Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a sting operation, Hilliard was charged with 10 counts relating to several controlled sales of heroin, a heroin‐for‐guns trade, and a gun and heroin found during the execution of a search warrant at his home. Hilliard asserted an entrapment defense. The jury found Hilliard guilty on nine counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting an argument that the testimony of an agent placed that agent in the position of both a factual and an expert witness, in violation of Hilliard's due process rights.. The trial court properly provided the definition of pre‐disposition and the factors to be considered in evaluating Hilliard’s defense. View "United States v. Hilliard" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to three federal drug and money‐laundering offenses, Jimenes was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Jimenes’s argument that his constitutional rights were violated by the use, for Sentencing Guidelines purposes, of a state misdemeanor conviction for driving with a suspended license that was obtained without the use of a Spanish interpreter. The district court reviewed the record of the conviction and was satisfied that enough informal translation took place to support a conclusion that his guilty plea was knowing. The court noted that the district court was not an appropriate forum for collateral attack of that conviction. View "United States v. Jimenes" on Justia Law

On June 30, 2015, Dutcher announced on Facebook that he planned to assassinate President Obama. He then drove to La Crosse, Wisconsin, where the President was scheduled to speak on July 2. Once in La Crosse, Dutcher repeated his plan to a security guard, the police, the Secret Service, a nurse, a doctor, and the Secret Service together. Dutcher was convicted of two counts of threatening the President, 18 U.S.C. 871(a) and sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and to jury instructionsthat it could find willfulness if the government proved Dutcher “either actually intended his statement to be a true threat, or that he knew that other people reasonably would view his statement as a true threat but he made the statement anyway.” View "United States v. Dutcher" on Justia Law

In 2007, Shannon pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Shannon was released and began supervised release. In 2011, the district court found that Shannon had violated the conditions by possessing a web camera without previously notifying his probation officer, and sentenced Shannon to 28 days of incarceration. In 2015, the probation office notified the court that Shannon had temporarily uninstalled the monitoring software on his computer, viewed legal adult pornography, encrypted digital files, possessed external storage devices, and installed “scrubbing” software. The court found that Shannon had done so and was not compliant with his release conditions, but declined to revoke his supervised release. At a subsequent a modification hearing, the parties disputed Special Condition 2, intended to require Shannon to notify the probation office before using certain electronic devices. The district court reasoned that Condition 2 was “related to the offense of conviction which involves the sexual exploitation of minors from a computer in [Shannon’s] home and will protect the public. [Shannon’s] demonstrated non‐compliance with external storage devices indicates he is at a continued risk to reoffend.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the condition justified. View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 24 month prison sentence after pleading guilty to one count of wire fraud. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his participation in a scheme to defraud companies that were interested in obtaining loans for environmentally friendly upgrades to their facilities. Defendant committed the offense while he was on probation for a felony forgery conviction in Indiana. At sentencing, the district court considered defendant's leukemia as it considered what sentence to impose, but it was unpersuaded that defendant's medical condition justified a noncustodial sentence. The court concluded that this was not a case in which the only substantively reasonable sentence would have been one that kept defendant out of prison. In this case, the district court weighed evidence supporting a noncustodial punishment, as well as evidence supporting some time in prison, including the nature of his crime, the fact that he committed it while on probation, and the factual finding that BOP would be able to serve his medical needs. The court concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in its fact finding, and the sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rothbard" on Justia Law

Petitioner, serving a 110 year sentence for two murders he committed when he was 16 years old, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3) application seeking authorization to file a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2254. Petitioner challenged his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, which was made retroactive by Montgomery v. Louisiana. The court agreed with the state that petitioner cannot state a claim to relief under Miller because his sentencing judge was afforded significant discretion by the Indiana Code to fashion an appropriate sentence and, in fact, considered petitioner's age at the time of the offense in mitigation. Accordingly, the court denied the authorization and dismissed the application. View "Kelly v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2010, Moore stole a BMW after showing the driver a gun. He was captured by Chicago police after he crashed into another vehicle during a high-speed chase. A jury was unable to reach a verdict on a charge of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 2119, but convicted him of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and possession of a firearm following a felony conviction, section 922(g)(1). Judge Grady imposed a sentence of 240 months. The Guidelines advisory range was 360 months to life. Moore had three prior convictions for robbery, among other offenses. He had previously used a gun and had assaulted victims and a police officer. When he stole the BMW, he was still wearing an electronic monitoring bracelet. Judge Grady referred to “protecting the public.” After a re-trial on remand, a jury acquitted him of carjacking and carrying a firearm during the offense of carjacking. Judge Kocoras found Moore subject to a minimum prison term of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), and imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 240 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that on remand, Judge Kocoras was bound to re-sentence him to the same 120-month sentence originally imposed on the felon-in-possession conviction and that the government waived reliance on the 15-year minimum specified by the ACCA. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

The DEA received a tip that Carraway was distributing narcotics in East St. Louis. Agents arranged controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Carraway’s distributors and received authorization to wiretap Carraway’s phone. Carraway was obtaining cocaine from a barbershop; Graham was the intermediary. Carraway distributed cocaine from “the Gate.” On January 14, intercepted calls revealed that Carraway and Graham were going to retrieve narcotics from the barbershop; surveillance teams watched and intercepted calls between Carraway and Jenkins. Two weeks later, agents intercepted calls planning another pickup. Agents followed them to the Gate, where they saw the same vehicle from their previous surveillance. They described it to Illinois Trooper Leckrone. The vehicle had illegally tinted windows; the driver was not wearing a seat belt. Leckrone stopped the vehicle near the Gate. Leckrone observed that Jenkins acted nervous and an odor of burnt cannabis. Leckrone searched the dashboard and center console and found a plastic panel, concealing cocaine, plus ringing cell phones. One phone had the number from which agents had intercepted calls and showed recent calls to Carraway. Jenkins stated that the truck belonged to his cousin. Jenkins was charged with conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846, and 18 U.S.C. 2. The court denied a motion to suppress, citing the collective knowledge doctrine. Jenkins was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute. The court sentenced Jenkins to 27 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to an unrelated sentence for kidnaping and carrying a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of the motion to suppress and the imposition of a consecutive sentence. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Minhas defrauded customers of his Chicago travel agencies and airlines through a scheme in which he collected payment for airline reservations that he canceled without his customers’ knowledge, by manipulating the two-tiered online ticket-reservation system. Minhas was convicted of wire and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343 in two separate cases: one that proceeded to a bench trial and one in which Minhas pleaded guilty in 2015. At a consolidated sentencing hearing, the district court imposed two partially concurrent prison terms totaling 114 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines’ enhancement for causing “substantial financial hardship” to the two sets of victims (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)). The court acknowledged that it had “seen stronger evidence,” but was not convinced that the district court committed clear error in its assessment of the record. View "United States v. Minhas" on Justia Law

Mulvania, arrested for domestic battery, refused to exit the vehicle at the jail. Officers moved her. Mulvania’s speech was slurred, she screamed obscenities, and was physically combative. Mulvania claims she was experiencing a “post‐traumatic stress disorder flashback.” Mulvania tested positive for cocaine and cannabinoids that day. Mulvania refused to change into a jail uniform. The defendants claim that misdemeanor detainees are permitted to change in a private room when they are cooperative. Two female and three male officers restrained her, placed Mulvania on her stomach, held her arms over her head, and lifted her shirt off. Mulvania banged her head against the floor and yelled, “They’re going to rape me.” After removing her clothing, the officers draped a jail uniform over her body and left the cell. Minutes later, Mulvania had a seizure and was taken to the hospital. After she returned, she was released without charges. Mulvania filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans With Disabilities Act, amending her pleadings several times, claiming the jail had a widespread practice of conducting strip searches with excessive force and without accommodating people who are experiencing mental distress. Others joined the suit to challenge a policy that requires female detainees to either wear white underwear or no underwear. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of Mulvania’s claims and denial of class certification, but reversed as to underwear claims. View "Mulvania v. Rock Island County Sheriff" on Justia Law