Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Vivas-Ceja, a citizen of Mexico, was removed from the U.S. on three occasions. In 2013, he was arrested at an airport in Madison, Wisconsin, for illegally reentering the country. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The maximum sentence for a defendant with a prior conviction for an aggravated felony can be up to 20 years. The definition of “aggravated felony” is supplied by the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. 16(b), which includes “any … offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” The district court concluded that Vivas-Ceja’s Wisconsin conviction for fleeing an officer was a crime of violence, and imposed a sentence of 21 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding section 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence” unconstitutionally vague in light of the 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States. In Johnson the Supreme Court found the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA’s residual clause. View "United States v. Vivas-Ceja" on Justia Law

In 2007 Garner was convicted of federal gun and drug crimes and sentenced to 322 months’ imprisonment. Garner appealed, but counsel filed a no-merit “Anders” brief; the Seventh Circuit dismissed. A year later, Garner sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2013, new counsel amended the motion, arguing: enhancement of his sentence using a state conviction that was later vacated violated Garner’s due process rights, and his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to evidence that came directly from plea negotiations. The court granted Garner’s motion, finding merit in his first argument and vacating the sentence. Garner filed a pro se notice of appeal, relating to the effectiveness of counsel issue. In the meantime, the district court held the resentencing hearing and reduced Garner’s sentence to 248 months. Garner did not file timely notice of appeal from that judgment, but appealed from the new criminal judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his original appeal, stating that the fact that the court accepted one reason for its outcome and rejected another is of no importance. The court vacated the resentencing, however, and remanded for full resentencing, at which both sides will be free to present all their arguments, including those related to ineffective assistance. View "Garner v. United" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Illinois Stateville Prison, filed a complaint against members of the prison staff, claiming that a prison prohibition against inmates receiving any magazine that “includes sexually explicit material that by its nature or content poses a threat to security, good order, or discipline” violates his First Amendment rights. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the prison regulation is valid because it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and Defendant made no valid case against the district judge’s grant of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Payton v. Cannon" on Justia Law

Mathew Neisler worked as a stockman in food service during his incarceration at the Waupun Correctional Institution. Three months after Neisler suffered work-related injury, he was fired for “medical” reasons. Neisler filed suit against defendant prison administrators, alleging that he had been fired because of a disability in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Defendants filed motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Neisler was not entitled to pursue an employment-discrimination claim under Title II. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Title II of the ADA covered Neisler’s claim but that no rational finder of fact could find disability discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Title II does not apply to a prisoner’s claim of employment discrimination in a prison job. View "Neisler v. Tuckwell" on Justia Law

An Illinois state trooper stopped a car that had been speeding. The subsequent search of the car revealed 1.5 kilograms of cocaine, which the police seized. Defendant, who was one of two passengers in the car, was prosecuted in federal court for possessing and intending to sell the cocaine found in the car. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine evidence. The district judge denied the motion, concluding (1) as a passenger in the car, Defendant had no standing to challenge the search; and (2) even if Defendant had standing, the delay did not make the search unlawful. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) Defendant’s conviction was proper; but (2) the district court erred in imposing certain conditions of supervised release as part of Defendant’s sentence. View "United States v. Sanford" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender. A federal district court sentenced Appellant to thirty months in prison, five years of supervised release, a special assessment, and a fine. As part of the sentence, the district court imposed several special conditions of supervised release. Appellant did not object to any of these conditions in the district court, but he challenged them on appeal, arguing that they were unjustified restrictions on his liberty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit plain error in its decision to impose the challenged conditions of supervised release, as the conditions imposed no greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary for the purposes of supervised release. View "United States v. Douglas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in an Illinois state court, Appellant was found guilty of murdering his girlfriend’s one-year-old daughter. After exhausting his state appeals, Appellant filed a federal habeas petition, claiming, inter alia, that the forty-two-month delay in bringing his case to trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the habeas petition. On direct appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the pretrial delay was presumptively prejudicial but that the delay was attributable to continuances requested by Appellant’s counsel and did not impair the defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Illinois court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law, and therefore, habeas relief was unwarranted. View "O'Quinn v. Spiller" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to a drug conspiracy charge. The plea agreement contained a waiver of Defendant’s right to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence. The district judge did not expressly discuss the collateral-attack waiver with Coleman at the guilty-plea hearing. At sentencing, the district court imposed a term of supervised release that included “standard conditions.” The Seventh Circuit (1) affirmed the conviction, holding that the plea colloquy did not comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 with respect to the collateral-attack waiver, but the omission did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights; and (2) remanded for resentencing, as certain conditions of supervised release imposed on Defendant were impermissibly vague. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Anthony Zimmerman, the president and owner of Premier Forest Products Products, Inc. (together, Plaintiffs), was hired to harvest trees on certain property. When the landowner discovered that Zimmerman had been harvesting trees without regard to fence lines and had taken more trees than he was supposed to, the landowner warned Zimmerman to leave the property. When Zimmerman refused to do so, the landowner sought help from the Carroll County Sheriff’s Office. The sheriff’s office arrested Zimmerman for criminal trespass. Plaintiffs sued the sheriff’s office and its sheriff, deputy, chief deputy, and detective (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights in arresting him for criminal trespass. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Defendant and, alternatively, that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Zimmerman failed to establish that probable cause was lacking under the circumstances presented in this case or that Defendants engaged in arbitrary conduct unjustifiable by any government interest. View "Zimmerman v. Doran" on Justia Law

Sixteen days after Defendant, a dentist, learned Plaintiff, an inmate of Illinois’s Stateville prison, was complaining of a tooth abscess, Defendant diagnosed an abscessed molar, prescribed penicillin to bring the infection under control, and extracted the molar. Plaintiff sued the dentist and a prison guard (together, Defendants), charging them with deliberate indifference to his abscess. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence of deliberate indifference by Defendants to Plaintiff’s serious medical need precluded granting summary judgment in their favor. Remanded. View "Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea" on Justia Law