Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Madison Police Department established a focused deterrence program to increase surveillance of repeat violent offenders. Alston, one of 10 repeat violent offenders originally selected for the program, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was selected for the program because of his race, and arguing that his inclusion in the program deprived him of liberty without due process of law and that he was stigmatized and subjected to increased surveillance, penalties, and reporting requirements. Alston presented evidence that blacks accounted for only 4.5 percent of the Madison population but 37.6 percent of arrests and 86 percent of the program; four candidates associated with allegedly black gangs were selected while the one candidate associated with an allegedly white gang was not. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Alston failed to produce evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the program had a discriminatory effect or purpose or that Alston’s legal rights were altered by inclusion in the program. Alston’s statistics did not address whether black, repeat violent offenders were treated differently from white, repeat violent offenders and were not evidence of discriminatory effect. View "Alston v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

Nance shot and killed her husband, Timothy, in the shower. Four days later, Nance reported him missing. Fond du Lac detectives interviewed Timothy’s family, his new girlfriend, friends, and Nance’s sister, Ewell. They learned of the couple’s history of threats and violence. One witness had noticed that the shower curtain, liner, and hooks in the Nance bathroom had been replaced after Timothy disappeared. The detectives reviewed surveillance tapes from a local store, which showed Ewell and Nance buying new shower curtain liners and hooks the night Timothy went missing. Executing a search warrant at the Nance house, detectives seized “biological specimens,” a “projectile” from the bathtub pipes, and other evidence. Ewell refused to answer questions. Both sisters were arrested. A judge, relying on Ledger’s statement and affidavit, determined that probable cause existed to detain Ewell. She spent 12 days in custody before her release. Ewell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. While her appeal of the dismissal of that case was pending. Ewell was convicted in state court of hiding a corpse, harboring or aiding a felony, and resisting or obstructing an officer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For purposes of qualified immunity, it would not have been plain to a reasonable officer that arresting and detaining Ewell under the circumstances would have been unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. View "Ewell v. Toney" on Justia Law

Each of the defendants, registered sex offenders living in Wisconsin, left the state and failed to register in a new state. Both were indicted under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250. Wisconsin district courts dismissed, based on improper venue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on the Supreme Court’s 2016 holding, Nichols v. United States, that the Act does not require a sex offender to update his registration in the state in which he was previously residing after moving to a new home. View "United States v. Haslage" on Justia Law

While riding in a car, Stechauner’s sawed-off shotgun accidentally fired and hit Stechauner in the leg. At the hospital, a nurse reported that he had a bag of bullets. Officers entered Stechauner’s hospital room, where he was awaiting discharge. Eventually Stechauner produced the bullets and stated that the gun was at a friend’s house. The questioning lasted about 90 minutes. Stechauner “seemed lucid, and … was able to answer.” Stechauner was not given Miranda warnings. Stechauner accompanied officers to his friend’s house, where the gun was found under outdoor steps. Detective Kolatski thought that Stechauner may have been involved in recent robberies and other crimes involving such a weapon. Stechauner went with Kolatski to the station. Hours later, Stechauner was given Miranda warnings and was interrogated. Over the course of nine hours, Stechauner admitted to several crimes. The Wisconsin court denied a motion to suppress, finding that Stechauner was not in custody; Miranda’s warning requirement was not triggered. Stechauner pleaded no contest to second-degree reckless homicide and armed robbery. After unsuccessful efforts to obtain state post-conviction relief, Stechauner sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, rejecting arguments that the state court admitted Stechauner’s statements and shotgun in violation of Miranda and that Stechauner had received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by failure to argue that trial counsel had been ineffective at the suppression hearing. View "Stechauner v. Smith" on Justia Law

Keefer’s badly beaten body was found by police in Keefer’s Rock Falls backyard on November 27, 2006. A jury convicted Johnson of Keefer’s murder. Johnson admits he beat Keefer the night before, in the same backyard, but insists that he did not kill him. Keefer’s actual murderers, Johnson says, were two men with baseball bats who attacked Keefer later that night, in the same spot. Johnson’s theory apparently came from Manon, who told police that his cellmate at Whiteside County Jail, Masini, told him that Masini had hired two men to kill Keefer with bats and that they did so. Masini denied making the statement when police questioned him. The trial court barred Johnson from introducing Masini’s hearsay statement, reasoning that it was too unreliable to allow into evidence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. After exhausting other options, Johnson sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that exclusion of the hearsay evidence was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent (Chambers v. Mississippi, 1973). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Johnson’s petition; the state court’s decision did not run afoul of Chambers. The court noted the absence of corroborating evidence and obvious untrustworthiness of a murder confession to a stranger‐turned‐cellmate. View "Johnson v. Jaimet" on Justia Law

Whitfield's 2002, 2003, and 2007 prison disciplinary proceedings resulted in the revocation of 16 months of good-conduct credit Whitfield had earned. Whitfield diligently, but unsuccessfully, filed administrative grievances regarding all three actions. In 2003-2004, Whitfield filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the 2002 and 2003 proceedings, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district courts dismissed. Whitfield also, unsuccessfully, sought mandamus relief in Illinois state court alleging due process violations. In 2009, Whitfield attempted to challenge all three revocations of good-conduct credit through a state-law habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed without prejudice. An appeal was dismissed because Whitfield was unable to obtain the record. In March 2011, Whitfield filed a federal habeas petition. The state argued that Whitfield’s petition would be rendered moot in July 2011, when he was scheduled for release, and failure to exhaust state remedies. The district court dismissed the action as moot when Whitfield was released. Whitfield filed the present section 1983 action. Upon preliminary review (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)) the district court found that Whitfield stated claims for due process violations and for retaliation but granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Whitfield’s suit was barred by precedent requiring a plaintiff to pursue timely collateral relief while in custody. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whitfield did his best to obtain timely relief while in custody; precedent requires no more. View "Whitfield v. Howard" on Justia Law

Lynn was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, in 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2; and conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2), 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2. The court imposed a below‐guidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in admitting National Precursor Exchange System (NPLEX) logs concerning pharmacy purchases of products containing pseudoephedrine, an ingredient in methamphetamine; and a video of a chemist demonstrating a particular method for producing methamphetamine, called “shake‐and‐bake,” and that Lynn should not have been sentenced as a career offender because his two predicate offenses for aggravated battery under Illinois las did not qualify as violent felonies under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). The NPLEX logs were nontestimonial; although the “shake‐and‐bake” video showed a different, and perhaps more sophisticated, means of production, the video’s presentation did not prejudice Lynn. View "United States v. Lynn" on Justia Law

After a sting operation, Hilliard was charged with 10 counts relating to several controlled sales of heroin, a heroin‐for‐guns trade, and a gun and heroin found during the execution of a search warrant at his home. Hilliard asserted an entrapment defense. The jury found Hilliard guilty on nine counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting an argument that the testimony of an agent placed that agent in the position of both a factual and an expert witness, in violation of Hilliard's due process rights.. The trial court properly provided the definition of pre‐disposition and the factors to be considered in evaluating Hilliard’s defense. View "United States v. Hilliard" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to three federal drug and money‐laundering offenses, Jimenes was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Jimenes’s argument that his constitutional rights were violated by the use, for Sentencing Guidelines purposes, of a state misdemeanor conviction for driving with a suspended license that was obtained without the use of a Spanish interpreter. The district court reviewed the record of the conviction and was satisfied that enough informal translation took place to support a conclusion that his guilty plea was knowing. The court noted that the district court was not an appropriate forum for collateral attack of that conviction. View "United States v. Jimenes" on Justia Law

On June 30, 2015, Dutcher announced on Facebook that he planned to assassinate President Obama. He then drove to La Crosse, Wisconsin, where the President was scheduled to speak on July 2. Once in La Crosse, Dutcher repeated his plan to a security guard, the police, the Secret Service, a nurse, a doctor, and the Secret Service together. Dutcher was convicted of two counts of threatening the President, 18 U.S.C. 871(a) and sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and to jury instructionsthat it could find willfulness if the government proved Dutcher “either actually intended his statement to be a true threat, or that he knew that other people reasonably would view his statement as a true threat but he made the statement anyway.” View "United States v. Dutcher" on Justia Law