “unless and until the state provides substantial new evidence that Holmes’s psychiatric illness has abated, or its symptoms are sufficiently controlled, to justify the resumption of the proceeding.” The district court complied, suspending the habeas proceeding until 2013, when the prison superintendent moved to lift the stay and dismiss the habeas proceeding, based the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Ryan v. Gonzales, rejecting “the assertion that the right to counsel implies a right to competence.” The court recognized that the substantive claims presented in Holmes’s petition are “record‐based” and granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding many of his claims defaulted and the others without merit. View "Holmes v. Levenhagen" on Justia Law

Smith distributed heroin in Chicago. Four times, he sold heroin to an FBI confidential source. The FBI recorded telephone conversations between the two, searched the source and his car, provided the money, equipped him with an audio recorder, and conducted surveillance from nearby. At Smith’s trial for distributing heroin (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)), the court read aloud the “Silvern instruction,” urging jurors to use their “considered judgment,” listen to fellow jurors, but “not surrender [their] honest beliefs” for the sake of a unanimous verdict. The jury’s first two notes to the court requested copies of the verdict form and clarification about the definition of “distribution.” In a third note, a juror referred to being bullied by another juror and asked to be removed. Defense counsel requested that the jurors continue deliberating. The court proposed repeating the Silvern instruction. Defense counsel did not object. Another juror submitted a note, asking to be removed, stating “I cannot make a sound disstion [sic].” Defense counsel responded, “Continue to deliberate.” The court replied “each of you is part of the jury that has been picked ….. must continue to deliberate.” Defense counsel stated that the instruction was “perfect.” The jury found Smith guilty 20 minutes later. The court polled each juror. Seven months later, with new counsel, Smith moved for a new trial, arguing that the response was unfairly coercive because it did not remind the jurors to hold onto their convictions, despite being bullied and being unable to make a sound decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the argument had been waived. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Hill walked into a Naperville Illinois Credit Union, pointed a pistol at the teller, and ordered her to give him money. Hill escaped with a bag containing about $134,000 and a dye pack. As Hill fled, it stained most of the cash red. Days later, Hill drove to a Milwaukee casino and fed dye-stained bills into a slot machine without playing the game. He cashed out, receiving vouchers for the money he had put into the machine, and redeemed the vouchers for $6,650. He attempted to repeat the process at an Indiana casino. A slot attendant alerted casino security. Questioned by Hammond Police Lieutenant McKechnie, moonlighting as a security officer, Hill seemed nervous. Hill said that he had found the money while changing a tire. The stacks of cash were still wrapped in bank bands; Hill was questioned further and his bag was searched, revealing the rest of the money. Hill was indicted for money laundering, bank robbery, and transporting stolen money in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 2113(a), (c), and (d); 2314). Hill unsuccessfully moved suppress his arrest, the search of his backpack, and his statements to McKechnie and to exclude expert testimony regarding historical cell site analysis. Hill was convicted and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motions. View "United States v Hill" on Justia Law

Chicago police responded to an emergency at the house where Pedro and Abraham lived with others. Pedro stated that armed intruders had broken in, tied up the occupants, and demanded money and drugs. In a bedroom, police saw a handgun, a digital scale, and a small amount of marijuana. A drug dog signaled the presence of drugs in Pedro’s van, parked outside. After obtaining a warrant, police discovered, in the van, a safe containing $271,080 and notes including dates and numbers. A second dog alerted to the safe. No drugs were found. Pedro stated that after the intruders left, he moved Abraham’s safe to the van in case they returned and that he did not know its contents. The government brought no criminal charges, but sought forfeiture, 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6). The brothers swore that the money is their savings from working and that they were not involved in criminal activity. Weeks before the seizure, U.S. Immigration had recorded Abraham saying that he did not have any “equities” in the U.S.; Abraham’s application for cancellation of removal, filed with the assistance of counsel six months after the seizure, lists only $2,000 in “cash assets.” The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the government. A jury reasonably could find that the evidence fails to establish, even by a preponderance, that the money is substantially connected to drug trafficking. View "Cruz-Hernandez v. Funds in the Amount of $271,080" on Justia Law

Lawler was charged, with 30 others, based on a heroin‐distribution conspiracy that led to five overdose deaths. Lawler “purchased relatively small quantities" to resell and for personal use. Lawler pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2 and 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); 846. The statutory sentencing range is 10 years (20 years if death results) to life, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(a)(2) also recommends a longer sentence when death results. The government argued that she sold the heroin that led to a death. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Lawler sold the heroin that killed Topczewski, and applied the 20‐year statutory minimum. The Supreme Court vacated Lawler’s sentence in light of Alleyne v. United States, which held that any fact that increases the statutory minimum sentence must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. On remand, the court found that Lawler’s U.S.S.G. base offense level should be 38.. Lawler’s Guidelines range soared from 15–21 months to 168–210 months. Based on substantial assistance, Lawler was sentenced to 98 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence; U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(a)(2) applies if “the offense of conviction establishes that death … resulted from the use of the [heroin].” Lawler’s “offense of conviction”—distributing heroin and conspiring to possess heroin with the intent to distribute—does not “establish” that a death resulted. View "United States v. Lawler" on Justia Law

A confidential informant arranged to purchase cocaine at Duenas’s garage. Trailed by federal agents, the informant drove to the garage, parked, entered (with the consent of Duenas, the owner), and discussed the transaction. He left, ostensibly to get money from his car. He drove a short distance, parked, and phoned agents to report that there was cocaine in the garage, in Rivera’s truck. Agents arrived, arrested Duenas outside the open garage and Rivera. They searched the garage and seized two kilograms of cocaine. Between the informant’s departure and their arrival, about three minutes elapsed. The court denied a motion to suppress, citing “consent once removed.” If an informant is invited to a place by someone who has authority to invite him, and the informant, on the premises, discovers probable cause to make an arrest or search and immediately summons law enforcement officers, the occupant of the place to which they are summoned is deemed to have consented to their presence. The defendants pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The search and arrests invaded no protected right of privacy; pausing to obtain warrants would have risked the disappearance of the contraband. An attempt to obtain warrants before the informant phoned might have been denied for lack of probable cause, View "United States v. Duenas" on Justia Law

Davis trafficked heroin and crack cocaine in Rockford, Illinois. In 2010, he pleaded guilty to narcotics conspiracy in exchange for a sentence equal to 66 percent of the greater of the low end of the USSG sentencing range or the statutory minimum term. Davis expected to receive a sentence of no more than 80 months. The Guidelines range as calculated, after discovery that Davis had military offenses and a court martial conviction, was much longer than expected. The court ordered Davis to serve 172 months in prison--66 percent of the low end of the Guidelines range. No appeal was filed. In 2013, the Supreme Court held, in Alleyne v. United States, that any factual determination that increases the statutory mandatory minimum term to which a defendant is subject must be charged in the indictment and proven beyond reasonable doubt to the factfinder. Davis sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 contending that sentencing findings regarding his criminal history increased the statutory minimum term and that his attorney was ineffective in advising him about the consequences of his plea and in failing to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that Davis had no viable claim under Alleyne because the Supreme Court has not yet declared that decision applicable retroactively on collateral review, and that Davis’s other claims were untimely. View "Davis v. USA" on Justia Law

Rainone was suspected of robberies. In 2009, officers placed a GPS device on Rainone’s vehicle without his consent or a warrant. With information gained from the device, they arrested Rainone, then obtained a warrant to search Rainone’s condominium, where they recovered a firearm from a nightstand in a bedroom that contained mail addressed to Rainone, photographs, and Rainone’s birth certificate and Illinois identification card. Rainone pled guilty to residential burglary in state court. Charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Rainone filed an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the GPS. Rainone’s roommate testified, in exchange for immunity, that no one except Rainone stayed overnight in the bedroom where the gun was found; that others had keys to the condominium; and that she never saw Rainone with a gun and never saw a gun in the condominium. The gun's registered owner testified that someone stole it from his home in 2008 and that he had never seen Rainone before. The court gave a jury instruction explaining that multiple people can share possession of an object. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Rainone’s conviction and 15-year sentence, rejecting a challenge to the jury instruction, and claims that the exclusionary rule should apply to evidence obtained because of GPS surveillance and that testimony that the gun was stolen was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. View "United States v. Rainone" on Justia Law

Smith was appointed to the Illinois House of Representatives to complete an unfinished term. During his campaign to be elected in his own right, his assistant, “Pete,” alerted the FBI that Smith might be corrupt. Pete began recording conversations. At the FBI’s suggestion, Pete told Smith that a constituent would provide $7,000 if Smith wrote a letter supporting her state grant application. There was no such woman; the money would come from the FBI. Smith wrote the letter and received $7,000. Smith used some of the money to pay campaign staff; a search of his home turned up the rest. At Smith’s trial for violating 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and 1951, the prosecutor introduced the recorded conversations with Pete. Neither side called Pete as a witness: he may have been stealing from the FBI. Pete said that he would not testify, asserting his constitutional self-incrimination privilege. The prosecutor did not seek use immunity; defense counsel did not call Pete to see whether the judge would honor his privilege assertion. Questioning why Smith did not raise the hearsay doctrine, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument under the Confrontation Clause. If the statements are not hearsay, they are not testimonial. Smith was not convicted on hearsay or of out-of-court testimonial statements. Smith’s own words and deeds convicted him. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law