Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Bell and Dixon were cellmates in the Terre Haute Federal Penitentiary. Video recorded on June 18, 2011, showed the two entering inmate Pendleton's cell, then leaving and depositing clothing into a trash can. An inspection revealed a makeshift ice-pick, wrapped in bloody clothing, bearing Bell’s name and inmate number. The blood was Pendelton’s. No blood or fingerprints were found on the sharpened metal rod. Searches of individual cells in the unit unearthed no weapons. Dixon said that he had thrown Bell’s clothes into the trash can without Bell’s knowledge because the clothes were soiled and gave a story about passing Pendleton in the hall that was inconsistent with the videos. Bell was convicted of premeditated murder within the special jurisdiction of the United States, 18 U.S.C. 1111; Dixon was convicted as an accessory after the fact to that murder, 18 U.S.C. 3. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Bell’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he premeditated the murder and Dixon’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he aided Bell with the intent to prevent Bell from being held to account for the murder. The court upheld admission of evidence concerning Bell's inculpatory statement and the decision to shackle Dixon’s legs during trial. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Lacy was indicted for distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). With prior drug convictions, Lacy faced a maximum term of incarceration of 30 years. Lacy pled guilty and waived his appeal rightts. The government agreed to allow Lacy to cooperate and recommend a reduction for substantial assistance, and recommend a sentence at the low end of the guideline range. During the plea hearing, Lacy acknowledged that he understood his appeal rights and that he agreed to waive them. The government honored its promises and recommended a sentence of 168 months. At the close of its presentation, the government asked that Lacy’s federal sentence run consecutively to any sentence that he would receive for pending state‐court charges, referring to the request “as a courtesy” to the state prosecutor. The court sentenced Lacy to 168 months, to be served consecutively to any state sentence. Lacy’s counsel made a record of his objection to the imposition of a consecutive sentence without specifying the grounds for his objection. Lacy pleaded guilty to the state charges and received a 20-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit dismissed because Lacy had waived his right to appeal, but expressed “reservations about the way in which the consecutive sentence was imposed.” View "United States v. Lacy" on Justia Law

Maxfield was searched by law officers who discovered more than 100 pseudoephedrine pills and half a gram of methamphetamine; their search of his motel room revealed other items used to make methamphetamine. He admitted manufacturing methamphetamine. Maxfield was released and warned to discontinue his illegal activities. One week later, Maxfield sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant. Maxfield pled guilty to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), manufacturing methamphetamine, distributing methamphetamine, and possessing a listed chemical knowing it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. The PSR concluded that Maxfield was responsible for 144 grams of methamphetamine. Because Maxfield had prior felony convictions for residential burglary and aggravated battery, he was a career offender with an offense level of 34, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, 4B1.2(a)(2) . After a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, with a criminal history score of 22, his guidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. Maxfield objected to his career offender designation, asking the court to consider that he entered the residence with a key and that his was a non‐violent burglary. He emphasized mitigating factors: drug addiction, childhood abuse, family deaths. The court denied the motion for a downward departure and sentenced Maxfield to 188 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Maxfield" on Justia Law

Rosales pleaded guilty to a charge that he conspired to possess, with intent to distribute, 500 grams or more of cocaine, and was sentenced to a term of 120 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting an argument that the court did not give adequate reasons for rejecting his contention that he should not be sentenced as a career offender. Rosales played a managerial role in the Sauk County cocaine trafficking ring. He faced an advisory sentence of between 188 and 235 months. The range would have been lower—140 to 175 months—absent a three-level increase resulting from the career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Rosales’s criminal history reflects a pattern of drug sales that began with marijuana, transitioned to cocaine (a more serious narcotic), and culminated in a multi-participant trafficking operation. In 2004 and 2008 Rosales was convicted of possessing, with the intent to distribute, less than 200 grams and more than 2,500 grams of marijuana, respectively; in 2011, he was convicted of possessing, with the intent to distribute, between one and five grams of cocaine. View "United States v. Rosales" on Justia Law

Spitzer pleaded guilty to 10 counts of mail fraud, based on a scheme that took in $106 million, which Spitzer promised to invest for clients. Less than $30 million was invested. The remainder was used to pay earlier investors or was siphoned off by Spitzer and others. The presentence report calculated a Guideline range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment. The base offense level was 7. A loss of approximately $34 million added 22 levels; the existence of more than 250 victims added six more. The PSR proposed two levels for use of sophisticated means, two because Spitzer personally took more than $1 million, and another four because Spitzer claimed to have acted as an investment adviser. Deducting three for acceptance of responsibility resulted in level 40. Spitzer’s lawyer asked that the loss be reduced to account for the fact that more than $70 million was returned to investors, some of whom were made whole, and $30 million was invested. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 300-month sentence, noting that Spitzer owes restitution of $34 million to 458 people. Spitzer did not contend that the PSR was wrong in calculating the offense level to 40, so the abbreviated judicial explanation was not error. View "United States v. Spitzer" on Justia Law

Stern posted an ad, “Coach Seeking Boy” in the “Men Seeking Men” section of Craigslist. An undercover police officer posed as a 14‐year‐ old boy, “Peter,” to communicate with Stern via e‐mail and Myspace. Peter repeatedly stated that he was 14 years old. They agreed to meet in the restroom of a McDonald’s. When Stern appeared at the agreed time, he was arrested. Police searched Stern’s car and found a box of unopened condoms and personal lubricant. Stern was charged with using a computer to facilitate a sex crime against a child, in violation of Wisconsin’s statutory rape law. The child sexual assault crimes are strict liability crimes. Stern’s defense was that he knew Peter was really an adult based upon the language Peter used and the “dated” photographs Peter provided. While serving his 25-year sentence, Stern unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Stern’s argument that the Wisconsin appellate court’s unforeseeable interpretation of the belief and intent elements of the statute violated his due process rights by depriving him of fair notice of such elements. View "Stern v. Meisner" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute an illegal drug, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a), and was sentenced to 114 months in prison, below the career offender guidelines range of 151 to 188 months. His career offender status was based on 1997 offenses, when defendant was 19 years old, and involved small amounts of crack cocaine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence, rejecting arguments that it was based on unreliable evidence consisting of police reports of previous crimes that he’d committed, unrelated to the convictions that resulted in the career offender determination that increased his guidelines range. Those offenses, from 2001 and 2005, involved greater amounts of cocaine. A judge may allow his exercise of sentencing discretion to be influenced by a summary of police reports in the presentence report. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Trudeau “spent his career hawking miracle cures and self-improvement systems of dubious efficacy.” The FTC sued him under consumer-protection laws. Trudeau entered a consent decree, promising not to misrepresent his books in TV infomercials. Later, Trudeau published The Weight Loss Cure “They” Don’t Want You to Know About and promoted it in infomercials, as “simple” and “inexpensive,” able to be completed at home, and not requiring food restrictions or exercise. The book described a regimen mandating prescription hormone injections and severe dietary and lifestyle constraints. The court imposed a civil contempt sanction and issued an order to show cause why Trudeau should not face imprisonment of up to six months. At Trudeau’s request, the case was reassigned. The new judge issued a new show-cause order, removing the six-month cap. Trudeau was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161. More than 70 nonexcludable days elapsed between the date the government agreed to prosecute the first show-cause order and the commencement of trial. The Act applies only to crimes punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment. Because the first show-cause order capped the potential penalty at six months, the Act did not apply. The second show-cause order removed the cap, starting the clock, but Trudeau’s trial began within 70 days from that date. The court also rejected challenges to jury instruction on “willfulness,” the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of his sentence. View "United States v. Trudeau" on Justia Law

In 2011, Solano was indicted on two counts of distributing cocaine and one count of conspiring to obtain and distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841. Solano pleaded guilty; the government agreed to dismiss one of the cocaine counts and recommend a reduction of the sentencing guideline range to reflect acceptance of responsibility. Solano’s written plea agreement included a waiver of Solano’s right to appeal his conviction, sentence, or any restitution order on any ground, including any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the hearing, the judge explained the rights that Solano was giving up and reviewed particular provisions contained in the plea agreement, including Solano’s appeal waiver, and found that Solano had knowingly waived his rights and that his plea was voluntary. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of his motion (28 U.S.C. 2255) based on trial counsel’s failure to file an appeal at his request, which, he claimed, constituted ineffective assistance. While the district court found the petition untimely, the Seventh Circuit stated that the Sixth Amendment does not require an attorney to accede to a defendant’s request to file an appeal where the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived that right as part of a valid plea agreement. View "Solano v. United States" on Justia Law

By age 20, McCarroll was running an extensive conspiracy involving the sale of heroin in McCarroll’s southside housing project. A jury found McCarroll guilty of multiple drug-related crimes. At McCarroll’s sentencing in 1996, the district court found him responsible for distributing over 75 kilograms of heroin, giving him a base offense level of 38, and applied a 4-level increase for his leadership role, resulting in a total offense level of 42. Combined with a criminal history category of III, McCarroll’s total offense level yielded a guidelines range of 360 months to life, and the court sentenced him to 396 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. He moved under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for a reduced sentence based on Amendments 782 and 788 to the sentencing guidelines, which retroactively lowered by two the base offense level for his drug crimes. The court denied McCarroll’s motion, stating that U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 makes clear that a defendant is ineligible for a sentence reduction if a retroactive amendment does not lower the defendant’s guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting McCarroll’s argument that a “’sentencing range’ and ‘guideline range’ are not necessarily the same.” The court characterized the argument as frivolous. View "United States v. McCarroll" on Justia Law