Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, defendant Jason Austin was the leader of a street-level, retail drug-trafficking operation. Austin received drugs from suppliers and sold the drugs to users, with the help of many others. Money was passed up a chain of “managers” or “bundle runners,” who in exchange distributed drugs to “pack workers” for sales. Drug proceeds were then finally passed from the managers up to Austin. Off-duty Chicago Police Detective Robert Soto and Kathryn Romberg were shot and killed while sitting in Soto’s car on the west side of Chicago. The investigation into their murders focused on Austin and his operation. The murder case against Austin was ultimately dismissed. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Chicago Police Department then began what became a two-year investigation into Austin and his operation. The investigation included numerous undercover drug purchases, extensive surveillance, and interviews with informants and coconspirators. At the end of the investigation in November 2010, over 100 people were arrested. Austin was indicted on federal charges relating to his role in the drug-trafficking conspiracy, particularly for his participation from January 2008 through June 2010. A jury found Austin guilty of five counts of drug distribution and one count of conspiracy to distribute, but only for an amount of less than 100 grams of heroin. He appealed only his sentence, challenging the quantity of drugs attributable to him and the court’s finding that he played a leading role in the organization. In particular, he argued that a key witness has been so thoroughly discredited by alleged misstatements and contradictions that it was error for the court to credit his testimony at least in part. After review, the Seventh Circuit disagreed, and affirmed Austin’s sentence. View "United States v. Austin" on Justia Law

Appellant, an alien, has been frequently removed from the United States in light of his criminal record. Appellant has been convicted three times of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). In this, Appellant's most recent prosecution for illegal reentry, Wisconsin turned Appellant over to immigration officials after he had been caught fleeing the scene of an accident. Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea preserving for review his argument that the district judge wrongly rejected his defense under section 1326(d). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Appellant did not establish a defense under section 1326(d). View "United States v. Larios-Buentello" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Petitioner’s attempted armed robbery conviction and ordered resentencing on the murder conviction, arguing that the evidence did not support the conviction for attempted armed robbery. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a second appeal challenging his conviction for first-degree murder. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Petitioner’s murder conviction, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied further review. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment had been violated and that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his murder conviction. The district court denied relief, concluding that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claims. View "Crockett v. Butler" on Justia Law

On four occasions, Normal, Illinois, police attached battery‐powered, global‐positioning‐ system devices (GPS) to the Lincoln sedan belonging to Martin, a suspected drug trafficker, in an effort to monitor his movements. The police attached the GPS without seeking a warrant or consulting legal counsel regarding the constitutionality of this investigative technique. The GPS tracking assisted police in identifying locations Martin used for his drug‐trafficking operations, which later led to a search warrant, seizure of evidence, and indictment. Before Martin’s trial, the Supreme Court held that attachment of a GPS to a vehicle and its subsequent use to track a vehicle’s movements constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Martin’s motion to suppress, finding that Seventh Circuit 2010 precedent permitted warrantless use of the GPS. Martin was later convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, the exclusionary rule does not apply “when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent.” View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

A building that housed the Café, other restaurants, and 10 apartments burned to the ground. The Cafe’s owner, Rahman, signed a consent form that allowed investigators to look for the “origin and cause” of the fire. Investigators performed a line search looking for a laptop and safe that Rahman told investigators were in the basement, but found neither. Based on the absence of the laptop, the presence of gasoline, and other evidence, investigators settled on arson as the cause of the fire. Rahman was charged with arson and lying to investigators about the location of the laptop. He was acquitted of the arson counts, but convicted of providing false statements to the government. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that evidence from the basement line search should have been suppressed as exceeding the scope of Rahman’s consent. The investigators had already ruled out the basement as the origin of the fire when they conducted the search. Their only purpose was to find secondary and circumstantial evidence of arson, which exceeded the scope of Rahman’s consent. The fact that one of Rahman’s computers was found at his home and did not contain business records was not sufficient to find him guilty of the charged false statement. View "United States v. Rahman" on Justia Law

Chatman was charged with six counts of distributing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), based on separate transactions between Chatman and an undercover agent. He pled guilty to one count, his sixteenth criminal conviction since 1996 and third for delivery of a controlled substance. He had convictions for possession of a controlled substance, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, domestic battery, driving under the influence, and driving on a suspended or revoked license. At Chatman’s sentencing hearing, when describing Chatman’s criminal history, the government stated that Chatman had “several” possession of a controlled substance convictions and “several” DUI convictions. After hearing arguments, the court assigned him 27 criminal history points under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1, which produced a Category VI criminal history designation. The court matched this criminal history designation with the instant offense score of 29 to reach a suggested sentence of 151 to 188 months. The court heard arguments regarding the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, then sentenced Chatman to 160 months in prison and three years of supervised release, with conditions including refraining from “excessive use of alcohol,” and of “any narcotics,” and having a mental health evaluation during supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court improperly relied on inaccurate statements by the government regarding his criminal history, but modified to expunging a mental health evaluation that was not orally pronounced from the bench. View "United States v. Chatman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to fraud consisting of having abused her position as a Chicago public-school board member by accepting kickbacks of more than $500,000 from bus companies to which she steered transportation contracts worth $21 million. The parties stipulated that the value of the benefit received from the fraud was $7-$20 million, and so the guidelines range would have been 360 months to life. The guidelines in effect at the time required a 20-level enhancement for honest services fraud when “the value of the payment, the benefit received or to be received in return for the payment, the value of anything obtained or to be obtained by a public official or others acting with a public official, or the loss to the government from the offense, whichever is greatest,” was between $7 and $20 million, U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2), 2B1.1(b), but the statutory maximums for the two counts were 20 years and 3 years respectively, and that changed the range to 276 months. The judge imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 120 months, ordered the defendant to pay restitution of $7.2 million, and imposed a year of supervised release, which the judge may have thought mandatory. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the district court’s explanation inadequate. View "United States v. Harper" on Justia Law

Rogers has a long criminal record that includes West Virginia convictions for sexually abusing his daughter and stepdaughter. He is required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act to register in each state in which he resides, is employed, or is a student. 42 U.S.C. 16911(1), 16913. In 2011 he moved from West Virginia to Indiana and failed to register there. A few months later his 18-year-old daughter reported to West Lafayette police that Rogers was sexually abusing her. Rogers pleaded guilty to traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250. The judge applied a six-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) for committing a sex offense (incest against his daughter) while in failure-to-register status. The judge refused to award credit for acceptance of responsibility because Rogers falsely denied this relevant conduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 105-month sentence. The threshold definition of “sex offense” found in section 16911(5)(A)(i) requires a categorical approach—an inquiry limited to the elements of the offense—but the exception in subsection (5)(C) calls for an examination of the specific facts of the offense conduct. The district court conducted the correct analysis and properly applied the section 2A3.5 enhancement. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Vinyard pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute. At sentencing, he started to backtrack on whether he was admitting some of the relevant conduct. After consulting his attorney, he withdrew his objections. His hesitation prompted the district judge (Gilbert) to vacate his plea and sentence on the court’s own initiative, which led to unusual proceedings culminating in a writ of mandamus ordering the court to reinstate Vinyard’s plea and sentence. Vinyard tried to challenge his plea in district court proceedings conducted to comply with the mandate. Judge Stiehl rejected Vinyard’s challenge and reinstated the plea and sentence. Vinyard then could have filed either direct appeal or a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255. On his attorney’s advice, he chose collateral attack. He later sought reinstatement of his right to direct appeal, arguing that advice caused him to default some claims and amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. The district court denied relief, concluding that the decision to forgo a direct appeal was strategic and not objectively unreasonable, and that Vinyard could not show prejudice in any event. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Vinyard proved neither deficient performance nor prejudice. View "Vinyard v. United States" on Justia Law

A jury found Ferrell, a licensed psychologist, and Bryce, Ferrell’s employee, guilty of six counts of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. Ferrell was sentenced to 88 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s refusal to admit two out-of-court statements made by Bryce’s brother (also Ferrell’s employee), and contained in a voicemail and an email. The district court held that these statements were hearsay and did not fall within Rule 804(b)(3)’s hearsay exception. The district court held that although the brother was unavailable to testify, the statements were not against his interest and the corroborating circumstances did not indicate that his statements were trustworthy. The court also upheld admission of testimony by another doctor concerning Ferrell’s conduct while in Texas. The court found that the testimony did not constitute impermissible character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). View "United States v. Ferrell" on Justia Law