Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Wheeler pled guilty in 2006 to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 108 months in prison followed by 36 months of supervised release. Ten months after he began serving the term of supervision, the government sought revocation, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) and (g), alleging that Wheeler had tested positive for marijuana four times, missed nine drug-treatment sessions, and twice failed to submit a monthly supervision report. After Wheeler admitted the allegations, the district court revoked his supervised release and imposed 21 months of reimprisonment to be followed by another 12 months of supervised release. Wheeler filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney filed an Anders motion to withdraw, asserting that the appeal is frivolous. The Seventh Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. There is no constitutional right to counsel in a revocation proceeding where the defendant admits violating the conditions of his supervision and neither challenges the appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. View "United States v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Orozco-Sanchez, pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of a substance containing cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to 75 months of imprisonment, consecutive to a separate 41-month sentence from an earlier case for illegal reentry into the U.S., 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 6 U.S.C. 202(4). The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the district court erred by imposing certain written conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced from the bench. The court rejected arguments that the court did not properly consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) mitigation factors and used the 2013 Sentencing Guidelines instead of the 2014 Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Orozco-Sanchez" on Justia Law

Blake pled guilty to possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Based on his career offender status, he was sentenced to 216 months in prison. Blake did not appeal, but almost a year later filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on one of Blake’s claims, that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file a requested notice of appeal, then denied Blake’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on a finding that Blake did not ask his attorney to file an appeal. View "Blake v. United States" on Justia Law

Pu, a 28-year-old quantitative finance professional, worked for two financial institutions that traded stock and other assets for clients: “A” and Citadel. While working at each company, Pu copied proprietary software from his employer’s computer system to personal storage devices . The software allowed them to execute strategic trades at high speeds and were company trade secrets. Pu’s copying of the files was a significant data breach. Normally, crimes involving the theft of computer trade secrets lead to the sale of the data to, or the thief being hired by, a company that will use the data. Pu, however, used the data to conduct computerized stock market trades for himself and lost $40,000. Pu pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a trade secret belonging to A and unlawful transmission of a trade secret belonging to Citadel and was sentenced to 36 months in prison and ordered him to pay over $750,000 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, stating that the district court’s factual findings did not support its conclusion that Pu intended to cause a loss of approximately $12 million and that the court erred by awarding restitution without evidence that reflected a complete accounting of the victims’ investigation costs. View "United States v. Pu" on Justia Law

On February 14, three masked men walked into a Fort Wayne bank; pointed their guns at employees; handcuffed the manager; and left with approximately $100,000. Officers arrived and discovered a loaded handgun the robbers had left behind. Forensic analysis found Seals’ DNA on the ammunition inside the gun. On March 20, an officer attempted to initiate a traffic stop of a black Infiniti; a high-speed chase ensued, ending when the Infiniti crashed into parked cars. Two occupants fled on foot. They were not apprehended. Officers searched the car and found a handgun, a cell phone, a traffic citation that had been issued to Seals, Seals’ driver’s license, a black ski mask, boxes of ammunition—some of which matched the gun recovered from the bank—and $1,231 in $1 and $10 bills. Seals voluntarily met with the FBI and stated that he had loaded the gun for his brother, but that his participation ended there. Convicted of armed bank robbery, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, he was sentenced to 272 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that the government introduced improper propensity evidence, but remanded for resentencing because the court erred in applying enhancements. View "United States v. Seals" on Justia Law

Stanbridge was walking to his car carrying a duffel bag when Quincy police officers passed. Stanbridge looked surprised, so they shadowed him, hoping to catch him in a traffic violation. After driving a short distance, Stanbridge activated his turn signal, pulled over, and parked parallel to the curb. Officer Bangert, the driver, had not witnessed any traffic violation. Officer Hodges later reported that Stanbridge had turned left without signaling. Unaware of his partner’s observation, Bangert stopped behind Stanbridge and activated his flashers because Stanbridge had not activated his signal 100 feet before pulling over. Stanbridge had a valid driver’s license, but a criminal history check showed “priors.” Bangert requested a drug-sniffing dog. Stanbridge’s only drug conviction was for marijuana possession, 11 years earlier when he was 17. The dog arrived 10 minutes later; its alert led to the discovery of methamphetamine, marijuana, and pills inside Stanbridge’s duffel bag. He confessed to acting as a “middleman.” Stanbridge was charged with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and possession with intent to distribute. The court denied Stanbridge’s motion to suppress, finding the left turn irrelevant, but reasoning that the Illinois Vehicle Code is ambiguous concerning whether a driver must signal for 100 feet before pulling to a curb, and finding Bangert’s belief reasonable, if mistaken. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that Bangert's belief was not objectively reasonable. View "United States v. Stanbridge" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing cocaine and cocaine base with intent to distribute, distributing cocaine base, and possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). In 1998 he was sentenced to consecutive prison sentences of 40 years on counts 1 and 3 and 20 years on count 2, totalling 100 years. In 2011 the Sentencing Commission promulgated Guidelines Amendment 782, retroactively reducing the base offense level and changing the recommended guidelines sentence from life to 30 years to life. The court reduced defendant’s sentence, imposing 30 years on counts 1 and 3 and 20 years on count 2, to run consecutively: a total sentence of 80 years. The judge believed that he had to make the sentences consecutive. The Seventh Circuit reversed. When defendant was first sentenced, the judge had to make the sentences on the individual counts consecutive to get as close to a life sentence as possible. Amendment 782 would not allow reconsideration of any feature of the original sentence other than its length, but allows sentences not exceeding 30 years on each count and making all the sentences run concurrently, as authorized by U.S.S.G. 5G1.2(c)—80 years is not the floor. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Campbell bought a stranger’s social security number, went to the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles and obtained a new license, then opened three lines of credit and purchase a vehicle. After an FBI investigation, Campbell and others were indicted for wire, loan, and social-security fraud. Campbell pled guilty to using a false social security number with intent to deceive, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), waiving his right to appeal his conviction on any ground and his right to appeal his sentence, including under 18, U.S.C. 3742, regardless of how the sentence was calculated. Neither party filed a sentencing memorandum or objected to the PSR’s proposed guideline calculations and conditions of supervised release. The court sentenced Campbell to 21 months of imprisonment, at the low end of the guideline range, to be served consecutively to 12 months imposed for violating supervised release in another case, to pay about $15,000 in restitution, and to three years of supervised release subject to conditions recommended in the PSR. Upholding the waiver, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Campbell’s appeal of conditions requiring that he: not leave “the judicial district”; “support” his family and meet family responsibilities; work “regularly” and notify his probation office of changes in employment; avoid “excessive” alcohol use; not knowingly “associate” with felons; permit regular probation visits; and notify third parties of risks occasioned by his criminal record, personal history, and characteristics. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Indiana law forbids using a device to “text” or email while operating a vehicle, but allows other uses of a cell phone. A police officer, passing a car on an interstate highway, saw that the driver was holding a cellphone in his right hand, that his head was bent toward the phone, and that he “appeared to be texting.” Paniagua was not texting, but searching for music. An examination of his cell phone revealed that it had not been used to send a text message at the time. The officer received Paniagua’s permission to search the car and discovered five pounds of heroin concealed in the car’s trunk. After the court denied a motion to suppress, Paniagua pleaded guilty to possession of heroin intending to distribute it and was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The government failed to establish that the officer had probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that Paniagua was violating the no-texting law. The officer saw behavior consistent with several lawful cell phone uses. The court speculated: Suppose the officer had observed Paniagua drinking from a cup, would the district court's reasoning justify stopping the driver for possible drunk driving? View "United States v. Paniagua-Garcia" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess an illegal drug intending to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841, and to possession of a firearm for use in his drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). He was sentenced to 152 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The court uheld the increase to the defendant’s guidelines range by two levels on the ground that he was “manager, or supervisor,” of joint drug activity with a man he had recruited to sell heroin, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). However, the government conceded error in regard to supervised release. The district judge failed to make the findings required by 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and 3583(d) to justify the length of a term of supervised release and the particular conditions and failed to state at sentencing the conditions that he was imposing. The court particularly noted that the judge did not explain why he was requiring the defendant to “permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and … permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer.” View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law