Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The district court vacated defendant and his codefendants' convictions on the conspiracy charged in Count 1 of the indictment after the district court learned that the government had knowingly used false testimony at trial. Defendants were convicted on various counts stemming from their participation in a Chicago drug conspiracy. The district court left intact defendants’ convictions on a number of other counts that incorporated the conspiracy charged in Count 1 as a necessary element. In United States v. Wilbourn, the court held that the dismissal of the conspiracy count did not, by itself, necessitate dismissing the remaining counts encompassing the conspiracy. In this case, the district court's decision to vacate defendant's conspiracy conviction was primarily ordered toward redressing prosecutorial misconduct, rather than clearing a verdict obtained by false testimony. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial (or acquittal) on the gun and phone counts. In regard to defendant's challenges to his sentence, the court affirmed the district court's drug-quantity findings, as well as its refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing at sentencing. The court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and aggravated identity theft pursuant to a written plea agreement. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his multi‐year scheme to fraudulently obtain and use credit cards. On appeal, defendant alleged that the government materially breached the plea agreement by presenting evidence of twenty‐eight victims when only four were referred to by name in the agreement. The court enforced defendant's appellate waiver and dismissed the appeal, concluding that the plea agreement made clear that the named victims were either an example or just one of the companies he defrauded and therefore the government did not commit a material breach by introducing evidence that there were more victims than those specifically named. View "United States v. Malone" on Justia Law

Defendants Anthony Lomax, Brandon Lomax, and Demond Glover were convicted of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute 1,000 grams or more of heroin. Defendants raised various issues on appeal. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants and rejected their claim that they were running three separate heroin businesses. Anthony argued that he was not part of the conspiracy, but instead had a buyer-seller relationship with Brandon. The court agreed with Anthony that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury about the buyer-seller relationship. Therefore, the court remanded Anthony's case for a new trial with the instruction. The court rejected Brandon's argument that he was entitled to a jury determination on whether he had two prior drug convictions, holding that, pursuant to Almendarez-Torres v. United States, a sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction is not subject to the Sixth Amendment requirement for a jury determination. The court also rejected Brandon's argument that the district court’s finding that he had two prior drug convictions, which enhanced his mandatory minimum sentence to life imprisonment, violated the Constitution. Therefore, the court affirmed Brandon's sentence. Finally, the court rejected Demond's argument for resentencing because he was erroneously classified as a career offender in light of Johnson v. United States because the error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed Demond's sentence. View "United States v. Lomax" on Justia Law

Defendant contested the sentencing procedure the judge used after he pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment. The district judge arrived at the sentence after a multi-step process involving, as relevant in this appeal, Step 3 (holding a telephonic conference to discuss how to proceed) and Step 5 (two days after the telephonic conference - and a week before the date set for sentencing - the district court issued a short opinion that both summarized the extent of consensus at the conference and tentatively approved defendant’s request for a below-Guideline sentence). Defendant contends that Steps 3 and 5 violate the Due Process Clause, principally because he was not present during these stages. The court rejected defendant's arguments and concluded that the procedure the district judge used gave defendant more notice than required and more opportunities to be heard than required. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

When the defendant was sentenced, the guidelines range applicable to his multiple violations of the federal laws relating to child pornography was 360 months to life. Under the version of the guidelines in force years earlier, when the defendant had committed the crimes for which he was convicted, the guidelines range had been only 121 to 151 months. The judge sentenced him to 198 months. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed the conviction and sentence in 2012. In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Peugh v. United States, prohibiting subjecting a criminal defendant to an increase in his guidelines sentencing range made by the Sentencing Commission after the defendant had committed the crime for which he is being sentenced. Defendant filed his 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3) petition exactly one year later. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to vacate. The sentence was within the statutory range and was thus a sentence that the judge was constitutionally permitted to give both before and after Peugh. View "Conrad v. United States" on Justia Law

Muse, with others, boarded the MV Maersk Alabama in 2009, off the Somalian coast, taking its captain hostage. Muse initially stated that he was 16 at the time. Before a hearing to determine his age, Muse told an agent that he was 18. At the hearing, Muse refused to testify. A New York Magistrate concluded that Muse was at least 18 when the crime occurred. Prosecuted as an adult, Muse pleaded guilty to piracy, 18 U.S.C. 2280, and was sentenced to 405 months’ imprisonment. The plea agreement contains a promise “not to seek to withdraw his guilty plea or file a direct appeal or any kind of collateral attack" based on his age at the time of the crime or the time of the plea. Nonetheless, Muse filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing that a magistrate lacked authority to decide whether he was an adult and that his lawyer furnished ineffective assistance by not pursuing that question. Chief District Judge Preska denied that motion; the Second Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Turning to the Southern District of Indiana, where he is imprisoned, Muse unsuccessfully sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Muse has not identified any inadequacy in section 2255. The reason he could not contest the magistrate’s decision has nothing to do with section 2255, but was the consequence of his waiver. View "Muse v. Daniels" on Justia Law

In 2011, McCoy pled guilty, before a magistrate, to: enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a); transfer of obscene material to a minor, 18 U.S.C.1470; receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2); and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The district judged sentenced McCoy to 327 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court denied McCoy’s petition for certiorari in 2013. McCoy then filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that an insufficient factual basis existed to support his conviction for enticement. McCoy was appointed counsel. The motion was denied. The court declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Upon learning of the 2014 Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Harden, McCoy moved “to vacate appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Harden held that magistrate judges do not have authority to accept felony guilty pleas, and that neither the defendant’s consent nor lack of apparent harm to the defendant precluded reversal. The Seventh Circuit granted McCoy a certificate of appealability, but affirmed dismissal. McCoy did not demonstrate sufficient cause for failure to present this claim in the earlier proceedings. View "McCoy v. United States" on Justia Law

Harrington sold cocaine to a confidential informant. He was convicted of seven counts under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(c), and 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). Court-appointed attorney Charnock represented Harrington at trial. After trial, Harrington notified the court that he believed Charnock was ineffective. Without addressing the accusations, the court discharged Charnock and appointed Loeffel. Before the scheduled sentencing hearing, Loeffel sought a competency evaluation, reporting that Harrington had been exhibiting bizarre behavior and had been placed on suicide watch. Harrington opposed the motion and stated that Loeffel was trying to kill him. Harrington stated: “I’m ready to represent myself .... You can sentence me right now.” The judge denied Harrington’s request and granted Loeffel’s motion, while noting that Harrington had been in custody for a year without any question about his mental state. A psychologist who evaluated Harrington found no evidence of mental illness and opined that he was malingering. Harrington again expressed dissatisfaction with Loeffel. At the scheduled hearing, Harrington renewed his request to proceed pro se. The government warned that Harrington could appeal on grounds that he was denied the right to represent himself. The court questioned Harrington and stated that self‐representation was “as bad an idea as you may have ever had.” The court allowed Loeffel to withdraw, gave Harrington and additional two weeks, and set yet another hearing date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 360-month sentence. View "United States v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Alicea burglarized a Hammond residence; seeing a police vehicle, he fled, cutting through an alley and hiding in an above-ground pool in the backyard of another house. Sergeant Thomas was on canine duty, drove to the location, and released his 72-pound dog, Leo on a 30-foot leash. He announced his presence twice. Leo began barking by the pool. Officers Alvarez, Grisafi, and Fletcher arrived. Alicea was bleeding, looked in pain, and was screaming that a dog had bitten him and he needed medical help. Stories diverge about what happened. Alicea was taken to the squad car, where he was handcuffed. Someone called an ambulance. Alicea admits he may have told police and hospital personnel that he had used cocaine in order to explain why he started running and to gain admission into the hospital’s cardiac ward, where he believed he would receive better treatment. Aliciea sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Indiana Code 34-13-4-1, which governs indemnification of government employees for civil rights violations. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the facts taken in the light most favorable to Alicea create a material dispute as to whether each officer’s actions violated clearly established law. View "Alicea v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Wheeler pled guilty in 2006 to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 108 months in prison followed by 36 months of supervised release. Ten months after he began serving the term of supervision, the government sought revocation, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) and (g), alleging that Wheeler had tested positive for marijuana four times, missed nine drug-treatment sessions, and twice failed to submit a monthly supervision report. After Wheeler admitted the allegations, the district court revoked his supervised release and imposed 21 months of reimprisonment to be followed by another 12 months of supervised release. Wheeler filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney filed an Anders motion to withdraw, asserting that the appeal is frivolous. The Seventh Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. There is no constitutional right to counsel in a revocation proceeding where the defendant admits violating the conditions of his supervision and neither challenges the appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. View "United States v. Wheeler" on Justia Law